A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. 
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Preface

Although the number of subjects and cross-references given in this Index might be multiplied, this fourth volume of the Critique of Theoretical Thought has already assumed considerable proportions. The compiler alone is responsible for any errors or regrettable omissions and only hopes that the work may be found useful.

H. DE Jongste
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Brunner, Emil, I, there is a point of contact between nature and grace, 66; he rejects the Biblical view of Law and replaces it by an irrationalistic ethics of love which must break through the temporal divine ordinances because they are not the true ‘will of God’; he fulminates against the Idea of a Christian science, philosophy, culture, 519; politics, etc.; this indicates a new synthesis, this time with Kantianism and Existentialism; he tries to accommodate Lutheran Nominalistic dualism of nature and grace to Calvin’s view of the Law; if a Christian philosophy, etc., is impossible, this sphere is withdrawn from Christ; and then accommodations are unavoidable; Brunner absolutizes love at the expense of justice, misinterprets the central commandment of love; his idea of justice is Neo-Kantian, it is a ‘purely formal value’; he denies the fulness of meaning of the Cross, 520; his thought must lead to antinomies, 521.
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BRUNNER, EMIL, III, law and morality are contrasted; this is a result of the absolutization of civil inter-individual law; BRUNNER knows no other positive law besides state-law; he calls this view the anti-natural attitude of the Reformed view of life, but it is the individualistic ‘natural law’ conception, 281; numerical relations in a family point to monogamy as the order of creation, 302; he calls love a ‘sandy ground’ as the basis of marriage, 322; the fundamental nature of the State is half demonic, namely: power, 402; the State is an enigmatic formation and escapes any univocal theory; this riddle points back to the riddle of creation and fall within man; BRUNNER relapses into a synthesis with the immanence standpoint by accepting the latter’s dialectical principle; his false contrast between nature and grace in his opposition between love and law; he confuses the subjective realization of the factor ‘power’ with its structural meaning and denies the possibility of a Christian State, 403; power is called an irrational product of history with its ‘hidden god’; BRUNNER tries to combine the Biblical motive of creation and fall with Humanistic irrationalism, 404; the ‘morale’ of an army, 422; Kirche des Glaubens and Kultgemeinde, 509; the organized (Church) institution must at least document itself before the world as a manifestation of the Church,..., 522; sects nearly always arise through the fault of the Church, 532; as a rule the sect will approach the Church institution more and more in the second or third generation, 534; his undefined concept ‘order’ (Ordnung) is unserviceable, 538; a confessional Church may become a sect through misunderstanding the Gospel; a national Church, recognizing infant baptism, may influence the whole nation, 540; the manner in which the Church is organized is not decisive; only the living Word of God is decisive, 541; Christ's inheritance is divided, who shall investigate who has retained or acquired the biggest part! this is relativism with respect to the Church, 542; a church without a living congregational diaconate must be mortally ill; necessity of an
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BRUNO, GIORDANO, I, is obsessed and enticed by the endless, 194; his pantheistic philosophy embraced CUSANUS’ doctrine of the Infinite, and of the coincidentia oppositiorum; infinite nature is reflected in the microcosm of the human personality; nature as ‘natura naturata’ is the self-development of God (natura naturans); the opposition between the ‘Jenseits’ and the ‘Diesseits’ of Christian dogmatics is ascribed to the standpoint of sensory appearance and imagination, an exploded anthropomorphism in COPERNICUS’ sense; BRUNO is at pains to reconcile the unity of homogeneousness of infinite nature in all its parts to the Idea of the creating individuality of the monads, 199, 200; later on LEIBNIZ transformed BRUNO’s aesthetically tinted individualism in his conception of the monad as a microcosm into a mathematical one, 230; the tendency of activity in the personality ideal penetrated the Idea of the cosmos, 231.

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BUBER, MARTIN, II, Modern Christian existentialism has taken over BUBER’s distinction between ‘experience of the world’ and the ‘I-thou’ relation; the latter does not allow of rules and laws and boundaries; ethical relations are supposed to be extremely personal and existential; this view is based on the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; the I-thou meeting is central and religious, not specifically ethical, and not in the temporal order of human existence; BUBER has considerably influenced dialectical theologians, 143.

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striving after reformation; this precludes the canonizing of any one system; its basic Idea embraces the religious antithesis between the apostasy of nature and its destiny according to creation, 522; it recognizes in ‘common grace’ a counter force against the destructive work of sin in the cosmos; because the antithesis between sin and creation is really abrogated by the redemption in Jesus Christ; common grace must not be dualistically opposed to particular grace; both are subordinated to the ‘honour and glory of God’; the root of common grace is Christ, 523.

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by a lex specialis; canonists did not recognize free corporations in State or Church; such freedom, 234, evidenced anarchy, and was dangerous; canonist accommodation of the Roman legal concept universitas to the Church and its sub-divisions; the universitas became a foundation; the Church is a persona ficta, an individuum, a unity without plurality; church authorities are outside of the Church in a juridical sense, because the fictitious person lacks legal capacity of acting; internally the Church is fitted into a representational theory, 235.

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CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY, II, related the idea of development to the Kingdom of Christ in the consummation of times and was engaged in a fierce struggle with the spirit of the Enlightenment, 351.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, I, is aware of its being bound to the cosmic order of time and only points beyond and above this boundary line to its pre-supposita; it does not elevate human reason to the throne of God; its transcendental basic Idea is the cosmonomic Idea (idea legis), 93; its idea of the Archè, meaning totality, modal laws, subject, object, (97;) depends on the cosmonomic Idea; typical laws corresponding to individuality structures, 98; the lex as the boundary between the Being of God and the meaning of the creation, 99; the apostasy from God and the fall into sin; its effect on 'meaning'; the logical function and sin, 100; the re-formation of the cosmonomic Idea by the central motive of the Christian religion; Archè, totality, diversity; the subject side is the correlate to the cosmonomic side; the supra temporal unity of the modalities; Christ as the new root of mankind subject to the divine law; the relation between the aspects is expressed by the term: sphere sovereignty, 101; the principle of sphere sovereignty is indissolubly connected with the transcendental ideas of the Origin and the totality and radical unity of meaning and with that of cosmic time, 104; cosmic time and the refraction of meaning into mutually coherent modal aspects, 106; everything created is subjected to a law, and in this sense a 'sub-
Christian philosophy does not break off philosophical contact with Greek, Scholastic and modern Humanistic philosophy; it enters into the most inner contact with immanence philosophy, but distinguishes sharply between philosophical judgments and supra-theoretic prejudices; undeniable states of affairs form the basis for a cooperation of the different philosophical schools in the accomplishment of a common task, 115; partial truths are not self-sufficient, 116; even the Christian basic motive and the content of our transcendental basic Idea determined by it do not give security against fundamental errors in our thought on account of the effects of the fall into sin; the Idea of the 'philosophia perennis', 117; not any thinker can begin with a clean slate and dissociate himself from the age-old process of philosophical reflection; the historical development of philosophic thought is implied in the Christian transcendental basic Idea, 118; but the religious starting-point and the whole direction of Christian philosophy remain consistent and require the rejection of any accommodation to non-Christian basic motives; apostate currents of thought also contribute to the fulfilment of the Divine plan in the struggle between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, 119; the central basic motive of Religion, cf. sub voce Religion, 173-175; this motive requires the inner reformation of the theoretical vision of temporal reality, destroying any dualism; no dichotomy of pre-logical opposed to post psychical aspects, between 'sensory nature' and 'super-sensory freedom', between 'natural laws' and 'norms'; no 'theodicy'; the conflicts because of sin are not due to the cosmic order; Christian philosophy does not believe itself to be in possession of the monopoly of theoretical truth, 176; in the Alexandrian school of CLEMENS and ORIGEN there arose a speculative Logos-theory denaturalizing the Biblical motive of creation: the Divine creating Word was conceived of as a lower, mediating being between the divine unity and impure matter; the Christian religion was made into a moralistically tinged theological and philosophical system, a higher gnosia placed above the faith of the Church; in the Orthodox period Christian philosophy culminated in AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, 177; but the inner point of contact between religion and philosophy was not accounted for; the Christian character of philosophy was the 'ancilla theologiae'; a notion already found in ARISTOTLE's Metaphysics; philosophy had no independent rights in AUGUSTINUS' statement: 'Deum et animam scire volo. Nihil plus? Nihil omnino.' AUGUSTINUS started on the path of scholastic accommodation of Greek thought to the doctrine of the Christian Church; his cosmonomic Idea (the lex aeterna expressed in the lex naturalis); we find the neo-Platonic descending progression of degrees of reality accommodated to the Idea of the Divine sovereignty of the Creator; this Idea was combined with the Logos theory accommodated to the dogma of the Trinity; Genesis 1:1 was interpreted in the cadre of the Greek form-matter motive, 178; but the central religious motive remained foremost in AUGUSTINUS' theological conceptions; he emphasized the absolute creative Sovereignty of God and rejected any original power of evil; the radical character of the fall, the rejection of the autonomy of theoretical thought; but in spite of his growing insight into the radical character of the Christian religion he, at the least, regarded Greek philosophy as a natural foundation for a 'super-natural revealed knowledge'; the central theme of his De Civitate Dei; he broke with the Greek Idea of time and paved the way for an Idea of development; Roman Catholicism strove after a religious synthesis of Christian faith with the Aristotelian view of nature; THOMAS AQUINAS' posited the autonomy of natural reason in natural knowledge; nature is the
understructure of super natural grace; philosophy was the ancilla theologiae, 179; philosophy belonged to the sphere of natural reason where it is independent of revealed theology; the basic motive of the Christian religion was replaced by that of the Aristotelian form-matter scheme accommodated to the Church doctrine of Creation; the Roman Catholic motive of nature and grace; creation became a ‘natural truth’ in THOMAS’ theologica naturalis; the Greek form-matter motive excludes the Biblical creation motive by its thesis: ‘ex nihilo nihil fit’; the Greek concept of the divine Demiurge; ARISTOTLE’s ‘Unmoved Mover’ is the radical opposite of the living God; the principle of matter is that of metaphysical and religious imperfection and cannot find its origin in pure Form, i.e. in God; human nature is a composition of a material body and a rational soul as a substantial form, 180; the theory of the donum superadditum; sin is the cause of the loss of the supernatural gift of grace, but did not lead to the radical corruption of human nature; THOMAS developed the metaphysical theory of the analogical concept of Being (analogia entis), 181; under the sharp critique of Nominalism the Christian and pagan motives, synthesized in Thomism, were radically disrupted; ‘nature’ and ‘grace’ separated; then Humanism was able to develop the line of ‘autonomous natural thought’ the manner of which is based on the motive of nature and freedom, 187; the Reformation took over the Scholastic motive of nature and grace, 188; Patristic and Medieval Compromises;
Scholasticism proclaimed the ‘autonomy of the ‘naturalis ratio’ in the sphere of natural thought, 508; ‘theologia naturalis’; Neo-Platonism, Aristotelism, Stoicism penetrated Christian thought; the Biblical conceptions of soul, heart, spirit, flesh, were replaced by abstract concepts of dualistic Greek metaphysics; Christian philosophy began to seek the concentration point of human existence in ‘reason’ and there arose a cleft between speculative philosophy and genuine Christian faith; pseudo problems arose: the primacy of will or intellect in the ‘essentia Dei’; individual immortality of the soul and the Aristotelian ‘principium individuationis’, 509; psycho creationism; misuse of Holy Scripture and the conflict with COPERNICUS; theology as ‘regina scientiarum’, and philosophy as ‘ancilla theologiae’; controversy with DESCARTES, 510; the dilemma forced on the Reformers; Protestantism relapsed into Scholasticism; LUTHER and MELANCTHON, 511; LUTHER and ERASMUS; and Occamism, Augustinian Franciscans; ECKHART, 512; MELANCTHON landed in Scholasticism; MELANCTHON, REUCHLIN, AGRICOLA, ERASMUS, WILLIBALD PIRKHEIMER, 513; MELANCTHON’s school-reforms, 514; he did not break radically with immanence philosophy; CALVIN’s early Humanism, 515; his Biblical thought and the rejection of accommodations and compromises, 516; his rejection of speculative metaphysics; and of the dualism of nature and grace, 517; his view of the Law, 518; CALVIN and LUTHER; BRUNNER versus CALVIN; his denial of a Christian science, philosophy, politics, etc., 519; BRUNNER’s dependence on Lutheran thought; he absolutizes temporal love at the expense of justice; his Neo-Kantian and modern Existential motives, 520; Dialectical theology, 521; Christian philosophic thought needs the vivifying spirit of God’s Word; God has maintained the cosmic structural order, in spite of sin, the Christian transcendental basic Idea embraces the religious antithesis between the apostasy of nature and its destiny according to creation; it does not seek a dialectical synthesis, 522; it recognizes Common Grace; and particular grace; common grace is grace shown to mankind as a whole, which is regenerate in its new root Jesus Christ, but has not yet been loosened from its old apostate root; the parable of the tares; the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea is the fruit of the Calvinistic Awakening in Holland in the 19th cent.; led by Dr. ABRAHAM KUYPER; it includes within its range all of Christian thought as such, 523; the Kingship of Christ must be taken seriously, and the central confession of God’s sovereignty over the whole cosmos as the Creator; Christian freedom cannot imply a freedom in thought stimulated by an anti-Christian basic motive; this is the universal sense of KUYPER’s Idea of the religious antithesis in life and thought; this antithesis does not draw a line of personal classification, but one of division according to fundamental principles in the world, which passes transversely through the existence of every Christian personality; this antithesis is not a human invention but a great blessing from God; by it He keeps His fallen creation from perishing; the author rejects the name ‘Calvinistic Philosophy’ and insists on denoting his thought as ‘Christian Philosophy’; Thomistic philosophy has constantly rejected this name; neo-Thomists like GILSON and MARITAIN depart from the Thomist tradition in this respect, 524; there is a Reformed and a neo-Scholastic Christian Philosophy; the latter remains bound to the motive of nature and grace, and breaks through the boundaries between the natural and the supernatural spheres in order to show the insufficiency of natural philosophical thought in respect to the Christian faith; from French Spiritualism arose the philosophy of MAURICE BLONDEL, 525; the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea approaches each philosophical system from the
standpoint of its own basic motive it opens the way to a better mutual understanding of the various philosophical trends by means of its transcendental Critique so that supra-theoretical prejudices shall no longer be propagated as theoretical axioms; it embraces a theory of the modal structures, and of those of individuality, 526; these theories disclose real states of affairs which are the same for every philosophical standpoint, 527; Chr. phil. and science should interpenetrate, 566.

CHRISTIAN POSITION, THE, II, is that of a pilgrim; he loves creation and hates sin; relinquishes the 'world' in the sense of sin, and is given everything in Christ, 34.

CHRISTIAN RELIGION, I, connects the meaning of the creation and the Being of the Archê, 104.
CHRISTIAN RELIGION, II, should penetrate philosophy, 566.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE, II, the Christian Idea of truth should permeate scientific thought, 572.

CHRISTIAN STATE, III, is impossible says C. BRUNNER, 403; is expressed in a faith community; the possibility of Christian politics; a Christian state is not an ecclesiastical State, 502.

CHROMOSOMES, II, the typical numerical relations between the chromosomes, 425.

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CHRYSYPPUS, I, opposed the philosophers
CHRYSSIPPUS, III, valued the positive laws of the state, 228.

CHRYSIPPUS, III, its competency marked off from that of the State by GELASIOUS, 216; its institution became a sacramental hierarchy of grace with absolute authority over the souls, identified (gradually) with the ‘invisible’ Church, the Corpus Christi; it became the only integrating factor of Western culture; feudal interlacement with the State; the rise of the ecclesiastically unified culture; a universalist view of the Church; the Holy Roman Empire pretended to embrace spiritual and secular relationships; the struggle between pope and emperor, 217; theory of the two swords of the Corpus Christianum; a new problem posed by Scholasticism, 218; the Church is the perfect society in the super natural sphere of grace, 220; the infallible interpreter of natural law and of the limits of the State's competency, 221; the Christian conception of the ‘invisible’ Church as the corpus mysticum with Christ for its Head and the faithful for its members was transformed by the Canonists (cf. sub voce), 234; 235; in the late Middle Ages the Nominalists rejected the canonic legal theory and viewed the Church as a congregatio fidelium (democracy versus hierarchy), 234; visible and invisible Church; the una sancta ecclesia is the Body of Christ; the terms visible and invisible; KUYPER's noumenon and phenomenon; KATTENBUSCH introduces ‘Kirche des Glaubens’ and 'Kultgemeinde'; like BRUNNER; this is fideism, 509; a State separated from the Body of Christ is part of the civitas terrena; the body politic as such is a divine institution; its subjective actualization does not coalesce with its structure but is defective on account of sin; AUGUSTINUS did not sufficiently distinguish between the Church as the kingdom of Christ in the hearts of men and the temporal Church; and thus laid the foundation for the medieval view of the Holy Roman Empire; the medieval Church view identified visible and invisible Church in a universalistic way, 510; Scholastical compromise with the classical Greco-Roman view of human society; GREGORIUS VII viewed the visible Church as the hierarchy of a sacramental institution of grace transcending all the 'secular' social relationships as the absolutized perfect Christian society; THOMAS based this view on the motif of nature and grace; the dogma of papal infallibility; the seven sacraments; the supra natural power of the clergy; the ecclesiastical juridical community was modelled on the public juridical organization of the State, 511; BONIFACE VIII's bull Unam Sanctam and the two swords; LUTHER's view of the Church: the invisible Church is the true Body of Christ; but as such it has no temporal organization; LUTHER held that the Church is both visible and invisible; the formula of the Augsburg Confession; the Church in its essence is invisible, as a congregation it has ‘visilbe marks’, 512; LUTHER's dualism; its origin; he hypostatized the faith aspect of the institutional organization and thus favoured the formation of sectarian conventicles; the idea of the ‘congregatio fidelium’; ecclesiola in ecclesia; the Conciliar Movement of the XV century, 513; the peasant revolt in Germany induced LUTHER to appeal to the secular government to give the Church its organization; he distinguished between the external juridical organization and the spiritual essence of the Church; the lord of the country as the praecipuum membro ecclesiae had to supplement the spiritual order of the Church with a compulsory secular legal order; he turned to the Elector of Saxony with the request to institute visitation, 514; the lord of the country also
instituted consistories; they could impose secular public juridical penalties; LUTHER did not want the government to affect the pure doctrine and the right administration of the sacraments; the old Lutheran conception of Church government distinguished between jurisdictio ecclesiastica and jurisdictio saecularis; the Christian sovereign was the guardian of the two tables of the decalogue in his capacity as the praecipuum membrum ecclesiae; then the brothers STEPHANI tried to find a positive juridical justification for the secular Church government, 515; their juridical construction was the episcopal system; later on episcopal authority was considered to be an illegal usurpation; the arrangement of the religious peace was thought to be a final restitution to the sovereign of his natural rights within the Church; GERHARD, CARPZOVIIUS and others promulgated the doctrine of the three estates oriented to a universalistic conception of the Church relationship; the secular government has to maintain public worship, to institute the ministry, etc. the family fathers have potestas communis and their consent is required for the government and the ministers to impose any iudicium on the family fathers, 516; the juridical aspect of the Church as an institutional community continued to be viewed as external political; the doctrine of the three estates originated from the late medieval nationalist view of the Church; it was not sufficiently clear that the internal church authority has an original legal competence independent of the secular government; episcopal theory therefore fell a victim to the Humanistic natural law theories of
the territorial and the collegial system, 517; under the influence of Thomasius, the territorial system ousted the episcopal system and was inspired by the desire to guarantee ecclesiastical tolerance to pietists; all organizational authority in the Church was merged into that of the territorial sovereign and the ministry were denied any influence on Church government; the establishment of the doctrina publica had to safeguard the external peace in the interest of the State and was entrusted to secular governors ‘sine concursu necessario Theologorum’; finally the collegial theory destroyed the last remnants of the insight into the specific structural character of the Church institution, 517; the latter was conceived as a mere ‘societas’, a social contract between individuals having the same religious faith; the State has sovereign authority over the Church; the Church possesses the jura collegialia including the contractual establishment of dogma, the regulation of liturgy, the ordaining of the ministry, etc. The majority has the power to decide upon everything, 518; Zwingli also started from the ecclesia invisibilis, characterizing it as the community of the elect; only the visible Church has an organization; Zwingli opposed the sects; the visible Church consists of the assemblies of the local Churches; ecclesiastical organization and government are left to the reformed lord of the country, 518; and are to be performed in accordance with the congregation in the name of the Church; Zwingli, Bullinger and Thomas Erastus were opposed to the Calvinistic conception of Church discipline; Calvin conceived the temporal Church institution as a real organized community and inferred this from the New Testament; the visible Church is essentially connected with the invisible Church; he recognizes only the absolute authority of Christ exercised through Christ’s Word and Spirit; the internal organization is indissolubly related to Holy Scripture and the confession of faith; from the basic thought of Christocracy it follows that the Church has sovereignty within its own sphere in a juridical sense, 519; the internal structural principle of the institution expresses itself in all the aspects of its actual existence; Church authority is not exclusively qualified by faith, but has its juridical, moral, economic, aesthetic, historical, psychical aspects, etc.; the Church institution is not exclusively an institution of salvation (Heilsanstalt); his conception of the Church offices was derived from the Scriptures; he did not advocate a theory of people’s sovereignty, nor of political democracy, 520; the Church institution has its qualifying function in the aspect of faith and displays a typical historical foundation; this is a radical typical qualification which is not intended to subsume this institution under a higher logical genus as a pseudo-general concept; A. Kuyper’s remark, 521; other societal structures only function in faith, the Church is qualified by it; the Church institution is a temporal manifestation of the ecclesia invisibilis. the una sancta ecclesia in Jesu Christo, 522; a non-Christian Church is a contradictio in terminis, one that is precluded by the internal structural principle which characterizes the Church as a manifestation of the supra-temporal corpus Christi; its transcendent limiting character does not allow of an apostate isolation from its Head, Jesus Christ; it is a manifestation of the ‘gratia particularis’, 523; particular grace has a radical-universal character, changing the direction in the root of life and revealing itself in temporal reality in its conserving effect as well as in its regenerating operation already in the present dispensation, so that the disintegrating effect of the fall into sin is checked, 524; common and particular grace; the Church ‘as an organism’ is intended by Kuyper to oppose the dualistic separation between special and common grace, 525; the temporal revelation of the ‘corpus Christi’ in its broadest
sense embraces all the social structures of temporal human existence; the antithesis between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena; the institutional Church should not be identified with the supra temporal Body of Christ, but is nevertheless the institution of 'gratia regenerativa'; as a temporal organization it has been instituted by Christ within the modal and radical typical structures of temporal reality given at the creation, preserved by temporal grace from the disintegrating operation of sin; it does not embrace believers and unbelievers alike as to its inner nature, but only those who have been included in the New Testament Covenant by baptism and (when adults) by their confession of faith; it is qualified as a Christian community of faith, 526; thus it is a particular institution of regenerating grace; gratia regenerativa reveals itself also in the institutional Church as the true root of temporal conserving common grace, for in this institution the structure of the function of faith implanted in the human race at the creation is again opened to the Divine Word revelation in Christ Jesus; the problem about the Church and the sects is discussed by WEBER and TROELTSCH; TROELTSCH calls Church and sect two independent sociological types, 527; in ‘the religious basic scheme of Christianity, with its radical tension between individualism and universalism a sect is perfectly equivalent to the Church in a sociological sense; the Church is an ‘Anstalt’ of saving grace; bears the treas-
ure of grace independently of the possible personal unworthiness of the office-bearers; membership starts at birth as a rule; the inherent miracle working power of the Church institution; it will conquer the world; all temporal societal relationships are incorporated into the Church as a lower, previous stage of the Christian community of grace; Evangelical standards are relativized by combining them with Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions of the lex naturalis; the Church type always aims at an ecclesiastical cultural unity, 528; the Church type is universalistic; the sect is individualistic, prefers an associational form of organization relying on the personal, individual dignity of its members, and their conversion; its standards are exclusively derived from the Gospel; there is no compromise but patient avoidance, or open conflict, when worldly ordinances are incompatible with Evangelical norms; all differences in social position are meaningless in comparison with the infinite value of the individual person as a child of God; TROELTSCH's view is oriented to the medieval Roman Catholic view of the Holy Roman Empire; his idea of the 'religious basic scheme of Christianity is dependent on the 'Religionssoziologie', rooted in the Historicist immanence standpoint, 529, 530; his erroneous dilemma; his 'ideal type' is an unscientific generalization of the Roman Church; he wrenches the Gospel from its context; and he misinterprets CALVIN's views, 531; the universalistic conception of the institutional Church embodies the medieval synthesis with the Greek 'perfect society'; TROELTSCH approached the structure of the Church from a Humanistic religious point of view with its dilemma: the motive of domination or that of personal freedom; the sect type is of an individualistic nominalistic origin, and serves to construe the temporal Church community from the 'converted individuals'; the latter cannot be the basis of the Church; for the foundation of our salvation is solely to be sought in Christ Jesus, 532; the institutional Church cannot be an 'association'; Christ builds His Church by His Word and Spirit in the line of the Covenant; He alone is the judge of the regeneration of its members; human judgment would interfere with Christ's authority and invert the relation between the visible and the invisible Church; the institutional administration of Word and Sacraments constitutes the centre of the ecclesiastical corporative temporal structure as a congregatio fidelium; the Word is the norm of faith; the congregatio is an outcome of the Divine Covenant embracing the believers with their children, 533; a sect considers the visible Church as a group of converted individuals, misinterpreting its divine structural law; the visible Church is an institutional manifestation of the invisible Church; spiritually dead members cannot be outwardly distinguished from the elect and are left to the judgment of Christ, the King of the Church; in a sect the same state of affairs obtains; the institutional Church is not superior to all the other societal relationships, for the visible Church is not limited to the Church institution, 534; the invisible Church is the supra temporal religious radical community in Christ in which all temporal societal structures are of equal value; in temporal life institutional structures are more fundamental than free associations; societal relationships that are subjectively withdrawn from the Corpus Christi fall outside of the ecclesia visibilis and remain enclosed within the Civitas terrena, viz. in a subjective sense; Civitas terrena and civitas Dei do not form an axiological hierarchy, but an irreconcilable antithesis; societal relationships are equal in rank only in their common root, viz. the invisible Church; they are mutually irreplaceable in their own temporal value, and fundamentally diversified in their structures; the Church institution occupies an exceptional position as the mother of our faith in Christ Jesus, 535; the
institutional Church is founded in the historical law-sphere, its leading function is that of faith; it is a power-organization, 536; which directly expresses the transcendental limiting character of the Church, pointing as it does to the transcendent root of the ecclesia visibilis, i.e. Christ's Kingdom in the hearts of men; it is the power of the 'sword of the Divine Word'; therefore the Church has no territorial boundaries; its task is to gain spiritual dominion over all nations and peoples; in its non-institutional manifestations the visible Church also has faith power, 537; in the Church institution faith power is a typical internally qualifying form of organized power; its internal organization has to be realized by sinful human action; its offices and the Word and the Sacraments are holy, but the human instruments are only sanctified in the hidden ecclesia invisibilis in Christ; the basic rules of its organization have been ordained in God's Word; communicant members invested with the general office (diakonia) cooperate in forming and re-forming the Church institution; special offices have been ordained for the administration of the Word and the Sacraments; eldership and diaconate; in this organization of faith power the institutional and the corporative factors have been harmoniously combined; the power of the institutional administration of the Word and the Sacraments is the centre of the ecclesiastical organization, 538; TILLICH and DIBELIUS hold that the Church as a 'socio-
logically approachable societal relationship’ can be explained by means of general sociological concepts, 539; the organization of Church power is incompatible with political dominion and also with the vassalage of the secular sword; the structural principle of the Church is constant and based on the temporal world-order, but as an actual formation the Church institution could only appear after Christ's incarnation, death and resurrection; the leading function qualifies the Church as an institutionally organized community of Christian believers in the administration of the Word and the Sacraments, 539; the idea of a national Church is a deformation, even a disintegrating power; the bond of unity in the institutional Church is faith, and is realized by unity of confession; BRUNNER’s preference for a national Church, 540; infant baptism is based on the Covenant and must not be detached from the Church confession as the expression of its communal faith; baptism is not an empty cultic ceremony about which everybody is free to confess what he likes; fundamentally different confessional tendencies in a national Church are conflicting and make the internal ecclesiastical unity illusory; a confessional Church allows for non-fundamental differences; Church doctrine is subject to the Scriptures; the Church Confession gives to the norm of faith for the congregation a positive form; this positivization is the work of man and must be tested by the Divine Word, 541; a confession requires actual adaptation to the historical development of the pisteutical insight into the Word-revelation under the Spirit’s guidance; a confession should never be elevated to an infallible authoritative document stifling the freedom of believers; nor should it degenerate into theological dogmatics; fundamental differences in confession disrupt the institutional ecclesia visibilis; an appeal to ‘pluriformity’ cannot justify fundamental deviations from the Divine Word Revelation, 542; the need of ecumenical cooperation; its essential requirements; the Church confesses the sole sovereignty of Christ in this community of faith and recognizes that such authority is exercised by means of the ecclesiastical offices; these offices are qualified and destined as instruments of faith and founded in the formative power of the Divine Word and Spirit in historical development, 543; a Church office is service in the faith community; this qualification retains its pregnant sense in the juridical aspect of the institution’s authority; the authority of the State is public legal authority of the government founded in the power of the sword; it is only service in a moral sense and in its pisteutical aspect; its authority is coercive; ecclesiastical authority is service also in juridical respects, 544; typical political forms of government such as monarchy, democracy, etc., are incompatible with the structural principle of the Church; CALVIN did not at all favour the idea of any sovereignty on the part of the congregation and did not try to introduce a representative system; SOHM’s summary of all kinds of misconceptions of CALVIN’s view, 545; KAMPSCHULTE tries to prove that the Reformer started from the sovereignty of the congregation, but K. is in error; CALVIN’s use of the term ‘representative’, 546; CALVIN says that in appointing men to an office in the Church Christ does not transfer His own right and honour to them but only uses them as a workman does his tools, 547; CALVIN observes: ‘Christ attributes nothing but a common ministry to men, and to each of them a particular part.’ - German synods and congregational representation in the 19 century was oriented to modern political thought; offices were not really services; the synod was a ‘parliament’; every change in the political regime was bound to reflect itself in the Church organization, 548; in a moral sense the institutional Church is a community of love among fellow-believers in Christ; this is a retrocipation;
as such it is qualified by faith expressed in a common confession; this love
does not allow of competition by any other love, and interlaces all those who
are of the ‘household of faith’; its realization is imperfect, especially in large
towns; it explains the character of the diaconate as the organized office of
charity towards the poor members of the Church, 549; outside of the Church
institutions charity belongs to the general priesthood of all believers; the diaconate
is a Christian institution of faith, the institutional official expression of Christ's
divine priestly office; it differs from civil care of the poor on the part of the State
or of private persons; Lutheran countries mixed ecclesiastical with civil charity,
contrary to Luther's view; civil relief is qualified by public interest; private charity
is qualified by the moral aspect, 550; Sohm holds that the legal order and the
nature of the Church are mutually exclusive; this statement is rooted in the
Lutheran antithesis between the Gospel and the Law; the essence of the Church
is spiritual, law is secular, says Sohm; the same in E. Brunner's opposition of
love and secular ordinance; they think of law in terms of the coercive State
Law; E. Brunner knows of no other than State Law, 551; Sohm's investigations
of the Church organization in the course of history start from his petitio principii;
he identifies the essence of the Church institution with the perfect Kingdom of
Heaven; E. Brunner distinguishes be-
tween a cult community and the Church of faith; the former needs a material Church order, which is subservient to the ‘commandment of the moment’; the latter cancels the former, 552; the cult community has some share in the divine authority as regards matters of faith; its legal orders are derived from the State; in content Church law is ecclesiastical, in form it is purely secular-political; this view is based on Neo-Kantianism; the juridical form is thus considered to be alien to the content embraced by it; the dualism between ‘nature’ and ‘grace’, law and Gospel, asserts itself here, 553; the individuality structure of the Church as an organized community necessarily possesses an internal-juridical structural aspect; its law is not coercive, nor is it determined by its formal juridical source; its genetic juridical form functions as a nodal point of enkaptic structural interlacements within the juridical lawsphere; alien legal forms may intrude upon Church law: an official Church rate, e.g., 554; internal Church law displays its pisteutical qualification in regulating the inner constitution of the Church, the competence of its offices, its discipline, alteration of the confession, etc.; by Roman Catholics legal regulations of marriage are held to be the exclusive competence of the Church; this view denies the ‘natural’ substructure of marriage requiring ‘secular’ sanction, 555; Roman Catholic ecclesiastical authority presumes giving a binding interpretation of a ‘natural’ ethical law; Church law displays the meaning of a retributive harmonization of interests; it is a genuinely legal order of an ecclesiastical stamp, distinct from State law; Church law is an instrument of faith; it does not permit any coercion by the State; Church law is not unchangeable, not a ius divinum positivum; it does not permit any formalism, 556; it is a sensitive instrument for the working of God’s Word and Spirit in the community of Christian believers; it is service and never qualifies the community, 557; other functions of the institutional Church: ecclesiastical harmony, economy, etc.; the subject-object relation; objective thing structures structurally bound art; ecclesiastical symbolism; the subject-object relation in which art functions is not aesthetically qualified, should not obtrude at the expense of the faith function; objects of an explicit political structure do not belong in a Church; the Garnisonskirche in Potsdam; Westminster Abbey in London; structural interlacements may give the Church an external variability type, 558; external variability types of the organization of a Church may result in the ‘pluriformity’ of the Church, which never affects its internal constitution; political boundaries have an external sense in the structure of a Church; the local congregation is the primary institutional manifestation of the Church of Christ; the apostles never mention a Church which is a more comprehensive body embracing a number of local Churches; the Church service requires a local centre for it to be performed regularly, 559; the spatial structure of a Church should express the universality of the ecclesia invisibilis; Churches of the same confession all over the world form a unity expressing itself in organizational bonds (synods, e.g.); the authority of a synod is that of a ministry, 560; the external limitation by the difference in language, the impossibility of actual communication, etc., is only variable in character; national groupings of congregations into a more comprehensive organization are variability types of the institutional structural principle of the Church; the Roman Catholic idea of this principle lacks the moment of dynamic growth from local congregational unities; the papal centralized hierarchical institution is held to embody the all-inclusive unity of all present and future parts of the Church; its static universalism originates from the absolutization of the institutional Church; the full realization of the spatial universality of the body of Christ
expresses itself only in the transcendental direction to the eschatological future of the Kingdom of Heaven, 561.

**Church and State**, III, the Church is merged into the State by Hobbes, 236; they differ radically, 411; the Scholastic conception of their relation, 425; the Humanistic natural law theories, 426; the task of the Church in political affairs, 620; Church confession and political party, 621.

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HERMANN COHEN, I,
Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 75, 235;
Ethik des reinen Wollens, 75;
Logik des Ursprungs, 91.
HERMANN COHEN, I, ‘only thought can create what should have the value of being’, 10; philosophic thought (Vernunft) is selfsufficient ‘thinking of being’ (Ursprungsdanken) creating reality in a transcendentallogical process according to the ‘principle of continuity’, he breaks up the ‘Vernunft’ into, 74; logical, ethical, and aesthetical reason; his ‘principle of truth’ (Grundsatz der Wahrheit) implies a continuous coherence between logos and ethos, although thought and volition are to have different meanings; the principle of origin and that of continuity are to bridge the meaning diversity; his ‘unity of reason’ remains an asylum ignorantiae; his continuity principle; this is derived from the infinitesimal calculus; his statement: ‘Thinking in which movement is inherent, transforms itself into will and action’, 75; the transcendental Idea is nothing but the ‘self-consciousness of the (logical) concept’; it no longer points to the transcendent sphere, 91; he divides philosophy into: Logic of pure knowledge, Ethics of pure will, and Aesthetics of pure feeling, 530.
HERMANN COHEN, II, on legal person; state and society, law, 167; legal theory is the mathematics of the socio-cultural sciences, 343.

COHERENCE, I, of all temporal aspects finds its expression in each of them, and also points beyond its own limits to all the others (3) and toward a central totality, 4; man transcends the temporal coherence, and at the same time he is fitted, with all temporal creatures, within the coherence in a status of being universally bound to time, 24.
COHERENCE, III, structural coherence of modal functions; internal and external, 59, 60.

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Coincidentia Oppositorum, I, in Giordano Bruno, 200.

COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS, II, in DURKHEIM’s sociology, 188; in primitive society, 460.

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COLLEGIAL SYSTEM, III, of Church government, 517.

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COLLOID SYSTEM, III, most living cells have the material structure of a colloid system; its protoplasm may pass from a sol- into a gel-condition, and vice versa, 719.

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COMMANDMENT OF THE MOMENT, III, the material Church order is subservient to the 'Commandment of the moment' in E. BRUNNER, 552.

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COMMUNISM, II, the liberalism of the 19th century evoked socialism and communism, 362.
COMMUNIST DISTRIBUTION, III, according to needs, in PASJOEKANIS's view, 459.

COMMUNIST COMMUNITY, III, is incompatible with the State institution, 464.

COMMUNITY, I, the religious community; a common spirit; a basic motive in historically determined forms; the fall into sin, redemption, the Holy Spirit, 61. COMMUNITY, II, the central spiritual comm. of mankind, 200; the essential community (SCHELER), 589.

COMMUNITY, III, a cultural community is not all-embracing, 164, 165; COMTE's view of humanity as an all-embracing community, 167; community in PLATO's Phaedo, 168; mankind is the central religious community, 169, 170; the term community defined, 177; natural unorganized communities, 179; institutional and non-institutional communities, familistic communities; the State; the Church; the conjugal community; community according MAX WEBER; community implies a normative task, 183; institutional; and non-institutional communities, 187; differentiated and undifferentiated communities, 188; institutions; voluntary associations, 189; organized communities in naïve experience, 192; organized communities in THOMAS AQUINAS; autonomy; not sphere-sovereignty, 220; external and internal functions of marriage, family, and kinship, 336; organized and natural communities, 411; of human beings in the unity of their social relationships, 298.

COMMUNITY OF LOVE, III, in a moral sense the Church is a community of love among fellow believers in Christ, qualified by faith expressed in a common confession, 549.

COMMUNITY STRUCTURES, III, cannot occur outside a correlative enkapsis with inter-individual structures; Eve and Adam, 656.

COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, according to ARISTOTLE, 212.

COMPANIES, THE DUTCH EAST AND WEST INDIAN, III, exercised a genuine State authority, 175.

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COMPLEX NUMBERS, they are also called multidimensional by NATORP, 172.

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COMTE, AUGUSTE, I, the continuity postulate in his positivistic philosophy, 204; his positivistic sociology; law of the three stages (derived from TURGOT); historical development is a necessary causal process, 209; the first two stages were the theological and the metaphysical periods; they were abandoned to historical relativity; the Ideas of the third stage embody the classical science
ideal and its domination motive in a positivistic form; they are the goal and standard of historical development: faith in the freeing power of science; positivistic historicism later claimed to be a new Christianity, 210; he systematized the sciences in a successive continuous procession from the simple to the complex spheres of thought, in an encyclopaedical way and applies the method of mathematical natural science to every field of investigation, in accordance with the continuity-postulate of the science ideal, 530.

COMTE, AUGUSTE, II, cf. 194, 200, 269, 270; progressive evolution of mankind is subject to sociological laws, 194; rationalistic and naturalistic conception of society and culture: a social whole with many qualities (economic, legal, etc.), 200; view of history, 269; his law of the three stages; his optimistic view of development, 270, 271.

COMTE, AUGUSTE III,
Cours de philosophie, 455;
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COMTE, AUGUSTE, III, he intended to reintegrate Western Culture; he viewed society as an organism, 163, 164, 167; founder of positivist sociology, 452; the State is a secondary product of civil society; civil property causes class distinctions; political authority belongs to the ruling classes; the method proper to sociology is the same as that of mathematical natural science (GALILEO and NEWTON), 453; the three stages in the historical development of human society; theology, metaphysics, industry; Roman society; feudal-Christian medieval society; industrialism, 454; the moral bond of a new solidarity, 455.

CONCENTRIC LAW, I, our ego restlessly seeks its Origin in order to understand its own meaning and the meaning of our entire cosmos; in this tendency towards the Origin the fact is disclosed that our ego is subjected to a central law, which limits and determines the centre and root of our existence, 11; the Archimedean point of phil. thought must not be divorced from the concentric law of the ego's existence, 12; the concentric law of human experience, 162.

CONCEPTS, I, for the formulation of the concept of philosophical thought it is necessary to abstract thinking from the actual entire ego that thinks; conceptual determination is required in thinking, 5; a pseudo concept cannot be analysed, 7;
a transcendental Idea is a limiting concept, 24; a theoretical concept joins in logical simultaneity the analysed characteristics of what it defines in subjection to the principles of identity and contradiction, expressing the analytical order of simultaneity in the sense of logical implication and exclusion, 30; the theoretical concept of a modal aspect is directed to the modal diversity of meaning and separates the aspect from all the others, 69; the metaphysical-analogical concept of totality; that of being, 71; the metaphysical concept of the whole and its parts is a pseudo-concept, 72; the 'logical formalizing' of the concept of totality, 73; the question about the meaning of the concepts validity and being, 76; generic versus total meaning; in special science generic concepts (class-, genus-concepts, etc.) join together the individual phenomena within a special modal aspect; generic concepts cannot level the irreducible modal meanings of the various aspects, 77; concepts without sensory intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind, according to KANT, 363; HEGEL affirms that concepts precede representations, 457.

CONCEPTS, II, generic and specific in KANT, 15; concept and Idea, 45; analogical concepts in science, 61; in logic; logical unity and plurality; totality, 62; in jurisprudence; moral bi-unity in marriage; tri-unity in theology; the word 'space'; space as a mode of existence; formal logic and spatial analogy, 63; space in pure, non-formalized geometry; sensory space; physical space; legal space; economic space; extension, 55-71; RUSSELL's class-concept an incomplete symbol, according to MALAN, 84; the intentional content of a concept, 387; and actus intelligendi, 388; the concept of the juridical aspect defined, 406; extension and content of concepts in KANT, 420; analytical and synthetical, 435; attributionsurteil; concepts, logically and ontologically, 440; 'a plane triangle has three interior angles' and the principle of identity, according to PFÄNDER; KANT's empirical judgments are a posteriori -, PFÄNDER's distinction between subjective concept, logical object, and Gegenstand -; his formal (= intentional) object; the Gegenstand is not a logical object but an aspect opposed to theoretical thought; a subjective concept must intend the full logical objectification of the Gegenstand; incomplete subjective concepts, 441; the objective logical traits of the Gegenstand are not exclusively logical; 'all bodies are heavy' expresses universally valid law-conformity; SIGWART's subjective interpretation, 442; SCHLEIERMACHER's view; a concept is always in the state of becoming; analytical and synthetical refer to different stages of becoming; this explanation is contrary to KANT's ideas; KANT's view of transcendental synthesis preceding analysis; this view cancels the contrast between analytical and synthetical judgments, 443; KANT's dualistic cosmonomic idea, 444; 'general concepts', 450; BERGSON's 'fluid concepts' as the expression of 'psychical empathy' lacking the analytical epochè, 481.

CONCEPT, PSEUDO-, I, a pseudo-concept cannot be analyzed, 7; of the whole and its parts, 72.

CONCEPTUS SINGULARES, I, space and time; intuitus singulares puri; opposed to conceptus universales by KANT in his inaugural address at Königsberg, 345.

CONCILIAR MOVEMENT, III, of the 15th century, 513.
CONDILLAC, II, art and science are related to language, but have different symbols; simplicity is beauty; CASSIRER, 348.

CONDORCET, II, adhered to VOLTAIRE's view of history, 350.

CONDITION SINE QUA NON, II, J. STUART MILL's theory identified the physical and the logical meaning of causality, 119.

CONFESION OF FAITH, III, allows for non-fundamental differences; is a positivized norm of faith, 541; requires actual adaptation to the historical development of the insight of faith into the Word Revelation, but should not degenerate into theological dogmatics, 542.

CONGREGATIO FIDELIUM, III, the Nominalistic late Medieval view of the Church, 234.

CONSANGUINEOUS FAMILY, III, in L.H. MORGAN's view, 339.

CONSCIOUSNESS, II, the phenomenologist seeks to restrict himself to the data by directing his intuitive gaze to the intentional acts of consciousness. Then meaning is identified with the intentional relationship of the absolute pure ego to the 'Gegenstand' intended; it becomes identical with the 'reine Aktwesen' in its subjective noetic and its objective noemetic aspect, (HUSSERL) 27-29; its intentional content distinguished from sensory impressions by BRENTANO, 28; historical stream of consciousness, in FREYER, 225; cf. s.v. Satz des Bewusstseins.

CONSTANT -H-, THE, II, the typical constant -h- in quantum mechanics, 425.

CONSTANT AND INCONSTANT STRUCTURES, III, PRAXITELES' Hermes is a relatively constant structure; music, etc. is an inconstant individuality structure, 110.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, II, as a contract, 359.

CONTACT, II, language, and social contact, 112, 113.

CONTINUITY-POSTULATE, I, COHEN derives
it from the infinitesimal calculus; it has to bridge the meaning diversity, in Cohen's thought, 75; Fichte's idea of continuity; it broke through the boundaries accepted by Kant with respect to the theoretical Idea of freedom, 90; Neo-Kantian view, 91; in Hobbes, 200, 216; it is employed as the scepter of the absolute sovereignty of reason, 203; this postulate in Comte, and in Natorp, 204; the Neo-Kantians applied Leibniz' continuity principle as a transcendent logical principle of creation to Kant's categories, 407; in Maimon this postulate halts before the boundary of sensory phenomena, 411; Fichte elevated the moral function to the basic denominator of all the aspects, 417; with him the personality ideal has absorbed the science ideal, 447; this principle and the concept of function, 555.

Continuity, II, and number, 88; of thought, in Leibniz, 103, 104; actual continuity cannot occur in the numeral aspect; only in that of movement, in its original form, 105; historical, control or mastery always seeks new roads in such a way that what precedes fructifies what follows later on, thus preserving a certain measure of continuity, 198; the antinomy in the construction of a 'continuum of points', 385.

Continuity and Identity, III, of a communal whole, 296.

Continuous Number, II, this concept was introduced by Weierstrasz, Cantor, Pasch and Veroneze, 91.


Contract Theory of the State, III, the Stoics emphasize the juridical bond externally holding the individuals together in organized communities; they also speak of an internal social instinct, 226; they valued positive laws in the state, 228; Roman Stoics held the external tonos of the functional legal order to be founded in the lex naturals; this natural law implied the original freedom and equality of all men in the 'golden age of innocence'; the state existed for bridling human dissoluteness, 230; the legal order is the order sanctioned by the State; the republican Roman jurists on the consensus populi as the origin of the State's authority, 231; the Stoical idea of the social instinct in man, 232; the Humanist theory of natural law; the Humanist contract theory; Hugo Grotius; Thomas Hobbes; positive law as the general will; in Marsilius of Padua; Kant's volenti non fit iniuria; positive law is the general will; the contract theory was gradually applied both to Church and State, in Hugo Grotius, 232; Locke, Wolff, Hobbes, Rousseau, 237.

Contractual Liberty, II, was only a principle that was adapted to the juridical interindividual relations, 361.

Copernican Deed, I, of Kant, is the reversal of the relation between the knowing subject and empirical reality, 107, 354.

Copernicus, I, introduced the heliocentric view of the world, 194.
COPERNICAN EVOLUTION, II, of KANT; his Transcendental Idealism regarded the Gegenstand of knowledge as the product of a universally valid subjective formative process, 430.

COPYRIGHT, II, is a ‘personality right’ recognized by Dutch law; and objectifies an economic interest of the party entitled, 412, 413.


CORAL POLYPS, III, 774.

CORAL ZOOPHYTES, III, in animal colonies, 649.

CORNELISSEN, A.J.M., I,
The Doctrine of the State of Calvin and Rousseau, 517.
CORNELISSEN, A.J.M., I, ‘if faith requires neither a praemebula furnished by reason, but the reverse, if rational knowledge is strengthened by faith, then, if one is consistent, the act of super-natural “knowing” is only an act of feeling. CALVIN drew this conclusion and thus fell into sentimentalism’; this statement is based on a misunderstanding of the Biblical meaning of the word ‘heart’, interpreted by CALVIN, 517.

CORPORATION, I, is supposed to be a purely technical juridical concept, 551.

