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[p. 388]

Bijlage VII.
Yorke aan lord Stormont, 7 November 1780. (Public Record Office, Londen).

.... In bringing forward the sea-service great obstacles arise; the long Neglect of it occasions a great Deficiency of Officers of all Ranks, especially subalterns, so that Boys are Lieutenants who know little more of the matter than to keep a Watch, and certainly are incapable of command. Stores of all kinds were wanting, and are still not very abundant, though they may and do build ships by degrees, and with celerity enough. But when they are built, new Difficulties arise; the Roads and Rivers of this Country are too shallow to admit the Ships of the Line of the other Maritime Powers. Flushing is the best they have, and there twenty-two Feet, I am told, is the greatest Depth of Water, with a large Bank to get over. Even this, which might be a Ressource if improved, as I suppose it capable of being, the Jealousy of Holland will never profit of, as the removing the principal Military Dock there would be depriving the Towns of their Province of a Profit and Circulation, in behalf of another they have been undermining for many years. This sentiment and conduct have so alienated the Zealanders, that if ever the Austrians attempt to open the Scheld, grant Liberty of Conscience, and join with England, Zealand may very probably withdraw itself from the Union, and join the Lords of the Scheld. This Idea is not confined to the Cabinet, but is frequently talked of in publick in the streets of Middelburg.

As to the Dutch Settlements in the East and West Indies, their own Avowal proves them in a deplorable State. About the former, Numbers return'd from India to England within these few Years, are able to give a most satisfactory account. I must remark however upon this occasion, that for the purpose of immediate alarm, or Effect upon the Dutch in Europe, the Idea of an Attack at that Distance will not operate so strongly as more within reach. I know the party at Amsterdam lull their people asleep with the Idea that it would only be a temporary Evil, that England would be obliged to restore, and as the great View of the Faction is to annihilate the Influence of the Stadtholder, it is indifferent to the leading Members of it in what manner that is brought about, or whether the Commonwealth suffers more or less in the Operation.

But it is in the West Indies that the most immediate Reprisal might be made, and which would affect them the most, because it is the golden Mine of the Moment, and in the working of which the greatest Numbers are actually employ'd. It is sufficient to cast an Eye upon the Custom-House Lists of the Rebel Ports in North America to see what is carrying on through St. Eustatius, Curaçao, and other Dutch Settlements, but above all the former. I imagine our factious Enemies at Amsterdam, knowing

[p. 389]

what they deserve, begin more or less to apprehend that something of the kind may happen. For it begins to be said with certainty that Ten or Eleven Men of War, with a Flag-Officer, are preparing to sail for the West Indies in a fortnight or three Weeks. It is uncertain whether they will go together or separately, but the Destination is certain. Three are to remain at St. Eustatius, the rest dispersed in the other Possessions. It might be important to have struck the Blow before they could arrive.

The Republick has at present Thirty-Six Ships of War equipped, and seven in commission not ready. Sixteen of those in readiness are of the Line, as they call everything upon which they can place above Fifty Guns. There will no doubt be some good and gallant Men amongst the Officers. Experience however few of them can have had, and as the Captains are their own Pursers, Ships have been more sought for as the means of subsistance, and raising a Fortune, than of acquiring Military Reputation. The Crews are said to be very middling, for the Merchant Service as well here as in England is generally preferr'd, and the Zeal of Premiums is rather too expensive to be of long Duration. In their Equipments then much depends upon the Reputation of each individual Captain for Generosity or Covetousness towards his Crew, for manning the Ships. Just now the Proportion of Landmen is very great, and I know in general the Officers are not satisfied. Indeed the inclination of most of them turns towards England, and as far as they can throw obstacles in the way of the present animosity, I have no doubt they do it.

I cannot yet do my old Friends the honor, with all their Violence, to suppose them active or provident enough to have formed a Plan of carrying on War against England. It is the fashion still to suppose such an Event impossible, and that delusive Idea is one of the most dangerous I have to combat, because my Antagonists make use of that to lull the better part to sleep, and take their Measures unopposed. The French Ambassador tells them indeed that they have so many little Ports, and we so much Trade, that they will enrich themselves by privateering, but this is all idle talking, fit only to amuse Children. The Truth is that the Naval Force above mentioned is the only Preparation, or Plan for War, any of us Priviledged Spies can discover, and that from one end of their Coast to the other they have neither Fortifications, Batteries, or Troops, which last for their Misery and Weakness, are not in a Condition to be march'd from one Place to another1).

1)De laatste bewering alleen is te sterk: spoedig werden detachementen voetvolk en ruiterij naar de kust van Noordholland en naar den Briel en Hellevoetsluis gezonden. Batterijen zijn toen opgericht aan den Helder en op Goeree.
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