CORPORATIONS, III, on the possibility of forming corporations during the Roman republic, 234; (independent) are dangerous, 235; Free corporations were not recognized by the Canonists, 235.

CORPORATIVE LAW, III, versus inter-individual law in GIERKE’s view, 259.

CORPUS CHRISTI AND CHURCH, III, cannot be identified, 215; the Corpus Christi embraces all the social structures of human existence, 526.

CORPUS CHRISTIANUM, I, this idea dominated the medieval ecclesiastically unified culture up to the times of the Renaissance, 188.
CORPUS CHRISTIANUM, II, in the Middle Ages the Holy Roman Empire was considered to be the corpus Christianum, 288; the real corpus Christianum is a religious organism revealing the individuality of its members to the full, 418.

CORRELATIVE ENKAPSIS, III, unites intercommunal and interindividual relation-
ships in undifferentiated organized communities, 655; and the first formulation of the married order in Scripture, 656; and the intertwinelement of natural communities with intercommunal and inter-individual relations.

Cosmic Structural Temporal Order, The, II, the limit to the cosmos, making the aspects relative; modal laws; no antinomy between sphere sovereignty and cosmic coherence, 3; refractional time, 4; law, subject, object, and time, 8; theoretical thought and cosmic temporal order, 47; aspects are arranged in an order of increasing complication, 49; how to have access to the cosmic order theoretically, 74; nucleus, retrocipations, anticipations, 75; terminal spheres; foundation and super-structure, 76; cosmic order as a lex aeterna based on divine reason in Christian synthesis philosophy; universalia ante rem and in ré, 559.

Cosmic Time, I, is the indissoluble correlation of time order and time duration; it is only transcended in the religious centre of our existence; but not in a concept, nor in the transcendental Idea as a limiting concept qua talis, 24; the classical Greek dilemma of time as something subjective mental or objective physical; Aristotelke considers time to be the numerability of motion, 25... Anaximander's view of time as a divine order of Dikê; Albert the Great defended the objective physical conception; Thomas Aquinas held the subjectivistic psychological position with respect to time, following Augustinus, 26; in Humanistic thought there are objectivistic and subjectivistic views; Kant calls time a transcendental form, of intuition of sense experience; he coordinates time with space, the other form of intuition; Einstein considers time as a fourth dimension of physical world space; Bergson calls time the psychical duration of feeling; the actual 'durée' is the 'absolute' time; Phenomenology says that 'true time' is an 'Erlebnisstrom'; Dilthey and Heidegger conceive of time irrationalistically as historical; in Heidegger historical time has a dialectical existential meaning, 27; the idea of cosmic time constitutes the basis of the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea; time has a cosmonomic and a factual side; the cosmonomic side is the temporal order, the factual side is the factual duration; the duration remains constantly subjected to the order; an example in the aspect of organic life; temporal order and duration are each other's correlata and must not be dissociated; rationalism absolutizes the cosmonomic side, irrationalism the factual subject side of time; the duration is disclosed in a subject-object relation; the objective duration can never exist actually independently of the subjective duration in the subject-object relation; the measurement of time depends on the latter, 28; the modal structures and the typical totality structures of individuality are based on the order of cosmic time; and necessarily related to the factual duration of transitory beings, events, processes, acts, social relations, etc.; the cosmic character of time discloses itself in the indissoluble inter-modal coherence into which it fits the modal aspects; in the empirical opening-process in which anticipatory moments develop cohering with later aspects, 29; we can form a theoretical concept of the separate aspects of time, but time itself in its all-embracing cosmic meaning can never be comprehended in a concept; it can only be approximated in a theoretical limiting concept in critical self-reflection as to the necessary presupposita of the theoretical attitude of thought; then we get a transcendental Idea of cosmic time-order in the theoretical discontinuity of the aspects caused by logical analysis; in the logical aspect cosmic time discloses a modal analytical
sense; cosmic time offers no concentration point for philosophy to start from; in time meaning is broken into an incalculable diversity having its radical unity only in the religious centre of human existence where we transcend time; some seek this concentration-point in time and suppose the religious centre to be pre-functional but not supra-temporal; but ‘eternity is set in the heart of man’ so that he can direct himself to things eternal; even in idolatry the idea of the absolute is a priori related to the supra temporal, 31; the term ‘central trans-cosmic time’ is objectionable, 32; the eschatological aspect of cosmic time in faith is a limiting aspect; it embraces the eschaton, i.e., that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time, e.g., the days of creation, the order in which regeneration precedes conversion, etc., 33; in theoretical thinking we approximate time only in the analytical setting asunder of its modal aspects, 34; cosmic time cannot be the starting point for the theoretical synthesis of the two terms in the Gegenstand relation, 45; the transcendental Idea of time is the basic denominator of the various aspects; their diversity pre-supposes a temporal coherence as the expression of a deeper unity; if they had nothing in common, they could not even be distinguished from each other; their unity is in a religious root, 79; cosmic time in its correlation of duration and order, and the successive refraction of meaning, 106.

COSMIC TIME, II, its lawside is order; its subject-side is duration, 3; it overarches and permeates all the aspects; it splits up the fulness
of meaning into modal diversity, 4; the law of refraction of cosmic time; concept of modal function requires abstraction; the cosmic temporal order is the basic denominator of the aspects 6-8; spatial time is simultaneity, 384; before and after in the spatial time function refers to magnitude, 384; cosmic time is the guarantee of the temporal coherence but not the deeper identity of the functions, 529; it cannot contain the totality of meaning but refracts it into meaning diversity, 532.

COSMOLOGICAL, II, cosmological ideas, 43; the meaning of the term ‘cosmological’ in Christian philosophy, 47; cosmological and cosmic self-consciousness are logicized in KANT, 498; the ‘categories of knowledge’ in ‘Critical’ epistemology belong to the cosmological analysis of modal aspects, 517; cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, 540, 541.

COSMOLOGY, I, rationalist cosmology was reduced to absurdity by KANT, 367.

COSMONOMIC IDEA, I, the origin of the term, 93; and special science; and logicism; and mechanistic biology; and the ‘pure theory of law’, 98; the content of the Cosmonomic Idea, 101; the cosmonomic structure of the aspects, 105. COSMONOMIC IDEA, II, in Neo-Kantianism, 27; the Christian Cosmonomic Idea determines the sense of ‘meaning’ in relation to the Origin and the unity of all temporal meaning, 30, 31.

COUNTING, II, is not the origin of number but implies logical distinction, 81, 82.

COVENANT, THE, III, Christ builds His Church by His Word and Spirit in the line of the Covenant, of which the Congregatio Fidelium is an outcome, 533.

CREATION, II, and religion, in AALDERS, 155.

CREATIVE IDEAS, III, in the Divine Logos; in AUGUSTINUS and in THOMAS AQUINAS; antinomies in the view of immortality of the soul, 17.

CRIMINAL LAW, II, in primitive society is based on the principle of ‘Erfolgshaftung’, 182.

Criminal Organization, III, relation between purpose and structure; adduced by SINZHEIMER as an argument in favour of a non-normative legal view, 577.

CRITERIA OF TRANSCENDENTAL THEORETICAL TRUTH, II, principium exclusae antinomiae the first criterion; infringement of sphere sovereignty entangles thought in antinomies; the second criterion is the datum of pre-theoretical thought, 579; naïve experience is not a copy theory; critical epistemology and its ‘universal a priori validity and necessity’ of transcendental truth; idealist and phenomenologist hypostases of theoretical synthesis are mythological, 580; the experimental criterion, 581; this criterion requires the disclosure of our objective sensory experience, 582.

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not conform to mechanical, but to vitalistic laws, 741; only the controlling influence of entelechy constitutes the difference between 'living' and 'dead' matter; the brain, e.g., is a 'physico-chemical' system and the 'psyche' operates by means of it; the brain's physico-chemical condition is not the completely sufficient genetic ground, but only the partial ground of what happens in it, 742; entelechy may originate physical movement (energy); entelechy removes energy by 'turning' material systems; entelechy may suspend movement or set free energy, in a teleological relation to the needs of a living whole; entelechy imposes a building plan on the material system; these are the four possibilities with respect to a causal operation of entelechy; the first possibility is incompatible with the law of the preservation of energy; in 1908 he chose the third possibility; but later on he preferred the 'building plan' idea; GURVITCH meant something similar, 743; BAVINK's criticism of DRIESCH, 744; the suspension theory implies the production of some energy in entelechy, hence a physical force; but entelechy is supposed to be an immaterial cause; the realization of a building plan also requires physical energy, 745; DRIESCH's entelechy and that of ARISTOTLE, 746; his dualism of totality and chance, 747; DRIESCH's philosophy of nature is influenced by SCHELLING's freedom-idealism, and by KANT's 'Krit. d. teleol. Urteilskraft'. 748; he thinks that genuine freedom is incompatible with any general law. 749; WOLTERECK criticizes DRIESCH, 750; for lack of insight into the typical individuality structures of our experiential horizon, DRIESCH elevated 'life' to an 'immortal substance' and called it 'entelechy', 762; DRIESCH gets entangled in the wrongly posited question as to how a psyche can influence a material body, 766; he refuted the aggregate theory, and also the pure physico-chemical theory of biotically qualified shape formation, 771.

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Ego, I, our ego expresses itself as a totality in the coherence of all its functions within the modal aspects of cosmic reality; the ego or selfhood transcends this coherence; the ego as a totality operates in the conceptual determination of philosophical thought, but also in all my temporal functions; it is I who am the central point of reference and the deeper unity above all modal diversity; the ego transcends the philosophical concept; it is the concentration point of all its cosmic functions, a subjective totality lying at the basis of all the functions, 5; the supposed reduction of the selfhood to
an immanent, subjective pole of thought; in this attempt the thinker imagines that he is able to set the logical function of thought apart as a self-sufficient activity, 6; but such a reduction of the thinking ego to the would-be ‘transcendental logical subject’, executed in the process of thought, can be performed only by the selfhood, which cannot itself turn into the result of the abstraction formed by thought, 7; the restlessness of the ego is transmitted from the selfhood to all temporal functions in which the ego is actually operative; the ego must participate in the meaning totality if genuine thinking in terms of totality is to be possible; the ego seeks its origin in order to understand its own meaning and thereby the cosmos; the ego is subjected to a central law, which derives its full meaning from the Origin of all things and limits and determines the centre and root of our existence; the Archè transcends all meaning and our ego comes to rest in it, 11; the ego is the inner concentration point of all the aspects, and does not coalesce with the mutual coherence of the aspects, but is transcendent over it; the modal diversity is the expression of a totality of signification; the meaning totality is the transcendent centre where the aspects converge into the unity of direction towards the Origin, the Archè of all meaning; the transcendental logical ego is the subjective pole of thought to which the empirical world is related as Gegenstand, i.e., in immanence philosophy, 16; the conception of the ‘transcendental cogito’ conceals a pitfall in its neglect of the problem of the relation between the ego and the logical function, 17; the original choice of a position is an act of the full self which transcends the modal diversity; it is a religious act for it contains a choice of position in the concentration point of our existence in the face of the Origin of meaning, 20; the self-hood, or ego, as the religious root of existence is the hidden performer on the instrument of philosophic thought, 21; the central sphere of human existence; the religious sphere; pre-functional; the concentration point of the root of our existence, 31; this central sphere is one of dynamic occurrence out of which the conflict between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena takes its issue; but occurrence is not identical with the historical aspect of cosmic time, 32; the ego and religion, 57; religion is the ex-sistent condition in which the ego is bound to its true or pretended origin; religion is self-surrender; the idolatrous elevation of the ego to an ‘ideal selfhood’ opposed to our ‘empirical’ I-ness as the objectivation of our self in the past and subjected to causality; if this ‘ideal selfhood’ is related to the present and the future, a dialectical time problem results in the existential conception of the ego, due to the basic motive of nature and freedom; but the ‘authentic’, the ‘fundamental’ I-ness is then dispersed in time and recedes from our view for ever; a purely temporal ex-sistere may never be identified with the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of human nature, 58; the ego is rooted in the spiritual community of mankind, in the ‘We’ directed to the Divine ‘Thou’, 60; the concrete and the thinking ego, in THEODOR LITT, 82; HEIDEGGER reproaches KANT for conceiving the Ego as a Subject in an ontological sense, thus considering the being of the ego as the reality of the ‘res cogitans’, 111; the absolute and the thinking ego in FICHTE, 142; the ego is mathematical centre of thought in DESCARTES; in HUME it is a merely collective concept of the series of ideas ordered constantly in accordance with the laws of association, 295; the ego is an illusion and must be explained in terms of the laws of association, in HUME, 296; in KANT the ego becomes an ego only if it obeys itself, 373; FICHTE's absolute ego is the hypostatization of the concept ‘ego’ as the totality of reason, according to LASK, 416; the ‘Ego-Drama’ is the formal expression of the art of the German ‘Sturm und Drang’, 453.
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EIDOS, II, as immanent essence in ARISTOTLE, 10; or supertemporal essence, HUSSERL, 454; logical eidos in the Wesensschau, 544.

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THE ELDERS OF THE CHURCH, III, THOMPSON asserts that the Presbyterian church order considers them to be the representatives of the Church, 521; but they are Christ's instruments of faith for the exercise of His authority in the Church, 543.

ELEATICS, THE, I, developed a metaphysical ontology in which the all-inclusive form of being was qualified as the only true, eternal, and unchangeable entity; they were oriented to the ouranic religion of nature, 532.

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ELECTRONS, III, the determination of their positions and their velocity, 715. ELECTRONS, III, protons, neutrons, electrons, deuterons, mesons, have mass and charge, 100; the typical chemical reactions occurring in chemical combinations are related only to the electrons in the periphery of the atom; in the heavier elements the change is restricted to the outermost shell of electrons; the inside shell and nucleus retain their inner structure unaltered, 699; electrons emit elementary waves, 705.

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EMPATHY, II, the inner life of experience can only exist in a social exchange of experiences; hence the psychological method of empathy, 113 (note), 114; (in Bergson) is an immediate subjective psychic penetration into the durée, 480, 481.

EMPIRICAL JUDGMENTS, II, are synthetical, according to Kant; this view criticized, 438.

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ENERGIDE, III, is a potential unit of nucleus and protoplasm sphere, according to Sachs, 722.

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ENGELS, F., III, in the class struggle it appears that the idea of a common interest is illusory; then the State is necessarily an ideological whole; it only serves the interests of the ruling class; the State will die out, 457.

ENGLISH EMPIRICISM, II, starts from the dogmatic supposition that the datum in experience is of a purely functional sensory character; the same thing is found in Kant, 431.

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munaland inter-individual relationships, 181; enkapsis in compulsory organizations (with the State), 190; voluntary and indirectly compulsory organizations may be interwoven with each other in the genetic form of a free association, 191, 192; Theodor Litt’s view of the ego who interweaves past & present experiences, 250; Litt’s idea of the social interwovenness of the ego in the community of the closed sphere, 251; intertwinements of individuality structures cannot be posited a priori, but must be discovered in continuous confrontation with empirical social reality, 264; undifferentiated organized communities are interlacements of social structures, 347; interlaced in an intra-communal sense, like the sib, 349, 350; the Kirghizian Aul, 350-351; ancestor worship, 352; sibs, 354-362; Männerbunde (secret men's societies) are politically guided; Vehmgerrichte, 363-366; the medieval guilds, primitive vicinages (villae, domaines), seignories, 367; the Greek household, 368; phylae; phratries; polis; Roman curiae, 369; quirites, 370; primitive primary norms are interweavings of various structural norms, 374, 375; the enkaptic interlacement between Church and State as seen in an Established Church; the State may enact ecclesiastical norms, 376; no single individuality structure can be realized but in inter-structural intertwintements with other individuality structures; the idea of a ‘Universe’, 627-632; the structural type of a linden tree is incapable of complete isolation and cannot be conceived in itself as an independent substance; its metabolism appeals to the cosmic coherence between the tree and its environment ('Umwelt'); outside of the latter the metabolic functions are impossible, 632; the complicated structural interlacements revealed in the natural scientific view of the tree are multiplied when the objective normative functions are considered, including the tree also in the structures of human society; the universal inter-structural cosmic coherence is reflected in the pheno-typical individuality-structure of this thing; according to its transcendental limiting function the tree is an object of faith integrating it into the cosmic interwoven coherence, which only makes its structure possible and a real datum centring in the religious root of human existence; the interwoven coherence of the individuality structures and the teleological order of the Aristotelian 'essential forms'; (see Anaxagoras; Diogenes of Apolonia; Socrates; Xenophon; Plato; Aristotle; the Demiurgle), 633; the interstructural interweaving in the cosmic order does not display a uniform schematism; the different types are so varied that they defy any speculative construction; Theodor Haering borrowed the term 'enkapsis' or encapsulation from Heidenhain to denote the relation between the separate organs of a living body and its total organism; kidneys, lungs, etc. are not mere 'parts' of the body but relatively independent individuals, 634; the body, however, displays an independent internal unity working in all the individual component parts; an example is the enkapsis of histo-systems arranged one on top of the other in a muscle, a rather shoved into one another; Haering uses the terms enkapsis, Funktionseinheit and Ganzes mit Gliedern promiscuously and applies these terms a.o. to the psyche as 'ichhafte Funktionseinheit', etc.; his conception is oriented to a constructive trichotomistic schema of physis, psyche, and spirit, 635; Haering's own term, viz. 'unity of individuality' is better suited to what he intends to express; in a genuine enkapsis the interwoven individuality structures are not related to the whole as its parts; the relative autonomy of the organs within the total organism does not mean that they have a natural leading function of their own, 636; an animal organ does not have the natural destination to live apart from the total organism; the inner nature of an 'autonomous' organ is determined by its natural destination.
as a part of the whole; in its artificial isolation an organ may continue to propagate itself in its process of growth; this proves its relative autonomy, not its sovereignty within its own sphere, 637; the relation between an individual totality and its parts is determined by the internal structural principle of the whole; there are different types of this relation: internal homogeneity, and internal heterogeneity of the parts (cf. ANAXAGORAS, ARISTOTLE); all biotically and psychically qualified natural beings are non-homogeneous in structure; so are the objective works of art realized in a thing structure; the marble of the ‘Hermes of Praxiteles’ is not a part of the work of art, though it functions in it through an interstructural interlacement; the physico-chemically qualified molecules are not parts of the living organism of a cell; because they lack the subjective vital function of the cell; the real parts of the cell are the nucleus and the protoplasm with their numerous organic-structural component parts, 638; the parts of a non-homogeneous thing are qualified by the structure of the whole; such parts can only be identified by an inquiry into the internal individuality structure of the whole; the physico-chemical functions of a cell are bound to the molecules of the different kinds of its constitutive matter but these functions are no living parts of a cell; in an enkaptic interlacement one structure is bound in another and exceeds the boundaries of its internal structural principle in this enkapsis, which is
regulated by the law of the enclosing thing-structure; the internal sphere-sovereignty of the bound individuality structure is left intact, 639; enkaptic interlacements display different types of ordering; between the marble and the sculpture there is an irreversible foundational relation in their enkaptic interlacement; the marble of the ‘Hermes’ is the foundation of the artistic object in the relation of material and form; the technical form is the foundation of the artefact as an aesthetically qualified thing; the qualifying function is found in the objectified depiction of the aesthetic conception of the god’s figure which is not at all identical with the technical form; in this enkapsis the structure of the marble is opened and deepened turning it into an aesthetically expressive material of the object of art; the internal nature of the marble has not been destroyed but rendered subservient, 640; the marble assumes a variability type and, conversely, it gives the artefact a variability type; in a cell’s nucleus and plasm with their organic subordinate parts the atoms are enkaptically bound in a molecular union but retain their own inner nature and internal sphere sovereignty, 641; only in the physico-chemical macro-processes the bound structure is opened by that of the cell-organism; assimilatory and dissimilatory processes display an anticipatory direction; the resulting chemical combinations are for the most part extremely complicated and in their phenotype they are determined by the structure of the organism; each type of organism produces its own type of albumen; the enzymes or ferment and their rapid operations, 642; modern biology holds that ‘life’ reveals itself in a solitary activity permeating ‘the living mass’ to its minutest biotically qualified particles; but in the molecular structures of matter the living structural whole of the organism is enkaptically founded; modern scientists say that the cell is not the real bearer of life, but much rather the living mass; but this assertion is unwarranted; the hypothetical ‘protemoreis’; they are often called ‘bio-molecules’. Life will be extinguished when ruthlessly exposed to the light; BOHR, called this fact ‘complementarity’; it found expression in HEISENBERG’s ‘relations of incertitude’, 643; JORDAN’S theory; he biologizes the internal atomic structures of matter; his theory premises that atomic and molecular structures of matter, enkaptically bound in a living organism, are biotically qualified; but the enkaptic physico-chemical function of the atoms and molecules in a living cell is determined by the structure of this living whole, 644; enkaptive symbiosis and correlative enkapsis; the field of research of ecology; environment or Umwelt; the environment exhibits and objective biotic and objective psychic qualifying function; pheno-types of individuality; these interlacements bear the character of mutual interdependence in a different respect; symbiosis remains interwoven with the correlative enkapsis between living being and Umwelt; symbiosis of an independently existing individual outside of the collective unit within which it functions as a part of the whole, 648; animal colonies of coelenterates, coral zoophytes, and synphonophora; the medusas of the jellyfish; there is enkaptic symbiosis also in the volvox and the spongia; parasitic symbiosis between animals and plants; symbiotic enkapsis between structures of a different radical type; gall-wasps and oaks; virus and plants or animals; a collective type of enkaptic symbiosis between forest, heath, meadow, steppe, etc., and plants and animals; a pine forest; a heath, 649; natural collective centres or nodal points of enkaptic symbiosis (landscape and fauna and flora) are not to be confused with structural wholes proper; they are ruled by a law of biotic balance; enkaptic subject-object relations between animals and plants and their objective formations: calc-shell of molluscs; the shell can be detached and then its object function is...
in-actualized, 650; planets with their satellites; solar system; spherical groups of stars, galaxy, etc.; astronomy; the universal interwoven coherence of thing-structures and the nodal points of these enkaptic interlacements, 651; enkaptic interlacements of natural things in human societal structures; a mixed farming business; fields, pastures, cattle, buildings function in this societal structure as well as all the usable objects belonging to farming; the live stock in their own internal structure are not economically qualified; they are bound to the pasture (as a vegetative collectivity) in a symbiotic interlacement, and form a correlative enkapsis with their Umwelt; they can be enkaptically interwoven with an industrial relationship, 652; Primitive societal interlacements like the extended family, the patriarchal or matriarchal sib or clan, are undifferentiated, 653; marriage bond and cognate kinship cut across the sib relations and are bound in a foundational enkapsis within the sib; types of enkapsis between communal and inter-communal or inter-individual relationships, 654; the latter are united in a correlative enkapsis in undifferentiated organized communities; the fancied figure of a family living in temporary isolation in an uninhabited island; the story of ROBINSON CRUSOE; the supposed genetic character of the relation between natural communities and the other relationships of human society, 655; the latter cannot have developed from natural communities genetically;
there is genetic coherence between a real marriage bond and the family relationship as far as their genetic form is concerned; but the first pair of human beings did not develop from marriage; only the transcendent root community of mankind forms the ultimate basis of temporal human society; the transcendental Idea of the origin refers to the basis of all societal structures laid at the creation and transcending theoretic thought; community structures cannot occur outside a correlative enkapsis with inter-individual structures; Eve was led to Adam as a woman in her full temporal existence (in principle comprising all societal structures at the same time); the first formulation of the married order in Scripture, 656, indicates a correlative enkapsis of marriage and family with the inter-individual societal relations outside of the family; the positive forms of exogamy are of an historical foundation; the intertwinement of natural communities with their intercommunal and inter-individual relations display the type of corelativity; the enkaptic foundational relation between the opened structures of inter-individual relations and those of free associations; contractual genetic forms of free associations and the constitutive rôle of ends and means of an association, 657; prohibition of trade-unions and enterpreneurial associations in liberalism; the French Code pénal; in England the Combination Act; opened individual relationships may occur without the formation of free associations but not the reverse; their interweaving is found in an irreversible foundational relation; this enkapsis implies a transcendent corelativity not to be confounded with a correlative type of enkapsis; the enkapsis of free associations with inter-individual relations displays reciprocity between these two; natural institutional communities and differentiated organized communities are interwoven in an irreversible foundational relation, 658; in their genetic forms the State and the Church institution do not show any genetic relation with natural institutional communities; the opening of the nonpolitical inter-communal and inter-individual relations pre-supposes the rise of institutional communities of a differentiated organized character; there may exist a real State or Church, whereas the inter-individual relations have not yet emancipated from their binding to undifferentiated communities, e.g., the Carolingian State and the medieval Church; the opened interindividual relationships and the nonpolitical relationships stand in a one-sided foundational relation with Church or State, 659; the juridical form of a free association pre-supposes common private law; the State in its turn is bound by the opened and differentiated inter-individual societal relations in its inter-individual course; between different States there is a correlative type of enkapsis; the State's structure has always been realized in a plurality of States; the idea of a Civitas maxima is speculative; -, Kelsen derives the validity of the international public legal order from the constitutional law of the separate States, or vice versa, 660; this view is internally contradictory; the sovereignty of the State's legal order is not the ultimate origin of the validity of international inter-communal law; this view would deny international law as an inter-communal legal order; the reverse hypothesis is the denial of the inner communal character of constitutional State-law. There are various types of enkapsis of societal relations; e.g.; correlative and foundational types: fashion in sporting clothes; international trade is one-sidedly founded in traffic; free market and competition form a correlative enkapsis; the territorial enkapsis of the other differentiated social structures in the State, 661; members of the same Church or family may belong to different nationalities; so do international organizations; Bodin's concept of sovereignty; Althusius' theory of human symbiosis; his Politica, 662; his
anti-universalistic view of the interstructural relations between the different types of social relationships; he formulates the principle of internal sphere sovereignty; difference between the territorial and the personal type of interlacement, 663. Nodal points of enkaptic interlacement; they are the positive forms given to them which have a typical historical foundation; genetic and existential forms; genetic forms and the sources of law; marriage, organized communities, contractual inter-communal and inter-individual relationships presuppose positive genetic forms establishing or constituting these relations; these genetic forms are declarations of will, as such they are omni-functional, 664; there are constituent and constituted genetic forms; agreements for cooperation are formal sources of law intra partes, civil law and integrating non-civil social law (general conditions, customary stipulations, etc.). These genetical forms are centres of enkaptic structural interlacements within the juridical lawsphere; examples; in the juridical genetic forms of positive law different material spheres of competence are interwoven with each other, 665; the theory of the sources of law; positivistic, natural law, naturalistic-sociological, historicistic, all ignore the fundamental problem of the individuality structures within the jural order; the ‘naive’ legalistic theory elevates one of the genetic forms of law to the highest source of validity; but in these genetic forms there lurks a
problem, viz. that of structural enkapsis; the political dogma of the will of the legislator as the sole source of validity (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) is taken for granted; other theories recognize autonomous law formation in a contractual way and in non-political communities; yet they lack insight into their enkaptic interlacements, 666; modern sociologists eliminate the competence problem because it implies a normative viewpoint; Gurvitch turns the problem into a historical one; Beseler and Gierke; their theory of the juridical autonomy of associations; they keep clinging to the constituted juridical genetic forms of autonomous social law (articles of association, domestic bylaws); in a differentiated human society the genetic forms cannot guarantee the internal independence of law-formation in non-political associations; the genetic forms are bound to the typical structure of the legal sphere of the organs; a Church community cannot promulgate a State Act; etc., 667; but the genetic form of ecclesiastical rules may contain provisions of a civil juridical nature; a private contract of sale may contain economically qualified legal rules, general civil-juridical clauses, and social integrating law; a particular genetical form (juridical) cannot be the original source of validity of all positive law; indirect and implicit, direct and explicit genetic forms; custom and customary law; longaeus usus, 668; juridical genetic forms interlace original and derivative spheres of competence; one and the same genetic form positizing juridical principles may be an original source of law in one sphere of competence, and a derived source in another sphere; articles of association are an original source of law within the society concerned, a derived source with regard to civil law; the original spheres of competence bind and limit each other, 669; a question of internal communal law may have its counterpart in a civil juridical question; this civil juridical question can only relate to the external formal-juridical aspect of an internal communal legal point of difference; all law displaying the typical individuality structure of some community or inter-individual or inter-communal relationship falls within the original material juridical sphere of competence of such an orbit and is only formally connected with the spheres of competence of other societal orbits; the legal history of the medieval Germanic unions; the Historical school opposed the absolutization of Roman jus civile et gentium on the part of the Romanistic wing led by Puchta, etc., 670; Gierke's theory was universalistic-metaphysical and gave no insight into the real individuality structures of society; medieval juridical life had very intricate structural interlacements, both in territorial and in personal enkapsis; e.g. the ordinances of a mark alternating with regulations concerning weddings, funerals, poor relief, the Church, etc.; medieval craft guilds; trade unions; coercive legal organizations (guild ban), a part of the political organization of a town on a military basis, an ecclesiastical group; the guild fraternity (including families); communal spirit (like the old sib), 672; Gierke's definition of a medieval guild; he ignores the differentiation of the guilds at the time of their greatest power; the oldest are Frankish and Anglo Saxon, and have an undifferentiated structure; the oldest, espec. the sworn peace guilds formed an artificial sib; also in the late medieval fraternities the sib-idea survived; Sommer's and Sieber's conception, 673; later differentiation in the genuine craft-guilds: economically qualified industrial organizations, interwoven with fraternities; primitive neighbourhoods may have been the basis of the craft guilds; then this would be an example of territorial enkapsis; the natural family relationships of the guild brethren were interwoven with the fraternitas in a personal enkapsis, 674; the vocational organization of the craft guild was not identical with the
organization of the public office; in various towns there were crafts that were not all connected with the magisterium, and the guilds embracing these crafts had not obtained the guild ban either; if craft and office were connected, this could only be in an enkapsis; Overvoorde and Joosting's edition of the sources of law relating to the guilds at Utrecht up to 1528, 675; the guild fraternity was interwoven with the craft, with an internal ecclesiastical group structure, a political structure; the guild ban is only concerned with the positive existential form of the craft organization in a particular variability type; but this element cannot be based on the internal structure of the industrial organization; the guild society is an autonomous organization and also a part of the town community; both in an enkaptic interlacement; Gierke's error; he seeks the internal bond in the guild as a juridical community, 676; he clings to the real or supposed genetic forms of guild law. The guild regulations show a great structural variety of provisions, which do not form a unity as to their material sphere of competence; they only hang together in having the same genetic juridical form; there is a fundamental difference between the political and the industrial members; between fellow craftsmen and mere members of the protective guild relationship, 677; the guild could possess original spheres of competence only as the free organization of a craft, and as an undifferentiated fraternity without a political
structure; the Dutch Judicial Organization Act, art. 167 of the Constitution; the
limits to the competence of the State's common courts, 678; provisions
concerning the 'attributive competence of the common courts; the nature of
the disputes to be submitted to the civil judicature; the fundamentum petendi,
according to THORBECKE, deciding what actions, for debt belong to the
cognizance of the civil judge; but this article is invariably interpreted in conformity
to art. 2 J.O. Act, and only the object of an action is decisive; 'the right to be
protected is decisive', 679; judicial decisions show the difference between civil
and non-civil law to be fundamental; the civil judge is competent to take
cognizance of claims whose fundamentum petendi is found in non-civil legal
relations; he has to refrain from judging of material questions of law concerned
with the internal structure of the public administration and with that of non-civil
communal and contractual law; English judicature adopts the same attitude,
680; so does the Supreme Court of Germany; but makes an exception with
respect to Zwanggenossenschaffen; in the latter the private member's social
status is at stake; then there is an enkaptic structural interlacement with the
State, 681; a new criterion of civil wrong was introduced by the Supreme Court
of the Netherlands; illegal acts are also those that are 'contrary to the due care
pertaining to another's person or goods' in inter-individual social intercourse;
this appeals to unwritten legal norms lacking the genetic form of statute law; a
civil judge employs a formal concept of unlawfulness if the decision of the
material legal question should lead to an encroachment upon the internal legal
sphere determined by the inner structure of the societal relationship concerned;
examples of disputes about Church matters, 682; the positivistic contractual
theory is influenced by the Humanistic doctrine of natural law and its contractual
construction of all communities irrespective of their inner nature, 683; this
construction is helpless when a civil court has to decide material juridical
questions not concerning the internal structure of a private organized community;
the decision of the Amsterdam Court given on the 22nd June 1880 is an
instructive example, 684; the South African case in which professor DU PLESSIS
was deposed and the judge was induced to a material appreciation of questions
of belief and confession; this was an excess of legal power. Within its own
sphere an organized community cannot be compelled to accept a civil judge's
decision, 685; a civil judge's final decision has to be accepted unconditionally
in a civil juridical sense only; the positivistic construction of the 'formal autonomy
of a free association' or a Church community cannot clarify the judicial view in
cases of civil wrong on the part of the public administration; the decision of
1919 and the material criterion of unlawfulness formulated by the Dutch
Supreme Court cannot be explained by the contractual theory; the civil judge
makes a halt before the internal sphere of communal law, 686; jurisdiction has
to form law in concreto; it refuses to judge the internal structure of unlawful
governmental actions by means of a material civil law standard; the internal
communal relationships have their civil legal counterpart. GIERKE criticized,
687. If the internal rights of membership in an organized community are qualified
by their inherence in membership qua talis, and a member is merely a part of
the whole, he cannot bring an action against the whole, just like an outsider;
GIERKE's separation between communal law and inter-individual civil law and
his lack of insight into their enkaptic structural interlacements render this state
of affairs inexplicable; but every internal communal law and civil inter-individual
law are related in an enkapsis, 688; a civil judge applies the formal test of the
articles of association and the domestic regulation of a society to the actions
performed by the organs within their original sphere of competence, in order to maintain legal security; he examines a domestic jurisdiction and puts it to the test of the principles of audi et alterem partem and of impartiality; he also applies common civil law principles to the so-called inalienable human rights; the juridical regulations of an organized community are necessarily interwoven with civil legal relations to protect the legal status of the human personality as such; an ecclesiastical assessment imposed upon baptismal members of the Dutch Reformed Church brought before a civil court and the juridical sphere sovereignty of the Church, 689; the theoretical view of the Dutch Supreme Court agreed with the doctrine of THORBECKE; DE SAVORNIN LOHMAN opposed this view by absolutizing the juridical internal sphere of the Church; but here is a case of enkaptic structural interlacement between civil law and internal ecclesiastical law; baptism establishes a juridical bond of an internal ecclesiastical nature; the obligation to pay a Church tax imposed on baptismal members - 690 - can never be of an internal ecclesiastical juridical character as it has no relation to the typical structural principle of the institutional Church; it is contrary to this principle; the Church is not a coercive power organization; partiality or abuse of power may arise when the authorities of an organized community or a family exercise their authority contrary to its inner nature and destination so that the
civil juridical interests of its members are injured, 691; then there should be an appeal to the civil judge possible. The agreements with a transportation company may violate the deepened civil-juridical principles de facto; then the civil juridical counterpart of the non-civil law-formation must not be lost sight of; the enkaptic inter-structural interlacements between civil law and non-civil law form a delicate tissue; the original spheres of competence cannot be isolated from one another hermetically; sphere-sovereignty only functions in the cosmic meaning coherence; the legislator's competence is limited as regards the enkapsis between non-civil inter-individual commercial or industrial law and the civil legal order; the Dutch Code of Commerce in its earlier form restricted commercial transactions to movables; brokers in real estates were not merchants, 692; this was encroachment on the part of the civil legislator upon the internal sphere of competence of commerce and industry; it was abolished in the Limited Liability Company Act of 1928; and the Acts of May 1922 and July 1934, - 693.

**ENKAPTIC WHOLE - AND - SUBSTANCE CONCEPT, III, naïve experience knows individual wholes; the idea of the enkaptic structural whole is opposed to the a priori substance concept of metaphysics, 694; preliminary definition of an enkaptic structural whole; its interwoven structures are not parts of the whole; the leading structure has the qualifying rôle; but this highest structure does not coalesce with the enkaptic total structure; the enkaptic structural whole is not identical with a primitive undifferentiated individuality structure, e.g., a primitive organized community, 695; in a genuine enkaptic structural whole the different interwoven structures maintain their sphere-sovereignty and belong to the totality so long as they are united in the mutual enkaptic bond; the encapsulated structure has its own internal operational sphere and an external enkaptic sphere ordered by the higher structure's operational sphere; the relation of enkapsis should not be confused with the whole-part relation, 696; the enkaptic structural whole and the different types of enkaptic interlacement; the irreversible foundational relation does not always function in an enkaptic structural totality: in a differentiated human society there is no 'highest component structure'; in physico-chemically qualified things and matter, and in the vegetable and animal kingdoms there is always found an enkaptic totality cohering with the irreversible foundational relations in their interlacements; it is also found in man's temporal individual existence, 697; enkaptic symbiosis displaying a real collective structure; in the type of correlative enkapsis the figure of an enkaptic whole is lacking (e.g., plants and their 'Umwelt'), 698; the apparent paradox in the basic thesis of chemistry. An atom's nucleus determines the place of an element in the periodical system as well as its physico-chemically qualified geno-type; typical chemical reactions in chemical combinations are only related to the electrons in the periphery of the atom; probably only the outermost shell of electrons in the heavier elements; the inside shell and the nucleus retain their inner structure unaltered; in the chemical combination 'water' we are confronted with an irreversible enkaptic foundational relation; H₂O is the minimum form-totality, 699; the H-atoms and the O-atom remain hydrogen and oxygen; their nuclei remain unaltered as to their structural principle; they are not ruled by the structural principle of the matter 'water'; they function in enkaptic binding within the new individuality structure; but without their internal connection with the nuclei the electrons could not display chemical functions; the theory of valency; three types of binding; the combination is always concerned with the
electrons of the outermost atomic sphere, whereas the nucleus, (and in the heavier elements the inside shell of electrons) remains unaltered; the H-atoms and the O-atom cannot be called parts of water; they only function enkapically in the combination; the atoms are embraced by the molecule as the minimal form-totality, viz. a typically ordered physico-spatial figure or configuration (701) as the foundation of the qualifying physico-chemical function of the whole (i.e. water). Enkaptic natural totalities of the macro world, a mountain, a poly-cellular plant or animal, etc., cannot exist without a typical foundational spatial form; unordered aggregates lack the typical total form of an inner structural whole; inorganic crystals are enkaptic structural totalities; mountains displaying typical totality figures; shell-lime, lithographic slate, chalk; an enkaptic total structure must possess a typical embracing form-totality doing justice to the enkaptic interlacement, 702, and to the whole-part relation; the form is the nodal point of enkaptic interlacements; a mere correlative enkapsis is not an enkaptic structural whole; but a water-molecule is; it is a physico-chemically qualified form totality with a typical spatial ordering of atoms according to their valency; the formula H₂O; the atomic nuclei are immune to the combination; an atom is not essentially changed; only in its periphery, 703; the existential duration of an individual whole is determined by the typical temporal order of its individuality structure; experimental proofs of the conclusion that atoms do not change es-
sentially; H-rays; radio activity; stoechiometrical laws; crystal-lattices; the Laue diagram, 704; crystals have a net-like structural form whose nodal points are occupied by the centre of atoms; the intensity of the rays reflected by the crystal lattice also depends on the inner structural forms of the atoms; separate atoms of a crystal lattice may operate as independent sources of radiation; the classical atomistic conception of a molecule as a mechanical aggregate does not explain the fact of the absorption-spectrum, 705; a chemical combination is a new totality; the mechanistic view of classical science culminated in the atom model projected by RUTHERFORD: an atom is a kind of solar system; quantum physics exploded this conception; BOHR tried to accommodate RUTHERFORD's pattern to MAX PLANCK's quantum theory; MAXWELL's electro magnetic theory conflicted with RUTHERFORD's model; BOHR's improvement entailed new anomalies, 706; HOENEN's neo-Thomistic theory concerning the ontological structure of atoms and molecules and crystals; the continued actual existence of atoms in molecules must lead to the atomistic conception of molecules as aggregates, according to HOENEN; he offers only one alternative, viz., the neo-Thomistic conception of a mixtum (or composite) as a new substance in which the elements are not present actually but only virtually or potentially; the 'mixtum' is then a substance, a new totality, consisting of one 'primary matter' and one 'substantial form' giving the matter unity of being; there is a gradation of potencies according to this view; the unity of an extended substance does not exclude a diversity of properties in its different parts; there are 'heterogeneous continua'; this theory is applied to atom and molecule; HOENEN's criticism of the classical atomistic conception is convincing, 708; but the immunity of the atom-nuclei in a combination is not due to some virtual preservation of heterogeneous properties, for the nuclear structure of an atom is not an accidental property; the nuclear structure determines the particular type of element; giving the atom its indispensable 'unity of being'; in Thomism this structure should be called its substantial form; it cannot be destroyed in the combination of atoms; HOENEN's theory has landed in an impasse; the immunity of the existential duration of a radio active element as to its bound condition in a molecule is concerned with the element's actuality as an internal structural whole; HOENEN's theory of a crystal lattice as a heterogeneous continuum; he does not mention the 'atomic formfactor' 's influence on the intensity of the reflected Röntgen rays, 709; nor does he mention KOSSEL's experiments; the neo-Scholastic concept of a heterogeneous continuum is incompatible with the foundations of modern wave-mechanics; DE BROGLIE's pronouncement; the unacceptable dilemma in the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of substance; temporal reality is in principle built up in enkaptical structural interlacements which leave no room for absolute metaphysical points of reference; the substance concept precludes the insight into the relation of enkapsis; the molecule, or the crystal lattice, is a typically qualified enkaptical form-totality bearing the genuine chemical combination; there are three different structures enkapically interlaced, 710; a molecule or crystal as an enkaptical form totality can embrace the interlaced structures of its bound atoms leaving the atomstructures’ sphere sovereignty intact; the Thomistic substance concept is bound to the form-matter motive; HOENEN posits a wrong dilemma, 711; it is impermissible to argue from neo-Thomism that an enkaptical structural whole cannot satisfy the ontological requirement of a 'unity of being', for such a structure requires the binding of plural structural wholes in an embracing totality preserving the inner proper nature of each of these wholes; HOENEN cannot
solve the structural problem concerning the dissolution of a combination; how can the atoms regain their substantial form in the process of dissolution after losing it in the chemical combination?, 712; there is no genetic affinity of nature between the mixtum and its elements; ‘the preservation of the properties of the elements is to be explained by a material cause as ratio sufficient; new properties of the mixtum are explained from the efficient cause,’ says HOENEN; this reasoning should hold in the reverse direction as well, but a ‘material cause’ is no ‘ratio sufficiens’ and HOENEN fails to point out its efficient and ‘formal cause’. The conception of material composites in pre-Thomistic medieval Scholasticism; the Arabian Aristotelians and the older Christian Scholastics, 713; their view was contradictory; atoms and chemical combinations are not parts of the living organism; the structural enkapsis embraces both the matter structures and the living organism of a cell, 714; cell-organism must be distinguished from the real cell-body; the small number of elements in a cell: H., O., C., N. and usually nine others; the higher organic combinations in plasm and nucleus are complicated and labile; BOHR’s biological relation of incertitude, 715, shows the limits of mathematical causal explanation of the chemical constellation in a living organism; the individuality structure of such a living organism posits these limits; only for extremely complicated organic combinations there are no fixed structural formulas as yet (e.g., globulin, nuclein, albu-
men, etc.); chemistry has succeeded in the synthesis of a great number of organic combinations; the rôle of catalysts in fermentation processes; ‘living organism’ (716) is a typically biotically qualified individuality structure functioning within an enkaptic whole; a living body does not coalesce with its ‘living organism’; HOENEN’s view, 717; neo-Thomism reasons a priori from the Aristotelian substance concept rendering empirical research superfluous; the cell with its nucleus and plasm sphere is the smallest unity capable of independent life discovered up to now; there exist non-cellular tissues; the extra cellular bifurcation of the genuine cellular plasm in protozoa (exoplasm); exoplasm has autonomous division, increasement, capability for stimulation, etc.; but they lack viability, 718; bacteria, blue-green algae have no cell–nucleus; their more diffuse central cell-sphere plays the part of a nucleus; most living cells have the material substructure of a colloid system; the enormous development of surface of solved matter in the cell’s colloid mixture; their enormous surface charges of electricity render them sensitive to changes of electric condition and temperature; being colloid, protoplasm may pass from a sol into a gel-condition and vice versa; most cells have an alveolar form of plasm, 719; the hylocentric, kinocentric and morphocentric structure of a living cell; the living cell has a centred structure; metabolism, and its organizing, determinating and regulating effects are directed from a central sphere in the cell-body; the rôle of the nucleus; that of chromatin; in animal plasm there is an internal motive centre, viz. centro-soma; the cell’s centred structure and the production of typical somatic part-forms; difference between a living cell and physico-chemically qualified micro-wholes, like molecules and crystals; its physico chemical aspect expresses the cell’s individuality structure qualified by the biotic function, 720; an artifical model of a polypeptid molecule is not centred; KOLZOFF’s materialistic conception of the ‘molecular components of living albumen substance’; assimilatory processes are supposed to be crystallization processes; but this theory cannot explain the typical centred structure of living plasm; in protozoa every nucleus is the potential centre of a new cell-body; finally the polynuclear protozoa split up into as many new individuals as there are nuclei; cell-division in metazoa; polynuclear protozoa may retain their plurality of nuclei: an actino-sphaerium has over a hundred of them; arbitrary cut pieces of cytoplasm can become complete individuals, 721; SACH’s designation of ‘energide’; infusoria have dissimilar nuclei; a nucleus bears the heredity factors and is the vital centre; genital cells in poly-cellular beings have an unlimited capability of propagation; protozoa nuclei bear heredity factors and are vital centres; infusoria have two different nuclei: for propagation and for vital processes; generative and somatical nucleus; the smallest living units within the cell-structure: bio-molecules; Miscellen; vitules; protomerries; but they have not been proved to maintain life apart from a living cell, 722; endo- and exoplasm; the cell-organism is the real normal minimal centre of life; non-living components of the cell-body and their enkaptic binding in the living organism; enzymes or ferments are not living components of a cell; but are organic catalysts; BUCHNER’s experiments of 1896; fermentation is an intricate process; enzymes are complicated protein combinations; ‘organizers’ are inductive, non-living material components influencing living cells, 723; vacuoles, nucleoles, and other para plasmatic material particles; typical mineral formations of protozoa and protophytes; SiO₂ formations of radiolaria; they are typical form-totalities, enkaptically interwoven in a cell, but not parts of the living organism; the term ‘bio-molecules’, 724; a molecule or quasi crystal of an
organic chemical combination lacks the centred structure of living units, it is physico-chemically qualified; in bio-physico-chemical constellations there are biotically directed physico-chemical functions of material components; such constellations are opened by the subjective vital function; such constellations are directed by bio-impulses qualified by the central subjective vital function of the organism as a whole, 725; they have a physico chemical aspect; these impulses use a minimum of energy and possess a spontaneous character; BOHR’s relation of incertitude is structurally localized and determined as an enkaptic relation; the bio-chemical constellation starts exactly at the point where the molecular or quasi crystalline structures of organic matter end; the living organism avails itself of variability types of these structures; irradiation of nervous tissues; tendons are built up of genuine crystals with large molecules and ordered after the pattern of fibres; muscular contraction and myosin-molecules, 726; the problem of so-called 'living protein' is wrongly posited; protein combinations found in a living body are intricate, labile material combinations physically determined in structure; BOHR’s bio-chemical relation of incertitude can only pertain to the enkaptic functions of these molecules in the living organism; a possible bio-synthesis, 727; the search for a ‘proteid molecule’; WOLTERECK’s summary of the modern programme of bio-synthesis; but he holds that the combination of continual active change
with the maintenance of the total system is a completely new biotic phenomenon that cannot be produced artificially; 728; WOLTERECK adds that an artificial combination will never 'experience'; the most simple living beings have a kind of a-psychical experience (Innen-Erregungen) says WOLTERECK; this a postulate of his 'emergent evolutionism'; a cell's centred structure guarantees the preservation of its identity and has its necessary counter-part in the variability of all material combinations in their enkaptic functions within the living organism; the limits to physico-chemical penetration into the bio-chemical constellation, 729; metabolism happens with the aid of ferments; bio-chemistry is not identical with organic chemistry; the process of mineral formation in radiolaria and other protozoa, 730; typical field reactions and the catalytic processes in assimilation and dissimilation are started and directed by bio-impulses, which impulses are accessible to physics and chemistry only in their physico-chemical aspect, not in their qualifying biotic modality, 731; the question about a specific 'vital matter'; the materialistic view of KOLTZOFF denies its existence, because it would lead to a vitalistic standpoint; but DRIESCH denies the existence of a specific material bio-substance; he assumes that matter can only be 'living' so long as some 'entelechy' controls a physico-chemical constellation; 'bio-substance' in a recent conception; WOLTERECK defends the 'bio-substance' concept; he criticizes DRIESCH's 'entelechy', 732; vitalism should not be identified with the view of the biotic aspect having its proper laws and of the characterization of a living organism by its total structure of individuality; vitalism absolutizes the biotic aspect; the 'Stufentheorie'; or 'emergent evolutionism'; 'mnemism' (HERING and SEMON); GURVITCH, UNGERER, BERTALLANFFY, ALVERDES evade the problem; the mechanistic view is inspired by the classical science-ideal and starts from an a priori absolutization of the physico-chemical energy aspect, denying the irreducible nature of the biotic modus, 733; this view is involved in antinomies; it handles a deterministic concept of causality; its first limit is the micro-structure of atoms; the acceptance of a second limit in the internal biophysico-chemical constitution of a living organism cannot contradict the results of modern physics and chemistry; it is in conflict with the a priori mechanistic startingpoint of classical natural science; modal aspects do not have a rigid structure; the physico-chemical constellation is not closed; neo-vitalism holds to the mechanistic view of the physico-chemical constellation in a living organism but wants to withdraw 'life' from the rule of its causality; DRIESCH's experimental proofs of self-regulation, regeneration, and heredity; Older vitalism proclaimed the a priori thesis: [734] 'chemistry will never succeed in composing organic matter'; this conception could also be meant in a mechanistic sense; difference between neo- and old-vitalism; DRIESCH's proofs of entelechy; his 'Ganzheitskausalität' is contrasted with 'Einzelkausalität'; experiments with eggs of sea-hedgehogs, 735; regenerative processes in full-grown organisms; quantitative causality versus totality causality; the restricted force of DRIESCH's argument; his lack of insight into the modal structures; his recourse to the substance concept; 'life' lacks genesis, because it is an invisible immaterial 'organic form' in a pseudo Aristotelian sense; i.e., an entelechy; - psyche and psychoid - 736; the proper substance of organic form is entelechy, the form, the eidos; that which is formed in a visible way is only the transitory product of its operation in matter; DRIESCH's entelechy is a second natural factor; he wants to base his metaphysics on empirical research; he rejects an a priori and primordial basic science (philosophia prima); his startingpoint is the Cartesian cogito - he is influenced by KANT's epistemology, notwithstanding the intentional
character he ascribes to his ordering concepts or ‘categories’, 737; DRIESCH’s Ordnungslehre is nominalistic, 738; his dualism of a material and an immaterial substance, 739; phylogenetically speaking there is only one entelechy, viz. ‘super-personal life’, 740; his scheme: ‘potence-act’ compared with that of ARISTOTLE; he denies the existence of a typical bio-chemical constellation, 741; entelechy constitutes the difference between ‘living’ and ‘dead matter’; this is exemplified in the human brain; sufficient and partial genetic grounds of events in an organism, 742; four possibilities of entelechy influencing matter, 743; GURVITCH speaks of a vital form (morphe) regulating, but not determining the physico-chemical system; BERNARD BAVINK’s criticism of DRIESCH’s second and third hypotheses; DRIESCH should have shown how entelechy can alter the direction of a physico-chemical process that is already completely determined by its initional condition and the classical laws of nature, 744; the suspension theory supposes the production of some energy on the part of entelechy; a force that does not do any work is nevertheless a physical force; whereas entelechy is supposed to be an immaterial cause; the building plan theory; the realization of such a plan can never occur in a purely immaterial way, but requires physico-chemical energy not belonging to the physico-chemical constellation of the building materials; so long as ‘life’ is
viewed as ‘an immaterial substance’ working upon a ‘material substance’, the possibility of such operation will remain a problem; the dualistic substance concept involves theoretical thought in insoluble problems, 745; Aristotelian entelechy is in different ways in a better position than neo vitalism; DRIESCH could not adopt this conception because he started from the basic motive of nature and freedom in a Humanistic sense; his use of the scheme of matter and form, act and potency, anangkè and tuchè, 746; his dualism of ‘totality’ and ‘chance’ (BAER’s definition of ‘chance’), - but his idea of tuchè is: what is not related to a totality; in ‘matter’ chance rules without restriction, 747; DRIESCH and KANT on freedom; freedom is a question of belief; DRIESCH’s philosophy of nature remains within the frame of determinism; his totality concept remains a category pertaining to natural phenomena; it is influenced by SCHELLING’s freedom-idealism; SCHELLING’s and DRIESCH’s idea of totality was derived from KANT’s Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, 748; DRIESCH denies the genuine freedom character of KANT’s practical Idea of liberty; DRIESCH holds genuine metaphysical freedom to be incompatible with any general law imposing itself on human action; genuine freedom is only compatible with a consistent pantheism in the sense of a ‘becoming deity’ lacking any determination by a constant divine nature, 749; WOLTERECK’s bio-substance concept; this substance is connected with ‘immaterial and conditional structural constants’ as potencies which pass away with their material bearer; physico chemical bio phenomena are the temporal spatial outside of a living organism, their genuine essence is their immaterial inside; a vital process is the ‘inner experience’ of a living being; an artificial bio-synthesis is impossible; causal physico-chemical analysis of bio-phenomena has reached a limit, 750; by ‘bio-substance’ he means ‘living mass’; this mass is a complex of molecules different from inanimate matter or dead plasm; owing to a ‘primary bio-chemical moment’ this bio-substance is autonomously capable for stimulation, and has genetic continuity; it is comparable with radio-active elements and aromatic combinations; in a living cell some components produce other kinds of matter without passing away themselves; others are produced without being able to produce; enzymes are intermediate; only the producing ‘Chief substance’ is ‘living substance’; a bio-system has units effecting assimilation and dissimilation; the organizing regulators, i.e. the inductive material units (genes, hormones, enzymes); the ‘matrix’ (germ-plasm, idio-plasm, reserve-plasm), 751; the ‘matrix’ produces itself and, if need be, the inductive material components; the catalytic operation of enzymes in metabolism; the specificity of protein combinations; the significance of hormones; ‘developmental mechanics’ has pointed out the existence of ‘organizers’ and their influence on the embryo; SPEMANN’s experiments with the transplantation of cells from the blastophore, i.e. the invagination of the gastrula; inner-, outer-, mesoblastoderm, 752; during its development the living cell of an embryo has more genetic potencies than that which is realized; neighbouring cells exercise a determining influence on the direction of the development; the two part-cells of the egg of a sea-hedgehog and the direction of their development; H. MANGOLD’s experiment; ‘chimera formations’; SPEMANN’s hypothesis: the blastopore must contain the organizing centre, 753; mechanists called these ‘organizers’ material substances; neo-vitalists viewed them as effects of the immaterial entelechy; DRIESCH mentioned the building plan theory and assumed sub-entelechies; experiments have shown them to be inductive material factors; HOLTRETER’s experiments; the discovery of the genes in the chromosomes; the bearers of the hereditary
dispositions, 754; MORGAN's genetical analysis; chromosome maps; chromatin; WOLTERECK's hypothesis, 755; the genes have their seat in the nuclear loops of the germ-cells; we do not know where the matrix has its seat; presumable location of the matrix, 756; WOLTERECK later on speaks of the existence of the 'matrix' as an experimentally established fact; a cell's material components are non-living combinations; genes are not pure living units; the existence of bio-molecules causing assimilatory and dissimilatory processes has not been proved; by 'matrix' WOLTERECK means germ-plasm, idio-plasm or hereditary material; AUGUST WEISMANN's theory of germ-cells, 757; recent discoveries have almost invalidated this theory; DRIESCH's criticism of WEISMANN's view, 758; the question about material combinations is a philosophical problem of structure; the influence of the metaphysical substance concept on WOLTERECK's theory of 'matrix'; he holds that the bio-substance may display the intricate structure of a polypeptid molecule; there are living and non-living cell components; his theory is influenced by the metaphysical substance concept; his hypothetical 'bio-substance' seems to display the intricate structure of a polypeptid molecule, although he has asserted that such a model can never account for the typical centred structure of a living cell; the theory of a molecular 'living matter' eliminates the typical totality structure of a living organism, 759; the classical concept of matter; its transfor-
formation into the concept of function; in chemistry ‘matter’ only means a system of equilibrium between protons, neutrons and electrons; neither in modern natural scientific thought, nor in Greek and Scholastic metaphysics can it make sense to speak of a specific material bio-substance in contrast to an in-organic substance of ‘dead matter’; WOLTERECK’s standpoint is far from clear, 760; his concept ‘bio-substance’ implies an inner contradiction; ROUX’s criticism of a ‘matter’ which assimilates itself; WOLTERECK is involved in antinomies, 761; his ‘Ontologie des Lebendigen’, containing a dynamical ‘Stufentheorie’; this is a genetic monism accepting irreducible levels of becoming; life is a new level of reality, and at the same time an ‘emergence’ of physico-chemical constellations; emergent evolutionism; different chemical elements are explained by WOLTERECK from increased possibilities of a material basic substance; psychical life as an ‘emergence’ of biotic, and ‘mind’ as an ‘emergence’ of psychical life; the rise of different autonomous ‘levels of reality’ is ruled by ‘structural constants’ called ‘autonomous powers’, ‘determinants’, ‘imagoids’ or ‘ideas’, 762; the constancy of these ‘determinants’ is in conflict with the continuity and unity of the process of becoming in an antinomic way; WOLTERECK acknowledges this antinomous character of his theory and observes that determinants of becoming and those of value are mutually incompatible, like validity and the genesis of validity; this antimony is due to an overstraining of the modal aspect of biotic development; W.’s evolutionism is irrationalistic; he views structural laws as products of the creative freedom of a ‘Welt-Subjekt’ in the process of development; here the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom is the ultimate, religious power of his theoretic thought; ‘freedom’ is called the ‘completion of nature’, 763; W. asserts that the ‘spiritual-psychic phenomena, the productive activities and their results belong just as much to life as, e.g., the shell formation or movement of protozoa’; a temple, a book, a sonata, or a strategic plan are bio-phenomena, 764; the cell-body is a biotically qualified enkaptic form-totality embracing three different kinds of individuality structures: the physico-chemical material combinations (themselves enkaptic structural wholes), the cell’s living organism, in which these building materials are enkaptically bound, and finally the cell-body as a biotically qualified enkaptic whole; in animal cells the structure of the living organism is the foundation of the psychically qualified sensorium structure; the enkaptic structural whole is, therefore, also psychically qualified, 765; the bio-chemical constellation in a cell is built up by means of those physico-chemical functions of the material components that are enkaptically bound in the living cell-organism; these functions fall outside of the internal structure of the material components; they are subject to the continual direction of the leading biotic function of the organism whose internal physico-chemical functions they are, and they are not functions of the material molecules; the organism can only realize itself in the enkaptic whole of which (in vegetable cells) it is the qualifying component; in animal cells the sensorium binds the lower individuality structures; there is a bio-chemical as well as a physico-chemical constellation; a psychical qualified reaction in protozoa also displays a physico-chemical and biotic aspect; THEODOR HAERING distinguishes ‘material body’, ‘psyche’ and ‘mind’ (or ‘spirit’); the living organism of a cell-body can as such not contain lifeless parts, but this organism is not identical with the cell-body of which it is a part-structure, 766; this total cell-body is an enkaptic form-totality also containing lifeless material combinations bound by its living organism; in an animal cell the organism is enkaptically bound by the sensorium; this theory of enkapsis harmonizes two series of experiential data which in the
substance view seemed to contradict each other; the contest between mechanistic and vitalistic views cannot be settled on the basis of the substance concept; the Aristotelian-Thomistic substance concept is unable to resist the mechanistic view; so is neo-Scholasticism with its theory of the virtual preservation of properties of the material components in a living whole, 767; the internal molecular and crystalline structures of the material components are not as such part structures of the living whole; our theory of a plurality of structures interwoven within an enkaptic structural whole does not contradict this structural unity, 768; the living body is not an aggregate; a cell cannot live in the molecular or (quasi-) crystalline matter structures, though the latter are actually present in the living cell, because its organism can no more live without than within them and the material sub-structure functions within its form-totality, 769; a living cell-organism is enkaptically founded in a very particular mixture of matter and binds the latter within its own individuality structure; its nodal point is the alveolar-colloidal and centred form of the plasm maintained in the continual processes of dissolution and building up of the matter structures; in this form the material components disclose their particular variability types that function in the bio-chemical constellation; the cell-body as a whole gives the plasmatic matter its par-
ticular form qualified by the subjective biotic (or in animals by the psychical) function; the form is plastic, enabling the body to adaptations; the total form is an expression of the total system (e.g. of the cell); also the cilia, fibres, vacuoles, etc., are produced by the total substratum of the system; the living 'cell-body' is the bearer and producer of all its part-forms and of the specific total figure of the radiolarium, infusorium, bacterium, \(^770\); Driesch and others have refuted the aggregate theory; the visible figure of poly-cellular plants, animals, the human body, obeys the specific form-laws of a totality; Weismann's theory was refuted; also the separate cell-form is an elementary total form expressing a typical structural whole, \(^771\); Woltereck's investigations into the 'biotic elementary forms' such as bacteria, algae, amoebae; no particular forms have developed in them besides membrane and nucleus; flagellated cells; sperm-cells; monads; peridinidiae; all these part-forms are produced by the living cell as a whole and are a differentiated morphological expression of its structural totality; tissue cells; epithelial cells, muscle cells, gland cells, etc.; the total cell form with all its particular articulations of inner and outer architecture is a function of the total cell-body, \(^772\); the typical totality character of the form products of protozoa and protophytes; silico lattices and flagellates; they differ from the physico-chemically determined crystal forms of the mineral silicon dioxide although they remain typical SiO\(_2\) figures; their production starts with alterations of the colloidal plasm which zonally passes from the sol- into the gelcondition; the fixed formations arising in the plasm of calc-algae and foraminifera; plasmatic, allo-plasmatic, and xeno plasmatic forms, \(^773\); they are typically qualified by a biotic (or post-biotic) object function; they arise from solidified plasm (having passed into the gel-condition; silico skeletons, and calc-shells of sponges, coral polyps, echino derms, vertebrates; cellulose coverings of uni- or poly-cellular plants, the chitin of articulate animals, and horny formations (scales, hairs, feathers, etc.); rhizopoda; foraminifera and their coverings; lobsters cover their hind parts with seaweed, sponges, or snailhouses; insect larvae build tubes and 'houses' from shell pieces, etc.; especially with protozoa the xeno- and allo-plasmatic forms may be similar: the different nature of the materials is not essential to the form production of the living bodies; the essential thing is the formative principle that selects the material and works them into moulded products; the xeno- and allo-plasmatic forms are qualified by an object-function, \(^774\); of biotic or post biotic modality; they can only function enkaptically in the living organism; but this subject-object relation does not detract from the enkaptic form-totality, \(^775\); the foundational form-totality of a living body is always an objective sensory-spatial figure; its non-living form product obeys form laws of the cell body as a whole and not the laws of crystallization of the materials used; the non living form product is taken up in the body's objective sensory form totality; the form of a living cell body as a whole, and that of its organic parts is a morphological expression of an enkaptic structural whole of a higher than physico-chemical qualification; the material components are no parts of this totality, but they are realized in the morphological interlaces of the structures concerned; there is no suitable single morphological criterion to distinguish the different 'structural layers' of a living body; this body is a morphological whole qualified by the highest structure enkaptically bound by it, \(^776\); vegetable or animal bodies are therefore real thing-structures, accessible to naive experience which immediately grasps the morphological whole; the form totality does not coalesce with the form functions of the interlaced structures; the sensory total form of the body
overlaps the interlaced structures, giving the body its material sensory figure, which is still lacking in the dynamic biotic space; it is the objective sensory image of the materialized living organism; in an animal it objectively expresses the higher structure of the sensorium; in the human body, in an anticipatory direction, it expresses the act-structure of the enkaptic whole, 776; the enkaptic totality constitutes itself by means of inter-structural interlacements without being reducible to the latter; the whole is thus accessible to naïve experience which grasps the continuous whole only, and is implicitly aware of the qualifying rôle of the highest structure as to the sensory form-totality; the enkapsis with the 'Umwelt'; the bodily form is produced by the living being itself and is not mechanically impressed on the latter by its vital milieu; the number of organ forms far surpasses that of the life conditions; WOLTERECK's three groups of morphological types: suspensoid, motoroid, and basoid types, 777; the organic forms are never a mechanical result of adaptation to the milieu, but always co-determined by the structural genotypes; in the same milieu are developed a thousandfold abundance of forms of the motoroid type, e.g., the freely swimming peridinidiae; the diatoms, radiolaria; the form-totality is a nodal point of enkaptic interlacements, both as to its internal constitution and as to its outer milieu, and remains the morphological expression of an internal structural whole; each of its struc-
tural strata has its proper internal structural criterion; the body intertwines them in its typically qualified form-totality; PLATO viewed the body as a vehicle (ochêma) of the soul, an objectivistic conception, 778; ARISTOTLE ascribed all the ‘formal’ qualities of the body to the soul as its substantial form (a subjectivistic view); Augustinianism preferred the Platonic conception; the objective sensory form of the body is the foundational function of its structure as an enkaptic whole; it is related to a possible subjective sensory perception; PLATO related this form to the ‘inmaterial substance’ (the soul) so that the material substance can only be a vehicle or organ of the soul; this is a hypostatization of the objective morphological aspect of the body; M. HAURIOU on the relation between body and soul; Modern Existentialism returns to the subjective view (SARTRE, MERLEAU PONTY), but emancipates it from the Greek metaphysical substance concept; PONTY’s ‘experienced corporality’ belongs to the supposed ‘pre-objective experiential field’, 779; human corporality is then considered as a ‘blind adherence’ to the ‘pre-objective’ world, 780.

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EXOGAMY, III, a law of the clan (= sib), 355.

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FACE, II, Human face shows logical thought in a concrete act of thinking, 377.

FACTS, I, LOCKE distinguished empirical facts from the necessary relations between concepts, 269.
FACTS, II, BAYLE discovered that historical facts are not given to scientific enquiry, but that science has to analyse them, 353.
FACTS, III, can only be conceived in their structural meaning, 330.

FACTS AND NORMS, II, this Kantian distinction is advanced by LEENDERTZ against the normative conception of God's guidance in history, 233.

FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY, II, modern psychology conceived feeling as one of the chief classes of Erlebnisse and co-ordinated it with volition and knowing as the two other classes. This misconception is due to the faculty psychology of the 18th century since Rousseau, especially to TETENS and KANT, 111.

FAIRCHILD, H.P., III,
Dictionary of Sociology, 177.

FAITH, I, the modal meaning of faith is related to divine revelation; it is an eschatological aspect of cosmic time; and groups the eschaton and that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time; e.g. the days of creation; the order in which regeneration precedes conversion, etc.; this aspect should not be identified with the historical modus, 33; faith is bound to Holy Scripture and the Church Tradition; the Bible becomes a law book, in OCCAM, 184; the faith in the validity of mathematics is a product of the imagination and of psychical association, according to HUME, 289; JACOBI opposes emotional faith to the understanding, 458, 459; faith and reason, in LUTHER, 513.
FAITH, II, ecclesiastical power, 69; faith power, 71; primitive popular faith and legal life, 183; historical development of faith, 291; of Humanism; WEBER's Religions Soziologie; substrata of faith, 292; and Marxism; WEBER's Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 293; faith and the meaning of history; civitas Dei and civitas terrena; Christ the consommation of historical power, 294; fear of natural powers is the content of primitive faith; deification of natural powers, 297; faith is not identical with religion; we must distinguish the subjective function, the root, the principium, content and direction; KUYPER's view of pistis, 298; the heart and faith; direction of faith; KUYPER's provisional definition, his material circumscription; faith and intuitive evidence, 299; KUYPER discusses sub-functional anticipations of faith; faith and imago Dei; Common Grace; its direction after the fall into sin; THOMAS AQUINAS' actus intellectus given by supernatural grace; TROELTSCH and OTTO psychologize faith; BARTH's view of Christian faith as a new creation; regeneration and faith; faith is not a new creation, 300; BARTH's Scholastic dualism, 301; natural man's impotence to have faith in Christ; sin is not a counter power but derives its power from creation; faith and the heart; Christ's work in the heart, 302; the dynamics of faith; faith and science; church and state; the identification of religion and faith leads to the view that religion is a special department of life; VOLKELT's view of faith as cognitive intuition, 303; HUSSERL's Glaube is noetic sensory perception, doxa, not certainty; this refers to a faith anticipation in sensory experience; the nuclear meaning of faith is transcendental certainty related to divine revelation; there is no concept of faith possible, 304; its lawside is the faith aspect of Revelation; revelation is expressed in all creation; faith and culture cohere; progressive revelation; its historical aspect; dynamics; development, 305; faith in a closed and in a deepened state; general revelation and particular revelation (in the Scriptures), 306; the Word revelation is universally intended; with ABRAHAM came revelatio particularis; Israel; revelation to a community, not to individuals; Christ as Root and Head of reborn humanity; no theologia naturalis, 307; revelation in nature disclosed by the
Word; idolatry; the Roman appeal to Paul's Epistle to the Romans 1:19-23; natural revelation apart from the Word turns into a law of sin, 308; Common Grace and general revelation; Common grace and Special Grace; the closed aspect of faith is the extreme limit of apostasy, 309; apostate faith has - reversed its direction away from God in the absolutization of created things; primitive faiths look like diseased mental states; restrictive faith is the running to waste of faith; Christian faith is deepened by its openness to the Word after the regeneration of the heart, 310; regeneration reverses the direction of faith; semen religionis; paganism; elements of truth in apostate faith and philosophy, falsified on the immanence standpoint, 311; magic; Frazer's opinion, 312; worship of nature and of death; animism; polytheism; monotheism, 313; magic and idolatry are interrelated; Beth's and Vierkandt's discoveries of a pre-magical cultural stage, 314; the restrictive revelational principle is not the original phase; the biotic sensory substrata of a closed society are deified; Eduard von Hartmann on faith in nature, 315; the restrictive revelational principle turns into a curse; personality becomes diffuse; mana; personal and impersonal, natural and supernatural are merged; taboo, 316; heno theism; Max Müller; split personality at initiation; totemism, 317; Bergson, Durkheim's views; Cassirer's criticism; moral analogies in faith in primitive cults, 318, 319; the opening process; Greek aesthetic humanizing of polytheism; Hesiod's theogony; the gods of measure, order, and harmony; Homer; personal cultural gods; Cassirer's view, 320; he identifies faith and religion; natural and cultural religions; art and science; national consciousness, gods; Olympians; the expansion of the normative lawspheres; Orphism; deified nous undermines polytheism; self-reflection, 321; transcendental selfconsciousness; faith anticipates the revelation of the deity in the selfhood; man becomes aware of his freedom to devise idols, 322; the principle of divine revelation in the order of creation; man transcends his own self in the central relation to his Origin; positive and negative opening of faith; Cassirer's view, 323; the self is identified with some normative function; Egypt; the juridical and the moral function; immortality; Osiris the judge; Iranian belief; Veda, rita, the Upanishads, atman, Brahman, 324; mythical consciousness; mythos and logos; mythos atheos; myth and magic; and fiction, 325; atman of the Upanishads is not a primitive magical form of faith; Kant's idea of the transcendental logical subject is a Humanistic article of the faith in reason, hence a myth; a logical unity without multiplicity! not every faith is mythical; myth is fictitious; though not like a tale or a legend; its time aspect; myth falsifies Revelation; misinterprets truth; the pistic interpretation of the Deus absconditus experience, 326; Plato's nous was a myth; Descartes' and Leibniz' intellectus archetypus; the self was identified with mathematical thought; the image of their mathematical god; Kant's homo noumenon is the image of his moralistic god; Hume and Kant had a mythical idea of the temporal coherence; the profane and the sacred; Brahman-atman; faith versus maya: noumenon-phenomenon; Plato's me on and apeiron; Leibniz' peras as the metaphysical evil; the myth of deterministic nature and creative human freedom, 327; naturalistic thought and transcendental thought are mythical; not in a restrictive structure of faith but of deepened pistis; mana faith separates the profane from the sacred, 328; the mysterious is magical; Lévy-Brühl thinks that primitive thought is pre-logical; he influenced Cassirer, 329; mythical thought is pistological and so is the faith in reason, 330; the dualism of faith and scientific thought, 334; the faith in science and

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the personality-ideal, 357; the faith in ‘reason’ determines KANT’s doctrine of Ideas, 492; in Nominalism, 564.

FAITH, III, of totemistic clans arose from economic causes, according to W. KOPPERS, 360.

FALL INTO SIN, II, has obfuscated our experiential horizon, 549.

FAMILY, THE HUMAN, III, its six stages of development, according to L.H. MORGAN, 331; extended family as a societal interlacement, 653; the internal psychical interlacements between the members of a family: authority and respect, 294; interlacement with national feeling, feelings of social standing, etc., 295; in the biotic aspect of the temporal existence of the members of a family there are structural communal interweavings, 299; they function in an anticipatory way under the guidance of the moral family bond, 300; the same holds for the members’ physico-chemical and spatial relations, their origin in the female ovarian cell and the male sperm; the care of their bio-physical existence is guided by love; the spatial centre of the home, 301; a harem is only enkaptically interwoven with the marriage bond, an unnatural enkapsis, 305; in primitive societies in India the pirraura relations are abnormal sexual relations interwoven in an external enkapsis with marriage, 341.

FARMING BUSINESS, A MIXED, III, is an enkaptic interlacement, 652.

FASCISM, III, its conception of the cosmos; it is a mental attitude in reaction to the superficial materialism of the nine-

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teenth century, according to MUSSOLINI, 414; the Fascist State is a will to power; the myth; Fascism was State-minded, 415; its economic autarchy concept, 484.

FASHION, III, and the leading houses, 591; is an integrating factor in inter-individual social relations, 592; fashion in sporting-clothes, etc., 661.

FATE, II, in SPENGLER, replaces the concept of causality, 283.

FECHNER, G.Th., III on the macrocosm; the somatic-spiritual individual Super-being; his pantheism, 630, 631.

FECHNER, G.Th., III, Zend-Avesta oder über die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits, 631.

FECHNER, G.Th., III, our bodies belong to the larger, or higher, individual body of the earth, just as our spirits belong to the larger and higher spirit of the earth; the spirit of the earth is not the sum total of the earthly individual spirits, but their unified higher, conscious coherence embracing them all; our individuality, independence and freedom are only relative; the earth and all other stars are individual animate beings, 631.

FEELING, I, F. BRENTANO ascribes an intentional relation to feeling as a Gegenstand, 52; according to FICHTE naïve man's emotional belief grasps reality, 458.

FEELING, II, is the nuclear moment in the psychical lawsphere, 111; is universal, and implied in every Erlebnis as a quality of the totality of our inner experience, 111, 112; is characterized by its polarity; sensations are elementary subjective feeling phenomena referring to objective sensory qualities of things or events. Indifference is also a feeling attitude, 116, 117; feeling in animals has a closed structure, 184; is absolutized in HUME, 332; of bloodrelationship, 424.

FEELING OF JUSTICE, II, the feeling aspect must first be deepened in its anticipatory spheres, before there can be any differentiation in the feeling of justice, 177.

FERMENT, III, its effect is chemical, 730.

FEUDALISM, II, the rise of feudalism in the Frankish kingdom, 252.

FICHTE, J.J., I,
Wissenschaftslehre, 78, 90, 417-425, 428-432, 437, 440-448, 455, 479;
Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, 301;
Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 449, 450; Grundrisz des Eigentümlichen der W.L. in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen, 433;
Transzendentale Logik, 449;
Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseyns, 449,461; Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 401, 414, 415, 416, 434-437;
Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, 415;
Appellation an das Publikum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, 438;
Ueber die Würde des Menschen, 447;
Aus einem Privatschreiben, 438;
Grundlage des Naturrechts, 436;
FICHTE, I, the ‘thinking ego’ has a reflexive-logical sense in the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’, 78; LITT identifies ‘pure’ reflexive thought and being (like FICHTE and HEGEL), 79; ‘practical freedom’ is the hypothesis of his epistemology in the first edition of his ‘Wissenschaftslehre’; he introduced a dialectical logic in order to bridge the Kantian gulf between epistemology and ethics; the postulate of continuity implied in the freedom motive broke through the boundaries accepted by KANT with respect to the theoretical use of the transcendental idea of freedom, 90; he is the father of the dialectical way of thinking; he spoke of the tension between ‘absolute ego’ and ‘thinking ego’, 142; he refused to hypostatize theoretical thought, in his Kantian period; to him the root of the selfhood was in the ‘practical’, not in ‘theoretical’ reason, 143; the concept of substance is antinomous; so is that of the ‘Ding an sich’, 301 (note); the development of the conception of the Idea displays a dialectical tension, 329; the idea of autonomous freedom is elevated to the all-inclusive root and origin of the cosmos, 358; he eliminated the natural ‘Ding an sich’ and proclaimed the ethical ideal of personality to be the deepest root of the cosmos, 362; F. accepted the domination of the personality ideal over nature at the expense of the science ideal, 390; in his first ‘Wissenschaftslehre’ the dialectical development of transcendental freedom idealism (413) took its start from the transcendental reflection upon the Idea of freedom as the hypothesis of the science Ideal; he abandoned the concept ‘Naturding an sich’; all functions of consciousness are referred to their absolute, transcendent root, viz., the selfconsciousness as absolutely free ego; this ego creates itself by means of a free pra-
tical act (Tathandlung); it is the dynamic totality of activity; from it originates the entire cosmos; even necessity is a product of the activity of the absolute -I-, 414; his highest principle is: the ego posits itself; the ego is the origin of the analytical principles and elevated above all logical determination; but the first principle of the doctrine of science proclaims the absolute sovereignty of ‘practical reason’ in the sense of the Humanist ideal of moral freedom, 415; the absolute ego's first 'Tathandlung' is thinking of itself; the laws of this reflection are tacitly pre-supposed as known and established; this absolute ego must be qualified as a mere hypostatizing of the universal concept ‘ego’ as the totality of reason; it is the absolute free activity of the moral function hypostatized in the personality ideal, 416; the Humanistic continuity postulate required mathematical thought to produce a cosmos of its own according to the mathematical science ideal, and similarly the same continuity postulate drove the Humanistic personality ideal to exceed the modal boundaries of the aspects and to elevate the moral function to their basic denominator; natural necessity became a product of the hypostatized moral freedom; ‘theoretical’ reason, practical reason, and faculty of judgment are no longer mutually isolated, but are related to the root of selfconsciousness viewed by FICHTE as freely creative moral activity; the ego is the absolute subject; every category is derived from it; everything to which it may be applied has its reality transferred from the ego to itself, 417; the logical principle of identity is merely the form of the conclusion from ‘being posited’ to ‘being’, abstracted from the proposition ‘I am’ by the elimination of the content implied in the ego; A is A is an A created and activated in the ego; the ego is not static but infinite activity, therefore identity is not an immobile logical form but an infinite task in the determination of the cosmos; the mode of activity of the human mind, disclosed in the logical form of the judgment of identity, is the category of reality; this category is reduced by FICHTE to the absolute ego as actual origin of all reality; its relation to sense experience is not based on the ‘natural thing in itself’, but on the absolute ego; the logical judgment of contradiction is also referred to the first principle of the doctrine of science, 418; the principles of identity and contradiction are found among the ‘facts of empirical consciousness’; logic cannot justify them ultimately; in the judgment: non-A is not A we can ask: has indeed non-A been posited, and under what condition of the form of the mere act has it then been posited? logical antithesis is an absolute act of the ego; it is possible only on the condition of the unity of consciousness in its thesis and antithesis; originally nothing is posited but the ego; all opposition must be made with reference to this ego; but the antithesis of the ego is the non-ego; ‘to the ego a non-ego is opposed’, from this material judgment FICHTE derives the principle of contradiction; further abstraction leads to KANT’s second category, viz., that of negation; like all other categories it is a dialectical point of transition to the ego's consciousness of itself as infinite free activity; in the second principle of the doctrine of science there is an overt antinomy; the non-ego (i.e. nature) is to be posited only in the ego as absolute totality, 419; but as antithesis it cancels the ego; ‘thus the second principle is opposed to itself and cancels itself’; but the third principle requires the synthesis of ego and non-ego: ‘The ego posits the non-ego in the ego by limitation of itself; further abstraction leads to the category of determination; in FICHTE’s thought dialectical thought usurps the task of the cosmic order; thus the boundaries of the modal spheres are relativized; the absolutized moral aspect is conceived as an unlimited totality from which by division the limited, finite functions must originate, 420; FICHTE’s basic
denominator is formulated in his statement: “Our world is the material of our
duty, rendered sensible; this is the authentically real in things, the true basic
matter of all appearance”; the moral function is thus torn out of the cosmic
temporal coherence and becomes a meaningless form and no totality of
meaning; FICHTE’s “Wissenschaftslehre” raises “ethics to the position of
metaphysics” (KRONER); speculative dialect demands that the thesis of the
“absolute ego” should not fall outside the dialectical system; F.’s absolute ego
of the thesis is separated by him from the limited ego of the antithesis, 421;
F.’s dialectical system in the “Wissenschaftslehre” is only concerned with the
finite ego; the absolute synthesis remains an infinite task; here the Idea of the
absolute ego as ethical task makes its entry; the predicate of freedom can hold
for man insofar as he is an absolute Subject who has nothing in common with
the natural being and is not even opposed to it; freedom and natural necessity
should be united in the Idea of the ego as undetermined by anything outside
of itself; this Idea is contradictory, but nevertheless set up as our highest
practical goal; the final antinomy in the dialectical system cannot be reconciled
logically, only ethically, 422; F.’s Wissenschaftslehre attempts to clear up the
problem of the epistemological synthesis by relating the latter to the root of the
self-consciousness, 423; the root of self-consciousness is the “homo
noumenon”; the synthesis is
then rooted in antinomy; the antithetical relation in theoretical thought becomes a logical contradiction in a dialectical sense; he derives KANT's categories of quantity and quality by abstraction from the absolute ego; later on he does the same thing to the categories "substance", "inherence" 'causality', 'interaction' starting from the synthesis between reasonable freedom and sensory nature, 424; he tries to derive the science ideal from the personality ideal by the way of the continuity implied in the freedom motive; 'everything reproduces itself and there is no hiatus possible; from any single term one is driven to all the rest', 425; FICHTE searches for the radical unity of philosophical reflection in a selfhood beyond the theoretical diversity of syntheses; he shows insight into the continuous coherence of the cosmos; but his insight is misdirected by his Humanistic cosmonomic Idea; the limits that reason sets to itself rest on free self-limitations of reason itself; ultimately the absolute synthesis should be effected by the hypostatized ethical thought of 'practical reason'; there is one function which achieves this absolute synthesis creating form and content alike, 426; to FICHTE it is 'the power of productive imagination' proclaimed the free creating origin of sensory matter; it is theoretical and practical; determining theoretical thought posits rigid conceptual boundaries and cannot bring about the highest synthesis; it remains confined in the final antinomy between the free infinite ego and the finite ego limited by the non-ego; they can be synthesized only in the concept of mere determinability, not in that of determination, 427; the boundaries between the finite ego and the finite non-ego in the infinite ego are relativized to attain to the final theoretical synthesis, which is grasped as 'determinability'; the ego posits itself as finite and as infinite at the same time; this change of the ego in and with itself is the faculty of imagination, 428; it is thetic, antithetic and synthetic activity; making consciousness possible through reflection; it is a free act not determined by any grounds; it operates prior to all reflection as pre-conscious activity; it hovers between determination and non-determination; its product is called into existence during and by means of this hovering; by 'pre-conscious' FICHTE apparently means 'pre-theoretical productive imagination', 429; the productive imagination has 'no fixed standpoint' and keeps the mean between definiteness and indefiniteness, finitude and infinitude; thus the opposites 'ego and non-ego' are united; the 'productive imagination' is a 'Factum', a synthesis, and a function of feeling; a comparison with KANT's transcendental 'productive imagination', 430; F. sought a 'pre-logical' function of the ego as a link between understanding and sensibility, a link that exceeded the theoretical antithesis; only our cosmic self-consciousness can grasp the deeper unity of all the aspects of reality; but a 'function of feeling' (FICHTE's idea) cannot accomplish an interfunctional synthesis, 431; FICHTE holds that an explanation of the occurrences in our mind is impossible without absolute opposites; these occurrences rest on the productive power of imagination which can only exist if absolute opposites appear as fully unsuited to the power of apprehension, 432; FICHTE supposes he has cancelled dogmatic idealism and dogmatic realism in a higher critical idealism; in his 'Grundrisz' of 1795 he follows the reverse method in comparison with his earlier work; he starts from the 'fact' of consciousness; the ego sets itself in opposition to itself; in producing itself it also produces the non-ego by imagination, creates sensory impressions, as parts of the ego itself and finds itself in them; so it transcends the sensory function and makes the sensory perceptions its own; this activity cannot cease before the selfhood has become conscious of the ego having produced the non-ego in itself; in the long run
sensation changes into the object of intuition and experience, and the latter into the transcendentally conceived ‘Gegenstand’ of epistemology, until finally ‘theoretical reason’ becomes conscious of itself as creating the ‘Gegenstand’; empirical reality is phenomenality of nature constituted in a synthesis of sensory and logical functions, but without a ‘natural thing in itself’; the non-ego gives the ego the impulse necessary for mental representation, 434; the guiding thesis of the ‘doctrine of science’ was: ‘the ego posits itself as determined by the non-ego’; it also implies the guiding thesis of the practical ‘doctrine of science’: ‘the ego posits itself as determining the non-ego’, 435; in this ‘practical part’ an account is given of the reduction of the theoretical to the practical reason; the restless dialectical movement of the theoretical reason depends on sensation, the first limit the ego sets to itself; the first impulse for the development of the entire dialectical series, i.e., sensory impression, makes ‘theoretical reason’ possible and is not to be derived from it; in its innermost nature the ego is ‘practical’, the root of personality and nature is in the moral function; the ego operates causally upon the non-ego; the antinomy between the ego as absolute being and its dependence and limitation as intelligence should be overcome; the non-ego must remain opposed to the ego if the I-ness is not to become an empty form, 436; the free infinite ego ought continually to set limits to itself as 'in-
telligence’ by an objective non-ego, in order to provide its infinite striving activity with a resistance to be overcome giving content to this striving; without striving there is no object; therefore the practical reason is the basis of the theoretical; (‘KANT’s categorical imperative’); the root of selfconsciousness is the hypostatized moral function, 437; the finite, moral, practical ego can have no other goal for its infinite striving than to become absolute; the tension between form and matter, consciousness and being, freedom and nature, personality-and science-ideal, should be eliminated in the absolute Ego (the Divinity). KRONER says: ‘even the absolute Ego needs the “impulse” if it is to be an ego’, 438; the theoretical ego is necessarily coherent with the practical; it must reflect on its being limited; practical and theoretical ego are the same, striving being their common root, 439; he supposes that he has destroyed fatalism by referring to the absolute freedom of reflection and abstraction and to the possibility of man’s focusing attention to something according to moral duty, 440; the sensory ego is driven forward by itself to become a self-knowing intelligence, and the ego dominated by sensual impulses becomes the ego determining itself as ‘pure ethical’ will; in the ego there is an original striving to ‘fill out infinity’; a Trieb (i.e. impulse) is a self-producing striving; the impulse to reflection (Reflexionstrieb) is also an ‘impulse toward the object’; feeling is the expression of a suffering, a passivity, an inability; it is united most intimately with activity: I feel - I am the feeling subject - and this activity is reflection - a limitation - I feel, I am passive, 441; this limitation supposes an impulse to go beyond it; that which wills, needs, embraces nothing more, is - naturally with respect to itself - unlimited, and thus satisfied and not satisfied; the course of FICHTE’s deductions, 442; a longing drives the ego in itself beyond itself and discloses an outer-world in the ego; causality is fulfilment of desire; compulsion arises through the limitation of longing by the non-ego, its object is something real; the object of the longing has no reality (the ego in itself has no causality, which would cancel it as ‘pure activity’) but ought to have it in consequence of the longing which seeks reality; both objects stand in antinomic relation to each other (nature and freedom); the reality felt determines (limits) the ego which as such determines itself (in the reflection about the feeling); its longing becomes the impulse to determine itself, and this reality, 443; in the longing arises the Empfindungstrieb, the drive toward knowledge, striving to regain for the ego the natural object created by it, not yet experienced by the ego as its own; it strives to represent the object in the I-ness; the limit is felt as felt, i.e., as created in the ego by the ego; by a new reflection the sensory feeling changes into an intuition; intuition sees, but is empty; feeling is related to reality, but is blind; the feeling ego must keep pace with the intuition which views what is felt as something contingent in the object, 444; the impulse toward a change of feelings is the disclosure of the longing; the changed feeling must be intuited as changed if the ego is to be able to reflect about the impulse to change its feelings; approbation; its opposite is displeasure, 445; the synthesis in the approbation may not be performed by the spectator, i.e., theoretically, but the ego itself must perform it; intuition and impulse alike must be understood as determined and self-determining; the drive towards change, that towards mutual determination of the ego through itself, that towards absolute unity and perfection in the ego; the absolute drive; the categorical imperative is merely formal without any object, 446; ‘Thou shalt’ is an eternal task never to be fully accomplished; in FICHTE’s identity philosophy the personality ideal has absorbed the science-ideal along the line of the continuity postulate of freedom, but at the cost of sanctioning the antinomy; his
hymn on the dignity of man, 447; the Faustian passion for power turned into the power ideal of the personality, 448; in the science-ideal ‘nature’ is hypostatized in its mathematical and mechanical functions for the sake of the continuity postulate; in FICHTE ‘nature’ only has meaning as material for the performance of our duty; he could not project a natural philosophy, 449; in KANT’s dualistic world-picture the antinomy between the science- and the personality ideal implied the recognition of both factors; FICHTE converted this antinomy into a contradiction within the personality ideal itself between free activity (spontaneity) and bondage to the resistance of the ‘lower’ nature, or between ‘Idea’ and sense; to FICHTE the world is the posited contradiction, and dialectic is the method to know it, 450; in his second period, since 1797, there are no new viewpoints with respect to the dialectical development of Humanistic thought; but under the influence of JACOBI’s philosophy of feeling FICHTE’s third period showed a new trend, an irrationalistic conception of the Humanistic personality ideal, 451; his connections with the ‘Sturm und Drang’; his titanic activity motive and strong voluntarism is congenial with this ‘Storm and Stress’ glorifying the ‘activity of the genius’; Sturm und Drang artistically expressed in its ego-drama; activity and selfhood are the two poles in this world of thought; GOETHE’s Faust; SCHILLER’s ‘Rauber’: ‘the law did not yet form a
single great man, but freedom hatches colossuses and extremities'; HAMANN's
'Sokratische Dekwürdigkeiten', 452; FICHTE separates theoretical knowledge
from real life; real life is feeling, desire and action; speculation is only a means
to form life, 455; his answer to the charge of atheism; ‘our philosophy makes
life, the system of feelings and appetitions, the highest, and allows to knowledge
everywhere only the looking on’, 456; F.'s view of the relation of the dialectical
concept and the reality of life, and that of HEGEL, who posits that the concept
is first and the contents of our representations are not; in FICHTE KANT's irrational
‘sensory matter of experience’ is the ‘true reality’; it is accessible to immediate
feeling, not yet logically synthesized and deeply irrational; ‘all theoretical
knowledge is only image... you seek after all something real residing outside
the mere image’, 457; this ‘something’ can only be embraced by belief, not
by science; like JACOBI FICHTE considers belief to be the diametrical opposite
of cognitive thought, 458; the true reality is discovered only by belief rooted in
the immediate feeling of the drive to absolute, independent discovery of true
reality to vital feeling alone in his third period; however, he concludes with the
eulogy of the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’; it will free the whole of mankind from blind
chance and destroy fate, 459; he now recognizes both the value of 'empirical
individuality', and feeling as an immediate source of knowledge of reality; such
individuality has an inner value as being rooted in the individuality of the moral
ego itself, 460; KANT's categorical imperative now has to read: 'Act in conformity
with your individual destination and your individual situation; in the individuality
of the empirical world is disclosed the material of our individual duty; in each
act of perceiving and knowing is concealed a 'practical' kernel of feeling; the
principium individuationis is sought in feeling as the concentration point of
knowledge; the transcendental critical line of thought never vanishes from
FICHTE's Wissenschaftslehre, the irrationalist philosophy of feeling never gained
a complete victory in it; FICHTE tries to individualize the contents of his activistic
and moralistic personality ideal in the cadre of its universally valid form, 461;
the change in his valuation of individuality brought FICHTE to a speculative
metaphysics that was completely different from his earlier identity philosophy;
there was a general and growing opposition to Kantian criticism; ‘Criticism’ had
vested all value in the universally valid forms of reason and deprecated the
individual, as the transcendental irrational; KANT had raised the problem of
individuality only within the frame of his form-matter schema, except in his
Aesthetics; the freedom motive began its contest against the old rationalist
science-ideal under the inspiration of problems of the philosophy of culture,
470; FICHTE's 'metaphysics of the spirit'; he formulates the question of the
individual ego, 472; and that of the metaphysical foundations in being for the
spiritual life; the consciousness of the other ego is essential in one's own
self-consciousness; the other ego is the Thou; the plurality of spiritual beings
outside myself have an altogether other mode of being with respect to me than
the material external ‘world’ of ‘nature’; the reality of the world of spirits arises
from the moral foundation of the ego itself; the duty to recognize every free
individual as an independent moral 'end in himself'; a metaphysical ‘synthesis
of the real world of spirits’ is needed; this synthesis is that of the Absolute Being
with infinite freedom; the individual ego is one of the many concentration points
of the ‘Absolute Spirit’; the ego has the form of existence ('Dasein') from the
Absolute Being, but definite, concrete, individual being from the interaction with
the spiritual world; all finite selves owe their being to a transpersonal life of
reason, 473; the bond of union among the spirits is their communion as
individual egos, as appearances of the infinite Origin; they originate from a metaphysical actus individuationis in which time itself acquires individual points of concentration; the Spirit's Being is transpersonal being of freedom; the moral order is the transpersonal bond of union for all finite spirits, 474; the Absolute Being, because actually infinite Divinity, is eternally transcendent to reflection and knowledge, the inner real ground of the possibility of rational freedom, and as such, the absolutely irrational; all life is only image or schema of God; 'nature' is the reasonable ethical appearance of God, who only reveals himself in this appearance in ethical activity; God is thus the absolute hypostasis of the creative, subjective ethical stream of life, which is the transpersonal bond and totality of the individual free subjects, 475; his moral basic denominator has changed into a historical one; historical existence is the final mode of being of finite existence; the world is an infinite chain of 'challenges' of 'freedom-evoking and spirit-cultivating inter-action of self-acting life-centres in creative freedom producing ever new faces from nothing'; the theme of history is that of striving upwards to freedom, 476; the higher ethos of spiritual life is in the creative historical process; through the concentration points of the great leading personalities the absolute metaphysical Idea is realized in the Ideas of art, state, science, religion; history is
essentially made by great personalities, 477; natural individuality must be annihilated by the individual spirit in the historical process, 478; individuality can only be understood from the individual communities, in which alone it has temporal existence; a nation is a historical totality; he denies both the reality of abstract general concepts (universalia) like the Nominalists, and the possibility of deriving subjectivity from a law; his absolute transcendental Idea is not a universal but a totality; he rejects any hypostatization of general concepts in the sense of Platonic ideas; his system is not monistic Eleaticism, for being in the latter sense is static, in Fichte it has an essential relation to the historical process; it is the divine origin of all activity and cultural individuality; he has broken through the Critical form-matter schema, 479; but his conception of the Idea as a metaphysical totality of all individuality easily leads to a priori construction in the philosophy of history; he requires a philosopher to be able ‘to describe a-priori the whole of time and all possible periods of it’; thus his idea of a historical world-plan, which is construed a-priori and defined in a teleological sense: ‘the aim of the earthly’, 480; life of mankind is ‘the arrangement of all its relations within it with liberty according to reason; this World-plan is the Idea of the unity of the whole of human earthly life’, his five chief periods of world-history whose subject is the ‘human race’; he offers no point of contact for the science of history; the latter is handed over to the annalist; philosophy should also make a logical analysis of the general conditions of ‘empirical existence’ as the material of historical construction; his ‘logic of the historical mode of enquiry’ emphasizes the irrational character of historical experience; Fichte’s ‘transcendental-logical’ delimitation of the historical field of investigation, 481; the philosopher has to guarantee to the historian his basis and foundation; physics is the science of constant and recurrent features of existence; the science of history investigates the contents of the flowing time-series; the philosopher of history has to comprehend the facts in their incomprehensibility, clarifying their ‘contingency’, therefore, to differentiate between speculation and experience; he opposes any attempt to deduce historical facts from the infinite understanding of the Absolute Being, 482; neither the historian nor the philosopher can say anything about the origin of the world or of mankind, for there is no origin at all, 483; the relationships between the components of historical development to be known a-priori and those to be known a-posteriori; his Idea of a Normalvolk, which was dispersed over the seats of rudeness and barbarism, and had been in a perfect ‘Vernunftkultur’ through its mere existence, without any science or art; the a-priori component of history is the world-plan leading man through five periods of world-history; history in its proper form is the a-posteriori component, 484; he distinguishes true historical time from empty time; he anticipates modern phil. of life in his conception of historical time; but at this stage (485) his historical logic exhibits a fundamental hiatus; true science of history is restricted to the collection of mere facts with the exclusive criterion of the external sequence of years and centuries without any regard to their content; in the Staatslehre he discovers the logic of historical truth; he attempts the synthesis of nature and freedom in the historical field, 486; the intermediate concept is: free force; ‘dead nature’ is governed by mathematical-mechanical laws; ‘living actual freedom’ is ruled by the autonomous moral law; the problem is: what rules ‘free force’, the realm of freedom products, i.e., that of visible, cultural freedom; then history is lawless, 487; but freedom disclosed in history possesses a hidden law-conformity, viz., the providence of the moral Deity; this law conformity is
not knowable from rational concepts; it is a hidden telos, 488; in this way the
law is made a simple reflection of individual free subjectivity disclosed in the
‘irrational process’, 488; it is the precipitation of the irrationalist personality
ideal, and the negation of veritable historical norms; in it the nomos is merely
the reflection of the autos; the individual person’s membership of a particular
community is a constitutive historical factor owing to the historical tradition and
the ‘common spirit’ that all the members share; this leads to a universalist
conception of society, viewing the latter as a ‘whole’ in relation to its ‘parts’;
FICHTE irrationalizes the Divine world-plan; this is now sought in the individuality
of the historical matter, 489; what he posited as absolutely factual (and therefore
incomprehensible), might be posited by an Understanding; history thus becomes
the principium individuationis, as the synthesis of value and temporal reality;
the gradual conquest of faith by the understanding is a merely formal one; it is
only the qualitatively individual moral nature which, as given freedom, produces
the material of history, since it becomes an individual paradigm for the producing
by freedom; the concept of a moral procreation or nature of man has replaced
Providence (as a Miracle); Providence is the ‘transcendental-logical condition’
for the possibility of historical experience, 490; the miraculous is further
transferred from the individual to com-
unities viewed as 'individual totalities'; we must conceive the appearance of freedom as a totality absolutely closed in time, and therefore we must assume some society possessing by its mere existence the morality to which it leads subsequent societies; this is FICHTE's conception of a original 'highly gifted people' (das geniale Volk); historical development is the non-recurrent individual and 'lawless' realization of value; it is of higher value than what recurs periodically according to uniform laws of nature; the historical is the totality of what is new and creative individual, 491; nature is static being; the infinite content of 'freedom', the moral task, remains incomprehensible, the image of God, to be experienced only in the revelations of history; revelation is the synthesis of irrationality and originality; religious life in the historical empirical form of Jesus is the immediate individual revelation of the Idea of God in the appearance; FICHTE brings all normative subject functions under a historical basic denominator; yet he denies all knowable historical determination of facts, because de-termination can only issue from a law regulating and limiting the subject functions in their infinite individual diversity, 492; his discovery of the national community of a people as an individual historical totality; under the influence of Romanticism he broke radically with the atomistic cosmopolitan view of the Enlightenment, 493; he opposes the nationality to the State; the latter is to him a mere conceptual abstraction; the former is 'true historical reality', which has an 'earthly eternity', far above the State, 494; he absolutes nationality to the true historical revelation of the eternal spiritual community of humanity; FICHTE and the Historical School; in recent times this view of the relation between nation and State has been elaborated in detail in the irrationalistic 'pluralistic' sociology of GEORGES GURVITCH, 495; he classified philosophy into a 'Doctrine of Science' with a theoretical and a practical section, 529.

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FICHTE, J.J., III, in his actualism the marriage bond depends on the actual subjective continuance of love between the partners; a modern irrationalistic conception, 307; his actualistic view of sexual love; he derived the essence of marriage from the bare moral notion of love, ignoring the civil juridical aspect and the internal juridical side of marriage, 318; objected to the term 'organism', replaced it by 'organization', 406; defended State education like PLATO, 442.

FICTION THEORY (of the unity of a community), III, devised by the Canonists, (sub voce Canonists), 233-234; taken over by the Humanists in their doctrine of natural law (cf. s.v. natural law), 235; the fiction theory denied the real unity of an organization and conceived of it as a mere juridical construction, 236.

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FLUID CONCEPT, II, in BERGSON; he connects intuition with concepts in an internally contradictory way; he deprives the intuitively founded concept of every analytical delimitation and considers it as the fluid expression of ‘psychical empathy’, 481.


FORCE, III, in naïve experience; and energy, in STOKER's philosophy; in LEIBNIZ’ monadology; and the ‘essence’ of things; and SCHELER’s thought, 70.

FORM, II, is a dynamic principle of development in ARISTOTLE, 558. FORM, III, is the nodal point of enkaptic interlacement, 703.

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FORMERS OF HISTORY, II, give cultural form to the social existence of persons (Personkultur), 198.

FORM-MATTER MOTIVE, I, in Greek thought, esp. in ARISTOTLE’s view of time and motion, 25; the Greek philosophical theoria was dominated by the form-matter motive. this term derives from ARISTOTLE, 36; from the purely intentional anti-thetic structure of the theoretical attitude of thought it is inferred that the logical function is really separated from all pre-logical aspects of the body; this conclusion was directed by the dualistic form-matter motive; THOMAS AQUINAS held that the entire rational soul must be an immortal and purely spiritual substance because he considered it to be characterized by the theoretical activity of thought, 44; the form-matter motive dominated the classical Greek world of culture and
thought, it originated from the encounter of pre-Homeric religion of life (a nature-religion) with the cultural religion of the Olympic gods; the former deified the eternally flowing Stream of life which was unable to fix itself in any single individual form; periodically emerging transitory beings are subjected to the horrible fate of death, anangkè or heimarmenè tychè; this matter motive was expressed, a.o., in the worship of Dionysus imported from Thrace; the Olympian religion was that of form; essentially a deification of the cultural aspect of Greek society; the form-matter motive was independent of the mythological forms it received in the old nature religions and the new Olympian culture-religion, 62; pure form in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, is the Deity, 67; Augustinus introduced the form-matter motive into the interpretation of Genesis 1:1, 178; this motive in Leibniz, 190; this motive is applied by Kant to the moral principles; his categorical imperative is a logicistic judgment, 374; Maimon attempts to overcome the antinomy of the Critical form-matter schema, 405.

**Form-Matter Motive, II**, in metaphysics and epistemology; Plato; Aristotle; Pythagoreans; medieval philosophy; Augustinian Scholasticism; - hylè; mè on; dynamei on; ousia delimits hylè - Plato's eidetic numbers; and geometric figures as transcendent being; the choirismos; the phenomenal world; the antinomy in this conception; dialectical logic; the 'ideal matter of Augustinian Scholasticism; oneness and plurality in Plato; Socratic kalokagathon; rational soul; Plato's anangkè; evil; Aristotle's eidos as immanent essence, 10; Aristotle's hylè, morphè, entelechy; the universal and the individual; the soul is the form of the body; the world order is intelligible; the actual nous is the Archè of all delimitation of meaning, 11; matter is the principium individuationis; form is a constructive a priori condition of sensory experience in Kant; Kant's epistemological use of the form-matter scheme; he calls time and space intuitional forms, and posits the transcendental consciousness, 12; the form-matter scheme is at the back of the distinction between reality and meaning, 31; form and matter in Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Socrates; Plato's synthesis of Eleatic and Heraclitean principles; being and not-being, 56; Plato's Philebus, genesis eisousian; the Idea of the good and the beautiful; unity and verity; peras and apeiron, 57; the form-matter schema applied to law by Stammler, 209; by Simmel, 210; Aristotle's use of the form-matter schema with respect to individuality, 419.

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**Formalization, II**, of the concept triangle, i.e., all meaning individuality in the spatial aspect is abstracted from such a concept, 458; triangle is a generic concept, geometrical, 459; formalizing cannot exceed the boundaries of the
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be individualized; REMBRANDT's Nightwatch; intercourse in marriage and in a club; in the form matter scheme there can be no question of individuality, 423; a modal aspect individualizes itself within its own structure but is not exhausted thereby; complete individuality is a-typical; nuclear or original types; sexual propagation; its retrocipations are unoriginal types, only constituted in functional anticipation of the sexual biotic types (which are anticipatory modal types); juridical types of individuality; psychical feelings of blood-relationship are biotically founded, 424; numeral, spatial, physical anticipatory modal types of individuality; the typical constant $h$ in quantum mechanics; the LOSCHMIDT number $n$; numeral relations between the particles of a cell (chromosomes, e.g.), are anticipatory types; typical albumen formations; mathematical types are anticipatory only; sensory phantasy, also in animals; not typically founded in the biotic sphere; phantasms of sensory imagination are intentional objects; entirely apart from the sensory objectivity of real things, 425; in the opened structure of this type all subjective types of aesthetical projects are founded; these projects are realized in objective works of art; the objective type of a picture differs from that of a painting or a sculpture; that of juridical types of movables and immovables; of servitutes praediorum rusticorum or urbanorum, etc., 426; individuality belongs to the apeiron in KANT's philosophy, 450; the plastic horizon comprises structural individualities, our insight is subjective and fallible, 583; individual knowledge and society, HUSSERL, SCHELER, SPENGLER: SCHELER's ‘essential community’, 584-594; the insight of genius, 595.

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worship, 352; [cf. s.v. Undiff. Org. Comm.].

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GEFÜHL IST ALLES, I, in GOETHE's Faust, 453.

GEGENSTAND, I, in the phil. of the Cosmonomic Idea, is what is opposed to the logical function in the theoretical attitude of thought; in current philosophy the 'Gegenstand' is usually called 'object' (6), in theoretical thought the 'Gegenstand' is formed by the non-logical aspects distinguished from the logical aspect and synthesized with the latter, 18; in theoretical thought we oppose the analytical function of our real act of thought to the non-logical aspects of our temporal experience; the latter become 'Gegenstand', i.e., the opposite to our analytical function; this antithetic structure of the theoretical attitude can present itself only in the temporal total structure of the act of thinking; this antithetic structure is only intentional; not ontical, 38, 39; the modal structure of the analytical aspect itself is given as a whole, and not in analyzed moments; in the theoretical attitude we can analyze the logical aspect, for the latter expresses in its modal structure the temporal order into which the different aspects are fitted; the theoretic act is not identical with the aspect; in its theoretical abstraction the modal structure of the logical aspect has only an intentional existence in our act of thought and can be made into the Gegenstand of our actual logical function, 40; dogmatic epistemology identified the subject-object relation with the Gegenstand-relation, 43; we must proceed from the theoretical antithesis to the theoretical synthesis between the logical and the non-logical aspects, if a logical concept of the non-logical 'Gegenstand' is to be possible, 44; the antithetical attitude offers no bridge between the logical aspect and its non-logical 'Gegenstand', 45; the starting-point of all special synthetic acts of thought must be sought by looking away from the 'Gegenstände' of our knowledge and exercising self-reflection, 51; in the phenomenological attitude the 'absolute cogito' (i.e. absolute transcendental consciousness) is opposed
to the ‘world’ as its intentional ‘Gegenstand’; SCHELER considers the ‘Gegenstand-relation’ as the most formal category of the logical aspect of mind; in this relation the human mind can oppose itself not only to ‘the world’ but even make the physiological and psychical aspects of human existence into a ‘Gegenstand’, 52; modern Humanistic existentialism grasps existence only in its theoretical antithesis to the ‘given reality of nature’; it creates a great distance between existential thinking as authentically philosophical and all scientific thought as ‘gegenständlich’; ‘Gegenstand’ in existentialism means ‘given object’ (das Vorhandene), 53; a generic concept cannot bridge the modal diversity in the theoretical ‘Gegenstand-relation’, 77; if LITT’s ‘pure thinking ego and its Gegenstand’ (the concrete ego) were one and the same, the Gegenstand-relation would be eliminated, 81; LITT confuses Gegenstand and object, 86; the Gegenstand is identified with ‘temporal reality’ in immanence phil., 87; the Gegenstand relation in LITT, 143; in KANT the G. is a chaotic mass of sense impressions received in the a-priori forms of intuition (space and time), 352.

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is no G. of knowledge, neither of the knowing subject or the ‘transcendental consciousness’, or the ego, or the ‘cogito’; the Origin of the Gegenstand is to be sought in the theoretical disjunction of the cosmic meaning-systasis in which our selfhood is not found; the Gegenstand must be in the diversity of the modal aspects owing to a theoretical setting apart, 467; the enstatic and the antithetical attitude of thought, 468; the ‘epoche’ and the continuity of time; varieties of ‘Gegenstände’, 469; we think ‘Gegenstände’ a-priori in KANT, 504; the Gegenstand in HUSSERL, 544.

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cultural relations between component groups, 259; SMEND applies LITT's theory of Gemeinschaft to the state, 259; LITT excludes the organizations from his community concept, 260; medieval society completely realized the 'Gemeinschaft', 271; TÖNNIES' category of 'Gemeinschaft', 571, 574.

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GEOLOGY, II, in often called ‘natural history’, when it refers to the natural genesis of geological formations and of species of plants and animals, 196.

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HOMO NOUMENON, II, this idea is the root of reality according to KANT, 44; KANT’s practical ethical metaphysics maintains the selfhood as the super-temporal, super-sensory noumenon, 527.

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among men; structural types of law are unchangeable; the plastic horizon, 557; ancient and medieval views, 558; individuality structures manifest themselves only in the analysis of variable things, events, and relationships; the plastic horizon is a priori because it determines experience and makes it possible; the a priori horizon of exp. is the Divine order of the ‘earthly creation’ itself; this order was present in God’s plan before the foundation of the world, 559; the perspective structure of the horizon of experience; its religious root; the transcendent horizon encompasses the cosmic temporal one, which encompasses the modal one and the plastic horizon, 560; CALVIN's view of self-knowledge; exp. is limited by, but not to, temporal reality, 561; the apostatic selfhood abused its religious freedom, 563; and fell away into the temporal horizon; it tried to hypostatize an abstract part of the temporal horizon, 564; the process of theoretical cognition is experience according to KANT, 568; the temporal horizon, 594.

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HUMAN ACTION, II, originates from the religious root, cannot be enclosed in certain aspects of reality, 40; if it is enclosed, theoretically, in its physical aspect, there arises antimony, 46; the act-structure; Erlebnisse and action, 112; can acts be studied? language and social contact give access to another personality; behaviourism, 112, 113; empathy; the act-structure is founded in a psychical lower structure; animal structure is a sub-conscious under layer; Grenzsituationen; depth psychology; acts are related to the human ego, 114.
HUMAN BODY, THE, III, there is no radical type, 87-89; is the individual whole of man's temporal existence; it shows a very complicated interlacement of different typical structures (87) combined in a form-totality qualified by the act-structure; this act structure is founded in animal, vegetative and material structures, functions in all modalities, lacks a typical qualifying structure; is the immediate expression of the I-ness, which transcends the cosmic temporal order; man's erect gait, his spiritual countenance, his hand formed for working after a free project; human acts have a threefold direction: cognition, imagination, volition; the human body is the field of free expression for the human spirit, i.e., for the religious centre of human existence, 88; the human body is man in the structural whole of his temporal appearance; the human soul is man himself in the radical unity of his spiritual existence transcending all temporal structures; racial differences, 89; the human body is not qualified aesthetically, 113; the body as 'experienced corporality' belongs to a supposed 'pre-objective' experiential field, according to MERLEAU-PONTY, 779; it is a blind adherence to the 'pre-objective world', 780.

HUMAN BRAIN, THE, III, exemplifies the difference between living and dead matter, according to DRIESCH, 742.

HUMANISTIC THOUGHT, I, (cf. Modern Humanistic Philosophy, I), its ground motive of nature and freedom; its conception of time is orientated rationalistically toward mechanical motion in the sense of classical physics; or it is irrationally considered in a vitalistic, psychological, or historical way; objectivistic and subjectivistic views, 27; As long as Nominalistic Scholasticism subjected itself to the dogma of the Church it rested in a dualism between faith and natural knowledge; its secularization was introduced by JOHN OF JANDUN and MARSILIUS OF PADUA, 188; the collapse of the ecclesiastically unified culture of the Middle Ages; the discovery of the pure Greek and Roman sources of culture, resentment against Medieval barbarian linguistic forms of Scholasticism, and against the synthesis between Christianity and the ancient life and world view, 189; Biblical Humanism and the Reformation; the Bible was moralistically interpreted by ERASMUS, etc., 190; the religious basic motive of Humanism is that of nature
and freedom; this motive is founded on the secularized Biblical motive of creation, and Christian freedom and assimilated the Greek motive of form and matter and the Roman Catholic motive of nature and grace; its inner dialectic is due to the ambiguous freedom-motive; which is the driving force of the modern religion of human personality; the latter wants to dominate nature by means of science to which it ultimately surrenders, 190; the radical unity of the human personality gets lost; any faith in the ‘supernatural’ is rejected; its religion concentrates on man and his needs; it rejected any ‘heteronomous’ Divine Revelation; a personal God is used as the foundation for mathematical truth in DESCARTES; as the requirement of religious feeling in ROUSSEAU, as a postulate of the ‘practical Reason’ in KANT; the Renaissance secularized the Christian Idea of regeneration, i.e., in the Italian ‘Renascimento’, with its thirst for temporal life and its Faustian desire to control the world; OCCAM's depression of ‘natural reason’ was replaced by religious confidence in reason’s liberating power, 191; the Humanistic life and world view was originally aristocratic; the ‘uomo universale’ of LEO BATTISTA ALBERTI’s autobiography; LEONARDO DA VINCI: Faustian desire for the progress of culture; the Greek ‘physis’ view was dominated by the motive of form and matter; modern autonomous man considers ‘immeasurable nature’ (192) as a macrocosmic reflection of the autonomous freedom of human personality; or as such a reflection of the Faustian domination-motive; this leads to a deterministic theoretical view of reality; GALILEO and NEWTON; this scientific method was proclaimed the universal model for thought; this creates a structureless view of reality as a continuous causal series, which is a threat to free human personality, 193; early Humanism turned away from the ‘formalist hairsplitting’ of scholastic conceptual distinctions; COPERNICUS’ heliocentric world picture, 194; for modern man the Platonic mèon, the endless, the apeiron, is the highest principle: CUSANUS, BRUNO; LEIBNIZ considered the limited as ‘metaphysical evil’, 194; Nominalistic subjectivism and individualism were considered as phenomena of decadence and a mortal danger to the Greek polis, in ancient Greek culture, 195; Humanism borrowed heavily from the Stoic ideal of the self-sufficient Sage, from Epicurean ethics (VALLA), etc.; but it had an inner predisposition to a deterministic view of the world; the mathematical ideal of knowledge became the transcendental ideal of cosmic order; but originally nature was not conceived as a mechanical system, but as filled with beauty, force and life; DA VINCI considered nature as a teleological whole animated with life; VALLA deified nature as the expansion sphere of the personality ideal, 198; since COPERNICUS’ astronomical revolution modern man discovered in nature a macrocosm that had its reflected image in man’s own personality as microcosm; BRUNO’s and CUSANUS’ worship of the infinite; and of the coincidentia oppositorum; their rejection of the opposition between ‘Jenseits’ and ‘Diesseits’; the religious freedom motive is still in accordance with the nature motive; BRUNO’s only difficulty intimates the future tension between these two motives, 199; the decisive turn came with the introduction of the functional concept of mechanic causality, 200; Humanist thought had built a new metaphysics, and in its cadre the dialectical tension between nature and freedom became manifest; under the science ideal HOBBES’ epistemological empiricism was extremely rationalistic, since it conceived of the process of knowledge in terms of the laws of mechanical movement; since LOCKE, empiricism gave the science-ideal a psychological turn, seeking the common denominator of the modal aspects within the functional apparatus of human knowledge, 262;
especially in feeling and sensation alone; substance, 'Ding an sich' became
the epistemological x, the unknown and unknowable background of the
'empirical world' given only in psychical impressions and perceptions, 263.
HUMANISTIC THOUGHT, II, in the crisis, 18; has given up reflecting on the
supra-temporal root of experience owing to the pressure of positivism and
historism; the historical consciousness; its irrational existential attitude; the
decay of religious self-reflection, 19, 20; the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, 26;
assumes a logical continuous order of the sciences, 49; the science ideal and
its creation motive in PASCH, VERONESE, CANTOR, etc. on 'continuous numbers',
91; tends to logicize number and space; the subject-side of number is merged
into its law-side, 92; natural law concept, 167; the a priori is taken in an
epistemological sense; in recent times in a phenomenological sense, 543.
HUMANISTIC THOUGHT, III, NEWTON's 'material units' and the concept of substance
are based on the classical Humanistic science-ideal, 23; this ideal is
deterministic; was intended to destroy the world of naive experience and
reconstruct reality by means of mathematical mechanical thought, 26.

HUMANITY, I, HERDER's ideal, 455.
HUMANITY, III, COMTE's idea of humanity as an all-embracing community, 167.

HUMAN NATURE, I, is a composition of a material body and a rational soul, in
Thomism, 180.
HUMAN SOCIETY, III, its ultimate basis is the transcendent root community of mankind, 656.

HUMBOLDT, W. VON, II,
Werke I, 276;
cf. 222.
HUMBOLDT, W. VON, II, the general dignity of man, 276.

HUME, DAVID, I,
Enquiry concerning human understanding, 276, 281, 288, 300;
Dialogues concerning natural religion, 275;
Dissertation on the Passions, 302;
The Original Contract, 312;
An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, 312.

HUME, DAVID, I, He criticized the Humanistic metaphysics of nature, 203; desired to reduce all phenomena to the smallest possible number of simple principles (economy of thought); and in this way to achieve a Copernican revolution in the field of the phenomena of human nature; all abstract concepts must be reduced to individual sensory ‘impressions’ as the simplest elements, 272; this shows a strong vein of Nominalism in Hume's psychologicism; his ‘empiricism’ and that of LEIBNIZ; moderate and radical nominalism; his reduction of universal ‘representations’ into ‘impressions’ is the exact psychological counterpart of (e.g. LEIBNIZ) the resolution of ‘complex concepts’ into the simplest conceptual elements by mathematicism, 273; Hume’s ‘data’ do not belong to the real data of our experience; Locke’s ‘simple psychical element of consciousness’ is as abstract as the concept ‘triangle in general’; he eradicated the boundaries between Locke’s ‘sensation’ and ‘reflection’; all reality was ‘sensation’; 274; he was strongly influenced by the method of SEXTUS EMPIRICUS; but he did not want to end in Pyrrhonian scepticism, 275; Hume’s scepticism was only a method in the interest of the psychological ideal of science; he repudiated the dualistic division between ‘sensation’ and reflection; reflection became an image of ‘sensation’; truth has its criterion in the demonstration of the ‘original impressions’ from which an Idea is derived; his notion of ‘impressions’; he does not conceive them in their subjective actuality, but according to their objective content as the elements of phenomena; ideas, or thought and reasoning are derived from sensory ‘impressions’; they are copies of impressions and less sensorily intense; his explanation of ‘false Ideas’, 276; the difference between the ideas of memory and those of fantasy; the phantasm possesses a concept of order excluding arbitrariness; the law of this order is that of necessary connection or association; Ideas are simple or complex; the complex ideas are partly based on sensorily perceived relations between impressions; impressions are either simple or complex; all associations obey the law of resemblance, spatial and temporal coherence (contiguity), the law of cause and effect, 277; they are purely mechanical laws and concern only the so-called ‘natural relations between the Ideas; their products are the complex ideas of relations, substances and modi, i.e., the ordinary objects of our thoughts and judgments; the imagination produces associations on the basis of sensory relations and exceed
that which is given; they may go astray; there are “natural” and “philosophical” relations; the latter compare Ideas or impressions not connected by association; there are six classes of philosophical relations (278) in this classification; the basic mathematical principles have become psychological ones, and so have the laws of logic, philosophical relations are either variable or invariable; the latter are the ground of certain knowledge; certain, because unchangeable and directly perceivable together with their terms without reasoning; reasoning always consists in a succession of Ideas; they fall under the province of intuition rather than under that of demonstration; the same thing is true for the variable relations of identity, time, and place, 279; natural relations rest on a veritable association in the sequence of Ideas; on the ground of the causal relation those of time, place, and identity can exceed the directly given sensory datum and play a part in the associational process of thought; HUME’s criticism of mathematics; contradictory interpretations of HUME’s critique of mathematics: RIEHL, WINDELBAND, 280; he doubted the claims of mathematics to exact knowledge; mathematics belongs to the knowledge of relations, not of facts; in his Enquiry he says: though there were never a circle or a triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by EUCLID, would for ever retain their certainty and evidence, 281; his Treatise contains very contradictory statements; the method to solve this riddle; HUME’s contrast between “matters of fact” and “relations of Ideas” is not Lockian; HUME’s “reflection” is an “image” of sensation; many complex Ideas are not due to corresponding ‘impressions’, many ‘complex impressions’ are never reflected exactly in ‘Ideas’, 282; ‘I can imagine a city like the ‘New Jerusalem’, although I have never seen such a city; I have seen Paris but I cannot form such an Idea of it that is adequate to reality; all judgments that are
not pure copies of the original impressions must relinquish their claim to certainty
and exactitude; if mathematics goes beyond the sensory limits it has no claim
to universally valid truth; all universal ideas are merely particular ones under
a universal name evoking other individual ideas in the imagination resembling
the first, 283; everything in nature is individual; this inclines to radical
sensationalism; the conception of space is the copy of sensory impressions of
‘coloured points’, Hume’s basic denominator is ‘visual and tactual meaning’;
coloured points are minima sensibilia, their sensory relation is reflected in the
concept of space as a mere copy of them; these points must possess a sensory
extension which is no longer divisible, 285; a mathematical point without any
extension must be an absurdity to Hume, even in the ‘order of thought’; the
concept of mathematical equality; of straight lines; curves; planes, etc.; they
are useful fictions; the first principles (of maths) are founded on the imagination
and the senses; the conclusion, therefore, can never go beyond, much less
contradict these faculties, 285; Hume’s concept of time; this ‘Idea’ is formed
out of the sequence of changing sensory ‘impressions’ and ‘Ideas’; five notes
played on a flute give us the impression and the concept of time; all false
concepts in mathematics arise through the natural associations of resemblance,
contiguity and causality, 286; arithmetical unity is the copy of a single
‘impression’; number as unity in the quantitative relations is a fiction; a real
unity must be indivisible and incapable of being resolved into any lesser unity;
a sum of units can only be grounded on a sensory relation between individual
impressions, 287; the ‘coloured points of space’, the minima sensibilia; he
reduces original numerical meaning to ‘sensory impression’; but sensory
multiplicity pre-supposes the original modus of number; in Hume arithmetical
laws are psychical laws; if this were true, arithmetic would have to relinquish
any claim to being an exact science; Hume shrank back from such a conclusion;
his ‘Enquiry concerning human understanding’ relapses into the Lockian
position, 288; mathematical exactitude and independence of sensory
impressions only has a pragmatic validity; faith in mathematics is to be explained
from imagination and the laws of psychological association; these laws are to
arrest radical Pyrrhonist scepticism; psychological thought is Hume’s
Archimedean point; his criticism of the substance concept and his interpretation
of naive experience, 289; he insisted that naive experience is not a theory of
reality, but must be explained in terms of a natural impulse of human feeling;
nothing is given in experience but the multiplicity of sensory impressions, 290;
Hume rejected Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities;
his positivistic psychologism had no recourse to a metaphysical theology to
explain our belief in an external world; ‘Ding an sich’ is a product of imagination;
‘natural associations’, resting on the temporal succession of Ideas lead fantasy
beyond what has been given and metaphysics to its false substance concept;
common sense (i.e. naive experience) or ‘the vulgar view’ derives its belief in
the external world from sensory impressions and true philosophy has to indicate
these impressions; metaphysics merely relates ‘natural associations’ to a false
concept (substance), 291; the constancy and coherence of our sense
impressions are the foundation of our naive faith in a world independent of our
consciousness, 292; we speak of an identical thing, but the only data we have
are similar impressions, separated in time but united by associational relations;
Hume absolutizes the sensory aspect of experience; he desired to explain the
claim to logical exactitude of so-called ‘creative mathematical thought’ in terms
of psychology, 293; he places sovereign psychological thought as such above
the ‘creative’ fantasy; the creative power of this thought is imputed to the faculty of the imagination; this thought is Arché, origin and law-giver of the cosmos of experience; but HUME fails to account for this transcendental Idea of Origin, because he had not yet arrived at transcendental critical self-reflection; his laws of association serve as lex continui, as the foundation of reality; he also destroyed the concept of the spiritual substance, 294; the conflict between materialism and idealism is one between ‘brothers of the same house’; SPINOZA was an atheist to the idealists because he did not believe in a soul-substance; then the idealistic metaphysics of the immortal soul is also atheistic; HUME asserted that the universe of our experience is resolved into impressions and Ideas derived from them; the ego is merely a collective concept of the series of Ideas ordered constantly in accordance with the laws of association, 295; the mind itself is not really a theatre for ‘impressions’, but consists in nothing else but ‘perceptions’; the ‘ego’ is an illusion; identity is merely a quality we attribute to different perceptions when we reflect upon them; in HUME the psychological science-ideal has destroyed the personality ideal in its foundation, 296; causality had been an ‘eternal logical truth’ to the mathematical science ideal; LEIBNIZ called it a ‘factual verity’; HUME did not distinguish between naïve experience and natural science in a fundamental sense; experience goes beyond the given sen-
sory impressions; then epistemological judgments of supposed universal validity and necessity are given with reference to the sensory impressions; we conclude from a sensorily given fact to another fact that is not given, with the aid of the principle of the connection of cause and effect; its foundation can only be sought in the relations of impressions; two relations: contiguity and priority in time of one event before another, 297; but the Idea of causality very decidedly goes beyond these sensory relations; a judgment of causality does not state a mere post hoc, but is intended to indicate a propter hoc; there is no object which as a ‘cause’ would logically imply the existence of any other object; the denial of a necessary connection between cause and effect does not lead to a single logical contradiction; we remember that after the sensory perception of fire we have regularly experienced the sensation of warmth; thereby is discovered the constant connection of two sorts of impressions that follow each other in time; in this relation there is nothing in itself implying an objectively valid necessity; from the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there will never arise any new original Idea such as that of a necessary connection, 298; but the constant resemblance in the different instances does raise a new subjective impression in the mind, namely a tendency to pass over from an instantly given impression to the Idea of another impression which in the past repeatedly occurred after the former; this is the impression corresponding to the Idea of causality; in his ‘Inquiry’ he immediately introduces habit in connecting Ideas as a natural law; this habit compels us to join the Idea of an event B repeatedly following the same event A, with the Idea of the latter, 299; the ‘propter hoc’ can never be demonstrated or understood rationally, it can only be believed; this faith is some feeling accompanying our Idea; HUME’s acknowledgment destroys the foundation of the psychical laws of association as laws of human nature; but HUME appeals to these laws in a purely dogmatic fashion; he shook the pillars of the personality ideal and of the science-ideal as well; he levelled the modal boundaries between the different law-spheres, and was involved in antinomies, 300; he did not understand that only theoretical thought is in a position to isolate the psychical aspect of reality; a concept is to him a mere copy of a psychical impression, thus he reduced the logical aspect to the psychical aspect; his basic denominator for all given reality was not psychical, but psychological, 301; HUME undermined the claim to truth made by his own theory; he recognized a relative meaning-diversity in the cosmos within his absolutized psychical sphere; ‘pleasure and pain constitute the very essence of beauty and deformity’; his mechanistic theory of the emotions; this theory was the foundation of his ethics and his theoretical view of faith; the laws of association are his explanatory principles; these laws are founded in the principle of the uniformity of human nature at all times, 302; primary impressions (of sensory perceptions) and pain and pleasure); secondary or reflective impressions (the emotions); calm and vehement emotions; direct and indirect passions; the selfhood cannot be the cause but only the object of a passion, 303; in pride and humility the selfhood is the object; in hate and love others are the objects; on the validity of the laws of association, 304; in his psychological mechanism there is no room for freedom of the will; ‘res cogitans’ the selfhood concentrated in its mathematical thought as a substance was destroyed by HUME’s psychological criticism; he conceives of the will as a mere impression felt in corporeal motion or in the production of a new Idea in our mind, 305; he thought his doctrine of the psychological necessity of human actions to be essential both for morality and religion; his philosophy was the
prelude to the shift of primacy from the nature motive to the freedom motive; he taught that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will, 306; nor can it oppose passion in the direction of the will; reason is and ought to be the slave of passion; even causal natural scientific thought cannot influence nor activate the will; where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connexions, discovered by reason, can never give them any influence; action only arises from an emotion; nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion but a contrary impulse; the rationalist prejudice is rejected that the decisions of the will are determined by theoretical Ideas, 307; he sharply distinguished that which ‘is’ from that which ‘ought to be’; this implies the contrast between scientific thought and ethical action; ethics cannot be proven logico-mathematically; if mathematical thought could prove ethics, the character of virtue and vice must lie in certain relations between the objects, or they are ‘matters of fact’ discoverable by scientific reasoning, 308; if virtue were discoverable through thought, it would be either an object of mathematical science, or of natural science; rationalists think that ethical norms can be proven a priori and ‘more geometrico’; HUME derives vice and virtue from feelings of pain and pleasure; this is antinomous; he explains that pleasure is a general term for very different ‘feelings’; e.g. aesthetic feeling and that of taste are mutually irreducible;
but Hume’s mechanistic theory of human nature destroys the foundation for all normative imputation, 309; the basis of normative ethical distinctions is the moral sense; a particular moral feeling is due to moral impressions; the sense of virtue is a feeling of satisfaction from the contemplation of a character; the fact that such a character pleases in a particular way makes us feel that it is virtuous; the motives of acts, even of moral acts, remain a-normative in Hume; acts are hedonistically determined; here is a tendency to withdraw the personality ideal from the grasp of the science ideal, 310; he criticized the doctrine of natural law and the contractual view of the State; he appealed to the psychical condition of primitive people; his criticism of the contractual view aimed a blow at the mathematical ideal of science; his connection with the Tory party; primitive people cannot comprehend obedience to political authority in terms of an abstract contract of individuals; he pointed out that the obligation arising out of agreement is not of a natural but of a conventional character, 311; a contract cannot precede the establishment of an ordered community and the institutions of the state; he replaced the contract theory - generally justifying the state along the mathematical logical path - by a psychological conception; in his ‘The Original Contract’ he assumed an original equality of men, hence an original consent of individuals to subject to authority; such equality is not conceived in mathematical exactitude; the original agreement was psychological and intermittent, in terms of the impressions of necessity and utility in a given situation, for the sake of submitting to somebody of eminent qualities; frequent recurrence of such situations gave rise to a custom of obedience, 312; the right of authority is due to the influence of time on the human soul; utility breeds the impulse to obey; Hume made the doctrine of natural law cave in under his critique, 313; Hume’s influence on Kant was only restricted in scope, 334; Hume sought the moral faculty in the moral sentiment, 338; in the third period of Kant’s development he followed Hume in reducing all synthetical propositions to the sensory aspect, qualifying them as ‘empirical judgments’, 341; Hume’s critique of the principle of causality stimulated Kant to demonstrate the transcendental-logical character of the synthetical categories, 353.

Hume David, II,
A Treatise of Human Nature, 331;
cf. 12, 86, 96, 332, 333, 350, 430, 494.
Hume David, II, psychologizes mathematics; this leads to antinomy, 46; he refuted the view of space as an a priori receptacle, 96; he provided Kant with psychologicist epistemology, 494; his definition of the imagination, and that of Kant, 515.
Hume David, III, his psychologicist notion of substance, 27.

Hundeshagen, III, emphasizes the fact that Calvin recognizes the functions that the Church has in all the spheres of human societal life, 520.

Husserl, Edmund, I,
Ideen zu einer Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, 52;
Logische Untersuchungen, 73;
Die Pariser Vorträge, 213;
Cartesianische Meditationen, 213.
Husserl, Edmund, I, in the phenomenological attitude the absolute ‘cogito’ is opposed to the ‘world’ as the intentional ‘Gegenstand’ which is dependent on
the cogito, 52; the modal diversity of meaning can be transcended by means of a formalized logical totality-concept; thus he arrived at the ‘formal logical’ relation ‘whole and its parts’ which is to be purified from any non-logical speciality of meaning; then he can formulate different purely logical propositions and definitions by means of the concept ‘logical foundation’; but the proposition: ‘the whole is more than its parts’ is not purely analytic; HUSSERL's concept of the whole is taken in the special sense of mathematics, which he considers to be reducible to pure logic, 73, 74 (note); the concept ‘whole’ remains enclosed in the analytical aspect which pre-supposes the inter-modal coherence; it cannot be a transcendental idea of totality; his formalized concept of the whole is conceived in the special sense of pure mathematics which he reduces to pure logic, 74; his ‘egology’ excludes the existence of limits for the ‘transcendental cogito’, 91; his ‘absolute consciousness’ is a speculative metaphysical concept, 92; his ‘eidetic logic’; direct intuition of the essence by an ‘uninterested observer’ in the ‘epoche’ can give an adequate essential description of the act-life of man in the intentional relation to the world, 213; considers his phenomenology to be the foundation of philosophy, 543, 544.

HUSSERL, EDMUND, II,
Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, 17, 18, 27, 29, 452, 453, 454, 543;
Logische Untersuchungen, 27, 28, 224, 450, 452, 453, 454, 457, 459;
Cartesianische Meditationen, 489, 538, 543, 544, 549, 584;
cf. 462, 468, 487, 488, 558, 560, 569.

HUSSERL, EDMUND, II, his theory of ‘regions’, 17; the 12th and 13th sections of his ‘Ideen’, and scholastic logic, obscuring the boundaries of the modal aspects, 18; Sinn (= meaning) and Bedeutung (= signification) -are identified; meaning is the pure act in its noetic and noematical aspects, 27; noetic consciousness is absolute, the residue of the destruction of the
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in connection with music, drama, etc.; gramophones; there is a secondary radical type: works of art, 110; a sculpture is an interlacement between a subjective material structure (marble) and an aesthetically qualified objective structure; the biotic function in a sculpture, 111; implied in its objective sensory perceptibility; there are abstract sculptural artefacts, 112; the Abbild-relation; the artist's aesthetic conception; RICKERT's view rejected, 113; the latent objective aesthetic function of a natural thing and the subject-object relation; the observer's task of deepening his own natural aesthetic vision, 114; the thing structure has no meaning, apart from its aesthetical totality; the merely intentional character of an object of fantasy; PRAXITELES has projected his Hermes as a merely intentional visionary object, 115; the sensory image of the Hermes is an intentional visionary object bound to the plastic hohizon; the sculpture's reality is the representation of the fancied thing structure; it is not the aesthetic objectification of the aesthetic subject function of the artist; it can only function in an intentional aesthetic subj.-object relation, 116; the organic vital function is implicitly intended in the artist's productive fantasy, and this intention is realized in the thing, viz. the statue, 117; the typical foundational function of this sculpture; this is not the marble, 118; marble is a phenotype of an original genotype of inorganic matter; the sensory objectified fantasy form is not the typical substratum of the sculpture; the marble is a: dynameion, 119; the marble is a bare material for the aesthetic expression; the sculpture's objective sensory image is not original but representational; the artist's plastic activity is an original free formation pointing beyond the sensory aspect; the sensory figure is anticipatory; the sculpture has a typical historical foundational function, 120; the nuclear type of individuality of the statue is its objective historical structural function; the inner articulation of its genotype: plastic work of art; pictorial, mimic, sculptural types; sculptured figures and deities; phenotypes: marble, bronze, etc.; style is a typical historical analogy in aesthetic structures; there is no style in nature; free art is not enclosed in an enkaptic structural whole lacking aesthetic qualification, 121; the term 'radical type' used in a modified sense with respect to products of human formation; music, literature, 122; classification of fine arts; interlacement of natural and aesthetic structures, 123; marble is an aggregate, the work of art is an unbreakable non-homogeneous whole determined by its inner structural law; marble is a variability type of calcium carbonate forming a homogeneous aggregate; its cultural form in a statue is not homogeneous, 124; the marble's physico-chemical processes are directed by the artist's technique in an anticipatory way to the aesthetic expression without being destroyed; this figure is enkapsis; there should be no dualism, 125; the artist has to open the natural structure of his material through the aesthetic structure of his work, 126; the terms 'form' and 'matter'; a variability type points to an enkapsis of structural principles, 127; there is an irreversible foundational relationship between the natural and the aesthetically qualified thing structures, 128; the wood of a piece of furniture in a tree; when sawn to planks the wood displays a secondary natural structure, 129; its ontic status is not on a level with that of, e.g., the shell of a molusc., 130; the physico chemical properties have been put under the guidance of the vital function in a living tree; resulting in a variability type of wood; planks are semi-manufactured material as the foundation of the structure of furniture; semi-products have no leading function, 131, 132; different materials may be utilized in the same chair, etc.; their inner structure remains distinct from the internal structure of the chair; its pre-technical modi have only an anticipating
type of individuality; e.g. numerical and spatial relations; physico-chemical properties; the technical project; subjective and objective functions, 133; weight, bearing power suit its typical objective destination; a chair is a seat: a biotic characteristic; a cultural need of man, 134; subject-object relations are typical anticipations; logic modus; implicit pre-theoretical analysis; explicit theoretical analysis; its sensory perceptible traits are implicitly conceived in an anticipatory sense; the general idea of the word chair does not exceed the naive concept, 135; the individual identity of the parts of a chair cannot be essential to that of the whole; a dog's use of a chair is without awareness of its structural meaning; at least if man is civilized he realizes this meaning, 137; the genotype furniture; their leading function is social; free and applied (or bound) art; handwork served as the historical occasion for the rise of independent plastic art, 138; mass production, bad taste and the pursuit of gain and architecture a work of architecture is bound to the structure of the building, as a social cultural object; the aesthetic aspect is subordinate to the social function, 140; furniture style has a bound character; Louis XIV style, 141, 142; useful objects belong to the radical type of the kingdom of historically founded, objectively and socially qualified utensils; the difference between a thing's structural destination and our subjective end in using it; an
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KAMPSCHULTE, III, this Roman-Catholic writer holds that Calvin seeks the sovereignty over the Church in the collective will of the Church members, 520, 521; his quotations from Calvin are to prove that the Reformer started from the principle of the sovereignty of the congregation, but are irrelevant or prove the very opposite, 546.

einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 336;
Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, 336, 340;
Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundätze der natürlichen Theologie
und Moral, 336, 337;
Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, 338;
Vom ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenenden im Raume, 342, 343;
Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik, 333, 334, 340, 346;
Physische Monadologie, 33;
De Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio, 335;
Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen metaphysik, 107, 159, 162, 344;
De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350;
Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus, 347;
Kritik der Urteilskraft, 354, 357, 369, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 384, 385, 392, 401;
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 65, 75;
Vom ewigen Frieden, 469;
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 354, 357, 369, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 384, 385, 392, 401;
Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, 529;
Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 529;
Gedanken von den wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte, 547.

KANT, IMMANUEL, I. *Time* is a transcendental form of intuition, coordinated with
space, the form of intuition, 27; number originates from a schematizing category
of quantity in time, 2; Kantian epistemology is involved in a theoretical
dogmatism, because it starts from the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical
thought, 35; since Kant the religious background to the Humanistic ideal of
science and personality has found expression in the basic motive of nature
and freedom, 36; he is the father of critical-transcendental philosophy; he sought
a starting-point in theoretical reason as the basis of every possible theoretical
synthesis; his ‘Gesinnungsethik’ rationalizes the ‘disposition of the heart’ as
the criterion of morality; he absolutized the moral aspect, (note) 49; he identifies
the act of thinking with a purely psychical temporal event, the ‘Gegenstand’ to
the ‘transcendental-logical cogito’; his dualistic view of reality, 50, 51; his
‘transcendental-logical unity of apperception’ is a subjective pole of thought in
the ‘Verstand’ (i.e. the logical function of thinking); representation, i.e. concepts
of empirical Gegenstände, must be accompanied by the ‘I think’ if they are to
be my representations; the ‘cogito’ can never be a ‘Gegenstand’ of the
‘transcendental-logical subject of thought’, 53; we do not possess real
self-knowledge, for knowledge is concerned with the forms of intuition and the
logical categories in connection with the sensory world; the
transcendental-logical ego remains caught in the logical pole of the theoretical
Gegenstand relation, the counter pole is the non-logical aspect of sense
perception, 54; theoretic self-reflection in thought pre-supposes self-knowledge,
the concentric direction of theoretic thought can only start from the ego; Kant
has overlooked this truth, 55; his motive of nature and freedom, 62; Kant’s
verdict: the antinomy cannot be solved, 65; Kant deprives nature (in the
natural-scientific sense) of all divine character and even denies its divine origin;
God is a postulate of practical reason, i.e., 67; of autonomous morality, which

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is completely dominated by the Humanistic freedom motive, 68; his distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments, 73; the unity of reason was dissolved by KANT in the dualism of theoretical and practical reason, 75; in his epistemology he calls ‘reality’ one of the ‘categories of modality’, 76; KANT’s ‘transcendental-logical subject’ and THEODOR LITT’s, 78; the tri-unity of the transcendental Ideas: the idea of the universe - of the ultimate unity of human selfhood - and of the absolute Origin; they are the hypothesis of every philosophy, which fact KANT does not recognize, nor does he realize that the theoretical ideas have a content depending on supra-theoretic pre-suppositions; he restricts their significance to their purely formal-logical regulative systematic function; the deeper reason for his view was his awareness of the unbridgeable antithesis in the basic motive of nature and freedom, and he refused to attempt a dialectical synthesis; his conception of the autonomy and spontaneity of the transcendental logical function was ruled by the freedom motive; the nature motive found expression (89) in his view of the purely receptive character of sensory perception subjected to the causal determinations of science; he accepted the a priori relatedness of the transcendental categories to sensory experience, but rejected this synthesis in his ethics; his ‘dialectic of pure reason’; the transcendental ideas point to the transcendent realm of the ‘noumenon’ in which the ideas of free autonomous will and of God have ‘practical reality’; theoretical thought has no other limits than its bond with sensory perception; freedom is dialectically related to causality and is the hypothesis of transcendental logic, 90; the same Idea obtains ‘practical reality’ for ‘reasonable belief’
in de Krit. d. pr. Vern., 91; his hypostatization of ‘theoretical reason’ as the self-sufficient Archimedean point of philosophy eliminates the cosmic temporal order; it was the source of subjectivism in the development of philosophic thought; his ‘Copernican revolution’ proves the impossibility of a truly critical critique of theoretic reason apart from the insight into the cosmic time order; he wants the reader to accept nothing as given except reason itself; this amounts to an abdication from the preliminary questions of critical thought, 107; in his ‘theoretical’ philosophy the subject is only epistemological, the Archè of the form of the theoretical laws of nature; the ‘transcendental subject’ is lawgiver of nature; pre-psychical reality is a synthesis of logical and sensory functions of consciousness; their modal and structural laws are replaced by a-priori transcendental forms of theoretical understanding and of sensibility in an a priori synthesis; in his ‘practical’ philosophy the subject is homo noumenon (pure will), the autonomous law-giver for moral life, 109; his epistemology has a theoretical dogmatic character, 118; his ‘critical’ standpoint; the ‘universally valid’ transcendental subject, stripped of all individuality is the formal origin of the real ‘Gegenstand’ of knowledge; his theoretical Idea (130) of the totality of reality was viewed by KANT as essentially an infinite task for thought, 131; the ideal of personality gained the upperhand over the Humanistic science ideal of the intellectualistic Enlightenment, viz., in KANT’s primacy of the practical reason, 137; KANT’s ‘homo noumenon’ is a synthetical hypostatization of the ethical function of personality; theoretical thought is ethically determined, 143; ‘universally valid’ is independent of all ‘empirical subjectivity’, valid for the ‘transcendental consciousness’, the ‘transcendental cogito’, which is the origin of all universal validity; the synthetic a-priori, making objective experience possible, is universally valid; perception has merely ‘subjective validity’; he distinguished judgments of perception from judgments of experience, 158; the former require no pure concept of the understanding but only the logical connection of perceptions in a thinking subject; the latter require special concepts originally produced in the understanding as well as the representations of the sensory intuition; ‘the sun heats the stone’ is merely subjectively valid, but if I say: ‘the sun causes the heat of the stone’, I add the concept of the understanding (viz. causality) to perception, and the judgment becomes universally valid, 159; the datum of experience is chaotic and must be formed by the transcendental consciousness to an objective coherent reality; the secondary qualities are merely ‘subjective’, 161; he eradicates the difference between theoretical knowledge and pre-theoretical experience, 162; since KANT the transcendental basic Idea of Humanistic thought has to be designated as the motive of nature and freedom, 190; the Idea of a personal God was accepted as a postulate of practical reason by KANT, 191; he criticized the Humanistic metaphysics of nature, 203; the extremely refined antinomies hidden in LEIBNIZ’ haughty metaphysics were scrutinized by KANT in his ‘Kritik d.r. Vern.’ in order to uproot the primacy of the ideal of science, 261; KANT did not make any fundamental distinction between naïve experience and natural science, 297; KANT was the first to undertake the actio finium regundorum against the primacy of the science-ideal over the personality ideal, 310; perhaps KANT was influenced by the fourth book of ROUSSEAU’s Emile where sensory nature was opposed to the feeling of freedom, 316 (note); the general will in which every citizen encounters his own will, cannot do any injustice to any one: volenti non fit injuria, 323; KANT’s philosophy inaugurated the phase of ‘transcendental freedom-idealism’; the ideal of science is limited to the world of
sense-phenomena; the root of human personality is sought in the normative ethical function of its free will; there is a growing self-reflection of Humanism on the religious foundations of its philosophic attitude, 325; RICHARD KRÖNER holds that KANT was the first to have expressed the intrinsic spirit of the Christian faith within a so-called philosophical life- and world view; he conceived of God no longer as an objective Idea, Pure Form, First Cause and Substance, but rather out of the depth of the ethical-religious life'; Roman Catholic thinkers consider German Idealism since KANT as the philosophical expression of the Reformed view of the relation between God and His creation, 326; KANT has been historically influenced by Puritanism and Pietism; his transcendental basic Idea is ruled by the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; criticistic idealism has deeply influenced the philosophical thought of Protestantism; this fact reveals the invasion of the Scholastic spirit of accommodation originating from the basic motive of nature and grace in its nominalistic conception; this motive impeded the inner reformation of philosophical thought; in KANT’s phil. the Humanistic ideal of personality awakens from its lethargy, 327; the freedom-Idea in KANT is religious totality and Origin of meaning; RICHARD HÖNIGWALD on the conception of the Idea as the embodiment of the Humanistic personality-Ideal; this development starts with KANT’s Kritik d.r. Vern.,
KANT struggled with various motives, viz. in NEWTON's natural science, and the Enlightenment, LEIBNIZ-WOLFF metaphysics of the mathematical science-ideal, in HUME's psychologism, in Rousseau's free personality; Puritanism and Pietism ruled his rigorous attitude towards sensory human nature, 330; he tried to find a scientific foundation for his moral and religious conviction, and began to realize that the speculative metaphysical mathematical science-ideal was no use in this attempt; but he still held the spirit of the Enlightenment in high esteem, 331; he repeated DESCARTES' motto: ‘Give me matter and I will build a world from it’; he never repudiated the spirit of NEWTON; his doubt only concerned the metaphysics of the mathematical science-ideal; he was deeply moved by Rousseau's proclamation of the freedom of human personality from the subjection to science; this influence was decisive, 332; in his ‘Dreams of a visionary’ he confesses that his disdain for ‘the mob who do not know anything’ has vanished and that Rousseau has set him right; he has learned to honour men; ‘true wisdom is the companion of simplicity and with it the heart lays down the law to the understanding, it generally renders the elaborate equipment of learning superfluous'; with Socrates he says: (333), ‘How many things there are that I do not need at all!’ This means the end of the domination of the science-ideal in KANT's thought; his humorous criticism of SWEDENBORG was turned against rationalistic metaphysics (LEIBNIZ, WOLFF); like Rousseau and Hume, KANT conceived of the personality ideal as the function of feeling; theoretical metaphysics was intended to criticize the foundations and limits of mathematical knowledge of nature; he did not reduce causality to the succession of psychical Ideas like Hume, nor did he follow Rousseau's complete degradation of the mathematical science-ideal, 334; he tried to limit mathematical and causal thinking to sensory experience; in his Physische Monadologie he differentiated between Leibnizian metaphysics and the mathematical conception of space; he opposed WOLFF's attempt to derive causality from the logical principle of contradiction; with Crusius he distinguished between ‘logical ground’ and ‘ground of being”; he rejected the ontological proofs of the existence of God; but he still held to WOLFF's metaphysics which would furnish a priori knowledge from mere concepts; the 'metaphysical' root and origin cannot be derived from the logical unthinkable of the opposite; KANT held that metaphysical being can be ascertained by logical thought only in the judgment of identity, 335; the different methods of mathematics and of metaphysics; mathematical definitions are synthetical, metaphysical definitions are analytical; mathematics creates its own Gegenstand, its definitions come first; in metaphysics the concepts of things are given, definitions come at the end; the true method of metaphysics is like Newton's method of mathematical physics, 336; ‘hypotheses non fingo’ was Newton's adage: natural laws formulated with the aid of mathematical thought must in the last analysis be subjected to the test of experience; the causes of phenomena cannot be devised by thinking; even mathematical thought remains bound to the confines of sense experience; KANT accepted this view, thereby implying that the line of demarcation between the methods of mathematics and philosophy in his writings of 1763 was not definitive; with him the science-ideal, at least partially, still has the primacy in the sense formulated by Newton, 337; he rejects the freedom of the will; under the influence of English psychologism KANT distinguishes the knowing faculty representing what is true and the power to distinguish what is good; the latter is the moral sentiment (cf. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume); ‘the judgment: “this is good”, is wholly incapable of
demonstration, and an immediate effect of the consciousness of the feeling of
the pleasure we take in the idea of the object'; the first principles of 'natural
theology'; they are capable of moral certainty only insofar as they are concerned
with God's freedom in action, His justice, and goodness; K. took the path of
psychologism; cf. his 'Considerations on the feeling of the beautiful and the
sublime'; ethics is based on the feeling of beauty (SHAFTESBURY); KANT made
CRUSIUS' distinction between the logical ground of knowledge and the ground
of being the foundation of his critical investigations, 339; he affirmed that in
physics the terms negative and positive have an entirely different significance
from that ascribed to them in logic and mathematics; in his third period KANT
was close to HUME's scepticism, and ROUSSEAU's thought led KANT to
emancipate the science-ideal from the grasp of theoretical metaphysics; K.
introduced the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, 340;
he considered all synthetical propositions to be concerned with sensory
experience, i.e., to be 'empirical' judgments; thus he was sceptical with respect
to the universally valid foundations of mathematical physics; physical 'causality';
its principle is not universally valid or necessary; then he saw that such
scepticism would destroy the very foundations of mathematics, 341; he was
now interested in the relation of space and time to real things; he defended
NEWTON's and EULER's mathematical doctrine of 'ab-
solute pure space' against LEIBNIZ' conception that space is nothing but an 'a priori order of possible coexistences'; space is not the product of the relations of material parts, but the pre-requisite for the relations of spatial things to each other; but he did not take over NEWTON's absolute space as 'sensorium Dei', 342; he discovered the mathematical antinomies; he rejected NEWTON's and EULER's view and accepted that of LEIBNIZ: 'space and time' are a priori forms of pure thought, 343; K. did not ascribe any value to the metaphysical application of LEIBNIZ' creative a priori concepts of the mind; in a new schema he coordinated space and time with actuality, possibility, necessity, etc.; he reckoned all of them to ontology, related to the rest of philosophy as mathesis pura to mathesis applicata, 344; in his inaugural address at Königsberg University KANT called space and time 'conceptus singulares' and also 'intuitus singulares puri'; he opposed them to 'conceptus universales' acquired by abstraction; there is only one space and one time, including all limited spaces and all finite periods of time as their parts; this new conception marks a reaction against theoretical metaphysics on the part of KANT's gradually maturing new conception of the personality ideal, 345; his inaugural address makes the important distinction between the sphere of sensory phenomena and the intelligible world; the value of personality is not dependent on scientific thought; K. still adhered to the sentimental religion and ethics of Rousseau and the English psychologists; but pietistic motives made KANT increasingly more suspicious of sensory human nature, 346; it became impossible to harmonize the sensory nature of man with the Idea of normative autonomous freedom; his pessimism of the 'radical evil'; nature as the sole experienceable reality is degraded to 'mundus sensibilis'; space is a synthetical form of the 'outer sense', time of the 'inner sense': both are necessary conditions for sensory experience, 347; the 'Dinge an sich' are fundamentally excluded from the sphere of experience; mathematics and natural science are therefore, limited to the phenomenon; corporeal things fill mathematical space; space is an a priori form of intuition; the usus logicus of logical understanding; the usus realis, 348; the intelligible world is that of the 'Dinge an sich' as the new conception of the personality ideal; our pure autonomous will, only determined by the form of moral legislation, is itself an 'example of an Idea of freedom, of an intelligible substance'; two tasks performed by metaphysics: an elenctic and a dogmatic one; knowledge from concepts of the mind is only 'cognitio symbolica'; he denied to theoretical metaphysics every mode of intuitive adequate knowledge; he rejects LEIBNIZ and WOLFF's view that sensory knowledge is a 'cognitio confusa'; KANT holds that sensory intuitions of space and time furnish us with the most distinct cognitions of all, namely the mathematical ones'; the 'mundus intelligibilis' is Civitas Dei; he identifies it with the mundus moralis; God is the 'practical original Being', this is the moralistic ideal of personality, 350; the idea of the autonomous self-determination of personality became KANT's hypothesis of theoretical knowledge; the discovery of the antinomies of theoretical metaphysics was the occasion of his transition to critical Idealism; the real motive was religious; the intellect is law-giver to 'nature'; in the spontaneity of the intellect is expressed the sovereign value of the personality; his letter to MARKUS HERZ in 1772; the intellect possesses an 'usus realis' in the a priori foundation of the 'mundus visibilis'; the problem of the a priori synthesis, 351; universally valid experience is identical with 'Gegenstand', and the latter with 'objectivity' in KANT; on what is the relation between our representation and the Gegenstand (object) based? This Gegenstand is a chaotic mass of experience,
of intermingled sense impressions; but they are received in the a priori forms of intuition, space and time; our representations of things in the external world are syntheses of our consciousness; the universal validity of such syntheses originates from the a priori function of pure logical understanding with its categories; KANT developed the programme of the Transcendental Analytic, 352; the central problem of his critical work is that of the possibility of synthetical judgments a priori; he soon found the metaphysical deduction of the categories; his system of the Critique of Pure Reason took nine years to elaborate; the difficulty was the ‘transcendental deduction’, which was to explain why the categories are necessarily related to the ‘Gegenstand’; in the ‘transcendental deduction the foundations of the mathematical and natural scientific pattern of knowledge were at stake; the core of his Critique is found in the Dialectic of Pure Reason, 353; he wished to open the way for the a priori rational faith in the reality of the autonomous freedom of the personality by denying the claims of theoretical metaphysics; his three ‘Critiques’ are one whole; his ‘Copernican Deed’ is the reversal of the relation between the knowing subject and empirical reality, 354; this reversal is only significant in the basic structure of KANT’s transcendental ground-Idea; since DESCARTES’ Humanistic philosophy had sought the foundations of reality in the knowing subject
only; but Kant did more than repeat this thought; he withdrew the ‘Ding an sich’ from the domination of the mathematical science ideal and limited theoretical knowledge to sense phenomena in order to safeguard the Humanistic religious freedom motive of the personality ideal, 355; he sought the transcendent root of human existence in the rational-moral function of sovereign personality; with regard to knowledge of nature Kant held to the sovereignty of mathematical thought; but the science ideal cedes its primacy to the ideal of personality; Kant bound mathematical and natural scientific categories to the sensory function of experience, 356; Kant proclaimed the ‘primacy of practical reason’; the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason break the cosmos into the sphere of sensory appearance and that of super-sensory freedom; the ideal of science makes the mind the law-giver of nature, since it constitutes empirical reality as ‘Gegenstand’; but this ideal is not permitted to apply its categories outside of sensory experience; in the realm of freedom the homo noumenon is the sovereign (i.e. the hypostatized rational-moral function); the noumenon is a self-sufficient metaphysical reality, but it avenges itself by logical formalism in ethical questions, 357; Kant’s ‘transcendental unity of apperception’; its relation to the absolutely autonomous moral freedom is unclarified; his ‘transcendental cogito’ has no metaphysical meaning; but it does not belong to the phenomenon since he considers it as the formal origin of natural phenomena; the ‘transcendental cogito’ is merely a logical function, 358; it is a pure spontaneity of the uniting act synthesizing the plurality of a possible sensory intuition; a final logical unity in consciousness above all logical multiplicity in concepts; but there cannot be a real unity of self-consciousness in the Kantian conception because of the gulf between ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical reason’; the cogito is lawgiver of ‘nature’; the transcendent subject of autonomous moral freedom is law-giver of human action; the antinomies of natural necessity causal law and norm; natural necessity remains a counterforce against the moral idea of freedom, 359; Kant’s epistemology opposes sensibility to logical understanding; sensibility is purely receptive and an insurmountable limit to the sovereignty of theoretical thought; logical understanding (the ‘Verstand’) is lawgiver in a formal sense only; the material of knowledge remains deeply alogical: the ‘Ding an sich’ behind it can affect sensibility; Ding an sich then is a substance, incompatible with the ‘homo noumenon’ Idea; the ‘Ding an sich’ destroys the sovereignty of thought, 360; Kant tried to avoid the antinomy in his delimitation of the science-ideal by a natural ‘Ding an sich’, in his construction of an ‘intellectus archetypus’, an intuitive Divine Mind creating its Gegenstand in direct non-sensory intellectual intuition, 361; Kant introduced the transcendental Ideas of theoretical reason; the limitation of the categories to the sensory phenomenon makes it impossible for the intellect to conceive of the ‘Ding an sich’ in a positive sense as the absolute; the concept of a noumenon is merely a ‘limiting concept’, 362; he criticized the Leibnizian-Wolffian school in the statement: concepts without sensory intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind; ‘Verstand’ (the understanding) brings unity to the phenomena by means of rules; Reason (‘Vernunft’) creates the unity of the rules of understanding under principles; the reality of ‘things in themselves’ is only secured by ‘practical Reason’ in a-priori faith; the concept of a ‘noumenon’ as the ‘Gegenstand’ of an infinite intuitive intellect; the intellect recognizing the infinity of its task in the determination of the ‘Gegenstand’ submits to ‘theoretical Reason’ with its transcendental Ideas; the latter point the understanding the way to bring unity to its rules; the Transcendental Idea
is the absolutized logical category, 363; ‘Pure reason’ is never related to ‘Gegenstande’ but only to the a-priori concepts of ‘Gegenstände’; KANT’s table of transcendental Ideas of pure Reason; the Idea of a Supreme Being; the Idea of the Soul; that of the universe; that of the Deity; not any transcendental Idea is related to experience; they do not give us scientific knowledge, 364; the ‘dialectical illusion’ arises when theoretical thought supposes it can attain to knowledge of the ‘supra-empirical’; the task of KANT’s Critique; he rejects metaphysical psychology, cosmology and natural theology, in his ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason’ he reduced the rationalist psychology, as theoretical metaphysics, to absurdity and struck at the root of the Cartesian conclusion from the cogito to the esse, 365; the basic theses of metaphysical psychology: the substantiality, immateriality, simplicity, immortality and personality of the ‘thinking ego’; by means of the logical categories these conceptions are based on relating the empty logical form of transcendental self-consciousness to the ‘external world’, to a supra-empirical ‘Gegenstand’; the basic problem of Humanistic metaphysics is the relation of the material substance to the soul substance and became null and void to KANT; this problem he reduces to the relation between subjective psychical phenomena of the ‘inner sense’ (366) and the objective psychical phenomena of the ‘outer sense’; the theoretical function of the
transcendental Idea of the soul; it directs theoretical thought to the homo
noumenon; KANT reduced to absurdity rationalist cosmology, 367; if reason
draws conclusions from the cosmological ideas of the universe with respect to
the ‘Dinge an sich’, it is involved in antinomies; if it is possible to prove both
the thesis and its antithesis of a speculative proposition, the logical principle
of contradiction is violated, and it is evident that the supposed object of such
a proposition cannot be a real ‘object of experience’; KANT posited four
theoretical antinomies: two mathematical and two dynamical antinomies; a
limited or an infinite world in space and time; its divisibility into absolutely single
parts, or the opposite; causality through freedom - or mechanical necessity;
the existence of an absolutely necessary Supreme Being can be proved and
 disproved, 368; KANT’s Ideal of Personality is founded in causality through
freedom, the ‘homo noumenon’ and God as the final hypostasis of the moral
Idea of freedom; he chooses the side of the theses with respect to ‘Dinge an
sich’; and the antitheses with regard to sensory appearance; in this dialectic
of ‘theoretical Reason’ the root and origin of the cosmos is concerned; but then
the insoluble antinomy in his dualistic transcendental basic Idea is in evidence;
this Idea implies ‘purity’, i.e., unconditionedness; thus there arises an
unerasable cleft between the science and the personality ideal, 369; in the
solution of the dynamic antinomies he appeals to the supra-sensory sphere of
human personality in favour of the thesis; in that of the mathematical antinomies
he excludes such an appeal, 370; the reason for this difference; but his
argument is not convincing; LEIBNIZ’ monad is spaceless; KANT’s second
antinomy: every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts and
there exists nowhere anything but the simple and what is composed of it; LEIBNIZ
taught that the series of spatial analysis originates in a noumenon which is
dissimilar to the parts of space; the thesis is: cosmic time originates in eternity
(as timelessness); KANT depreciates the theoretical Idea of God; his own Idea
of God has to pave the way for the practical Idea of the deity as a ‘postulate of
practical reason’; his Krit. d.r. Vern, destroys the entire theologia naturalis, 372;
the kernel of KANT’s transcendental basic Idea is the freedom and autonomy
of the ethical function of personality in its hypostatization as ‘homo noumenon’;
the latter is identified with the moral law, as ‘pure will’; the ego only becomes
an ego when it obeys itself (KRÖNER); the self-legitimating law elevates Reason
above all finite connections; self-consciousness has a vague existence in the
‘transcendental unity of apperception’, but in the Critique of Practical Reason
it discloses its ‘metaphysical root’, 373; his dualistic conception of the selfhood
is antinomous; his logical formalization of ethics and theology; theoretical logic
dominate the ideal of personality as formulated in the categorical imperative,
contrary to KANT’s own intention; the either or between sensory experience
and reason induced him to apply the form-matter schema to the moral principles;
his categorical imperative is a logistic judgement, 374; the transcendental
concept of freedom is merely negative and is to become positive through the
principle of autonomy; but the latter lacks meaningful content which is only a
formal principle; he teaches the self-sufficiency of the homo noumenon; this
makes any moral autonomy of man meaningless; his logistic hypostatization
of the ‘categorical imperative’ only offers ‘stones for bread’; KANT’s Eulogy of
Duty, 375; free personality is an end in itself; man is unholy, but ‘humanity’ in
his person ought to be sacred to him; this ‘human value’ is the sacred ‘homo
noumenon’, the empty formula of the categorical imperative; morality versus
legality, 376; man can be an end in himself only in the subject-object relation;
but not in the religious sphere, because there it would contradict the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of human personality; the religious root of our existence is nothing in itself, because it is the imago Dei; in KANT’s practical philosophy the absolute freedom of the homo noumenon exists by the grace of the same logical understanding that in his epistemology he had bound to the chain of sensory phenomena; this understanding subjects the personality ideal to logical formulization, 377; that which is said generally in the ethical rule (in abstracto) must be applied to an action in concreto by the practical faculty of judgment; a concrete action is always ‘empirically determined’, i.e., belongs to the sensory experience of nature; thus the hypostatization of the moral function is destroyed; KANT’s ‘solution’ of the difficulty, 378; if a subjective maxim of action cannot be thought of in the form of a natural law as a universal law of human action, it is morally impossible; the dualism between ‘nature’ and ‘freedom’ becomes an antinomy, 379; he called psychological freedom - which he subsumed under the mechanism of nature - the freedom of a turnspit, which also executes its movements of its own accord after it is wound up; he rejects the Leibnizian automaton spirituale; God has created man as a homo noumenon, not as phenomenon; according to KANT God cannot be said to be the cause of the sense world and at the same time to be the cause of the existence of the acting being as ‘nou-
menon'; but the ‘causa noumenon’ of sensory actions is merely the absolutized form of the law ‘überhaupt’; here is antinomy; the categorical imperative is the moral law and also the subjective ‘causa noumenon’; the subjective moral volitional function cannot be comprehended as ‘free cause’ because it is dependent on sensory nature; Kroner's attempt to solve this antinomy, 380; the origin of this antinomy is the impossibility of thinking the moral logical form of reason together with its sensorily determined material; in K.'s Dialectic of pure reason the natural scientific category of causality is exclusively related to sensory experience, never to ‘Dinge an sich’; in practical reason K. tried to re-establish the coherence between nature and freedom by means of the concept of the highest good; he observes that the old ethics sought after an ‘object of the will’, 381; in heteronomous ethics the concept of the highest good becomes the ‘unconditioned totality’ of the object of pure practical reason; it pre-supposes the final determinative ground of the moral law; in the concept of the highest good virtue and happiness are necessarily united; this union of virtue and beatitude cannot be conceived analytically, for freedom and nature do not logically follow from each other but rather exclude each other; it can only be thought of synthetically; if happiness is the moving cause of moral action, there is no autonomy; if happiness is the result of moral action (382), the will is directed by the knowledge of natural laws and not by its own moral inclination; this is the ‘antinomy of practical reason’; happiness as the result of moral action is a false thesis only in so far as it considers virtue a cause in the sense world thus ascribing only a phenomenal existence to rational beings; an intelligible Creator may have set moral inclination in a necessary causal coherence with beatitude as its effect in the sense world; K. had hypostatized the moral personality, and the ‘intelligible Creator’ is a postulate to escape his antinomies; this postulate rests on a universally valid and necessary reasonable faith (like two other postulates of practical reason: positive freedom and immortality); nature and freedom are to be brought into a deeper coherence, 383; but then he must abandon the Idea of the ‘homo noumenon’ as ‘Ding an sich’; the intrinsic character of the pure practical reason is autonomy, but this is undermined by K.'s inclusion of happiness as a material determination in the pure moral law; in the concept of the highest good all the antinomies between the personality- and the science-ideal are crowded together; K.'s ‘deity’ as postulate of ‘pure practical reason’ is the final hypostatization of the ideal of personality; this reasonable God is the categorical imperative itself; the principle of morality extends to all beings that have reason and will, even to the infinite Being as Supreme Intelligence; K.'s religion is one within the boundaries of mere Reason, 384; his lack of insight into the essence and starting point of Christian doctrine; the faith of pure reason he supposes to be the kernel of all religious dogmas; the fall into sin is the antagonism between sensory and moral nature; the ‘radical evil’ is the tendency to subject the will to sensory inclinations; regeneration is a free deed of our moral nature through which the good conquers the evil; the God-man is the ‘moral ideal man’, the pre-requisite for regeneration; in the two Critiques (of pure reason, and of practical reason) the antinomy between the science and the personality ideal had remained unsolved; a new attempt was made in the ‘Critique of Judgment’, 385; he acknowledged that the super-sensory ought to influence the sensory world; there must be a ground of unity of the super-sensory lying at the foundation of nature, with the practical content of the freedom-Idea; the concept of this unity has no proper realm, but it must enable us to pass from the
principles of nature to those of freedom; nature must be subsumed under the freedom of reason, 386; only in his aesthetic philosophy KANT recognizes subjective individuality in his doctrine of the creative genius; as a rule he called individuality 'specificity in nature', and identified law and subject; in the 'class of the higher cognitive faculties' there is a link between understanding and reason, viz. the power of judgment (Urteilskraft); it subsumes the particular under the universal laws; it is a 'determining transcendental faculty of judgment' and constitutive for experience, 387; as a 'reflecting faculty it judges the particular in its accommodation to the universal laws given to nature by the understanding in the a priori synthesis; reflecting judgment judges of the particular multiplicity of nature as if a higher than human understanding had given the laws of nature for the benefit of our cognitive faculty in order to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature; the soul has three original faculties: the cognitive, the feeling of pleasure and pain, the desiring faculty; he relates the reflecting judgment to feeling; in every feeling we order an imagined object to an end, 388; the a priori universally valid principle of the reflecting judgment is that of the 'formal teleology of nature'; this transcendental concept of teleology dictates a law to itself in order to judge nature; viz. the law of specification; a mere regulative principle for our view of nature, 389; but the teleological mode of contemplation must not
encroach upon the domain of the science ideal; the connecting link between understanding and reason is a third immanent function of consciousness; the faculty of judgment compares sensory intuition and logical understanding, 390; the Urteilskraft can establish that a given sensory representation has an appropriate accommodation to our understanding; or it can judge that a concept has an appropriate accommodation to the visible reality of an object; in the first case the representation is joined with a feeling of pleasure, it is a teleological representation of an aesthetic character; in the second case the teleology is laid in the thing of nature; hence KANT’s Critique of the aesthetic and that of the teleological judgment, 391; he formulates the dualism between the science- and the personality ideal with great acumen; the Kr. d. Pr. Vern. furnished the idea of causality through freedom; it ought to exist; the Urteilskraft is to furnish the mediating concept in that of a teleology in nature, 392; but the homo noumenon as Ding an sich and its moral freedom are to have unconditional validity; in this way the freedom motive is almost completely reduced to the logical principle of contradiction; human personality as an end in itself enables this motive to escape dissolution into a formal tautology, 393; in nature the living organisms set a limit to causal explanation and thus justify the critique of teleological judgment; a natural organism must be related to itself as cause and effect; it gives ‘objective reality’ to the concept of a goal; the causal coherence in an organism can never be a nexus effectivus; the organism cannot result from an external cause; its causal relation is that of a nexus finalis, in which the effect is a causa finalis; the parts of an organism can only exist through their relation to the whole, and are connected to the unity of the whole through their being the mutual cause and effect of each other’s form, 394; such a teleological union is only known to us from our own human action; we may judge the living organism only as if a teleological activity lay at its foundation; this principle leads to the idea of nature as a ‘universal organism’; everything in the world is good for something whatsoever; nothing in it is aimless; this transcendental Idea only has heuristic value; it results in an ethical teleology, 395; KANT formulates his antinomy as follows: ‘All production of material things is possible according to merely mechanical laws’; and: ‘Some production of the same is not possible according to merely mechanical laws’; the postulate of continuity of the science ideal and that of the personality ideal are irreconcilably antagonistic; KANT ascribes this antinomy to the fact that the autonomy of the reflective faculty of judgment is taken for the heteronomy of the determinative faculty, 396; but this antinomy cannot be solved by referring either of these functions to its own a priori principles; the principle of their compatibility must lie outside both and yet contain the ground of them; this is the supersensory; but we cannot acquire any theoretical knowledge of the supra-sensory substratum of nature, 397; here is evidence of Newton's view of the compatibility of mechanism and divine teleology in nature; KANT says: ‘we may not pretend, however, that there actually exists a particular cause having its determinative ground in the idea of a goal’, 398; ‘there is a certain casualty in the constitution of our understanding’ necessitating a teleological judgment of nature; he contrasts the intuitive Divine understanding which is creative in a material sense, with human understanding which is only creative in a formal sense; sensory material is the ground of all contingency of the particular in nature; our understanding must distinguish between possibility and reality, for it has to rely on logical understanding and sensory intuition; an absolutely intuitive understanding could only know reality; the Idea of the
absolute necessity (uniting possibility and reality) is itself only something possible, as an Idea it is distinct from reality; there is a similar situation with respect to the relation between mechanism and teleology in nature, 399; the principle of teleology remains a fiction, an as-if consideration of human reason; the basic antinomy between the science and the personality ideal remains unsolved; it has everywhere crystallized in the dialectical form-matter schema, 400; but in KANT’s system a teleology can never be a teleology of nature, since the sensory and the supra sensory are divided by an unbridgeable cleft; the merely subjective principle of teleology is related to the sensory material which in this way is subjected to two principles that are mutually exclusive, 401; his dualistic transcendental basic Idea lacks an unequivocal Archimedean point and Idea of totality; the ‘Ding an sich’ of nature continued to be a counter-instance against his moralistic Idea of totality, 402; by the dialectic of theoretical reason with its transcendental Ideas reason is elevated by KANT above the limits of sense experience, 403; a theoretical dialectic with insoluble antinomies is a proof of a speculative misuse of the transcendental Ideas; KANT’s dualism between reason and sensibility, universally valid a priori form and sensory empirical matter; transcendental, selfreflection on the personality ideal as the root of science, 404; KANT had tried to solve the problem of the relation between the universal
a priori forms of the ‘transcendental consciousness’ and the particular matter; he used LEIBNIZ ‘intellectus archetypus’ with its mathematical analysis completed in a single intuition of the whole individual reality to bridge the gap; this idea remains merely a regulative principle for the use of the understanding; his teleology, 405; KANT halted before the eradication of the limits between theoretical reason, practical reason and faculty of judgment in the interest of the science-ideal, for he did not want to reduce the latter to the freely creative moral activity of the ‘homo noumenon’ like FICHTE, 417; reality is a category of quality, 418; KANT had not really solved the problem of the epistemological synthesis, 423; the transcendental productive imagination achieves the synthesis of sensory matter and pure forms of thought by means of the schematizing of the categories in time as a form of intuition, by the creation of a ‘transcendental pattern’ for all empirical ‘Gegenstände’, 427; but the a priori synthesis issues from the transcendental logical function, 430; his ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’ oriented the aesthetic judgment to free feeling and recognized the absolute individual value of genius; it offered a point of contact to SCHILLER’s Aesthetic Idealism, 462; in his critical period he proclaimed three-dimensional space to be a transcendental condition of geometry; several Kantians opposed EINSTEIN’s theory of relativity on the ground of KANT’s thesis; but others, the Neo-Kantians GAUSz, LOBATSCHEWSKY, RIEMANN, BOLAY, etc., hastened to accommodate Kantian epistemology to the non-Euclidean geometries; the same applies to KANT’s conception of causal natural law oriented to the classic physics of NEWTON, which could not be maintained against modern quantum physics; in his pre-critical period KANT had admitted that a non-Euclidean space is conceivable, 547 (note); the Kantian conception of the a-priori and the empirical moments in human knowledge identifies the ‘empirical’ with the sensory impressions, 549.

KANT, IMMANUEL, II,
Kritik d. teleol. Urteilskraft, 201, 271, 421, 422, 506, 507;
Idee zur einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburglicher Absicht, 271, 272;
Kritik d. Prakt. Vernunft, 506, 538, 543;
Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolff, 507, 508, 530-536;

Logik, 450;

KANT, IMMANUEL, II, uses the form-matter-scheme, 12; categories are concepts of pure synthesis a-priori, 13; they have no genus proximum; transcendental and formal logic; generic and specific concepts in the teleological judgment, 15; the Idea is the origin of the being of what is, 19; theoretic antinomies; idea of reason, 42; cosmological ideas and categories; dialectical illusion; mathematical and dynamic antinomies; nature and freedom; and the antinomies; understanding and reason; noumenon is absolute normative Idea, 43; homo noumenon; dialectic of pure reason; speculative metaphysics and theology; reality is identified with sensory and logical experience; the moral aspect absolutized into the transcendent noumenon, 44; phenomenal and noumenal world; nature and freedom; the number of antinomies, 45; their nature and
origin, 46; KANT reduces antinomy to logical contradiction; theoretic thought separated from the cosmic coherence, 47; only three transcendental determinations; an artificial result; his categories of quantity are analogical, 58; he saw that it was impossible to derive number from logical synthesis; he conceived of movement as happening within space, 95; called space a transcendental form of intuition; this antinomic notion had already been refuted by HUME, 96; his faculty psychology, 111; causality as a transcendental logical category, 120; analytical economy, 123; Gesinnungsethik; Categorical Imperative; respect for ‘humanity’, 149; dialectical motive of nature and freedom; love is sensory inclination; the essence of man is his will; legal order is an order of peace; external; the radical evil; this is a secularized Christian conception, 150; he explained juridical analogies of number in a mathematical way, 167; theoretical reason interrogates nature as a judge, 176; theoretical and practical ideas; his abuse of the theoretical idea of the homo noumenon; he restricts science to sensory impressions of nature, 187 (note); teleological judgment; he influenced neo-Kantians, 201; absolutized formal ethics in his categorical Imperative, 206; his positive humanistic view of history, 270; his Idea of development was oriented to the personality ideal; his judgment ‘als ob’ (=as if); he shared ROUSSEAU’s criticism of the Enlightenment; he opposed civilization to morality, 271; the League of nations as the aim of history, 272; he blamed HERDER for the lack of direction in HERDER’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte, 277; KANT’s transcendentalism and moralism, 278; influenced the Austrian Civil-Code, 358; he excluded the idea of purpose from the concept of subjective right, 396; he seeks the principle of individuality in the sensory matter
experience; the intellectus archetypus idea; the view of nature as the work of a divine architect is teleological; the regulative use of theoretical ideas; the law of specification, 420; the extension and the content of a concept; generic and specific; the rule of variety in the similar among the lower kinds; homogeneity and continuity, 420; all individuality is empirically determined, 421; this view is criticized; KANT's law of specification is an a-priori logical rule; there are degrees from the general to the particular, 422; his epistemology: 'Ding an sich' is: 'substance'; the Gegenstand, 430; synthesis of logical categories and forms of intuitions; the datum; his implied pre-suppositions, 431; his starting point is dogmatic; ancient, Scholastic and pre-Kantian metaphysics gave an account of their cosmonomic Idea, KANT did not, 432; analytical and synthetical judgments; 'all bodies are extended' is an analytical judgment; 'all bodies are heavy' is a synthetical judgment, 435; body and extension cannot be identified logically, 436; 'body' in KANT's 'Transcendental Aesthetik'; and extension; he states: 'extension' is implied in the concept 'body'; therefore this concept embraces more than mere extensiveness; viz. its substratum of sense impressions; it is not an exclusively and 'purely' analytical concept; he means 'body in the sense of material body'; then it necessarily implies 'heaviness', 437; he calls 'empirical' judgments synthetical; if empirical predicates are excluded from the concept of the subject of a judgment, these predicates are not subject to the logical principles; then they cease to be 'predicates'; if they are genuine judgments, they must be analytical; 2 + 2 = 4; causality, 438; RIEHL, PFÄNDER explain KANT's 'notes' on the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, 439-441; criticism of KANT's theory, 442; SCHLEIERMACHER and SIGWART's attempts to clear things up, 442, 443; KANT's dualistic cosmonomic Idea; SIGWART confounds linguistic and logical structures, 444; KANT adopted ARISTOTLE's substance and accidentia in a modified form; his substance is only related to the senses; accidentia are modes of existence; his remark on empirical judgments, 445; his theory of synthetic judgments is confused, 446-449; he calls the expression 'general concept' tautological, 450; a discursive specific concept and its specima; space and the whole and its parts, 455; KANT's Categories and forms of intuition are false formalisms, 459; his view of the Gegenstand of theoretic thought, 467; Kritik der reinen Vernunft interpreted by HEIDEGGER, 492; KANT's epistemology is based on his Idea of human personality; his doctrine of Ideas is determined by his faith in reason; although he suggests that his 'Kritik' is religiously neutral, 493; his Transcendental Aesthetic and Logic are not to be isolated; such isolation is due to a misconception of epistemology; the sensory material is not really the datum; his debt to HUME, 494; his isolation of the sensory material of experience is a problem; it creates an antinomy; he assumes an a-priori reference of the categories to sensibility, but no reference of sensibility to the categories, 495; metaphysical 'Ding an sich' is unknowable though it affects sensibility; which latter is purely receptive; the understanding is free, active, spontaneous, 496; synthesis is the combination of a plurality and transcendental logical unity; it is the result of the imagination; and conceived by the understanding in a conceptual form; even the unconscious imagination executes this synthesis by means of the logical function; theoretical synthesis is the prerequisite of analysis, 497; KANT does not distinguish logical from intermodal synthesis; logification of cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness; his categories pre-suppose the basic unity of selfconsciousness, 498; but selfconsciousness transcends the logical function; KANT's 'law of the unity of apperception' is the well-known
logical: Cogito; he merges the self into the logical unity of thought, 499; definition of self-consciousness; KANT's Kritik is self-destructive; his unity of apperception is synthetical, i.e., a law conformity determining all experience; an a-priori relatedness of a plurality (in intuition) to the cogito; RICHARD KRONER realized KANT's self-refutation, 500; self-consciousness as the logical unity excludes sensibility; intuitive and creative thought are only in God as the intellectus archetypus; human knowledge is always conceptual. KANT denies the theoretical intuition, 501; his transcendental logical I-ness is a formal logical unity above multiplicity, a transposition of 'soul' as 'substance' into the logical modus; transcendental logic concerns synthetical cognitive thought, 502, 503; his doctrine of the pure understanding; we think 'Gegenstände' a-priori; general or formal logic; transcendental logic operates in the categories, which are conceptus dati a-priori applying to objects, 504; KANT's table of judgments, 505; the synthesis of the categories is purely logical; neo-Kantians; a subject without the capacity to become a predicate to anything else, 506; categories are independent of sensibility, 507; they do not imply any inter-modal synthesis; there is only a synthesis of the categories and time; but KANT cannot recognize this as a synthesis because it is not a logical function of the understanding; quantity categories, 508; those of quality; reality, negation, limitation, are analogies in a logical respect; movement
is misrepresented as an a-priori synthesis of sensation with the representation of time; Newton's time concept, 509; in kinematic time the impressions of the 'inner sense' are received; Kant's view is confused; the categories of quantity and quality are related to 'Gegenstände überhaupt'; in time as a sensory intuitional form the categories cannot become numerical or kinematical; qualitative categories determine mathematical kinematical meaning, 510; but Kant's categories are mathematical themselves; logical synthesis replaces intermodal, 511; his logical relation is analogical: the principium rationis sufficientis; logical imputation of an effect to a cause is not something physical; Kant ascribes physical meaning to the category of causality; Aristotle's categories; Leibniz identified possibility and logical possibility; the actual is the Divine selection from the possible, 512; Kant relates logical categories of modality to sensory phenomena; the sensory only is actual; actuality as such is a category of thought; in Kant's 'transcendental logic' the notion of the 'transcendental imagination' is introduced, which is central in the chapter on the 'transcendental schema'; this schema originates in 'the productive faculty of the imagination'; the pure concepts of the understanding are mere 'forms of thought'; sensibility is 'the receptive representative faculty'; based on this sensibility is a certain form of a priori sensory intuition in the mind; so that the understanding can determine the inner sense by means of the plurality of given representations in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception; thus the categories obtain objective reality, 513; the a priori synthesis of sensory intuitions as a 'synthesis speciosa' or 'figurative synthesis' is distinct from the 'synthesis intellectualis'; intellectual synthesis is called 'Verstandesverbindung'; the figurative synthesis is called the 'transcendental synthesis of the imagination', 514; Hume considers the imagination to be the faculty enabling us to picture something not actually given in sensory impressions; Kant says that this imagination can function only through the transcendental 'figurative synthesis of imagination'; it belongs to receptive sensibility; as and act of spontaneity of the understanding operating on sensibility, it is the first application of the understanding to the objects of possible intuition and the basis of all other applications; it is, therefore, the synthetical activity of the productive phantasy which is ascribed to the logical function of thought; this figurative synthesis is a synthetical influence of the understanding on the 'inner sense'; the problem is exactly the possibility of this influence, 515; the synthetical unity of 'transcendental apperception' is distinguished by Kant from sensory intuition; the understanding does not find a conjunction of the manifold in the inner sense by affecting the latter but creates it; the interfunctional synthesis is only ascribed to logical thought; Kant sticks to the dogma concerning the formative autonomy of theoretical thought, 516; the doctrine of the categories does not belong to general epistemology but to the cosmological analysis of the modal meaning structures; Kant constantly avoids the genuine epistemological problem; his solution is not a really critical one; he posits a third something between a category and a phenomenon; this something must be intellectual as well as sensible; it is a mediating representation, viz., the transcendental schema, 517; he explains the possibility of the interfunctional synthesis between logical category and sensory phenomenon by an appeal to the interfunctional synthesis in the a priori schematized category, 518; a transcendental determination of time being of the same kind as a category in that it is universal, is based on a rule a priori; it is also homogeneous with a phenomenon; thus its application to phenomena is made possible; this argument begs the question of the
inter-functional synthesis, 519; KANT’s view of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness involves him in an impasse (an aporia); his critical conscience has been roused in the chapter on the schematism; HEIDEGGER holds that the productive imagination also functions as the root of practical reason in KANT; KANT speaks of three subjective sources or faculties of the soul: sense, imagination, apperception, 520; each with its own synthesis; he assumed the possibility of a common root; but in the second edition of the Krit. der r. Vern. he retracts this view, 521; then there is no possibility to find the unity between sensibility and pure thought, nor to posit such unity as a problem; KANT wrote his Kritik d.r. Vern. for the sake of his metaphysics of practical reason; his critique of theoretical reason is oriented to his idealistic conception of the super-temporal noumenon, a fundamental theme of the traditional metaphysica generalis, 522; KANT sharply distinguishes between phenomena and noumena; the practical Ideas are absolutely transcendent above the temporal world; he clings to his rational faith in the homo noumenon; HEIDEGGER interprets KANT from a historicist, irrationalistic point of view, 523; he calls the transcendental imagination the root of knowledge and holds it to be identical with ‘pure reason’ (theoretical and practical), and with the ‘pure finite self’ rooted in time; the pure reason is pure receptive spontaneity, or sensory reason; human reason does not create but receives its ‘objects’; for human life (Da-
sein) is at the mercy of ‘das Vorhandene’ but capable of understanding that which is; if Dasein designs an a priori image of the being of what is; the question is: how can a finite being know the ‘Vorhandene’ before any reception of what is?, 524; the transcendental imagination must be understood as the ‘formative medium of the two stems of knowledge’; HEIDEGGER approaches KANT from the modern state of decline of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea; in KANT the ideals of personality and science are still unshakable pillars of the cosmonomic Idea, 525; HEIDEGGER has seen that we can only isolate understanding from sensibility on the basis of a primary intermodal synthesis; but he does not see that such isolation is made possible by starting from the fulness of the temporal meaning systasis; HEIDEGGER seeks the selfhood in the temporal (historically conceived) Dasein, 526; and he supposes that reality is only accessible to the self in theoretical abstraction of the ‘gegenständliche’; this is the phenomenon; human knowledge is delivered to what is given (das Vorhandene) in nature, the Platonic mè on, the relative nothing; he eliminates the cosmic order of time, merging the self into time, 527; pure thought and pure sensibility are modi of the ‘transcendental imagination’, which in essence is time and selfhood; KANT’s three modi of the cognitive synthesis are merely the present, the past and the future; time and the cogito are identified; time is pure self affection, the basis of the finite ego, and the finite ego is ‘pure understanding’; this explanation does not solve the problem of the intermodal synthesis, 528; HEIDEGGER makes the two cognitive functions flow together, thereby cancelling the possibility of a real synthesis; designating KANT’s ‘pure understanding’ as ‘pure sensory understanding’ results in a dialectic that KANT would have rejected; to KANT ‘representation in general’ is the genus proximum of thought and sensory intuition; the genus concept is of a logical origin, 529; in his treatise: Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolff, KANT emphatically rejects the identification of the transcendental self-consciousness with time as ‘pure sensibility’, 530; HEIDEGGER makes one of the ‘stems of knowledge’ into the origin of the other; his ‘existential time’ is not cosmic time; he seeks the transcendence of the self in the inner experience of the ‘ex-sistere’, the historical mode of time anticipating the future, 531; KANT’s ‘transcendental imagination’ is the connecting link between the two stems of knowledge, not its ‘hidden root’, 532; the subjective viewpoint considers the pure understanding and its possibility; this is not an essential element in KANT’s aim; his principal concern is to ascertain how much and what can understanding and reason know a priori?, 533; KANT ascribes the transcendental imagination to ‘pure sensibility’ relating to the transcendental unity of the apperception; first he follows a line of reasoning that descends from the transcendental unity of apperception; then he follows a course of argument in the opposite direction; apperception renders pure imagination intellectual, 534; all knowledge is based on the faculty of pure imagination; KANT starts from a necessary systasis, viz. that of sensibility and that of pure thought; he misrepresents it as a systatic datum, 535; in the supposedly ‘given’ unity of pure thought and pure intuition the logical function remains the law-giver and determining factor in KANT’s view; the Kantian conception of experience has become the shibboleth between the ‘critical and the dogmatic trends of thought; this conception was precipitated in the ‘Satz des Bewusstseins’ or the ‘Satz der Immanenz’, 536; the influence of the Kantian conception of ‘empirical reality’ in the normative special sciences, 537; for the benefit of the ‘Satz des Bewusstseins’ naïve experience is fundamentally misinterpreted, in ‘empiricistic-positivistic’ thought; in HUSSERL’s phenomenology;
KANT is entirely dominated by his dualistic cosmonomic Idea: the normative aspects of reality fall outside of experience; experience is only allotted to the mechanistic science-ideal; it is not possible for Christian thought to accept KANT's view of experience in his Krit. d.r. Vern, and to reject his Krit. d. pr. Vern., 538; KANT's conception of matter is a theoretical abstraction, not a datum of experience; the sensory aspect of reality is experienced only in its subject-object relations in the cosmic meaning coherence; animals merely undergo sense-impressions; if nothing outside of the psychic function has been given, we should not have been given anything at all, not even the sensible, 539; the data of experience have not been given to the sensory function but to our self-consciousness, 540; epistemology has long accepted the restriction of experience to the sensory and logical aspects because it was dominated by the dualistic Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, 541; his idea of the a priori as the universally valid transcendental forms; all synthetical judgments of universal validity which cannot be founded on sensory experience, 543; his categories of modality are supposed only to express the relation of the object (intended in the concept) to our cognitive faculty; but possibility and necessity can be conceived in every abstracted meaning modus, whereas 'reality' can never be enclosed in an abstract modal meaning, 550; KANT's 'Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes' were inspired by
the science ideal, and could not stand the test of the progress of natural science, 556; KANT understood the traditional Idea of truth as a mere ‘explanation of a name’; he asks how the adequacy of thought and reality is possible, 567; he seeks the criterion of truth in the activity of the transcendental logical ego and restricts truth to the Sensory phenomena; a priori synthetical judgments constitute the guarantee of truth; they are the source of all truth before all experience; empirical truth is relative; experience is identified with theoretical cognition; its direction to the absolute ideal; the correspondence between representation and ‘object’; his criterion of truth leads to the denial of the possibility of non-mathematical-natural-scientific-theoretical knowledge, 568; his concept ‘transcendental truth’ undermines every trans-subjective validity of theoretical verity; the transcendental subject is the seat of transcendental truth; his view of the empirical world was determined by the classical Humanistic science ideal; it landed him in an inner autonomy with regard to his conception of truth, 569; his principles of pure understanding (Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes), cannot hit off the transcendental structure of theoretical truth, because they are not oriented to the transcendental direction of time; functionalistically they isolate and absolutize two aspects of the theoretical horizon of experience, 575; on the immanence standpoint the subjectivist a priorism of the rationalist Kantian epistemology had to be outbid by an irrationalist a priori view, 583; KANT could only assign a place to individual genius in the field of artistic creation, 595.

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the monadology was opposed to metaphysical space universalism and materialistic atomism; monads are differential numbers, 229; they fill the noumenal cosmos as animate beings in gapless density reflecting (each of them) the entire universe; they are absolutely closed, self-sufficient, windowless, spaceless, points of force; compared with BRUNO's aesthetical monadology; LEIBNIZ considered qualitatively different individuality as a function of progression and accessible to rational calculation; both personality and science ideal were thus reconciled, 230; he hypostatized the concept of force introduced by Newtonian physics; it assumed the Aristotelian form of ‘entelechy’ and ‘causa finalis’ but intended in a modern Humanistic sense; space is an arrangement of co-existence, time is one of succession; mechanical matter is the mode of appearance of metaphysical force belonging to the essence of the monad; the force of the monads is materia prima, 231; the self-sufficiency and autarchy of the monad is in conflict with Aristotelian metaphysics, especially with the Aristotelian doctrine of the relation between body and soul; he tried to express the basic tendency of the personality ideal in a metaphysics of the science-ideal, which caused polar tensions; the science ideal remained supreme, espec. in its Faustian domination motive; mathematical science must construe the relation between totality and diversity in the meaning coherence; his common denominator of the aspects is the ‘perception’ of the composite or what is outward in the simple substance, 232; all monads are perceiving points of force reflecting the cosmic coherence in their representations; to these he applies the lex continui, arranging them in mathematical progression; their qualitative difference is quantified according to their degree of clarity and their tendency to pass from one perception to another, 233; the material, unconscious perceptions pass into conscious but confused representations (of the sensory soul monads), to the clear and distinct apperceptions of the limited spiritual monads; and then to the infinite creative mathematical thought of the Deity; man is placed between matter and Deity; his limitation; here Theism becomes pantheism; ‘universal harmony is God’; because of its limitations human thought cannot get an insight into the absolute (mathematical) necessity of a seemingly contingent event in the world of phenomena; the logification of the dynamic personality ideal, 234; the activity of all the monads has ‘Vorstellung’ (representation) for its basic denominator; their autarchical activity was interpreted as a tendency (appetition) to pass from one into another, a ‘causa finalis’, 235; he interprets original motion as movement of thought; he also logiziced ‘force’; force as a tendency is the expression of LEIBNIZ' individualistic personality ideal, 236; sensory perceptions are produced in absolute autarchy, entirely from the inside of the human soul monad; error of thought and ‘sin’ are due to metaphysical imperfection of the finite rational monads; sin and error are gradual conditions; innate ideas are dormant, virtual representations of which we are not yet aware; they gradually develop into clear, distinct concepts, 237; all monads experience the same things, so that their representations exactly correspond with one another through pre-established harmony; this is a stringent determinism; the slightest deviation in any one moment would disturb the whole cosmos; ‘the present is pregnant with the future’; there is no freedom of the will; nothing happens without cause; the freedom of indifference is impossible, 238; the spiritual monad is an automaton spirituale; determining causes are ‘inclinantes, non necessitantes’; freedom is in proportion to our agreement with reason; the lex continui and ‘harmonia praestabilita’ owe their origin to the deity; the latter is the hypostasis of creative mathematical thought untroubled by
sensory representations; volition is a modus of thought, 239; the deity is world-harmony; SPINOZA's 'Deus sive natura' becomes 'harmonia universalis, id est Deus' in LEIBNIZ; the kernel of this harmony is the mathematical lex continui; ideas are symbols of reality in L's nominalistic philosophy; he quotes OCCAM's distinction between conventional voces and universal symbols; natural symbols require a certain similitude (240) like that between a geographical map and the region represented by it; or a connection like circle and its perspective ellipse; the human mind can produce results from its own activity completely agreeing with the actual results in things; 'in nature everything occurs in a mechanical manner' is a thought laid by reason at the foundation of our experience of reality; his apparent fight against Nominalism; he clothes his Humanistic conception in traditional realistic scholastic terminology; he is concerned with the maintenance of his 'eternal truths' against the view that universal Ideas are mere creations of language (HOBBES); an Idea is an object of thought which is immanent to thought, the expression of the qualities of things; realists and nominalists both were right; simple Ideas and those of substance are grounded only in the possibility of thought; universalia do not have a model in natural reality; the essentiae are the 'eternal truths', i.e., logical possibilities in creative mathematical thought, 242; the eternal truths are by no means arbitrary.
symbols; their reality is that of thought itself; nominal definitions are arbitrary unions of symbols functioning in thought as ‘counters’; real definitions reveal the logical possibility of a thing by discovering the logical principle of its origin; but to L. Ideas do not possess any real existence outside of thought; they belong to the representations of the monads, 243; he took the side of the moderate Nominalism of the school of OCCAM, and fought against the conception of NIZOLIUS, 244; according to L. the real significance of the universal is in the universal validity of the judgment founded exclusively in the universal Idea or definition of terms, which indicates the a priori possibility of the genetic construction, i.e., the method of ‘logical creation’; it is the rationalistic Humanistic concept of the law implied in the mathematical science ideal; he blames HOBBES for doubting the theorem of PYTHAGORAS ‘that has been deemed worthy of the sacrifice of a hecatomb’; L.’s idea of a logical alphabet, a universal symbolical characteristic; he gave it a primitive form in his youth, 245; elaborated it in his analysis of the infinite; his ‘Ars Combinatoria’; concepts can be subjected to an infinitesimal analysis; the truth of a judgment depends on a general rule for the movement of thought allowing us to conclude with certainty that the distinction in the judgment between subject and predicate must approach zero in the prolonged analysis; the lex continui, 246; factual contingency must approach infinitesimally close to ‘eternal truths’ of mathematical thought; the central significance of the Leibnizian universal Ideas as symbols of relations; his transcendental basic Idea bears a subjective Idealistic stamp and seeks its Archimedean point in the ‘cogito’; the hypostatization of individuals; monads are subjective mirrors of the universe, 247; essentiae, possibilitates, or eternal truths have not a realistic sense; Divine thought is only creative thought in which mathematical possibility and reality coincide; this creation motive is foreign to PLATO’s divine nous as demiurge; L.’s conception secularizes the Christian (248) view of God’s sovereignty as the Creator; the modal aspects are modi of a mathematical order; the lex continui maintains the coherence; the universe in the representation of the monads is sensory phenomenon; the monads are the root of reality, the noumenon, 249; the spiritual ones are the autarchical individuals of the ideal of personality; vérités de raison versus vérités de fait; the former are eternal, necessary truths; purely noumenal; products of pure thought; analytical truths; the latter are contingent truths, empirical, established by thought in confrontation with sensory experience; the principium rationis sufficientis has a natural scientific causal meaning; in the deity the difference between vérités de raison and vérités de fait disappears, 250; he consciously rejects SPINOZA’s view ‘eternal’ and ‘metaphysical truths’ are only vaguely present in the ‘petites perceptions’ of material monads and hidden in the human soul as ‘unconscious representations’; these representations are contained in experience as a logical a priori of which we gradually become conscious; ‘contingent truths’ thus become preliminary to eternal mathematical truths; this view reveals a mathematicistic Idea of the Origin; the sensory aspect is merely a phenomenal expression of mathematical relations; the same thing applies to the other modal aspects of reality; even the aesthetic aspect is subsumed under mathematical thought; his view of music, 251; even (ethical) perfection is such a freedom of the will that the latter obeys reason; the moral goal is rational self-determination in which man acts according to clear and distinct concepts; rational freedom is obtained by the logical understanding of adequate representations of the other monads and by the insight into the harmonia praestabilita; his theodicy was to reconcile evil reality and the ethical
ideal, 252; he tries to resolve the antinomy between the mathematical science-ideal and the ideal of personality; his formal reconciliation of ‘causae efficientes’ and ‘causae finales’ in the divine world-plan; his radical optimism is typical of the faith of the Enlightenment in the final unity of the antagonistic factors in the Humanistic basic Idea; scientific thought was believed to make humanity free; the antinomy between science and personality ideal assumed the form of that between nature and grace in LEIBNIZ; their deeper unity was creative mathematical thought; the deceptive formulation of the polar tension in the Humanistic transcendental basic Idea in terms of Christian doctrine, 253; his view of predestination; his Idea of God; the existing cosmos is only the realized choice out of an infinite possibility of worlds, 254; the basic antinomy in the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea assumed the form of a mathematical problem in LEIBNIZ: the reduction of the discreteness of the monads to mathematical continuity; here is the mathematical antinomy of actual infinity in the monad; for the infinitesimal can never possess actual existence; L. points out the merely methodological origin of his ‘infinitesimal’; it is not a smallest part of spatial matter; but an ideal hypothesis for the mathematical process, 255; in the face of reality the differential is a mathematical fiction, also according to L. himself; nevertheless he elevates it to actual reality in the concept of the monad; his purpose was to reconcile the science ideal
with that of the personality; but his logistic continuity is in conflict with the discreteness of the monads; in his theodicy he contrasts the actual infinity of the cosmic monads as finite with the infinity of divine creative mathematical thought; finitude is the metaphysical evil; the monads must be finite substances, 256; they must be confined within their own borders if the cosmos is not to flow together into a formless whole; the spiritual monads participate in mathematical thought together with the deity, and form the Civitas Dei; metaphysical evil is necessary if there is at all to exist a cosmos; the origin of evil lies in the eternal truths of mathematical thought; evil is not from matter; the ancients thought it was because they considered matter as uncreated and independent of God; L.'s creation motive is a secularized biblical thought, 257; the human spiritual monad is limited in its thought, not omniscient, liable to error and to moral faults; three kinds of evil: physical, moral, metaphysical; physical and moral evil is possible, not necessary; metaphysical evil is necessary; the latter evil is privatio, lack of perfection; its cause is a causa deficiens; physical and moral evil are a negative condicio sine qua non for the realization of the good; physical good is pleasure; ethical good is free personality, a member of the Kingdom of grace; without evil the cosmos would not leave any room for the free rational personality of man, moral freedom is a requirement of the continuity principle of the science ideal; since there must be room for an organic union of soul- and material monads, and the continuity in the species of substances must be actualized, 258; in the actual infinity of the intuitive analysis of divine creative mathematical thought the individual evil of the monads disappears in the relative perfection of the cosmos conceived in the spaceless continuity of creative mathematical thought; nature is identical in its root with grace; grace is the intelligible world of the clear and distinct concept; causae efficientes, causae finales and harmonia praestabilita are brought into complete harmony with the appetitions in the monad's representations; the inner contradictions of this theodicy, 259; Leibniz' theodicy was pointed against Peter Bayle, 260, 261; he sought to free himself of the Cartesian dualism, 264; praised the principle of the economy of thought as one of the treasure troves of Nominalism, 272; he combated Hume's radical sensationalism from the very beginning, 284; the ego, the personality is identified with mathematical thought and hypostatized as a thinking substance, 295; he conceived 'causality' as a 'factual verity' but held to its logical foundation in our judgment, 297; causality is the foundational principle of all judgments of experience, bound to 'factual verities', 298; he distinguishes what is from what ought to be; but ethical action remains dependent on clear and distinct thought; he agrees in principle with Descartes' ethics; Leibniz' rationalism is mitigated by a mystical motive: that of a 'supra-natural' participation of human reason in the creative thought of God, which produces love and piety, 308; his monadology was attacked by Chr. Aug. Crusius with a famous argument, 339; space is an a priori order of possible coexistences, 342; space and time are a priori forms of pure thought, 'notions', or 'conceptus intellectus puri'; we become aware of them on the occasion of our sensory perceptions of corporeal things, 343; the apriori concepts enable us to know the 'eternal truths'; the metaphysical order of the cosmos; the laws of the 'noumenon', the 'Dinge an sich', but sense experience is a lower function of knowledge concerned with contingent truths only, 344; Kant derived the expression 'symbolical knowledge' from Leibniz, 349; Kant rejected Leibniz' and Wolff's theory of sensory knowledge being only 'cognitio confusa'; Leibniz' God was deified mathematical thought, 350; L.'s logistic cosmonomic Idea of
pre-established harmony included the free personality in a continuous mathematically construed cosmic order and relativized the distinction between sensibility and rational freedom, 356; the Idea of the intellectus archetypus in KANT is derived from LEIBNIZ, 361; KANT’s characterization of the Leibnizian conception of free personality as an automaton spirituale, 380; his doctrine concerning the ‘petites perceptions’ was introduced into Kantian epistemology by MAIMON who wanted to transform KANT’s antithesis between sensibility and logical understanding from a fundamental into a gradual one, 404; to bridge the gap between the universal and the particular KANT used LEIBNIZ’ theological Idea of the ‘Intellectus archetypus’, 405; LEIBNIZ gave to phenomena in their sensory form a foundation in creative mathematical thought, 406; the Neo-Kantians began to apply LEIBNIZ’ principle of continuity as a transcendental logical principle of creation to KANT’s categories, 407; LEIBNIZ’ conception of the relation between phenomenon and noumenon, 411; L.’s speculative Idea of God lost positive significance in MAIMON’s later works, 412; LEIBNIZ, the genius of the German Aufklärung, grew up in the School philosophy started by MELANCHTON, and transformed its motives in a rationalistic Humanistic sense, 513.

LEIBNIZ, II, cf. 86, 103, 118, 171, 272, 327, 345; Von der Weisheit, 347 (note). LEIBNIZ, II, his law of continuous movement of thought, 90; analysis situs, 103, 104;
apperception and perception, 118, 119; idea of historical development, 232, 272; and mathematics, 338; intellectus archetypus chooses from the possible to create the actual, 512; lex aeterna, 559; vérités éternelles and SCHELER's philosophy, 592.

LEIBNIZ, III, his monads are metaphysical concentration points of ‘force’; this ‘force’ is an undefined physical concept; its metaphysical application was inspired by the autarchy motive of the Humanistic personality ideal; and LEIBNIZ’ view was influenced by NEWTON’s concept ‘force’; STOKER’s use of this notion, 70; LEIBNIZ’ monadology, 182.

LEMECRIER, III, his chapel at the Sorbonne, 142.

LENEL, II, will power as a subjective right, 397.

LENIN, III, realized that a communistic community is incompatible with the State institution; its realization in the Marxian sense is Utopia, 464.

LENNEP, Mr. L.H. VAN, III, De Rechtskracht van de Verordeningen der Christelijke Kerkgenootschappen, 690.

LENTZE, H., III, Der Kaiser und die Zunftverfassung in den Reichsstädten, 479.

LEON, XAVIER, I, Fichte et son temps, 451.

LEVER, J. and H. DOOYEWEERD, III, Rondom het biologisch soortbegrip, 81.

LEVIATHAN, I, in HOBBES, and in ROUSSEAU, 317.

LEVIRATE, III, an abnormal external form of marriage, 339, 340.

LÉVY-BRÜHL, II, Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inferieures, 329.

LÉVY-BRÜHL, III, attributes characteristics to the primitive mind that have nothing in common with our civilized mind, 33.

LEX AETERNA, I, in Patristic Thought, 173; expressed in the lex naturalis, 178; and substantial forms, 202.

LEX CONTINUAI, I, in Neo-Kantianism; founded in the differential calculus by LEIBNIZ, 204; applied to the representations in the monads, 233; and harmonia praestabilita, 239; in LEIBNIZ, 246; the lex continuai maintains the meaning coherence, 249; as a developmental series from inorganic matter to organic life and human history in HERDER, 455.

LIBERAL IDEA, II, of the law state, 360.
LIBERALISM, II, resisted the reactionary policy of the Restoration in the 19th century, but evoked the reaction of socialism and communism, 362.

LIBERUM ARBITRIUM INDIFFERENTIAE, I, in DESCARTES, 238.

LIERMANN, H., III,
Das deutsche Volk, 497;
Deutsches Evangelisches Kirchenrecht, 545, 548.
LIERMANN, H., III, In the Lutheran Church, also with the sovereigns, office became right, service turned into dominion, 545; modern parliamentary ideas gave rise to the German Synodal-Konsistorial system of the 19 century, 548.

LIFE, II, as a 'substance' in DRIESCH, 110.

LIFE AND WORLD VIEW, I, Genuine Christian philosophy requires a radical rejection of the supra-theoretical pre-suppositions and 'axioms' of immanence philosophy, 114; because of the Christian radical critical standpoint Christian phil. is able to enter into the most inward contact with immanence phil.; it distinguishes sharply between philosophical judgments and supra-theoretic prejudices; a popular argument against the possibility of Christian science and philosophy; $2 \times 2 = 4$; this arithmetical truth holds for Christians and heathens; it draws the attention to undeniable states of affairs which form the basis for the cooperation of different schools, 115; the proposition $2 \times 2 = 4$ is not 'true in itself', but only in the context of numerical and logical laws; this proposition refers to a 'state of affairs' independent of the subjective theoretical view and its supra-theoretical pre-suppositions; and is dependent on the cosmic order; the latter is the same for every thinker; and every thinker has to throw light on the state of affairs from the standpoint of his transcendental basic Idea, 116; in the philosophical effort to account for the states of affairs the various schools of thought can learn from each other and compete; Christian philosophy cannot claim any privileged position, it is not infallible; Christian phil. does not place itself outside the historical development of philosophic thought; it aims at reformation, 117; the idea of the Philosophia Perennis; this Idea is required by the religious transcendental basic Idea; DILTHEY's philosophy of life and world views is historical relativism with respect to truth; OSWALD SPENGLER; Christian phil. turns against the Humanistic view of science with the philosophic idea of the sphere-sovereignty; in spite of its inner historical connection with KANT's Kritik d.r. Vernunft, Chr. phil. turns against the Kantian theoretical dogmatism of his epistemology, 118; the religious starting point of Christian phil. and consequently the whole direction of its thought remains consistent; any Scholastic accommodation is rejected; historical development implies
the biblical-Augustinian idea of the struggle in the religious root of history between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, 119; in immanence philosophy the antithesis of standpoints takes the modern form of a theory of life- and world-views (Weltanschaungslehre); the most ancient is that between idealism and naturalism; ‘critical’ idealism insists on it that the effort to reduce theoretical thought to a natural object pre-supposes a ‘transcendental subject of thought’ or a ‘transcendental consciousness; others make philosophy itself into a neutral ‘theory of the life and world views’; DILTHEY’s three types; RICKERT’s seven types, 120; such classifications obliterate the only really radical antithesis and proclaim relative oppositions as absolute; all oppositions on the immanence standpoint are relative; and become irreconcilable on account of absolutization; idealism is opposed to naturalism in consequence of the inner antinomy in the humanistic central religious motive between the ideal of science and that of personality; aestheticism and moralism are not polar oppositions; ‘theistic philosophy’ was built on a metaphysical idea of God, viz. the hypostatized nous, 121; the divine nous as actus purus and pure Form, etc., is hypostatized theoretical thought; the theistic philosophy of DESCARTES or LEIBNIZ; was ruled by the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; the philosophical meaning of terms like idealism, materialism, intellectualism, etc., depends on the transcendental basic Idea ruling their contents; LEIBNIZ was ruled by the science ideal; Greek ‘idealism’ by the Form motive; ANAXIMANDER and ANAXIMENES were ‘materialists’ in the sense of the Greek matter-motive; HOBES’ materialism was mechanistic scientialistic; DEMOCRITUS’ atoms were ‘ideal forms’ in the sense of the Greek Form-motive; the Greek ideal of the Kalokagathon (122) differs from SCHILLER’s Humanist aestheticism; KANT’s moralism is not affiliated with SOCRATES’ ethical thought; DILTHEY and RICKERT have interpreted ancient and medieval thinkers after the pattern of modern Humanism; the only ultimate and radical antithesis is that between deified meaning and thought turning to God in Christ and realizing the relativity and self-insufficiency of all created meaning; the antitheses within the dialectical basic motive have the character of polar tensions, 123; RICKERT’s criterion for the difference between philosophy and a life and world view; LITT’s criticism of RICKERT, 124; LITT’s criterion; NIETSCHES’s view; modern existentialistic opinion; KARL JASPERS and ‘prophetic philosophy’, 125; his ‘Psychology of Life-and-World Views’; LITT’s view; he refers to the atmosphere of the common convictions in a community, to myths & dogmas and popular wisdom; GEORG SIMMEL characterizes philosophy as a ‘temperament seen through a picture of the world’; and ‘the revelation of what is deepest and final in a personal attitude toward the world in the language of a picture of the world’, 127; a life and world view is a view of totality; it implies an Archimedean point, and has a religious basic motive; it requires the religious commitment of our selfhood; its attitude is pre-theoretical; it conceives reality in its typical individuality structures; it applies to everybody, the simplest included; the Divine Word-Revelation does not give a detailed life and world view but it gives both to philosophy and to the outlook on life and the world their starting point and direction in a radical and integral sense determining everything; in the root philosophy and life and world view are united, but not identified; each has a task of its own; philosophy has to give a theoretical account of a life and world view, 128; RICKERT’s defence of the neutrality postulate, 129; reality versus values; to philosophy ‘reality’ has validity as a category of thought in RICKERT; philosophic problems are theoretical problems of meaning and value; values are to be traced down to the life of culture;
philosophy re-unites reality and value, 131, the connecting link is ‘meaning’; meaning belongs to all ‘acts’ in so far as the subject chooses a position in them with respect to values; in the ‘immanent meaning of the act’ value and reality are synthetically together; the immanent meaning is not itself value, but reality is here related to values. Historical science has to do with reality to which values cling. Value is transcendent, timeless, absolute meaning; reality is the object of the transcendental epistemological subject, and in the realm of values there is no subjectivity at all, 132; such a system of a-theoretical values (beauty, holiness, morality, happiness) is an open system; ‘a formal order of the stages of value’; phil. must not be ‘prophetism’, nor a life and world view; the object of philosophy is the totality of the cosmos inclusive of the subject, 133; the ‘neutrality-postulate’ defended by RICKERT, although he recognizes the necessity for religion to penetrate the whole of life and never to put up with its coordination with other ‘values’; he also recognizes that the axiological viewpoint cannot exhaust the essence of religion, 134; his opinion that the absolute validity of the theoretical ‘truth-value’ can be proved theoretically is untenable: every theoretical proof pre-supposes a norm for its correctness; ‘absolute truth-value’ is an absolutization of theoretical truth and leads to antinomy in RICKERT’s own system, 135; if a special value is torn out
of the meaning-coherence and set by itself, it becomes meaningless; if it should not become meaningless, the postulate of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought is reduced to absurdity, and it is proved that in theoretical thought we cannot find the Archimedean point; the test of the transcendental basic Idea reveals the concept ‘value’ in RICKERT to be ruled by a supra-philosophical position with respect to the Archè and meaning totality; an Idea of reason has been hypostatized as a self-sufficient value; AUGUST MESSER’s defence of the philosophy of values, 136; the root of the axiological metaphysical theory is the Humanistic personality ideal that gained the ascendancy over the science ideal after a long struggle; the proclamation of the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought signifies the withdrawal of that thought from Christ as the new Root of our cosmos, 137; LITT reckons the value idea as such to belong to the domain of a life and world view; yet he defends the neutrality postulate by an appeal to the pretended self-guarantee of ‘theoretical truth’; this self-guarantee he considers to be not demonstrable theoretically; truth cannot be referred to something that is not truth; any one attempting to demonstrate this self-guarantee theoretically is a relativist, according to LITT; relativism in any form is internally contradictory, 138; LITT also identifies truth with correctness; self-sufficient truth, he says, exclusively holds good in correlation to the ‘cogito’; he does not hypostatize theoretical verity as an Idea or value apart from subjectivity; absolute truth only holds in and for theoretical thought; this is self-contradiction incarnate, 139; the ‘cogito’ is absolute, ‘pure’ thought which cannot be a Gegenstand of thought; the full concrete ego and all temporal-spatial reality is the objective antipole of the transcendental ‘I think’, 140; the correlation between truth and the transcendental cogito saves this philosophy from relativism, according to LITT at least; criticism of LITT’s view: he relativizes the fullness of meaning of truth to mere theoretical truth and starts from the tacit acceptance of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought, 141; his ‘unconditioned’ transcendental cogito, 142; FICHTE, KANT and LITT; in the antithetic relation of theoretical thought he conceives of the ‘I-think’ as the antipode to ‘Gegenständlichkeit’, 143; he determines the selfhood by ‘pure thought’, i.e. by dialectical logic, the ‘self-refutation’ of scepticism; the question as to whether the logical principia are set aside by God and the angels implies that God and the angels have to think in a cosmic temporal fashion, 144; Greek irrationalistic sophistic scepticism; the self-refutation of scepticism; LITT’s relativism is sceptical and antinomic; his view of the ‘transcendental cogito’; reality is only in the absolutized individuality; his ‘Erkenntniskorrelation’ and ‘Gegebenheitskorrelation’; the ‘pure thinking subject’ is itself the ‘universally valid’ and the origin of all universal validity, 145; LITT’s ‘theoretical universal validity’ replaces the cosmic order; there arises a dialectical tension between universal validity and individuality; between philosophy and a life and world view; individuality is lawless; dialectical thought has to recognize its other in the irrationality of life; it has to understand its dialectical unity-in-the-opposition with the life and word view as a normless ‘impression of life’, both are dialectical emanations from the same ego which lives in the relativistically undermined Humanistic ideal of personality, 146; the self-refutation of scepticism is that of the neutrality postulate as well; but this self-refutation cannot of itself lead us to the positive knowledge of truth; LITT inclines to the irrationalist philosophy of life, 147; we do not recognize a dialectical unity of philosophy and a life and world view; their deeper unity is found in the religious basic motive; philosophy has to give a theoretical account of a life and world-view; it should attain to
critical selfreflection on its transcendental basic Idea; it can never be religiously neutral, neither can a life and world view; LITT interprets philosophy and a view of life as personal confessions of the individual struggle between person and cosmos; philosophy must surmount the contents of such confessions, 148; his life and world view is a secularized one; he cannot claim for it ‘universal validity’ and ‘absolute truth’, nor ‘theoretical neutrality’; his hypostatization of ‘pure’ dialectical truth serves to release human personality from any norm of truth; hence the conflict against the ‘universally valid norms and values’ of rationalism and semi-rationalism; RICKERT’s theory of life and world views is not neutral; he stops half-way on the road to irrationalism; by his schematism he falsifies the meaning of every life and world view that rejects his own religious starting point; a Calvinistic life and world view cannot be classed as ‘theistic’, based on the choice of the ‘value of holiness’ to which as subjective commitment ‘piety’ answers, 149; the theoretical concept of truth depends on the transcendental basic Idea: HOBBS nominalist view of truth; ARISTOTLE’s realistic conception; HOBBS calls truth and falsehood only attributes of language; truth consists in the immanent agreement of concepts with each other on the basis of conventional definitions; HOBBS’ opinion; ARISTOTLE’s; KANT’s; HUME’s; DESCARTES’; HEGEL’s; LITT’s; the consequence of the neutrality postulate
would have to be the allocation of the concept of truth to a personal choice of
a life-and-world-view; Immanence philosophy recognizes no norm of truth above
its transcendental basic Idea; the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical reason
hands truth over to the subjective commitment of the apostate personality, 150;
the distinction between theoretical and a-theoretical judgments; only the former
are accorded the universal validity of truth by LITT and RICKERT; this distinction
goes back to KANT's dualism between theoretical knowledge and a priori rational
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'this action is immoral' there is an appeal to a universally valid standard of
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154; but if there is no universally valid truth about the meaning of the cosmos,
I can give no subjective 'interpretation of life', for I can interpret only what I can
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155; but LITT's view, if consistently thought out, annihilates the foundations of
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of an 'absolute merely theoretical truth' is internally contradictory; philosophic
thought is dependent on the religious basic motive of the thinker's ego;
philosophy has to clarify a life and world view, 156; the latter is not a system;
but in every such view there is left a residue of living immediacy which escapes
theoretical concepts; it is focused in the full concrete reality, though it is not
lost in faith and feeling; theoretical, systematic thought cannot be so focused;
a system speaks out of a distance preserved by scientific abstraction in
opposition to life; a life and world view bears a continuously open character to
each concrete situation; the radical Christian view of science was born in the
midst of a concrete situation; Dr. A. KUYPER; the attitude of the early Christians,
157; the ideal of personality reacted to the rationalism of the Enlightenment;
science was now required to be neutral with respect to a life and world view;
the development of such a view is constantly found in immediate contact with
concrete situations in the fulness of life; Christian philosophy is not an
elaboration of a Christian life and world view; the meaning of the concept
'universal validity'; in the dogmatic cadre of a pretended 'unconditioned pure
thought' his 'universal validity' concept was a 'standard of truth'; KANT defined
it as: independence of ‘empirical subjectivity’, and ‘valid for the transcendental consciousness’, 158; the judgment ‘the sun heats the stone’ is one of perception, but if I say: ‘the sun causes the heat of the stone’ I pronounce a judgment of experience which is universally valid; judgments of perception are only subjectively valid, 159; in the phil. of the cosmonomic Idea universal validity is the agreement of a judgment with the divine law for the cosmos in its modal diversity, inter-modal coherence, and fulness of meaning; such validity rests on the universal validity of the structural laws of human experience (universal, because elevated above all individual subjectivity); the judging subject is subjected to laws not originating in a so-called ‘transcendental-logical subject’; the judging subject can come into conflict with the laws; the laws of theoretical thought do not hold ‘ans ich’ but only in the cosmic coherence and in dependence on the religious radical unity of the divine law; universal validity inheres in every judgment to which assent ought to be given by any one; ‘I do not believe in God’ cannot be universally valid; it is subjective, restricted to the individual ego, 160; judgments of naïve experience like ‘this rose which stands on my table is red’ claims concrete truth and universal validity; the latter depends on the structural laws of pre-theoretical experience; there are structural differences between judgments as regards their
universal validity; a judgment of perception is not merely valid in the concrete here and now of the sensory perception; if it were, it would be merely subjective; the structural laws of temporal reality, and therefore of naïve experience, regulate the subject-object-relations in the latter and guarantee the plastic structure of the experience of things also with respect to its subjective-objective sensory and logical aspects; KANT’s view falsifies naïve experience, 161; the criterion of universal validity of judgments concerning supra-theoretical states of affairs and the unconditional validity of the religious law of concentration of human experience; the universal validity of religious judgments, 162; the ‘transcendental consciousness’ is hypostatized theoretical thought; in it truth is made dependent on the really general apostasy of thought in immanence philosophy; the concept ‘normal consciousness’ is not identical with the ‘norm of consciousness’; LITT explains the great diversity of life and world views by calling them ‘individual impressions of life’, 163; but philosophic and special scientific theories are no less divided among themselves; in theoretical thought it is impossible to eliminate the individuality of a thinker; the attempt to do so is a remnant of the rationalistic view of science prevalent in the Enlightenment; focused in the full temporal reality we direct our religious vision of totality towards the reality of life in its concrete structure, in our life and world view; neither life and world view, nor philosophy can be understood individualistically; they have a social origin; a life view is ex-origine the common conviction of a human community bound together by a central religious motive; philosophy, too, issues from such a common religious basic motive, 164; in philosophy as well as in a life and world view there may occur social prejudices due to the limitation of the views prevailing in a social environment (class- and racial prejudices, those of a church group, etc.); philosophic thought may be stimulated by a life and world view, and the latter may be clarified by philosophy, 165.

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not merely a logical but a real identity; he holds that by elevating itself to the abstract function of pure thought the ego has reached the ultimate limit of its inner possibilities, 81; his dialectical-metaphysical logicism, 82; the difference between philosophical and 'objective' scientific thought and LITT's view of the 'thinking' and the 'concrete ego'; his 'pure thinking ego' could not be detached from the Gegenstand-relation; there is a fatal confusion in his view of 'object' and 'Gegenstand' and of the really 'naïve' and the theoretical attitude of thought, 86; the concept of the pure self-reflection of theoretical thought lacks the tendency towards the Origin, 91; LITT criticizes RICKERT, 124; he considers 'value' to be a-theoretical, and the foundation of theoretical truth in a value is to be rejected; in philosophy not a single valuation may be either one of the determining factors or even the decisive factor; his view of life-and-world-views; but 'if valuations are incorporated in philosophy', the subject has not sacrificed its concretely personal relation to the totality of reality to the striving after pure knowledge', 125; if 'universal validity' is required for a life and world view, there appears to be 'a lack of logical integrity', 126; a life and world view is nothing but an 'individual impression of life' arising in contact with the conception of experienced reality formed by the community in which a man lives; common convictions; community conceptions: the image world of myths and dogmas of religion and the popular outlook on life; this view of LITT's agrees with GEORG SIMMEL's, 127; his criticism of RICKERT, 138; he identifies theoretical truth with theoretical correctness; theoretical truth is absolute and self-sufficient exclusively in and for theoretical thought; this is self-contradictory; and relativistic, 139; in all biological, psychological and anthropological thought the actual 'I think' remains hidden; it can never be made into a Gegenstand of thought; philosophical thought
is directed to self-reflection; it should set in the light the subjective antipole of all objective reality; it demonstrates how the validity of truth (in objectivizing special scientific judgments) depends on the validity of the pronouncements of reflective thought; the absolute validity of truth is bound to the thought relation, but this is not saying that truth is limited to real thinking beings; this validity is restricted to the ‘cogito’, the ‘pure thought’ that ‘springs back’ again and again into the counter position to the ‘Gegenstand thought of’; this ‘thought’ is no longer an aspect of concrete temporal reality, it is the transcendental subject of thought, universally valid itself, and inherent in mere thought as such (Denken schlechthin); all spatial and temporal reality and the full concrete ego is (in the epistemological relation) the ‘objective antipole’ of this transcendental ‘I think’, 140; truth is here not deduced from something else; there is a strict correlation between transcendental truth and cogito; critique of LITT’s conception: the fulness of meaning of verity is relativized to mere theoretical truth; and if the transcendental cogito was as self sufficient and absolute as theoretical truth is said to be, they would be identical; LITT’s view stands and falls with the supposed absoluteness and selfsufficiency of philosophical thought, 141; his ‘absolute truth requires theoretical logical determination by philosophic thought to be ‘purely theoretical’; philosophic thought receives its determination from absolute truth; this determination is logically undetermined to the highest degree; the first pitfall in LITT’s demonstration is the unconditional ‘transcendental cogito’; but this cogito is not the selfhood, only its logical function; FICHTE’s absolute and thinking egos, 142; LITT has not noticed the antinomy of ‘unconditioned thought’; ‘theoretical truth’ is dissolved into a speculative hypostatization of thought; the actual I-ness has vanished; conceptualization and knowledge become impossible; the second pitfall is the opposition of transcendental thought and full reality; in the Gegenstand relation LITT supposes that ‘full reality’ springs back into the ‘Gegenständlichkeit’, 143; thus he ignores the temporal meaning coherence; the self-refutation of scepticism; logical thought in its subjectivity is necessarily subjected to the logical laws, in casu - the ‘principium contradictionis’; the principle is not absolute and unconditioned, but of a cosmic-temporal character, 144; LITT’s concept of a self sufficient theoretical truth is ultimately relativistic and antinomic, it recognizes no norm dominating the absolutized ‘transcendental-logical subject’, in the datum correlation he only sees reality in the absolutized individuality of the ‘concrete ego’, the absolute irrational that can be objectivized only in the correlation of knowledge and conceived by the ‘transcendental-logical ego’ in universally valid thought forms; the ‘pure thinking subject’ is not subject to a law, but is itself the ‘universally valid’ and the origin of all universal validity, 145; there is a dialectical tension between philosophy and a life and world view; philosophy has to understand the latter as its other, in a dialectical unity-in-the-opposition with such a view as a normless individual ‘impression of life’, 146; he inclines towards the irrationalist philosophy of life, 147; his view is akin to HEGEL’s ‘pan-logism’, oriented to the irrationalistic turn in Humanistic ideal of personality in Romanticism; LITT’s view is an irrationalist logicism, oriented historically; he considers life and world views as bound ‘in a dialectical unity’ with philosophy, 148; he cannot claim ‘universal validity’ and ‘absolute truth’ for his outlook on every life and world view, nor ‘theoretical neutrality’, 149; he distinguishes theoretical from a-theoretical judgments and denies universal validity to the latter; this goes back to KANT’s dualism, 151; his distinction might make sense if he did not deny all ‘weltanschauliche’ truth; the truth of a view of life and the
world can only be the integral consistency of a thinker's personal confession with his actual behaviour, 154; universally valid truth (theoretical truth) is the judge as to essence, meaning, and limits of the truth of a life and world view, whose judgments are situated 'beyond truth and falsity'; theoretical thought must not dominate the life and world view of the sovereign personality, 155; as life and world views are so various, they must be mere 'personal impressions of life'; judgments of theoretical thought are only universally true; LITT ignores the dividedness among scientific and philosophic theories, 163.

LITT, THEODOR, II, on meaning, 31; historical stream of experience and language 225; logical integrity; his crypto religious attitude of thought, 492.


LITT, THEODOR, III, dialectical-phenomenological sociologist; tries to overcome the dilemma between individualism and universalism; sociology is a philosophy of culture, furnishes the methodical and metaphysical foundations of the Geisteswissenschaften (socio-cultural sciences), 248; the individual experiencing ego is a spiritual centre; in the communal bond this vital centre lives with other egos; LITT combines dialectical reflexive thought with the phenomenological analysis of essences; science is the self-transillumination of the human mind; the moments of a
social whole are interlaced in dialectical tensions social meaning is timeless; the egos’ psychical experience is united with it in symbols which possess a trans-personal character; the ego monad; its interweaving of past and present perspectives; its intertwining of corresponding experiences of other I-momads, 250; reciprocity of perspectives is realized in symbols; social interwovenness, 251; of the closed sphere; its coherence with the system of symbolical expressive forms necessary for mutual comprehension; the conjugal bond disqualifies the partners to separate the meaning content of this contact from this one momentary vital relation; in the closed sphere the symbol becomes objective, transpersonal, constant; the closed sphere can thus expand, 252; and embrace an unlimited number of persons, becoming a closed sphere of the second degree; Direct spiritual contact is limited to very narrow spheres; (of the first degree); the means of social mediation; it lends unity and continuity to the social whole; the Gesamterlebnis, 253; the experience and actions of all the members are incorporated in the indivisible unity of a social totality; a Gemeinschaft has a structural unity of interwovenness guaranteed by social mediation and centred in individual physico-psychical personality; a totality without an I-ness, without a personality of its own, 254; the individual personality is only constituted in the social totality of a temporal Gemeinschaft; and there is a final and highest community encompassing all other relationships as its parts; this view is universalistic; there is no authority in LITT’s closed sphere, because he ignores normative aspects explicitly, 255; to sociology, he says, only the meaningful and the meaningless count; (natural aspects are meaningless here); his phenomenological prejudice; he confuses the lawside with the subject-side of social reality, 256; criticism of his ‘closed sphere’ (cf. sub voce Gemeinschaft, p. 257), 257; his universalistic conception of the ‘final or highest social unity’ even embraces enmity or conflict; the relation between such a ‘final unity’ and its constituent parts is identical with the relation between the individual ego and the ‘closed sphere of the first degree’; this must lead to the concept of a supra individual ego of some ‘Gesamtperson’, which LITT rejects, 258; he ends in a functionalistic universalism of a historicist type, 259; criticism of LITT’s ‘soziale Vermittlung’ concept; he excludes the organization from his concept of Gemeinschaft (community), 260; his dialectical phenomenological method; his charge of ‘spatial mode of thought’; his universalist levelling of differences, 262; his ‘closed sphere’, 271; he intentionally eliminated the normative viewpoint; his idea of ‘social restriction’ is crypto-normative, 272; - psychic interlacements between family members are not a separate department; he rejects the hypostatization of a community to a ‘spiritual organism or super personality’; social acts are inferred from the interlacements among individual egos, 295; his monadological universalism, denies the religious transcendence of human personality, 296; his refutation of the organological view of human communities is only partly adequate; he holds that a community interweaves the individual I-nesses of its members (‘monadological universalism’), 297.

LIVING CELL, III, a living cell is the last independent viable unity of a living mass, whose reality is not directly accessible to naive experience, 102; a living organism is a typically biotically qualified individuality structure functioning within an enkaptic whole; a living body does not coalesce with its ‘living organism’, 717; living albumen in KOLZOFF’s conceptions, 721; ‘living protein’,

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Essay concerning Human Understanding, 224, 263, 305, 530.
LOCKE, JOHN, I, criticized the Humanistic metaphysics of nature, 203; an undoubted Nominalist, he still speaks of ‘eternal relations between the Ideas’; the ethical and mathematical Ideas are creations of thought, 224; ‘outer world’ of objective sensations, ‘inner world’ of subjective operations of the mind; reflection or ‘internal sense’; the understanding borrows all ‘ideas’ from them; parallel with DESCARTES’ dualism of ‘extensio’ and ‘cogitatio’; behind experience there is supposed to be a material substance and a spiritual one; they are held to be unknowable, 263; LOCKE undermines HOBBES’ monistic materialism; sensation and reflection are not of equal rank; the operations of the mind are perceived only when the mind is stimulated by sensations of the ‘outer’ world; Cartesian ‘innate ideas’ are rejected; the understanding owes all of its content to the simple or elementary representations (Ideas) given in sensation and reflection; mathematical thought, even, is not purely logical; simple sensible and spiritual impressions are passively received by the mind; Ideas, however, are complex, 264; ideas are freely formed by the understanding out of the combinations of simple ones; their number is infinite; simple ideas, e.g., pain, pleasure, joy, grief, etc., force,
causality, unity, reality; complex ideas comprise member, space, infinity, identity, power, substance; L. did not complete the psychologizing of scientific thought; he held science (mathematical) to be the mainstay of the science-ideal; his view is antinomic, 265; his psychological dualism is gradually transformed into radical dualism between psychic experience and creative thought; then he came into conflict with his absolutized psychological starting point; he dissolves the world of experience into atomistic psychical elements; they do not cohere, but relate to the unknown bearer, ‘substance’; they are like the letters of the alphabet and capable of being joined together arbitrarily in ‘reflexion’; from this it follows that no scientific knowledge of empirical reality is possible; but the necessary coherence between concepts required in science does not originate in the psychical impressions; between the ‘Ideas’ there are necessary relations elevated above the sensory impressions and having an eternal constancy, 266; true science is only concerned with this necessary connection of concepts; the understanding creates the necessary relations between Ideas and forms ‘archetypes’; in the experience of reality a triangle has the same sum of its angles as does the universal triangle in the mathematical concept; the same thing holds for ‘moral Ideas’; exact proofs are as possible in ethics as in mathematics; both furnish us with a-priori; knowledge, infallible, true, and certain, 267; thus the science ideal is given primacy; human personality can only maintain its freedom of action by obeying mathematical thought; but ‘sovereign reason’ refused to accept the Cartesian ‘innate ideas’, 268; LOCKE granted to psychology the central task of explaining the origin and limits of human knowledge and of critically examining the validity of its foundations; the dogmatic acceptance of innate ideas endangered the sovereignty of thought; the psychological Archè of mathematical thought must be traced; he refused to ‘swallow’ principles with a blind implicit faith; he limited scientific knowledge to the sphere of the non-real; he distinguished empirical facts from necessary relations between concepts (like HOBBES), 269; HUME was to adopt this distinction, too; LOCKE maintained that mathematical and moral judgments are synthetical; he then introduced a new faculty of cognition, the intuition of the ‘cogito’; this intuition was the basis of all mathematical proof (demonstratio); thought must always remain joined to psychical sensations if it is to lead to knowledge; the continuity and infinity of space and time are beyond sensory perception; he capitulates to the science ideal; physics and biology are entirely dependent on sensible perception and cannot be mathematically demonstrated, 270; here was the beginning of critical self-reflection on the root of the science-ideal; and of a reaction against the rationalism of the ‘Enlightenment’; L. rejected the Cartesian deduction of ‘Sum res cogitans’ from ‘Cogito ergo sum’; he denied to mathematical thought the right to identify itself with the ‘sovereign personality’ as the root of the science-ideal; he rejected the theory that the will was a mode of mathematical thought; the mathematical science ideal was emancipated from a rationalistic metaphysics of nature; the insight was possible that the root of reality is not to be discovered by science; the science ideal must have its fundamentals in the personality ideal, 271; HUME had outgrown the Enlightenment; he reduced the metaphysical conceptions of nature and human personality to absurdity, 272; he found room for moral freedom and responsibility in the power of man ‘to suspend his desires’; the care of ourselves that we do not mistake imaginary for real happiness is the necessary foundation of our liberty; LOCKE is indeterministic, 305; he opposed HOBBES’ absolutist doctrine, but remained a genuine figure of the Enlightenment.
in his optimistic faith that the domination of mathematical thought was the best guarantee of the freedom of personality; the free individual remained the central point of the civil State; he construed the transition from the natural state to the civil state by means of the Social Contract; the citizens guaranteed their inalienable rights of freedom and private property by an organized power according to a contract; the civil state is no more than a company with limited liability; this is the constitutional state of the old liberalism, 318.

LOCKE JOHN, II, together with NEWTON he dominated the thought of the times of the Enlightenment, 350; his conception of innate human rights pertaining to natural law became a guiding motive, but was a subjective theory that could not be positivized in the legal order, 357; WOLFF's and LOCKE's rationalism penetrated into the codifications of the times, 358; L. formulated the classical-liberal idea of the law state, 360; innate rights; this theory is destructive to the recognition of positive law, 395; theory of personality rights stems from innate human rights, 413.

LOCKE JOHN, III, his doctrine of secondary qualities, 39; his idea of the body politic construed the state as a political association whose sovereign authority is bound to the aim of protecting the innate natural rights of man to life, freedom and property; he thought the salus publica the highest law of the state, 237; his idea of the law state, 426, 427; of public interest, 442; he distinguishes between State and
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LOEB, III, secret societies have one common root, viz., the initiation rites of boys, 366.

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LOGIC, II, transcendental and formal logic in KANT, 15; logic historically explained, 195; logic as a science, 462; pure logic and pure axiology distinguished by SCHELER, 545; cf. s.v. Logical Aspect, II.

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LOGICAL ASPECT, I, in a closed state this aspect lacks anticipatory moments; viz. in the pre-theoretical attitude of thought; but in the theoretical attitude anticipatory moments find expression in the inner connection with the historical, linguistic, economic and later aspects, 29; time discloses a logical modal sense in the logical aspect; logical simultaneity and the order of prius and posterius is as much a modal aspect of time as the physical; the theoretical concept joins in logical simultaneity the analysed characteristics of that which it defines in subjection to the principles of identity and contradiction expressing the analytical temporal order of simultaneity in the sense of logical implication and exclusion; logical movement of thought follows the order of prius and posterius; this movement has duration in the real act of thought when we draw a syllogistic inference in theoretical logical form; in the logical order of succession the former stages do not disappear because the inference implies its premises; in mathematical movement the former stages disappear in the order of succession of its moments, 30; logical order is normative, physical order is not; cosmic time does not offer a concentration point serving as a point of departure for philosophy, not even in the logical aspect, 31; the logical aspect of our act of thought is that of analytical distinction in the sense of setting apart what is given together; logical analysis would have nothing to distinguish apart from a previously given cosmic diversity of meaning, 39; this concept enables HUSSERL to formulate different purely logical propositions and definitions, 73, 74.

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and conclusion; this is a logical and not a physical relation; the logical process of concluding is a retrocipation to movement; analytical space, 120; logical anticipations are only found in the deepened meaning of theoretical thought: logical control (historical anticipation); logical symbolism; symbolic logic; logical economy; in ARISTOTLE, PLATO and WILLIAM OF OCCAM, 122; MACH; AVENARIUS; W. JAMES; and pragmatic absolutization of logical economy; logical economy is not an application of the general economic principle embracing the ideal of science, 123; analytical economy pre-supposes the norms of identity, contradiction, and sufficient ground; and it deepens their meaning; misuse of this logical economy in jurisprudence and legal technique, 124; logical economy and the principle of sufficient ground, 125; the method of defining things by their genus proximum and differentia specifica was introduced by SOCRATES, PLATO and ARISTOTLE, 132; economy of thought is an economic anticipation; indirect; and in deepened theoretical thought; it is systematic and shows logical control (historical anticipation); biologic views of MACH and AVENARIUS; OWSALD SPENGLER's misinterpretation, 175; logical symbolism; logical harmony; justification of theoretical judgment anticipates the legal aspect; KANT’s verdict, 176; the relation of the ‘whole and its parts’ is not purely logical, 454; its numerical analogy; the ideas of continuous analytical extension and juxtaposition, are retrocipatory; movement of thought, prius and posterius; are kinematic analogies, 455; the science of logic; this notion is a seeming paradox, 462; the analytical aspect cannot be its own Gegenstand, but it is the I-ness who is operating theoretically, 463; ‘formal logic’ is an antinomy if it is conceived as ‘pure
analysis'; it is formalized logic; and in it logical individuality and all total structures of individuality have been eliminated; in the theoretical attitude the non-vertical
is analytically encompassed by the logical categories; logical sphere sovereignty and sphere universality; Christian logic, 464; what it means, 465; intuition is the bottom layer of the logical function, 473.

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LOGICAL CREATION MOTIVE, I, in HEINRICH RICKERT's thought, 14; in modern Humanistic thought; in DESCARTES; LEIBNIZ; HOBSES, 197, 203: a particular method in LEIBNIZ, 245; in PLATO, 247, 248 (note); the logical origin principle of creative mathematical thought, 407.

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LOGICAL LAWS, I, have been psychologized in HUME, 278, 279; cf. s.v. Logical Aspect, II, 118-120.

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LOHMAN, A.F. DE SAVORNIN, III, the ‘visible’ church is not a society, but an institution; it possesses an internal spiritual legal sphere of its own entirely apart from civil law; civil juridical rules relating to associations can never be applied here; if a baptismal member refuses to pay the ecclesiastic tax the Church cannot at all call in the aid of a civil judge, 690.

LONELINESS, INNER, III, WEBER's idea of a Calvinist's ‘inner loneliness’, 247.

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LOVE AND JUSTICE, II, are antithetically opposed in E. BRUNNER, 157-159.

LOVE UNION, III, marriage is essentially a love union, 307.

LOWIE, R.H., III, refuted the constructive evolutionist theory of the rise and development of the human family, 331; sexual communism (cf. 'group marriage'), instead of individual marriage, is nowhere to be found at present and the evidence of its early occurrence must be rejected as insufficient; the bilateral family of husband and wife and children is a universal unit of human social life, 332; LOWIE follows BOAS, 333; his criticism of economic explanations, 336; marriage and family are the centre of society among even the simplest cultures, whereas the latter lack the sib and the clan, 338; pirra-ura is a question of concubinage, 341; he warns
against overestimating popular juridical conceptions of marriage, 342; on the sib or clan; his error of seeking the basis of the sib or clan in the biotic aspect, 353; but LOWIE proved that the claim of common descent on the part of the sibmates rests on a fiction; there is often a mythical conception of common descent, i.e., a totem, 354; siblings belong to the same generation; the law of exogamy, 355; sibs are extremely changeable units, 357; adoption is a very important feature of a sib; the adopted child is incorporated in the husband's or in the wife's sib, 359.

LUCINDE, III, by SCHLEGEL, embodied the Romantic ideal of free love, 318.

ULLUS, RAYMUNDUS, I, conceived the idea of a logical alphabet, 245.

LUSCHAU, III, Völker, Sprachen, Rassen, 495.

LUTHER, MARTIN, I, LUTHER'S spiritualistic distinction between LAW and GOSPEL, 511; his Occamist Nominalism; he opposes temporal ordinances to Evangelical freedom, separates faith from science; although he opposed Aristotelism as well as ERASMUS, he was influenced by ECKHART and the Augustinian Franciscan spirit; his nominalistic dualistic view of the Church; in this dualism was implied his subsequently abandoned distinction between official and, 512, personal morality; his dualistic attitude towards scientific thought rested on a prejudice concerning the relation between faith and natural reason, 513; LUTHER did not escape falling into a spiritualistic antinomianism, 519.

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LUTHER, MARTIN, III, agapē, eros, and original sin; he gave love primacy in marriage, but ascribed sexual pleasure to original sin, 314; he rejected celibacy and the monastic vow of chastity; but remained dependent on the Roman views of marriage as a 'less perfect state', 315; the relation between the ecclesia visibilis and ecclesia invisibilis according to LUTHER, 512; his dualism favoured the formation of sectarian conventicles because of his hypostatization of the faith aspect of the temporal institution to the super-natural order; congregationis fidelium, 513; the peasant revolt induced him to turn to the Elector of Saxony to give the Church an external organization and to institute visitation, 514; LUTHER'S idea of giving the congregation the right to elect Church officers and to maintain doctrinal discipline is not of fundamental importance, 515; the Evangelical princes are to render a service of love in the Church and not to have dominion; he did not properly understand the juridical aspect of their service, 545.

LYCIANS, III, the ancient Lycians had matriarchy, 331.
MACCHIAVELLI, I, displayed a tension between pessimism and optimism in combining virtue and necessity, 217.
MACCHIAVELLI, III, influenced by POLYBIUS, 231; his theory of the ‘raison d’état’ appealed to by the adherents of the theory of the power State, 399.

MACH, ERNST, I, founder of Neo-Positivism, whose centre was the Vienna School, expected a more adequate approach to reality from modern natural science; formulas and concepts of physics are mere symbols, 213; his purely technical conception of the Humanistic Science-ideal, 556; his own and OSTWALD’s opposition to the acceptance of real atoms and light waves, and their attempt to resolve physical causality into a purely mathematical concept of function, depends on their positivist sensualistic standpoint in philosophy, 557; a mathematically formulated theory is correct if it explains in the simplest way possible the phenomena known up till the present time by bringing them in a functional coherence; this is the principle of logical economy, 558.
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MAGIC, II, FRAZER denies that magic belongs to ‘religion’, i.e., to a cult in the modal meaning of faith, 312; he holds that every cult is preceded by a period of magic; magic is directed to the impersonal forces of nature, and does not strive after the propitiation of the deity, but aims at dominating nature; the discovery of the inefficacy of magic leads to the feeling of the power of the invisible, and from this feeling arises the worship of the personified forces of nature, and death; later on to polytheism, and then to monotheism, 313.

EXTENSIVE MAGNITUDE, II, as a complex anticipation of space in the irrational function of number within the series of the ‘real numbers’, 170.

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MAIMON, SALOMON, I,
Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie, 405, 407;
Über die Progressen der Philosophie, 406.
MAIMON, SALOMON, he introduced into KANT's episte-
mology LEIBNIZ’ doctrine of the ‘petites perceptions’, eliminated the concept ‘Ding an sich’; his method to have the ‘matter’ of experience originate from the transcendental consciousness is an apostasy from KANT’s transcendental motive; KANT’s philosophy had started critical self-reflection on the personality ideal, MAIMON dropped it, 404; MAIMON wants to overcome the antinomy of the Critica form-matter schema; he reduced ‘sensory experience’ to the creative consciousness as purely theoretical; the matter of knowledge is produced unconsciously in the consciousness; it is to be understood as the ‘transcendental differential’ of clear transcendental-logical thought; ‘Ding an sich’ becomes a theoretical limiting concept; oriented to the continuity postulate of the science ideal; M.’s basic problem is that of the universal a priori forms of the ‘transcendental consciousness’ and the particular matter, 405; MAIMON tried to reconcile mathematical idealism with Critical transcendentalism; to the Idea of the Divine Understanding any Critique of pure Reason must be reduced; this was a regression to dogmatism; MAIMON tries to give KANT’s matter of consciousness a mathematical basis; the understanding asks after the origin of the sensory impressions of the Gegenstand, 406; KANT’s Idea or noumenon becomes a mathematical differential concept as the foundation of KANT’s sensory matter of consciousness; the Idea knows no other archè but creative mathematical thought, 407; he tries to clarify the relation of the particular to the universal by means of his new conception of the Idea as ‘differential of consciousness’; the modal particularity of meaning must be reduced to its origin, according to a logical principle of creation; the problem of specification is set in the frame of a cosmonomic Idea; he starts with the specification of the formal logical concepts into the special concepts of mathematics; he refers space as ‘apriori form of intuition’ to its logical origin; then the problem broadens to that of the origin of all ‘real’ thought in universally valid synthetic judgments with a special sense; his principle of determinability, 408; this expresses the Idea of logical domination of the manifold in the special Gegenstände of thought, not to be derived from merely analytical principles; the principle of determinability becomes the origin principle of all particular judgments of knowledge, in which thought becomes ‘thinking of being’, and all being becomes ‘being of thought’; three ways to combine a plurality of objects of consciousness into a logical unity; the elements are inter-independent; then thought remains formal; the elements are inter-dependent; cause and effect in a judgment of causality, 409; in the mathematical style of thinking, e.g., thought becomes thought of reality; the predicate cannot be thought without the subject; empirical judgments are synthetic but do not hang together systematically according to the principle of determinability; gold is a complex sense perception; the reason of its qualities occurring together is hidden; here is MAIMON’s critical scepticism, 410; he ends in scepticism with respect to KANT’s a priori principles of experience; he only acknowledges as valid the logicized mathematics and the transcendental philosophy as science of the synthetic origin of the pure forms of consciousness; his continuity postulate of the science ideal halts before the boundary of sensory phenomena, 411; M.’s dilemma with respect to the ‘Ideas’: they are either to be taken in LEIBNIZ’ sense, or as mere fictions of phantasy in HUME’s sense; later on LEIBNIZ’ speculative Idea of God lost its significance to MAIMON, the Ideas tend to be fictitious; he sharply separated reason and sensibility; his transcendental basic idea lacks unity in its Archimedean point, 412; MAIMON influenced FICHTE, 427.
MAIMON, SALOMON, II, denied that KANT’s synthetical judgments could be a priori applied to the sensory matter of experience, 449.

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MAJORITY PRINCIPLE, III, rejected by ARISTOTLE, 211.

MALAN, G.H.T., II,
De Eerste (Getals-)kring van Dooyeweerd, 84, 85, 89.
MALAN, G.H.T., II, starts from the ‘Gegenstandstheorie’ of A. MEINONG; he holds that number pre-supposes sensory perceptible pre-numeral sets of discrete objects, 84; he interprets BERTRAND RUSSELL; accuses DOOYEWEERD of hypostatizing a quantitative mode of being ‘number’; MALAN’s original objects with number, 84; numbers are his ‘objects’ of the third stage; ‘prenumeral sets’, 85.

MALBERG, CARRÉ DE, III,
Contribution à la théorie générale de l’Etat, 407.

MALEBRANCHE, I, his idea concerning a ‘visio omnium rerum in Deo’, 525.
MALEBRANCHE, II, strongly influenced SCHELER’s phenomenology, 589.

MALINOWSKY, II, contradicts CASSIRER’s assertion that in a primitive community the individuality of its members is totally absorbed, 320.
MALINOWSKY, III,
MALINOWSKY, III, legal, moral, social and faith rules are not interwoven into an undifferentiated unity in primitive societies; they have differentiated categories of norms; he also criticizes the current view that primitive societies do not possess an idea of ‘propriety’ (Sitte), 371.

MAN, I, he whose ego expresses itself in the coherence of all its temporal modal functions, was created as the expression of God's image, 4; man transcends the temporal coherence in his selfhood, but within this coherence he exists in a status of being universally bound to time, together with all creatures that are fitted with him in the same temporal order, 24; as an individual totality of functions in RICKERT’s thought, 129; according to NIETSCHE, man is a ‘phantastic animal, not yet fixed’, 211; may be an end in himself only in the subject-object relation, 377; was created as a ‘homo noumenon’, not as a ‘phenomenon’, according to KANT, 380.

MAN, III, is a microcosm in PLATO, 207; his hierarchical structure of the three parts of the soul; individual man is a kind of state ruled by reason, 230; the body of man is the vehicle of the soul; this is an objectivistic conception in PLATO, 778.

MANA, II, the divine mana is also named orenda, wakonda, manitu, dema; the mana-idea possesses a peculiar fluidity; in it the natural and the super-natural, the personal and the impersonal are merged; its counterpart is taboo; the disintegration of the sense of personal identity in mana and totemism, 316; is elevated above the familiar every-day sphere of life which can be conceived by common sense; it is personified in mythical figures embodied in visible things: plants, animals, men, and also in unfamiliar or huge objects, regarded as the masks of the mysterious mana, 317.

MANA-BELIEF, III, in totemistic clans, 356.

MANGOLD, H., III, he gave rise to an entirely new embryo by transplanting a piece of the blastopore of a gastrula into the tissue of another embryo, 752.

MANKIND, IDEA OF, II, the categorical imperative of KANT's philosophy demands respect for the Idea of mankind, 149.

MANKIND, III, the fall of mankind, 69; and love, 71; mankind is not enclosed in a temporal kingdom of individual beings, 87, 89; racial differences, 89; is not a temporal community, 163; the Biblical revelation, 168; the Stoic conception and that of HUGO GROT IUS, 169; mankind is a central religious community, 170; the religious solidarity of mankind, 196.

MANNHEIM, KARL, I, sociology of thought, 165.
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MANORIAL COMMUNITIES, III, villae, domaines; they are undifferentiated organized communities, 367.

MAN'S POSITION IN THE WORLD, III, this is a question of anthropology; it can only be dealt with after we have gained insight into the transcendental conditions of philosophic thought and into the different dimensions of the temporal horizon.
with its modal and individuality structures; existentialism seeks an immediate approach to the innermost sphere of man's temporal existence to interpret the I-ness in its situation in the world from the supposedly most fundamental strata of human existence of concern, care, dread, i.e., its 'Existentialen'; BINSWANGER replaces HEIDEGGER's 'dread' by 'love' (the meeting between I and thou); this seems to assume a trustworthy Christian meaning; this existentialistic trend is not interested in structural investigations like ours, 781; it pretends it can penetrate into its subject matter by an immediate 'encounter'; 'encounter' as the genuine inner knowledge method is opposed to 'experience' as affording 'objectifying outer knowledge'; Christian neo-scholasticists think this existentialist anthropology more 'Biblical' than rationalism and idealism; this is another attempt at accommodation; SÖREN KIERKEGAARD considered existentialism to be separated from the Divine Revelation in Jesus Christ by an unbridgeable gulf; the ultimate and central questions cannot be answered by philosophy in an autonomous way; they are religious; they are answered in the Divine Word Revelation; Christian theologians and philosophers join existentialism and thereby reject the radical transcendental critique of philosophic thought; it is wrong to expect so much from philosophic anthropology; the question about man's temporal existential form implies a series of primordial problems; man as such has no qualifying function, but transcends all temporal structures; man is not a 'rational-moral being'; he is the creaturely centre of the whole earthly cosmos; he has an eternal destination in the fullness of his individual personality, 783; in temporal human existence we are confronted with an extremely intricate system of enkaptic structural interlacements which pre-suppose a comprehensive series of individuality structures bound within an enkaptic structural whole; the question about 'who is man?' is unaswerable from the immanence standpoint, 784.

MANSION, S., III,
La première doctrine de la substance, 16.

MANUS MARITI IN JUS CIVILE, III, the old Roman conception, 325.
MARBLE, III, its structure; its function in a sculpture; a phenotype of an original genotype of inorganic matter, 119; its structure, 124, 125, 126.

MARBLE SCULPTURE, III, its enkapsis, 111.

MARCHAL, II, Gegenstand und Wesen der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, 123.

MARCK, SIEGFRIED, III, Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff in der Rechtsphilosophie, 255, 259, 401, 408.

MARCK, SIEGFRIED, III, he holds that THEODOR LITT has produced 'a new type of social universalism in contrast to the old dogmatic and ontological version', 255; he rejects GIERKE's distinction between inner corporative and inter-individual law (Sozialrecht and Individualrecht), 259; he is oriented to LITT's dialectical sociology; he capitulates to the dualism of sein and sollen; but rejects the dialectical solution of Hegelianism; he remains dialectical phenomenological, 401; he opposes organization to social organism, 408.

MARCKS, ERICH, III, Gaspard von Coligny, 521.

MARCKS, ERICH, III, interprets CALVIN's idea of Church government as the expression of the sovereignty of the congregation, 521.

MARITAIN, I, a French Neo-Thomist thinker, 524.

MARETT, III, an adherent of BOAS, 333.

MARKET, FREE, III, and competition, 661.

MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, II, and the mechanical analogies of price-movement gave the mechanistic conceptions of pure economics a firm basis in the opinion of economists influenced by the classical Idea of mathesis universalis, 344.

MARLET, MICHAEL FR. J., S.J., III, Grundlinien der Kalvinistischen Philosophie der Gesetzidee als Christicher Transcendentalphilosophie, 6, 15, 73.

MARLET, MICHAEL FR. J., S.J., III, interprets the substance concept as a structure of being; its relation to the accidentalia, 16; he objects to the rejection of the substance concept; and says that in the struggle against MICHAEL SERVET CALVIN exaggerated God's transcendence at the expense of man's being, accentuating God's immanence at the expense of man's creaturely activity, 72; on the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, 73.

MARRIAGE, III, conjugal relations remain separate from family relations; bi-unity in marriage; polygamy means a plurality of marriages; the harem is an enkapsis; the joint or extended family, polygamous or not; patriarchal agnatic kinship; the Roman family, 305; the Roman family excluded polygamy; the termination of the marriage bond, 306; marriage and family; radical and geno types; sexual union for the propagation of the race; marriage as a legal institution; love has primacy, 307; Scholastic view considered love as a changeable feeling.
instrumental to propagation; civil and canon law regulations have a formal and external character; the structure of the conjugal community subjects its partners to its institutional law, not to their arbitrary discretion; this law requires constant vital realization of the conjugal structure; permanent anti-normative behaviour destroys the internal union, but does not dissolve marriage as a civil (tribal, or ecclesiastical) institution; canon law and civil law may be in conflict with each other; the social form of marriage is maintained; divorce; Christ and the Pharisees, misuse of the New Testament; the Thomistic theory of the bona matrimonii; marriage as a natural law institution; this view favoured the idea of the primacy of the legal institution; canon law jurists and Roman Catholic philosophers elevate marriage as a divine and a natural law institution to a ‘sacrament’; marriage is meant for the propagation of the human race according to Thomists like CATHREIN, VON SHERER, HOEGEN, agapê, eros, in LUTHER; Scholastic Protestant ethics; LUTHER’s great Catechism gives love the primacy in marriage; AUGUSTINUS considered sexual pleasure as due to sin; LUTHER ascribed the sexual eros to the corruption of human nature; the pre-Thomistic view of marriage as a sacrament served to sanctify the supposed sinful sexual erotic basis through ‘the means of grace of the Church’; marriage was a ‘less perfect state’; later Lutheranism considered it as the juridical order of sexual intercourse with the positive duty of procreation; Reformed ethics was tainted with Scholasticism, rationalistic Enlightenment; its view of married love as a ‘blind passion’ was individualistic; the methodist WHITEFIELD boasted that in his proposal of marriage there had been no question of love ‘that foolish passion’; this was rationalistic utilitarian puritanism; the genetic juridical form of the marriage bond was absolutized in the Humanistic doctrine of natural law; marriage became the right to use each other’s body; but until the Enlightenment marriage was held to be a permanent union which could not be dissolved by mutual agreement; a contract giving rise to jura in re was already found in Canon Law, but it concerned marriage in the state of becoming, the matrimonium in fieri (not in esse); its causa was procreation; its essence was found in the traditio corporum; KANT’s view; he relates marriage exclusively to subjective sexual enjoyment; his crude definition; Romantic view of free love versus marriage as an institution, in this con-
ception nature was said to be dialectically united with freedom without any normative commitment; the aesthetistic morality of men of genius; SCHLE格尔's ‘Lucinde’ embodied the Romantic ideal of free love; FICTHE's actualistic view of sexual love was incompatible with the institutional character of the marriage community, ignored its external civil juridical aspect as well as its internal juridical side; HEGEL held the essence of marriage to be a juridical moral kind of love, 318; Roman Catholic recognition of the primacy of love; the new tendency: the Encyclical Casti Connubii; HILDEBRAND's view, 319, 320; HILNEBRAND; older Roman Catholic conceptions: CATHREIN; THOMAS AQUINAS, 321; the Encyclical ‘Casti Cunibii’; it compares very favourably with E. BRUNNER's conception of love as a ‘sandy ground’; marriage is intentionally adapted to the family relationship; and deepend by it; the selfhoods of the marriage partners are for all eternity interwoven with the new root of life, Christ Jesus; this is the religious fulness of meaning of marriage; they belong to each other as children of one Father in Christ; in a temporal sense they belong to each other as if they did not; temporal ties are perishable, 322; the religious union should find expression in the temporal; in a family the conjugal bi-unity has been expanded in a unity in plurality; the personality of the marriage partners in its temporal existence finds fuller expression in their union, and acquires a wider and deeper perspective in the multi-unitary bond of the family; THOMAS says that posteriority is essential to the marital bond; this is an error; childless marriages are genuine marriages; THOMAS' view is contradictory, 323; married love sanctified in Christ justifies the sexual consummation of marriage; temperance and chastity; marital authority; its external juridical function, 324; the old Roman manus maritii in ius civile; the Roman legal concept of the agnatic patrician familia as concerned with an undifferentiated societal relationship, viz. the domestic community of the pater familias with its enkaptically interwoven structures; manus marriage; its disappearance; a husband's jus vitae ac necis with respect to his wife in Roman law; a husband's authority leads but does not dominate; male and female are equivalent, though not equal; marital authority and normal emotional life; female emotional life wants to find support and guidance in the husband, 325; the question of normal male and female feeling; cultural influences; the normative structural principle, 326; effeminacy in men; authority in the juridical aesthetical and social function of marriage; no autocracy; marriage is not a state in miniature; the co-responsibility of the wife; and civil law; the civil judge should not be the supreme power of decision here, 327; the female lead in marriage is a disharmony; the aesthetic function in marriage; social and lingual forms of intercourse in marriage, 328; marital authority is biotically founded; active and passive rôles in sexual intercourse; ARISTOTLE's notions about the genesis of woman; the wife was held to be essentially imperfect; THOMAS AQUINAS calls her: ‘mas occasionatus’; ‘aliquid viri’; not ‘civis simpliciter’; marital authority, however, is a divine ordinance, 329; ethnological research should start from the structural principle of marriage when investigating marriage relations in primitive tribes; facts can only be conceived in their structural meaning; ‘empirical’ norms; ‘ideal types’, are useless; MAX WEBER; matriarchy in evolutionism; the socialist theories of ENGELS and BEBEL; were based on L.H. MORGAN's hypotheses; matriarchy discussed by J.J. BACHOVEN; he derived marriage from promiscuous sexual intercourse; matriarchy among the Lycians of Antiquity; BACHOVEN's explanation; women invented agriculture; then came patriarchy; L. MORGAN elaborated this theme; the refutation of this theory, 331; about matriarchy and the Kulturkreislehre, 332-339; other abnormal external
forms of marriage and family: levirate, sororate, brother-polyandry, the
pirra-urra-relation; FRAZER's theory of 'group-marriage', 339; his explanation
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HUME and KANT; the mathematical concept of function became the common denominator of all the aspects of reality; reason employs the method of continuity as the sceptre of its absolute sovereignty, 203; the lex continui in LEIBNIZ and in NeoKantians, 204; the continuity postulate opposes the subjection of philosophical thought to the cosmic temporal order originating in the Divine plan of creation; the postulate has led philosophy into a maze of antinomies, 204; the naturalistic science-ideal must reveal a fundamental antinomy in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental basic Idea, 204; there will be a time when the Humanistic personality-ideal falls a prey to this science-ideal; the Idea of unconditional and sovereign freedom of the personality will prove to be an illusion; transcendent-idealism supposes that since KANT and FICHTE the fundamental antinomy between the science and the personality ideal has been solved; the 'cogito' opened the way to self-reflection; all scientific syntheses depend on the transcendent logical function of the ego who is never a Gegenstand; but this 'transcendental cogito' is also antinomous, 205; the Humanistic classical science-ideal was a primitive kind of naturalism insofar as they wanted to comprehend actual thought in a natural scientific manner; the natural scientific method was expanded over the total act of thinking; Kantian idealism accepts only a cosmic determinateness of the empirical act of thought in a natural scientific causal sense; Humanistic philosophy is placed before an inexorable dilemma between science and personality; the freedom of the personality possesses the same tendency of continuity as the science ideal, 206; the philosophy of the Enlightenment had conceived the freedom and the personality ideal in a rationalistic individualistic sense, and even KANT had done so; after them it was attempted to synthesize nature and freedom dialectically, and freedom and personality received an irrationalistic and universalistic form; there arose a new mode of thought, viz., the historical one, elevated to a new science-ideal; a historicistic vision of reality also permeated the view of nature, 207; historicism undermined both the classical Humanistic science ideal and its personality ideal; the dialectical basic motive led to a spiritual uprooting; 'natural history' became the basis of human cultural history; SCHELLING's nature philosophy, the developmental process from inert matter to the living organism (from mechanical necessity to creative freedom); the dialectical union of necessity and freedom; Volksgeist, and the awakening of the historical consciousness; HEGEL's dialectical logicizing of the historical process, 208; as a dialectical unfolding of the Absolute Idea in the objective spirit, 208; it was impossible to conceive history in Hegelian a priori thought forms; man's creative freedom was thus lost; positivistic sociology and COMTE's law of the three stages, 209; the third stage embodies the classical science ideal and its domination motive in a positivistic form and is elevated to the standard and goal of the historical process; it is the old faith in the freeing power of science; it proclaimed itself to be a new religion, 'un nouveau christianisme'; in the middle of last century the dogma of evolution spread from biology to all other sciences; the classical deterministic science ideal was revived; it accepted the primacy of the nature motive; HEGEL's idealistic dialectic was transformed into Marxist sociology and its historical materialism, united with Darwinism; there was still belief in a final goal of development outside historical relativity; the spiritual uprooting became manifest in NIETSCHE's gospel of the super-man, 210; he was influenced by Romanticism and Idealism, later by Darwinian evolutionism; finally he developed a religion of power based on DARWIN and historicism; man is an animal not yet 'fixed', but not bound to static instincts and his 'Umwelt';
his anthropology; man overestimates his own importance; man is a ‘phantastic animal’ positing ideologies; science enables man to kill his gods; history is merely a struggle for power ‘Wille zur Macht’ is the only escape from nihilism; super-man; blond beast; the transvaluation of all values established on the ruins of Christian and Humanistic ideologies; the ideals of science and of personality are both rejected; science has mere pragmatic value; no faith in scientific truth or in the Idea of humanity, 211; he introduced the process of religious decay into Humanistic philosophy; Neo-Kantianism tried to check naturalistic positivism; historicism turned away from evolutionism; the difference between natural science and cultural science claimed attention; but the rôle of Neo-Kantianism was at an end with the rise of national socialism; German neo-Hegelianism interpreted HEGEL in a relativistic sense and soon became a docile instrument of the HITLER regime, 212; the twentieth century development of microphysics, destroyed natural scientific determinism; quantum mechanics, 212; neo-positivism of the Vienna school (MACH) viewed the formulas and concepts of physics as conventional symbols, but not as truth; EDMUND HUSSERL tried to rejuvenate the Idea of mathesis universalis; his ‘eidetic method’; tried to found logic on the direct intuition of essences (Wesensschau); his phenomenology and DESCARTES’ cogito and KANT’s practical reality
of the Idea of freedom; the ‘epoche’; transcendental Ego-logy; the transcendental phenomenological consciousness becomes an ‘uninterested observer’; his science of the ‘essences’, 213; the abyss of nothingness behind the absolutized transcendental theoretical consciousness; the second phenomenological trend was irrationalistic in origin, and established by DILTHEY; assimilated by HEIDEGGER’s philosophy of existenie; SØREN KIERKEGAARD’s existential thought opposed Hegelianism; since NIETSCHE there arose a strongly variegated philosophy of life, depreciating the science ideal as well as the Humanistic freedom idealism; ‘cogito’ replaced by ‘vivo’, the absolute Idea by the ‘stream of life’; depth psychology dealt the death blow to the personality ideal; FREUD’s mechanistic view of the unconscious, dethroning Humanistic ethics and religion; SPENGLER’s Untergang des Abendlandes; HEIDEGGER’s Sein und Zeit; SARTRE’s ‘l’Être et le Néant’ are representative of the attitude of decline in Humanistic philosophy; historicism allows modern man only the insight into the meaninglessness of his existential freedom in the face of nature in which he is ‘thrown’, a ‘freedom to death’, a ‘nothingness’, 214; Humanism in decay lost its monopolistic position; there is a chaotic struggle for leadership in the future of Western culture, requiring a transcendental critique of theoretical thought, 215; the critical separation between understanding and sensibility, universal form and individuality, form and matter of experience, understanding and reason, had to be overcome after KANT; the freedom motive was increasingly recognized as the root of the Humanistic life and world-view; it called into play its inner postulate of continuity; KANT’s theoretical reason elevated above the limits of sense experience, became a new dialectical logic, as a true ‘organ’ of freedom idealism; nature and reason should be thought together dialectically; the classical science ideal was pushed back and subjected to the personality ideal, 403; antinomy was now sanctioned as a transition to a higher synthesis, 404; in KANT’s dualistic world picture the science and the personality ideal remain the recognized antinomic factors; FICHTE changes this antinomy into a contradiction within the personality ideal itself, viz., that between free activity (spontaneity) and bondage to the lower nature, or between Idea and sense; this bondage to sensory nature cannot be cancelled without dissolving the personality ideal into an empty abstraction; with the hypostatization of the moral norm this antinomy must be retained, 450; the titanic activity motive of the ‘Sturm und Drang’, its voluntaristic tendency, its glorification of the ‘activity of Genius’; its artistic expression in the ‘ego-drama’; enthusiasm and optimism of the ‘Deed’; its bond with ROUSSEAU’s ‘natural forming of life’, but its absolutization of the subjective individuality; it culminates in its demand for subjective ethical freedom; an irrationalistic type of the Humanistic personality-ideal, 453; but the Sturm und Drang could never free itself from the deterministic rationalism of the science-ideal; its irrationalist Idea of Humanity, HERDER, KLOPSTOCK, 454; the method of empathy to understand every individuality, 455; FICHTE’s philosophy of life and feeling, 413-455; especially pp. 456, 457, 458-462; SCHILLER’s Aesthetic Idealism; the ‘Beautiful Soul’; the ‘morality of genius’ in early Romanticism; NIETSCHE’s development, 465; the irrationalist philosophy of life; BERGSON; the rationalist types of Humanistic philosophy make the concept of the subject a function of the concept of the law in a special modal sense; thus the subject is dissolved into the law; on the other hand the irrationalist types reduce the ‘true’ order to a function of individual subjectivity, 466; KANT’s formulation: ‘the true autos discovers itself only in the nomos’, concerns the Humanistic personality ideal; the Irrationalistic
version would be: ‘the nomos is a reflex of the absolutely individual autos’; rationalism and irrationalism are polar contrasts; absolutized individuality and law display an antinomic inner tension, so that the Early Romantics, e.g., HAMANN, developed a dialectical conception of reality; logical contradiction has an absolute reality here; DILTHEY’s irrationalistic historical philosophy of life led to modern dialectical phenomenology; HUSSELR’s phenomenology is rationalistic, however; not irrationalistic, 466; the dialectical trait of irrationalism shows that irrationalistic philosophy is rooted in the absolutized theoretical attitude of thought; the sanctioning of a theoretical antinomy manifests the subjective attitude of thought to be directed against the cosmic order and the basic logical laws functioning in this order; this attitude is a component part of sinful reality insofar as its anti-normative meaning is determined by the cosmic order and its logical norms; it implies the negation of the law side of reality; but subjectivity without an order can have no existence and no meaning; there are as many types of Irrationalism possible as there are non-logical aspects of temporal reality, 467; irrationalistic types of Humanistic philosophy concentrate their attention upon the science of history; KANT’s Transcendental critique of teleological judgment had cleared the way for a philosophy of history oriented to the personality-ideal, to a certain extent at least, 468; KANT’s teleological view of historical development in his ‘Vom ewigen Frieden’; HER-
DER's 'Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit', introduced the method of empathy and sympathy into the study of historical contexts in their incomparable individuality; SCHELLING's Organological Idealism equipped the Historical School with its philosophy of the originally unconscious growth of culture from the 'Volksgeist'; the post-Napoleonic spirit of the Restoration favoured the rise of the historical mode of thought; as also did the rise of sociology in the early part of the 19th century; this sociology led to the invasion of Darwinistic evolutionism in historical science, 469; FICHTE's contribution to the methodology of historical thought; Neo-Kantian epistemology of historical thought; Neo-Kantian epistemology of historical thought; RICKERT and MAX WEBER, 470; the development of Humanistic philosophic thought into apparently diametrically opposed systems is due to the internal dialectic of the same religious basic motive, viz., that of nature and freedom; its root is the motive of freedom, which evokes the opposite motive of the domination of nature; this root remained hidden under the primacy of the science ideal up till the rise of transcendental philosophy; the latter was the first trend that penetrated to the foundation of the science-ideal, viz., the ideal of sovereign personality; FICHTE was the first to recognize it openly; KANT was still dualistic, 499; Humanistic self-reflection remained at no higher level than its Idea of the sovereign free personality, which it identified with the religious root of the cosmos; its search for the transcendent root in particular normative aspects leads to absolutizations; in HEGEL free personality became a dialectical self-unfolding of the all-embracing metaphysical 'Idea'; HEGEL identified philosophic thought with divine thought; he tries to solve the religious antinomy in his basic motive by theoretical dialectic, like SCHELLING did in 'absolute thought'; HEGEL abandoned the critical transcendental attitude of Humanistic thought; if this critical attitude is preserved, it implies the absolutizing of theoretical thought; FICHTE's critical moralism; Humanistic philosophy lacks insight into the final transcendental determination of philosophic thought; if it concentrates on the Archimedian point, it focuses on some hypostatized function of personal existence, not on the religious root, 500; Confrontation of Humanistic Philosophy with Christian philosophical thought, 501-508.

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**Naïve Experience**, I, reality in naïve experience confronted with theoretical analysis, 3; in the naïve, pre-theoretical attitude of experience we have an integral, immediate experience of cosmic time in the uninterrupted coherence of all its modal aspects and in concentric relatedness to the selfhood; an example is: looking at the clock to know the time; the modal aspects are not explicitly experienced as such, but implicitly and conjointly, 34; the naïve attitude lacks an intentional antithetic structure; our logical function remains entirely accommodated to the continuous coherence of cosmic time; we grasp reality in its typical total structures of individual things and concrete events; naïve concept formation is not directed to the modal aspects but towards things and concrete events, 41; it is concerned with individual totalities, not with abstract relations, e.g., of number or space, energy effects as such, but with things countable, spatial and subjected to physico-chemical changes; the logical aspect is conceived as an inherent and implicit component of concrete reality itself; the subject-object relation is the pre-supposition of the integral character of naïve experience; objective functions and qualities are unreflectingly ascribed to things and events in modal aspects in which it is impossible for them to appear as subjects; thus water is experienced as a necessary means for life, etc.; a bird's nest is an object of life; a rose has objective beauty; the subject-object relation is grasped as a structural relation of reality itself; the sensory colour red is ascribed to a rose, not in relation to my or your perception, but to that of anybody, 42; we experience reality in the total and integral coherence of its aspects, leaving the typical total structures intact; naïve exp. is not a theory about reality; not an 'uncritical realism', 43; naïve experience is exclusively concerned with the typical total structures of individuality and does not explicitly distinguish aspects, 82; every philosophic view of empirical reality ought to be confronted with the datum of naïve experience; this datum must be converted by philosophy into a fundamental problem; it should analyse the typical structures of individuality which also constitute a philosophic problem; modern science breaks up the naïve concept of a thing in order to gain know-
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NAÏVE EXPERIENCE, II, is fundamentally misrepresented for the benefit of the ‘Satz des Bewusstseins’. The Humanistic conception of experiential reality tyrannizes science by means of the Humanistic prejudice, 538. NAÏVE EXPERIENCE, III, maintains the identity of a thing in all its changes within the limits of a thing's plastic structure, 3; but cannot account for such identity; metaphysics turns away from what is strictly given in naïve experience, 4; ARISTOTLE's primary substance is foreign to the naïve exp. of a thing, 10; RUSSELL's identification of thing and substance, 19, 21; and of naïve exp. with an ontological theory of 'naïve realism', RUSSELL's 'refutation' of naïve exp.; he reduces naïve exp. to sense-impressions like HUME did, and appeals to the laws of perspective, 22; his ‘perspective’-argument, 25; the modern mathematical logical concept of function and the plastic horizon of human experience, 26; HUME acknowledged that naïve exp. cannot be a theory of reality; naïve thinghood and epistemological Gegenstand in KANT, 27; of the identity of a thing misinterpreted by KANT; various attempts to explain away the identical thinghood of naïve exp., 28; naïve exp. is not impervious to mythological aberrations; in the Biblical naïve attitude the transcendent religious dimension of the experiential horizon is opened to the light of Divine Revelation; the I-we, and the We-Thou-relation, 29; a true Christian is not exempt from the solidarity of the fall into sin, and knows the impersonal attitude, the dread of nothingess in a so-called existential isolation; when his heart is open to the Divine Word-Revelation he experiences things as meaning pointing beyond and above itself to the true Origin; the Biblical attitude is not theology, 30; even concepts originating from modern science change their meaning and assume a concrete and practical sense when assimilated by us to common thought, 31; the plastic and the theoretical horizon have their historical aspect; social praxis forms naïve experience which pre-supposes a sufficient development of the act structure of human existence and practical acquaintance with the things of common life, 31; essential to it is the subject-object-relation; is the naïve attitude compatible with animism and magic?, 32; RUSSELL's opinion refuted; infantile and pre-experiential thought is provisionably unable to conceive subj.-obj. relations; and animistic myth or metaphysics; animistic metaphysics has nothing to do with the naïve attitude, 33; the sacral sphere of primitive belief does not affect the typical structure of the naïve attitude; primitive animism and magic may re-appear in the naïve attitude of modern Western cultured people as forms of superstition; causality is not functionally experienced but as a concrete fact in an emotionally striking event; the reason why superstitions do not prevent the opening of our experiential horizon; the representation or copy theory of naïve realism, 34; in the latter perceiving is like taking a photo; WINDELBAND's theory; the internal contradiction in his view is that common exp.
is called naïve and at the same time rooted in an epistemological theory to be refuted by the ‘critical’ analysis of knowledge, 35; our consciousness in the naïve attitude is systatic; the refutation of naïve exp. is based on the unreliability of sensory perception as to ‘objective’ reality; objective is here intended as verifiable by natural science; formerly the subjectivity of the secondary qualities was an argument against naïve experience; BERNARD BAVINK, 36; THEODOR HEARING; colours refer to electro-magnetic waves of which they are the symbols; physics has to restrict itself to formulae denoting the physical functions, but such formulae do not exhaust the objective contents of human experience, 37; in the naïve attitude we accept objective sensory qualities in the concrete context of our plastic horizon, we do not identify them with our subjective impressions; sensory perception is not pre-ponderant in our naïve exp.; perception is strongly anticipating in character; espec. symbolical anticipations; the structure of this experience and its degrees of clarity; its practical tendency; the subj.-object relation, 38; naïve exp. does not know about ‘Dinge an sich’, nor of a reality in itself opposed to consciousness, 46; naïve exper. is incompatible with critical realism and with critical idealism, 47; RIEHL’s view, 48; in NATORP naïve experience is lodged in the vestibule of mathematical logicism, 52; naïve exp. has an implicit awareness of the modal structural coherence of the functions of a tree, e.g., 59; philosophy cannot replace naïve experience, 66; force is a particularly strong manifesta-
tion of energy in naïve exp., and not the essence of a picture, table, etc., 70; in the macro world of naïve exp. our plastic horizon has three radical types of individuality structure of a prelogical qualification, matter, plants, animals; most border cases belong to the micro world, 83-85; a living cell is not directly accessible to naïve exp., 102; naïve exp. and Divine Revelation, 128; PLATO's interest in the 'trivial'; modern thought is indifferent to chairs, lamps, tables, etc., as such, 129; the routine view of modern daily life is not naïve exp., because it is content with names and with a very superficial knowledge of what these names mean; phenomenology bypasses such verbalism in its 'intuition of essences', 145.

NAïVE AND THEORETICAL THOUGHT, II, VON JHERING argues that the juristic conception of the res or of personality is merely an artificial expansion of the natural naïve concept of a thing or a person respectively; but the modal legal concepts of object and subject cannot be artificial expansions of the natural idea of a thing since they only refer to modal functions, not to things, 125 (note).

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NATIONAL SOCIALISM, GERMAN, III, its racial theory and its background, 414; was folk-minded, 415.

NATORP, I, out of the correlation of abstracting and combining, the continuity of the movement of thought gives rise to the continuity-postulate, 204.

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NATURAL FAMILY, III, the cognatic ‘extended family’, 180; the typical foundation of the family in the biotic aspect of reality; the communal tie between parents and children is genetic, grounded in a blood relation of an extremely immediate kind; human procreation is not entirely biotic or functional; but has a biotic substratum; human blood-relationship is not qualified biotically; ARISTOTLE's and THOMAS' views, 267; the universality view of the marriage and family bond; in what sense there is universality; the differentiating process leaves the inner structure intact and concerns only the positive forms of actual transitory societal relationships, 268; the undifferentiated household was never identical with the actual natural family-relationship; the natural family is not a rudiment of a former historical phase; it is a normative bond of love based on the natural ties of blood between parents and children; the reflection of the bond of love between the Heavenly Father and His human children; this love is not the meaningfulness of love in the corpus Christi, but is temporal modal; founded in the biotical aspect, qualified by the
typical moral love between parents and children, 269; its biotic foundation is not detrimental to the purity of its moral love but gives it intensity; this love cannot be matched by any other moral relation except the conjugal bond; the moral aspect coheres with all other modal aspects; family love cannot be reduced to an instinctive feeling of sympathy, 270; such feeling must be opened in the anticipatory direction by the moral bond; the love principle has not been affected by sin; sin affects subjective positivizations; family unity is normative; its realization is defective; LITT's error, 271; the moral qualification of parental authority; the latter has the intimacy of the bond of love by its natural biotic foundation; the divine fifth commandment is not at all in conflict with the intimacy of family love, education in the family sphere is irreplaceable, 274; the internal legal relations of the family; the parental competence has an internal function, and an external function in civil law; parental discipline compared with that of magistrates; difference between penal and disciplinary law; the competence to punish; parental discipline has a penal character in accordance with the structure of the family, 275; its pedagogical nature; it is accommodated to the stage of the child's development; children have a right to receive their livelihood from their parents as a proof of their love, 276; juridical relations within a family, 277; aesthetical aspect of family relations; aesthetical anticipation in juridical relations, 283; disharmony is a subjective anti-normative realization of family relations; beauty of family life is not artistic; it implies authority and subordination, 284; social and lingual functions; economic function; feeling tone within the family; the social tone; respect for parents; politeness and helpfulness; formality nor disrespect towards parents; tenderness; social respect is not identical with moral respect; they are interwoven, 285; cultural aspect of family life; education; the parents' formative power and the cultural stage of development of society; undifferentiated cultural spheres; modern society; home education in the early years; support of psychology and pedagogy, 286; school and family; the moral bonds among teachers and pupils are typically determined by the instructional community, 287; different schools, 287; communal sense in the home and in later life; communal notions in the family are pre-theoretical and directly founded in the life of feeling; such communal thought is guided by family love; it implies parental authority; later on in puberty parental thought should be justified by arguments, 288; the internal communal sphere of thought must be accommodated to the development of the adolescents; social prejudices; historical position of the family's milieu; pre-logical functions of family life; they are directed by family love; i.e. their anticipatory spheres are opened; the naturalistic conception: a reflex of biotic relations; reciprocity within the group is viewed as a biological necessity; but in this conception the opened anticipatory spheres of pre-psychical functions are unawares taken for the closed functions; ALFRED VIERKANDT on reciprocity, 290; what is taken for granted in his theory, 291; the biotic bonds of blood between parents and children cannot be separated from their moral qualification; motherly love of foster children; they do not belong to the family proper, 292; absence or weakness of communal family feeling is contrary to the inner vital law of the family; such feeling is opened by the moral function into tenderness, 293; souvenirs in the subject-object relation; pretium affectionis; psychical interlacements; authority and respect, 294; the internal affective relations between parents and children are actually interwoven with a great many other feelings: national feeling, that of social standing, ecclesiastical communal feeling, etc., 295; a family relationship does not have a mystical biotic corporeal organism apart from that
of its members; but in the biotic aspect of their individual existences there are structural communal relations interweaving the members of a family, 299; these relations function in a moral anticipating way, 300; the family has typical chemical-physical and spatial aspects; its origin lies in the female ovarian cell fecundated by the male sperm; the care of the biophysical aspects is guided by love; left to instinctive natural impulses a human being would die; the spatial centre of the home, 301; the feeling for home; souvenirs suggest spatial nearness of the other members of the family; the family unity implies a typical unity in multiplicity in the numeral aspect: bi-unity is expanded into multi-unity in normative freedom of action, 302; the family relationship functions in faith; the father is the priest; but the family is not qualified as a typical faith communion; but it is the temporal expression of the religious meaningfulness of human communion in Christ in His relation to the Divine Father as the Son; its moral function does not terminate a family's opening process; its anticipatory spheres are opened by faith in the transcendental direction; faith does not obliterate a family's moral destination, but refers it to the Heavenly Father; a family implies a certain simultaneity in the internal interweavings of its members; when both parents have died the family-bond as such is broken, 304; the typical conjugal relations remain separate from the family commun-
ity; the bi-unity of husband and wife depends on their personal individuality; polygamy means as many marriages as the husband has wives; the harem is only enkapitically interwoven with the marriage bond; it is unnatural; marriage is impaired by it; polygamy gives rise to the relationship of a ‘joint, or extended family’, a strongly patriarchal-agnatic kinship, 305; but such an extended family is not necessarily polygamic, the Roman family excluded polygamy in its extended patriarchal character; this type of family is not a natural community; death of a marriage partner and re-marriage of the surviving partner, and parental authority; the original marriage has then ceased to exist; marriage and family are intertwined enkapitically, 306; they are of the same radical type, but of different genotypes; the institutional sexual union of husband and wife is serviceable for the propagation of the human race; marriage is the ‘germ-cell’ of the family relationship; marriage is also a legal institution; but it is qualified as a love union; love is not subordinate, 307; but has primacy; Scholastic view of marriage as a legal institution for the propagation of the human race; conjugal love was considered as variable feeling, a mere instrument for propagation; civil and canon law contain regulations which have only a formal and external character; the Scholastic view is unbiblical and untenable, 308; the institutional conjugal community is not dependent for its structure on the subjective arbitrary discretion of the partners; they are subjected to its institutional law; its continuous identity is not exclusively found on its lawside, 309; their unity in duality should be realized in a constant subjective vital union; a constant anti-normative attitude destroys the possibility of realizing the internal bond of marriage; but in its external relations in society the marriage is not dissolved; it is a civil institution still; civil or tribal law alone can dissolve it, 310; or in Roman Catholic countries canon law can; canon and civil law may be in conflict in this respect; the social form of marriage is maintained; divorce problems; the Pharisees and Christ, 311; deriving legal norms from the New Testament is a relapse into legalism; the Thomistic view; the theory of the bona matrimoni; marriage as a natural law institution, 312; agapê, eros and original sin in LUTHER; influence of Thomistic natural law conception on Protestant ethics, 314, 315; the contractual view in canon law and in Humanistic natural law, 316, 317; marriage as a love union in post-Kantian German Idealism; ‘free love’, 317, 318; Roman Catholic reaction; the primacy of love: the encyclical CASTI connubii, 319, 320; see further under ‘marriage’ 306-342; Kulturkreislehre, 333-41; natural conjugal family; kinship community and marriage are biotically founded and morally qualified, 342; a joint family is not biotically founded; kinship is unorganized; leges barbarum of Germanic tribes, 343 (cf. Cogitate family).

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NATURAL HISTORY, II, this term explained, 196, 229; RICKERT first adopted it, but gave it up later on, 230 (note).

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NATURAL LAW, II, FELIX SOMLO, 142; from GROTIOUS to ROUSSEAU, KANT and the young FICHTE explained the indirect arithmetical retrocipations in the jural sphere by imputing an original mathematical meaning to them in the nominalistic doctrine of ‘natural law’, the ‘mos geometricus’; they tried to construe the State, the juridical person and the legal order out of their ‘mathematical elements’,
the Humanistic doctrine of natural law was tied down to an atomistic-mechanistic way of thought; the state became a totality of individuals instituted by means of contracts, 342; the ideals of natural law of the Enlightenment were meta-historical, guided by the faith in the science ideal and that of personality in its rationalistic individualistic form, 356, 357; the theme of innate human rights was conceived by JOHN LOCKE, then expanded in the theory of the rights of men and citizens by ROUSSEAU, and the French Revolution; the conception of absolute rights of the individual is in conflict with the fundamental structure of any positive legal order because every right is by nature relative, 357; in HOBSES, 403; the theory of personality rights tries to make the personality as such into an object of subjective rights; and is inherited from LOCKE is and CHF. WOLFF’s views of innate human rights, 413.

NATURAL LAW, III, and the view of HUGO GROTIEUS, 169; and the State, in ARISTOTLE, 223; in Stoicism; the legal order with its external tonos was grounded in the lex naturalis, 228, 229; but did not permit essential subordination in Stoicism, 231; the Humanistic view of natural law, 232; here the State is the centre of a corporative unity; fiction theory; contract theory; HOBSES, 235; the mathematical science ideal and natural law; the state is an all-embracing societal relationship in HOBSES and ROUSSEAU: State-absolutism; sometimes non-political organizations were granted freedom on the basis of natural law, 236.

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NATURE AND GRACE, I, the Thomistic conception of the autonomy of the naturalis ratio has its background in the Scholastic basic motive of nature and grace; in the proper use of natural reason philosophy can never contradict the supernatural truths of grace in the Church-doctrine; the Aristotelian metaphysics and view of nature are accommodated to the ecclesiastical dogma, 36; in Roman-Catholicsm, 63, 65; Thomism, 72, 180, 181, 183; these motives got separated in Humanism, 187; in LEIBNIZ, 190; Grace is the sphere of clear and
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NEUROSIS, COMPULSIVE, II, FREUD ‘explains faith’ as a universally human compulsive neurosis originating from the infantile ‘Oedipus-complex’. The father, admired and feared, is the primitive image of every form of deity, 313.

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will be endangered if philosophy were to bind itself to religious or 'weltanschauliche' convictions, 14; this is the so-called 'neutrality-postulate', defended by RICKERT, 15; under the influence of the personality-ideal the neutrality-postulate is a means to avoid self-reflection as to the transcendental basic idea of a philosophic system; it originates from KANT's distinction between theoretical and practical reason and his attempt to emancipate the free and autonomous personality from the tyranny of the science-ideal; this postulate is of a religious origin; RICKERT's defence of this postulate, 129, 134.

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NICOLAUS OF ORESME, I, formulated the new concept of the law of motion; and anticipated COPERNICUS' discovery; and invented the method of analytical geometry before DESCARTES, 202.

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NOUS, II, the actual nous, i.e., the actual reason, cannot become matter because it is the Archè of all delimitation of meaning, in ARISTOTLE, 11.

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NUMERICAL ASPECT, I, the + and - order of numbers is a modal aspect of time, and in temporal reality it is continually related to factual duration; the + and - directions express a numerical order of time determining the place and value of each of the numbers; KANT made number originate from a schematizing of the logical category of quantity in time; HAMILTON defined arithmetic as the science of pure time or order in progression; intutionalistic mathematics makes numbers originate from a synthesis of the original intuition of time and the original ideas of one and addition, 32 (notes); LEIBNIZ held that number as a sum of static units is the metaphysical basic Idea of the cosmos; later he gave this up and held that a discrete element is only a function of the mathematical principle of progression, and number itself is the simplest instance of the general relation of thought; his mathematics is logicistic, 229; the differential number anticipates the modal meaning of phoronomic movement, 236; according to HUME, number is a fiction, 287.

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PEASANT REVOLT, III, in Germany, induced LUTHER to appeal to the secular Government in matters of ecclesiastical organization, 514.

PERAS, I, in PLATO, is the natural law setting a limit to the apeiron, and the formless stream of becoming receives the character of a becoming to being, 113.

PERAS, III, and the material world, in PLATO, 11.

PERAS AND APEIRON, II, PLATO's idea of Being synthesized positive and negative Being, the on and the mē on, and the principles of form and matter; all genesis is a becoming to a form of being expressing the Divine Idea of the good and the beautiful (KALO\KAGATHON); the Eleatic determinations of Being by unity and verity were completed by those of beauty and goodness, and the dialectical Idea of Being embraced peras and apeiron, the distinction of form and matter, 57; the Pythagorean idea of peras limiting the apeiron supplies the rational measure of
the due mean between two bad extremes in the subjective ethos, 146.

**PERCEPTION I**, is wholly passive in **KANT**, 90; material unconscious perceptions pass into consciousness, but confused representations pass to the distinct and clear apperceptions of the limited spiritual monads, in **LEIBNIZ**, 234. **PERCEPTION**, II, perception, representation, remembrance, volition, etc., are concrete human acts which cannot be enclosed in a modal aspect of reality but have only a modal function in the psychical law sphere, 372.

**PERCEPTION**, III, its anticipations, 38; the necessary relation between stimulus and sensation, 44; in empiricist psychology, 104, 105.

**PERCEPTION OF SPACE**, II, the objective sensory space of perception functions in the modus of emotional sensibility, 372; but for our subjective feeling of extension we could not perceive any objective sensory image of space; the space of sight, of touch, of hearing have different structures; they function in structural coherence with each other; and are organically connected; the projective optic space and the tactile image, 373.

**PERFECTIBILITY**, II, the perfectibility of man was an article of faith of the Enlightenment, and also of J.F. **HERDER**'s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte, 272.

**PERFECT SOCIETY**, THE, III, in the sphere of grace it is the Church; in that of nature it is the State, according to **THOMAS AQUINAS**, 220. **PERIDINIDIAE**, III, 772.

**PERIODS IN HISTORY**, II, the temporal course of history expresses the struggle between the Civitas Dei and the civitas terrena; any division of history into periods should depend on the actual course of historical development, and is bound to the provisional phase of history in which the historian himself lives, 295.

**PERRAULT**, **CLAUDE**, III, his colonnade at the Louvre; disregard of the bound character of architectural style for the sake of monumentality, 142.


**PERSONA FICTA**, III, the Canonists conceive of organized communities as fictitious persons, 233; in the Humanistic theory of natural law; **HOBBES**, 235.

**PERSONALITY**, I, its freedom is guaranteed by the domination of mathematical thought in **LOCKE**, 318.

**PERSONALITY**, II, in primitive culture man does not realize that he transcends the things of nature. His sense of being a personality is diffuse, dispersed; he even incorporates personality in animals, plants or lifeless objects, 296; becomes diffuse in restrictive apostatic faith, 316.
PERSONALITY, III, BOETHIUS' definition adopted by THOMAS AQUINAS; the substance concept, 6; its typology in psychology; W. STERN; HEMPEL and OPPENHEIM, 81.

PERSONALITY-Ideal, I, in the Humanistic transcendental Idea, 198, 294-296, 302, 313; in KANT, is a function of feeling, 334, 341, 351, 384, 463; cf. s.v. FICHTE, MAINON, Irrationalism.

PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE, SUBJECTIVE, II, is restored to us in the faithful acceptance of Divine Revelation with all our heart; it enables us to grasp reality again perspectively in the light of Truth, 563.

PERSPECTIVE OF TRUTH, II, the a priori structure of truth bears on the horizon of human experience; its full richness is only conceivable theoretically in the Christian Idea of Verity; this Idea is directed to the fulness of meaning of Truth and has the same perspective character as the experiential horizon, 571.

PESSIMISM, I, in MACCHIAVELLI, 217; in HOBBES, 253.
PESSIMISM, II, 262; ROUSSEAU, 271.

PESSIMISM, MARXIAN, III, in F. TÖNNIES, 186.

PETITES PERCEPTIONS, I, in LEIBNIZ, 251; this Leibnizian doctrine was introduced into Kantian epistemology by MAIMON, 404.

PETRACZICKY, II, the attributive-imperative function of law, 134.

PFAFF, CHRISTOPH MATTHAEUS, III, founded the theory of the collegial system of Church government, 517.

PFÄNDER, ALEXANDER, II,
Der philosophische Kritizismus, 439; Logik, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 448, 488.
PFÄNDER, ALEXANDER, II, he objected to KANT's distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, 438; analytical judgments concern the subject, synthetical judgments concern the object of a concept; PFÄNDER distinguishes between subjective, intentional (or formal) Object and the 'Gegenstand an sich' (material object); Attributionsurteil, 440.

PHANTASM, II, a phantasm is an original type of individuality in sensory phantasy in its restrictive function, and also in animal psychical life; it is not typically founded in the biotic function, for the sensory imagination produces a phantasm in merely intentional objectivity, 425.

PHANTASY, III, the productive phantasy of an artist is founded in the sensory...
function of the imagination; the act-structure; a phantasy object has an intentional character; a phantasm is the product of our imagination; aesthetic phantasms are intentional visionary objects, 115.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE, I, the absolute ‘ego’ is opposed to the world, 52.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE, II, is absolutized by HUSSERL, and is internally antinomous, 489.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTUITION, II, of the essence; if theoretical insight could fully realize the *eidos* of a modal aspect, as the result of an adequate intuition of its essence, it should grasp the fulness and the totality of its meaning adequately; it should not merely refer to this meaning intentionally, but possess the latter as an immanent datum of the phenomenological consciousness. But then the modal meaning as such would have been cancelled. For such a condition can only be realized in the transcendent identity of all temporal modal meaning, 486; the phenomenological ‘identity’, however, remains enclosed in the horizon of a particular aspect; it is philosophical, theoretical, and requires the analytical epoché, 487.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY, I, of NICOLAI HARTMANN, 35.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL SCHOOLS, II, HUSSERL, PFÄNDER, SCHELER, N. HARTMANN, HEIDEGGER, HOFFMANN, each starts from a different cosmological Idea, 488.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL SUBJECT, II, in HUSSERL, is the phenomenological ego, in which the ‘universal Logos of all thinkable being’ is found immanent in the constitutive possibilities of the phenomenological subject or ego and the transcendent inter-subjectivity of the egos, 543.

PHENOMENOLOGY, I, with FRANZ BRENTANO phenomenology posited the intentional relatedness of every act of consciousness to a ‘Gegenstand’; it could not dissociate its theoretical attitude from the Gegenstand relation; BRENTANO and HUSSERL ascribe to feeling an intentional relation to a ‘Gegenstand’; (e.g. a melody); the absolute ‘cogito’ (i.e. the absolute transcendental consciousness) is opposed to the ‘world’ as its intentional ‘Gegenstand’; the intentional anti-thetical attitude of theoretical thought is present in the phenomenological attitude itself; SCHELER considers the Gegenstand relation as the most formal category of the logical aspect of mind (Geist), 52.

PHENOMENOLOGY, II, EDMUND HUSSERL; his ‘regions’ defined; and KANT’s categories, 17; on Sinn und Bedeutung in HUSSERL, 27; the phenomenologist’s intuitive gaze is directed to the intentional acts of his consciousness; then meaning is identical with the relation of the ego to the Gegenstand, 27; absolute consciousness; epoché; destruction of the world; noema, Gegenstand, meaning, 28; HUSSERL’s objective ‘meaning’, PAUL HOFFMANN’s subjective ‘meaning’; meaning is the opposite of ‘thing’; the pure I; Erleben, 29; HOFFMAN’s Logology, 30; unprejudiced analyses of the states of affairs in a religious sense is impossible; two conceptions of the theoretical epoché; phenomenological epoché, 73; reduction and Wesensschau, 486-488; the phenomenological attitude, 486, is that of P. HOFFMANN, 488; rooted in a deeper level of the a priori than the merely immanent transcendental horizon of human
consciousness, 489; this attitude is contrary to the truth; HUSserL; fundamental thesis: the transcendental ego is absolute, a super-human being, the ultimate origin of all meaning; the adequate intuition of essence; this attitude lacks critical self-reflection; the attempt to investigate human selfhood theoretically; phenomenological reduction, 489; phenomenology has to construe the forms of all thinkable worlds in the cadre of all thinkable forms of being (543) in correlation with the constitutive a priori of the intentional acts creating this world as the Gegenstand; its knowledge is founded in a radical and universal self-reflection of the ego on its acts and their possibilities; this a priori is rational; the Wesensanschauung is an intuition of the logical eidos; the noetical and noematic contents of the intentional acts; its universal concrete ontology or concrete Logic of being, 544; it ascribes infallibility to the intuition of the essence, 597.

PHENOMENOLOGY, III, SCHELER’s phenomenology fails to give an insight into the plastic horizon of naive experience, 53, 70; modern phenomenology demands more than an impersonal merely symbolical knowledge of things, 145; LITT’s phenomenological analysis of essences, 251; of social communities, 254, 255, 256, 259, 261.

PHENOMENON AND NOUMENON, II, in Immanence philosophy, 50; phenomena are related to the sensory perceptive function; noumena are accessible only to theoretical thought; KANT’s view of noumenon and phenomenon, 430.

PHILO, II, the contrast between a microcosm and a macrocosm, handled by SCHELER, originated in the pre-Socratic philosophy of nature; PLATO, the Stoa, PHILO, and Neo-Platonism handed it down to medieval Scholasticism, 592.

PHILOSOPHERS, I, approach the gods, 35; are commanders and law-givers in NIETSCHE, 125; in PLATO, III, 168.

PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS, I, its definition, 117; is an idea that is required by the religious transcendental basic Idea of philosophy, 118; in LEIBNIZ, 224.
PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA, II, in realistic Scholasticism the transcendental concepts of the 'philosophia prima' become objects of the actus intelligendi, 389.

PHILOSOPHICAL JUDGMENTS, I, are not to be identified with subjective supra-theoretical prejudices, 115.

PHILOSOPHY, I, Philosophy is theoretical thought directed to the totality of meaning, 4; philosophical thinking is an actual activity and only at the expense of this actuality can it be abstracted from the thinking self; this abstraction is necessary for formulating the concept of philosophical thought, but even in this act of conceptual determination it is the self that is actually doing the work, 5; the supposed reduction of the selfhood (in philosophy) to an immanent, subjective pole of thought, 6; philosophical thought has no selfhood as mere thought, i.e., 'reines Denken', 7; its genetic tendency towards the Archê, 9; so-called 'critical' philosophy regards one or more of our cognitive functions as independent, i.e., apart from all further possible determinedness and elevates these functions to the a-priori Origin of our knowable cosmos, 10; phil. thought cannot withdraw itself from its tendency toward the origin; philosophical thought is restless; because our ego is restless; the unrest is transmitted from the selfhood to all temporal functions in which the ego is actually operative; the twofold pre-supposition of philosophic thought: an Archimedean point, and a choice of position in the face of the Archê, 11; philosophy intends to give us a theoretical insight into the coherence of our temporal world as an intermodal coherence of meaning. Philosophic thought is bound to this coherence, 24; the theoretical attitude of thought arises only in a theoretical abstraction, so that theoretical reason cannot be considered as an uproblematic datum, 40; dogmatic theory of knowledge identified the subject-object relation with the antithetic Gegenstand relation and misinterpreted naïve experience as a 'copy theory' which had to be refuted, 43; the various '-isms' in the theoretical vision of reality are due to absolutizations, 46; the problem of the basic denominator for the theoretical comparison and distinction of the modal aspects, 47; starting-point of theoretical synthesis in the Kantian Critique of knowledge, 49; and critical self-reflection, 51; religion cannot be a theoretical 'Gegenstand', 58; the transcendental basic Idea of philosophy, cf. subvoce, 68-70; theoretical and supra- theoretical judgments, 70; analogia entis, cf. sub-voce, 71; the philosophical Idea of totality, 73; the Origin and the continuity principle in COHEN's philosophy, 74, 75; the masking of the transcendental basic Idea in THEODOR LITT, 77, 78, 79; LITT's dialectical Idea of unity and identity, 80, 81; the theoretical character of the transcendental basic Idea and its relation to naïve experience, 82; philosophy, special science, and naïve experience, 83, 84; philosophy has to grasp in the view of totality the different modal aspects set asunder by theoretic thought and thus to account for both naïve experience and special science; the analysis of the modal aspects must precede that of the typical structures of individual totality; special science can neither have an autonomous conception of the modal structures of the different aspects, nor of the typical structures of individual totality; with the structure of a special aspect there is expressed the inter-modal coherence of cosmic time order; the aspect requires a transcendental idea of its coherence with other aspects and of the radical unity of all aspects; special sciences are pointed to the examination of the functional coherence and typical character of transitory phenomena within a special aspect; special scientific concepts must be made a philosophic
problem; EINSTEIN's concepts of time and space; in them their special synthetic meanings in connection with other sciences remain hidden; philosophy can elucidate them, 85; 'reflexive' versus 'objective' thought in recent philosophy; reflexive thought is introverted to the transcendental logical subject of pure thinking', it is opposed to 'objective' thought, ('gegenständliches Denken'), in modern Immanence philosophy; 'objective thought' is that of special science, it is 'naïve', lost in its 'objets'; the ego of 'reflexive thought' can never be a 'Gegenstand'; cf. s.v. THEODOR LITT; object and Gegenstand are confused in these statements; in philosophy, however, we assume the antithetic attitude as well as in science, but we focus phil. towards the totality and unity in the root of temporal meaning; the transcendental basic Idea is the hypothesis of philosophic thought, 86; the problem of the possibility of inter-modal synthesis occurs in phil. as well as in science; phil. is confronted with the fundamental problems concerning the relation of origin, totality, modal diversity and inter-modal coherence; it encounters its own limits within cosmic time; these limits can only be accounted for in the concentric direction of theoretic thought to its supra-theoretic pre-suppositions; truly reflexive thought is characterized by critical selfreflection as to the transcendental basic Idea of philosophy in which it points beyond and above itself to its own a priori conditions; reflexive thought does not transcend all structural limits because of their belonging to the 'gegenständliche' world; this notion leads to the illusory sovereignty and autonomy of
philos. reflection; it is based on the identification of ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘temporal reality’; the limits of phil. thought transcend the Gegenstand relation; phil. thought is determined and limited by its being bound to its intentional and to its ontical structure in cosmic time, 87; we can reflect critically on the limits of phil. thought only because in our selfhood we transcend them; the pre-supposita of philosophy are infinitely more than Idea; the religious pre-supposition of philosophy is of a transcendent nature; the choice of the Archimedean point crosses the boundary line of the temporal coherence of our world; but philosophy itself remains within this boundary line because it is possible only by virtue of the temporal order; transcendent and transcendental are no alternatives, but the latter pre-supposes the former; this is the original critical meaning of transcendental thought, 87; KANT’s opinion concerning the transcendental Ideas; he does not accept them in their tri-unity as the real hypothesis of his ‘critical’ philosophy; and restricts their significance to a purely formal one: they have a mere regulative systematic function; here he has become aware of the unbridgeable antithesis in the basic motive of nature and freedom, 89; he accepted the synthesis between natural necessity and freedom in his epistemology, but rejected it in his ethics; he could not account for the possibility of the synthesis between the logical and the sensory function of consciousness; this was due to his fundamental dualism in his religious basic motive; FICHTE’s first edition of the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’ made ‘practical freedom’ the hypothesis of his theoretical epistemology and introduced a dialectical logic to bridge the Kantian gulf between epistemology and ethics; in FICHTE’s conception of the basic Idea of Humanism the postulate of continuity broke through the Kantian boundaries set to the theoretical use of the transcendental Idea of freedom; in KANT’s ‘dialectic of pure reason’ the transcendental Ideas point to a transcendent realm of the ‘noumenon’; thought sets limits to theoretical thought, except for the bond with sensory perception; the transcendental Idea of freedom is dialectically related to the category of causality and is the hypothesis of KANT’s transcendental logic, 90; this same Idea obtains ‘practical reality’ for ‘reasonable belief’ in the Krit. d. pr. Vern.; the essential function of the transcendental Idea is that of the hypothesis pointing beyond the limits of theoretical thought; it reveals KANT’s transcendental motive; in Neo-Kantian logistic idealism this motive fades away in the postulate of logical purity and continuity in the system of knowledge; to COHEN the transcendental idea is the ‘selfconsciousness of the (logical) concept’, but it does not point towards a transcendent sphere; LITT’s conception of the pure self-reflection of theoretical thought and EDMUND HUSSERL’s ‘egology’ exclude limits set to the ‘transcendental cogito’ and deny the ego’s transcendence in respect to transcendental thought and consciousness; the basic Idea of phil. is only a subjective hypothesis and must not dominate truth in a relativistic way, for it is accountable to an ultimate judge, 91; philosophy in its transcendental direction to the totality and the Origin remains bound to cosmic time and the cosmic order; failure to appreciate this limit leads to speculative metaphysics which seeks the absolute and supra-temporal within the temporal order; absolutizations and speculative metaphysics; the position that modal laws have absolute universal validity even for God is speculative; PLATO’s Ideas; modern absolute ‘values’; ‘truths in themselves; ‘absolute consciousness’ in HUSSERL; the ‘immortal soul’ doctrine; the hypostatization of the non-sensory psychical, logical and post logical functions of mental acts (Geist), in a rationalistic or an irrationalistic sense, 92; the absolutized realm of meaning becomes Archè, conceived of as ‘being’,
non-substantial actuality, 'validity', in its subject- or its cosmonomic side; 
CALVIN's verdict: 'God is not subject to the laws, but not arbitrary'; strikes at the 
root of metaphysical speculations; the origin of the term 'cosmonomic idea', 
93; Dr. H.G. STOKER's objection to it; and Dr. PHILIP KÖHNSTAMM's; reasons for 
maintaining the term, 94; comparison with the term: the Idea of creation; 
objections to this term; the cosmonomic Idea gives expression to the limiting 
character of the basic transcendental Idea; Socrates on the nomos as 
limitation, 95; the cosmic nomos has meaning only in correlation with the 
subject-side of the cosmos; the Idea of the subject points toward the factual 
side of reality (totality, diversity, coherence); the philosophy of the cosmonomic 
Idea is not an 'idealism of meaning', (STOKER), 96; RICKERT's meaning-Idealism 
distinguishes between meaning (Sinn) and reality; the latter has meaning 
ascrbed to it by means of reference to values (Wertbeziehung); RICKERT's 
reality is psycho-physical only; meaning cannot live, act, move, but living, action, 
motion are meaning not coming to rest in themselves; God's Being is not 
meaning; the meaning-totality transcends philosophic thought and has its 
correlate in the Being of the Archè; the modal concepts of laws and of subject 
and object in the sciences depend on the cosmonomic Idea, 97; in the logistic 
trend in pure mathematics; the 'continuous' series of real numbers is based
on a logicist-rationalist cosmonomic Idea; mechanist biology depends on the classical deterministic Humanist science ideal; the Neo-Kantian ‘reine Rechtslehre’ of HANS Kelsen depends on a dualistic cosmonomic Idea (nature and freedom); the rationalists reduce the subject side of reality to the nomos-side; functionalistic biology and juridical science do not know of typical structural-individuality laws, 98; the Archimedean point of philosophy is chosen in the new root of mankind in Christ, in which by regeneration we have part in our re-born selfhood; the totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos is in Christ, with respect to His human nature as the root of the re-born human race; in Christ the heart bows under the lex as the universal boundary between the Being of God and the meaning of His creation; theological objections to this theme answered, 99; the transcendent totality of meaning of the cosmos is no eidos in the speculative Platonics sense, no being set by itself, but remains in the ex-sistential mode of meaning; sin is the revolt against the Sovereign of our cosmos; it is apostasy, the absolutizing of meaning to the level of God's Being; the fall permeated all temporal meaning aspects, also the logical one; the logical function in apostasy; ST. PAUL's word about the carnal mind; the laws of thought are not affected by sin, 100; only the subjective activity subjected to these laws; the contents of the cosmonomic Idea concern the Archê, subjection to God's sovereignty requiring love and service of God on the part of man, through Christ, in the observance of the sphere-sovereignty of the various divine laws regulating the temporal world; the symbol of the sunlight refracted by a prism into the seven colours of the spectrum, 101; the sphere sovereignty of the modal laws, 102; the disregard of this state of affairs on the immanence standpoint owing to absolutizations: psychologism, historism; dualistic starting-points; is the Christian starting-point an absolutized religious meaning?, 103; Christian religion is the connection between the meaning of creation and the Being of the Archê; religion is not identical with the function of faith; RICKERT acknowledges this fact; sphere-sovereignty as a philosophical basic problem, 104; and the intermodal coherence; the aspects have a cosmonomic structure; all temporal structures of reality are laws founded in the cosmic order and are principles of temporal potentiality; as realizations of laws they have duration and actuality as transitory factual structures; potentiality resides in the factual subject-side, its principle in the cosmonomic side of reality; cosmic time and the refraction of meaning; STOKER and KÖHNSTAMM, 105; the fulness of meaning is not actually given and cannot be actually given in time; the meaning of cosmic time (in its correlation of order and duration) is to be successive refraction of meaning into coherent modal aspects; in the religious fulness of meaning love, wisdom, justice, power, beauty, etc. coincide in a radical unity; cosmic time can only be approached in a limiting concept; such a concept is necessarily discontinuous; the relativity of the logical function is not of a logical, but of a cosmonomic temporal character, 106; the elimination of cosmic time order in KANT's Kritik der reinen Vernunft; KANT's hypostatization of 'theoretical reason' as self-sufficient Archimedean point; the question about the possibility of philosophy pushed into the background; KANT's 'Copernican revolution' concerned epistemology; it proves the impossibility of a truly critical Critique of theor. reason apart from a transcendental insight into the cosmic time-order; KANT's 'Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik': (this system) sets at its foundation nothing as 'given' except 'reason'; but this reason is a product of theoretical abstraction!, 107; the lex of the cosmos originates from God's holy creative sovereignty and is the boundary between the Being
of the Archè and the meaning of everything created as ‘subject’, i.e., subjected
to a law; the subject-side implies the object-side; in immanence philosophy the
subject becomes sovereign, 108; as a ‘substance’ (noumenon) or in a
transcendental logical or phenomenological sense; KANT: the subject is only
epistemological, and as such Archè or form of the theoretical laws of nature;
the ‘transcendental subject’ is lawgiver of nature; the pre-psychical aspects
dissolved into a synthesis of logical and sensory functions of consciousness;
their structural laws became a-priori transcendental forms of (theoretical)
understanding and of subjective sensibility; numbers, spatial figures, energy
effects; in his ‘practical’ philosophy KANT makes the metaphysical subject (homo
noumenon) the autonomous lawgiver for moral life; his polar opposition between
laws of nature and norms; the subject on the Immanence standpoint is
epistemological and ethical; things and events are considered only as objects;
the proclamation of the ‘critical’ ‘Satz des Bewustseins’, 109; the subject as
‘transcendental’ or as ‘ideal’ subject is the autonomous lawgiver; classical
rationalism reduces the subject to a complex of causal relations; the laws are
‘the objective’; the empirical subject is ‘object’, identified with ‘Gegenstand’ of
the ‘transcendental subject of thought’; in modern ‘realistic’ positivism the lex
is a scientific judgment of probability, an ‘autonomous’ product of science by
which to order the ‘facts’
by way of a ‘logical economy’ rationalists dissolve individual subjectivity into a universality valid order of laws originating from sovereign reason; irrationalistics consider the ‘theoretical order’ as a pragmatival falsification of true reality; the latter in its creative subjective individuality is not bound to universally valid laws and mocks at all ‘concepts of thought’, 110; prophetic philosophy, according to JASPERS, 125; phil. has to clarify a life and world view, 156.

PHILOSOPHY OF FEELING, I, of JACOBI, 451.

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, I, is given theological preference by SENCA, 539.

PHONEMES, II, in modern phonology the expressive articulated speech sounds (phonemes) are understood from the meaning-structure of language itself, 224.

PHRATRIA, III, in the Greek polis, 369, 371.


PHYYLON, III, in biology, 80.

PHYSICO-CHEMICAL PROCESSES, II, are undirected in a closed state, 184.

PHYSICAL ASPECT, II, Classical physics; its view of matter, 95; in mechanics there is movement, but physics is always concerned with functions of energy, which implies cause and effect; acceleration is a physical concept; inertia is a kinematical concept, not a physical one, 99; ‘moving matter’ is a physical concept; so are: fields of gravitation, protons, etc.; physical events have an objective sensory aspect, 100; theory of relativity; physical space is determined by matter; quantum theory, 101; electromagnetic fields, quanta, photons, electrons, neutrons, protons, etc., become manifest in real events that have an objective sensory aspect, 108; physico-chemical energy in biotic phenomena anticipates life; organic unity directs physical anticipatory potencies, 110; NICOLAI HARTMANN holds that matter is completely transformed by life; this is an error, 110, 111; in physical-chemical processes there is a closed state, and an opened condition; these processes are deepened in living organisms and animals; also in human beings; PAVLOV’s experiments with animals, 184.

PHYSICAL ASPECT, III, ARISTOTLE was confronted with the question about the metaphysical primary substance and not merely the physical sensible Gegenstand, 13, 14; RUSSELL thinks that modern physics has destroyed the naive conception of things; GALILEI and NEWTON and the classical physics view of substance filling up space; time as the fourth dimension of world space, 19; energy has replaced matter; the curious facts of interval and quantum; RUSSELL’s ‘events’; his ‘rhythms’; physical and mental, 20; Whitehead’s events and permanent objects, 21; the constants of modern physics and NEWTON’s ‘material units’, 23; RUSSELL’s concept of structure; he identifies psychological time with physical, 24; his theory of light waves, 25; he identifies the physico-psychical world with the whole of empirical reality, 26; the metaphysical ‘substance’ since DESCARTES is the modal coherence between physical phenomena, 27; KANT on our naive experience of the identity of a thing: the physical concept of quantitatively constant matter, the Gegenstand of natural scientific thought, 28;
the doctrine of secondary qualities; B. BAVINK, 36; sensory colour and physics, 37; the physical system in a linden tree, 56; force, essence, energy, 70, 71; atoms, molecules; radio activity; the visibility of a body depends on light waves, 99; wave mechanics; corpuscles; Wellen pakete; classical mechanics; KANT on matter; substance; primary typical operational quanta are not 'substantial'; the temporal unity of an individual whole is not modal in character; radio activity cannot be influenced by external functional factors; chemical 'elements'; electrons, protons, neutrons, deuterons, mesons, viewed physically have mass and charge, 100; an atom possesses a veritable individuality structure in the radical type of physically qualified totalities; the structure of molecules and that of crystals are more complicated; enkaptic structural wholes; the functional schema x, y, z, t; the metaphysical reconstructions of the exploded substance concept in neo-Thomism; in EDDINGTON's 'world-substance' in his psycho-monism after the manner of HEYMANS; mathematical forms are supposed to be 'spiritual'; PLANCK's 'Wirkungsquantum' -h- has no modal mathematical meaning, however, 101; structure of atoms, 105, 106.

PHYSICO-PSYCHICAL WORLD, II, in Immanence phil. we find the form-matter scheme; the disruption of the integral empirical reality into a noumenon and a phenomenon; the reduction of this reality to a merely physico-psychical world, 50.

PHYSICS, I, is the science of constant and recurrent features of existence in FICHTE, 482; has eliminated the naïve view of reality, 559; is held to be philosophically neutral by B. BAVINK; modern physics and its epistemological pre-suppositions, 562.

PHYSIOCRATS, II, Economic individualism took the leadership of the ideas of the Enlightenment and attained to theoretical reflection in the economic theories of the physiocrats and the school of classical economists, 361.
PIRKHEIMER, WILLIBALD, I, a friend of MELANCHTON's, 513.

PIRRA-URA RELATION, III, an external form of marriage, 339; a kind of concubinage; an external enkapsis with abnormal sexual relations; in primitive Indian societies, 341.

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PLANETS, III, with their satellites; solar system; spherical groups of stars, galaxy, 651.

PLANKS, III, are semi-manufactured material used as the material foundation of furniture, 131, 132.

PLANTS, III, are typically biotic subjects, 267; the continuity of the life of a plant extends beyond the span of the always changing individual cells, 296; and can only be actualized in the coherence of these cells; the plant possesses no more life of its own than a human community does outside of the structural relation between its members, 297; plants have not been proved to possess feeling, 645; they do not form an enkaptic whole with their environment, but may form a correlative enkapsis, 698.

PLASTIC HORIZON, III, SCHELER's phenomenology cannot give an insight into this horizon, 53, 70.

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RADICAL EVIL, II, in KANT's philosophy, 150.
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RADIOLARIA, III, 107, 108; their SiO₂ formations, 724; and mineral formations, 730.

RADLOFF, III, the Kirghiz formed ‘auls’, a kind of ‘joint family’, an interlacement of different structures, under the authorithy of a patriarch, 351.

RAMUS, PETRUS, I, developed a semi-Platonic mathematical method in logic, in which ‘invention’ played the main part, 198.

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RATIONALISM, I, absolutizes the law-side of time, 28; reduces the subject-side of reality to the law-side, 98.

RATIONALISTS, I, think that ethical norms can be proven a priori and ‘more geometrico’; - HUME’s criticism, 309.

RATZEL, III, he tries to prove that the spread of similar elements of culture is due to emigration and derivation; he remained entangled in the environment-theory, 333; a quotation from RATZEL by W. SCHMIDT proves that this theory shows a lack of historical insight, 335; he calls political geography ‘geopolitics’, 500.

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RAVAISSON, I, developed neo-scholastic thought in an increasingly anti-rationaliistic sense, 525.
REACTION, II, historical reaction, 237.

READING BOOK, A, III, contains the intentional conception of its author; variability types; a cultural foundation and a symbolic qualification, 151.

REALISM, II, Scholastic realism is sometimes called conceptual realism; universalia ante rem and in rē AUGUSTINUS and ARISTOTLE; Divine Logos doctrine; metaphysical eidos (essence) gives matter its form; PLATO’s extreme realism; Scholastic formae separatae split up reality into noumenon and phenomenon, 387; intentio and the intended objective contents; copy theory of concepts; erroneous view of the Gegenstand, 388; Gegenstand and substance are identified; the transcendentalia; philosophia prima; the objects of the actus intelligendi, 389; realism versus nominalism, 386, 387, 419.

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REALITY, I, in RICKERT, 97. REALITY, II, as a category in KANT; but possibility and necessity can be thought of in every meaning modus; reality can never be modal, 551.

REALITY AND MEANING, II, that which makes reality into meaning lies beyond the limit of time; meaning is ‘ex origine’ the convergence of all temporal aspects of existence into one supertemporal focus, which is the religious root of creation, 30.

REALITY OF A THING, THE, III, is a continuous process of realization, 109.

REALLASTEN, II, in Germanic Law a jus in rē may be vested in an immovable in such a way that it is independent of the particular person entitled to it, and remains valid even when he is temporarily lacking; this is instanced by the so-called ‘Reallasten’ of Germanic Law. 408.

REAL RIGHTS, II, the will-power theorists identified jus in rē with absolute rights, 398.

REASON, I, alone can never be a motive to any action of the will, 306; in HUME reason is the slave of passion, 307.

REASON, II, Vernunft, nous, ratio, 11, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26; KANT’s idea of reason, 42; the idea of reason in rationalistic metaphysics is antinomic, 43; reason and understanding, 43; natural reason and natural ethics, 144; reason and faith; the act of thinking includes its faith aspects, 564.

REASON OF STATE, III, MACCHIAVELLI’s theory, 399.

REASON, PURE, I, in KANT, is never related to ‘Gegenstände’, but only to the a priori concepts of ‘Gegenstände’, 364.


RECIPIROCITY OF PERSPECTIVES, III, of the ego with other egos, in LITT; they are
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REFLECTION, I, in HUME, is in image of sensation, 282.

REFLEXIVE PERMISSION, II, and subjective right in VON JHERING, 404.

REFLEXIVE THOUGHT, I, and objective thought, in recent philosophy, 86; and critical self-reflection, 87.

REFORMATION, THE, I, took over the Scholastic motive of nature and grace, 188, 511, 512, 514.

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REGALIA, II, medieval regalia were considered as rēs in commercio, 410.

REGENERATION, II, reverses the direction of the faith function, 311.

REGENERATIVE PHENOMENA, III, and DRIESCH’s experiments, 646.

REGIONS, II, the delimitation of the phenomenological ‘regions’ in EDMUND HUSSERL, 17; material regions of being delimited by material ‘synthetical categories’ in HUSSERL, 454.
REGIONS, III, in HUSSERL, and the thing-structure, 54.

REGIUS, I, the innate ideas are present at birth; his polemic with DESCARTES, 222.

REHM, III,
Geschichte der Staatsrechtswissenschaft, 211.
REHM, III, on PLATO and ARISTOTLE’s sociology, 206; he overlooked the kernel of AR.’s view of democracy, 211.

REICHENAU, E., III,
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REICKE, E., II,
Lose Blätter aus Kant’s Nachlass, 438.
REICKE, II, Published a note given by KANT, 438.

REINES DENKEN, I, or philosophical thought as ‘mere thought’, has as such no actual selfhood, 7.

REINGKINK, TH., III, and Church government; the episcopal system, 516.
REINHARDT, II,
Das Persönlichkeitsrecht in der geltende Rechtsordnung, 413.

REINHOLD, I, a disciple of KANT, gave the doctrine of the affection of the subjective sensibility by the mysterious ‘Ding an Sich’ such a gross form as to expose its inherent antinomy sharply; this ‘Affizierung’ was, according to REINHOLD, a causal process, 413.

REINKE, JOH., III,
Ueber Deformation von Pflanzen durch äussere Einflüsse, 647.

RELATIVISM, I, in LITT, 138.
RELATIVISM, III, with respect to the Church institution, in EMIL BRUNNER, 542.

RELATIVITY, II, incongruity between relativity and physical continuous space, 101.

RELIGION, I, the fundamental dependence of human selfknowledge on the knowledge of God has its inner ground in the essence of religion as the central sphere of our created nature, 55; it is the innate impulse of the human selfhood to direct itself toward the true or a pretended absolute Origin of all temporal diversity of meaning, which it finds focused concentrically in itself; to the formal transcendental character of this description the concrete immediacy of religious experience remains strange; in theoretical thought we can only arrive at a transcendental idea; the function of such an idea; religion transcends all modal aspects, faith included; religion is not at all a temporal phenomenon manifest within the temporal structure of human act-life, 57; it can be approximated only in the concentric direction of our consciousness, not in the divergent one, not as a ‘Gegenstand’; religion cannot be described ‘phenomenologically’ or ‘psychologically’; it is not the experience of the ‘tremendum (RUDOLPH OTTO); it is the ex-sistent condition in which the ego is bound to its true or pretended firm ground; veritable religion is absolute self-surrender, 58; true self knowledge discovers the ex-sistent character of the self also in the fact that the ego is bound with other egos in a religious community; the I-ness lives in the spiritual community of the we, which is directed to the Divine Thou; the central command of love is of a religious and not of a moral character; in this Command the neighbour is a member of the religious community of mankind in its central relationship to God Who created man after His image, 60; a religious community is maintained by a common spirit which as a dynamis is active in the concentration point of human existence; it works through a basic motive, whose forms are historically determined, but whose central meaning transcends historical form-giving; since the Fall and the promise of the coming Redeemer, there are two central main springs operative in the human heart, viz., the Holy Ghost and the spirit of apostasy from the true God, 61; in Western thought the apostate spirit has disclosed itself in two central motives,
61; pre-Homeric religion of life was a nature religion; the classical-Greek motive (since ARISTOTLE) of form and matter; the Olympians were cultural gods; and the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom, 62; the Humanistic motive took its rise from the religion of the free autonomous human personality and that of modern science evoked by it, and directed to the domination of nature; the Christian motive of creation, fall, and redemption; the Scholastic motive of nature and grace was introduced by Roman-Catholicism and directed to a religious synthesis between the Christian and the other motives; the fall into sin is a privatio, a negation, a nothingness; but the central dynamics of the spirit of apostasy is no ‘nothing’; it springs from the creation and cannot operate beyond the limits in which it is bound to the divine order of meaning; the dynamics of sin can unfold itself only in subjection to the religious concentration law of human existence; without the law there is no sin, and there is a law of sin; but sin has no real power in itself, independent of creation, 63; idolatrous motives conceal themselves in a religious antithesis, for the absolutizing of relative meanings evokes their correlata; these motives are composed of two religious antithetic motives driving human action and thought continually in opposite directions; the resulting religious dialectic is quite different from the antithetical gegenstand-relation of theoretic thought, 64; the Roman-Catholic theological dialectic of nature and grace was taken over by Protestant Scholasticism; it aimed at a synthesis of the Aristotelian view of nature with the central motive of the Word-Revelation; but it lends itself as well to a combination of the motive of the Word Revelation with the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; then the Christian motive loses its radical and integral character; the Scholastic vision does not assign a central place to the Biblical revelation about the human heart as the radix of temporal existence; Thomism could proclaim the autonomy of natural reason in the ‘natural sphere’ of knowledge; the dialectic tension between nature and grace hides the inner dialectic of the Greek and the Humanistic motives; in Scholastic anthropology this component is expressed in the dichotomy of body and 65 soul; Scholastics was swayed from the Thomistic ‘natura praeambula gratiae to the Occamist denial of any contact between nature and grace (WILLIAM OF OCCAM); the same polar tension in ‘dialectical theology’ between KARL BARTH and EMIL BRUNNER, 66; Rousseau’s religion of feeling, 67; cf. sub voce Transcendental Basic Motive; - the central basic motive of the Christian religion is the motive of creation, the fall into sin, and the redemption through Jesus Christ in communion, with the Holy Ghost; God is the absolute and integral Origin, the Creator of the ‘earthly world’ concentrated in man, and of the world of the angels, 173; there is no original power which is opposed to Him; in His creation there is no expression of a dualistic principle of origin; man has been created by God according to His image in man’s heart participating in the religious community of mankind; the creation implies a world plan; Divine providence is concerned with the law side and with the factual side of the creation; the providential plan concerning the factual side is hidden from man; sin can only be understood in veritable radical self knowledge, as the fruit of Biblical Revelation, 174; Sin is apostasy from God; it involves the root of existence and the whole temporal cosmos; it does not stand in a dialectical relation to the creation; the redemption in Christ is also radical; sin is propitiated by Him; gratia communis, 175; KANT’s religion remains within the boundaries of mere reason, 384.

RELIGION, II, nature religions, 263 (and note); faith and religion identified; erroneously, 303; religion and magic; WESTERMARCK; FRAZER’s definition;
FREUD, 312; CASSIRER, 321; Egyptian religion, 324; HUSSERL’s idea of religion, 544.

RELIGION OF FEELING, I, in ROUSSEAU, 67.

RELIGIOUS FULNESS OF MEANING, I, love, wisdom, justice, power, beauty, etc., coincide in this fulness, 106.

RELIGIOUS HORIZON, III, the temporal and the religious horizon of experience, 68; the imago Dei, 69; religious love is the fulfilment of all temporal meaning, 71; the I-ness is the spiritual centre, of human existence, 88.

RELIGIOUS ROOT OF THE STATE, III, faith points to this Root, 500; State and Church, 501.

RELIGIOUS SPHERE, THE, I, is pre-functional, the concentration point of the root of our existence, 31.

REMEMBRANDT, II, Nightwatch, 423.

REMEMBRANCE, II, is an act, 372.

RENAISSANCE, I, at the time of the Renaissance Humanism was completely aware of its real religious motive, but in the 18th century this notion faded away, 170; Romanticism was as aristocratic in character as the Renaissance had been, 171; the Renaissance began as a spiritual Humanistic movement when the medieval ecclesiastically unified culture had collapsed, 173; in Italy, especially, the Renaissance took the side of the ancient world view; it re-discovered Greek and Roman Culture and gave up synthesis
philosophy, 189; in the Renaissance the Biblical motives were secularized, 190; the Faustian domination; the personality-ideal was permeated with an unquenchable thirst for temporal life and a Faustian desire to subject the world to itself; the Renaissance secularized the Christian idea of regeneration, 191; this 'renascimento' and the 'uomo universale'; LEO BATTISTA ALBERTI; LEONARDO DA VINCI, 192; its secularized motive of regeneration, 193; the Renaissance did not explicitly develop the model of modern natural scientific thought, although it contained such a tendency; it also inclined towards the infinite in which modern man thinks he can rediscover himself in his boundless impulse of activity, 194; Stoic and Epicurean motives in Renaissance thought; DA VINCI; VALLA; the thirst after infinite nature and its mysteries was manifest in Renaissance painting and poetry; the Faustian passion to dominate nature was revealed in a flourishing alchemy; PETRUS RAMUS' logic, 198; BRUNO'S pantheism, his dithyrambic glorification of nature's infinity and the human microcosmic monad; natura naturata and natura naturans; the rejection of a 'Jenseits', 199; the Renaissance ascribed the mathematical conception of natural phenomena to PLATO and DEMOCRITUS, 200.

RENARD, G., III, La théorie de l'institution, Essai d'ontologie juridique, 384.

RENASCIMENTO, I, and the 'uomo universale' of the Renaissance, 192.

REPRESENTATIONS, I, are 'synthetic concepts' of empirical 'Gegenstande' in KANT, 53.

REPRESENTATION, II, is an act, 372.

REPRESENTATIONAL RELATION, III, the naïve experience of a thing is not that of a copy or representation of such a thing (Abbild-relation), 34-38, 44-47; RICKERT's view of the copy theorie 49-51; SCHELER, 53; HUSSERL, 54.

REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM, III, CALVIN did not introduce this system into the Church, nor the idea of the sovereignty of the Congregation, 545-549.

Rēs, II, the Roman conception of the rēs in a juridical sense, 393.

Rēs PUBLICA, III, the State is a res publica, 412.

RESTLESSNESS, I, of phil. thought, and of our ego, is transmitted to all temporal functions in which the ego is operative, 11.

RESTORATION, II, of the 19th century was conservative, 233; and reaction, 362.

RESTRICIVE STATE OF FEELING, II, is found in animals, 117.

RETRIBUTION, II, is to be taken in bonam partem as well as in malam partem, 130: and economic life, 131, 132; and love; retribution acts against excessive manifestations of altruism; is not a feeling-drive, 134; ARISTOTLE's arithmetical and geometrical proportions in retribution, 135; economic, aesthetic, social retrocipations in the juridical aspect, 135, 136: the expression of the modal meaning of retribution in a primitive legal order, 182; in primitive society the
legal subjectivity of man and the validity area of the norms are still rigidly bound up with the unopened aspect of social intercourse restricted to the members of the tribe, in psychical life, 168, 183, 184; logical substratum of juridical aspect, 182, 183; biotic retrocipations in primitive culture, 270; juridical retrocipations, 405.

REUCHLIN, I, a friend of MELANCHTON’s, 513; R. was disappointed when MELANCHTON broke with the ideals of Humanism, 515.

REUTER AND HART, III,
Introduction to Sociology, 177.

REVELATION, I, is the synthesis of irrationality and originality - FICHTE -, 492. REVELATION, II, appeals to ourselves in the root of our existence, 52; general and particular, 306; are universally intended, 307; natural revelation, 308; and common grace, 309; the principle of Divine R. in the order of creation, 323.

REVÉSZ, G., II,
Het psychologisch ruimteprobleem, 373.

REVOLUTION, III, Christian revolution and Stoicism, 169; revolution can only succeed when its leaders collar the military power, 421.

RHIZOPODA, III, mineral formations in their protoplasm, 108, 774.

RHUMBLER, III,
Das Lebensproblem, 733;
Das Protoplasma als physikalisches System, 733.

RICHTER, OTTO, III,

RICKERT, HEINRICH, I,
System der Philosophie, 22, 23, 120, 121, 129, 151;
Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Weltanschauung, 23, 129;
Grundprobleme der Philosophie, 129, 130, 133, 134;
RICKERT, HEINRICH, I, theoretical philos. thought first demolishes everything a-theoretical, leaving a chaotic material of consciousness, which is to be ordered in the creative forms of philos. thought, 14; he defends the neutrality postulate with respect to philosophy, 14, 15; his statement: 'if we are
able to determine the boundaries of thought through thinking, we must be able, too, to exceed these limits', is contradictory on the immanence standpoint; he distinguishes ‘heterological’ from ‘hetero-logical-monological thought’; but it leads to antinomy, 22, 23; he observes, correctly, ‘as soon as we are beyond thought, we do not know anything’, but fails to appreciate the transcendence of our selfhood; the non-scientific attitude towards the world must not claim universal validity for all; then it can hold its own by the side of scientific philosophy; the latter makes the entire man also its object and transcends man himself, 23; as a Neo-Kantian RICKERT opposes being to validity, reality to value; these concepts are not modally defined; he reserves ‘meaning’ for ‘culture’ as a subjective relating of ‘reality’ to ‘values’, 76; his meaning-idealism distinguishes meaning (Sinn) from reality; the latter is only viewed in its abstract sense of the psycho-physical aspects, 97; his classification of the ‘life-and-world-views’ is oriented to the Neo-Kantian philosophy of values; he distinguishes intellectualism, aestheticism, mysticism, moralism, eudemonism, eroticism, theism, polytheism, 121; his classification is a confusing schematism, 122; it is construed apart from the religious basic motives of Western thought and interprets ancient and medieval thinkers after the pattern of the modern Humanistic motive of nature and freedom, 123; his view of the difference between philosophy and a life view, 124; his ‘Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Weltanschauung is aimed at modern existence-philosophy (HEIDEGGER, JASPERS, etc.), which opposes existential thinking to RICKERT’s purely theoretical; he tries to demonstrate that the cosmic totality must remain hidden from the total man, who is an individual complex of functions, 129; philosophy must separate the cosmos into two spheres: temporal-spatial (sensory perceptible) nature reality and timeless values having absolute validity; imperatives and norms are not the business of philosophy; the concept of a normative science is internally contradictory; special science studies what is ‘mere reality’ and immanent as ‘given reality’, the ‘psycho-physical’; reality is also a theoretical form, a category of thought, which itself is not real, but has ‘validity’, 130; the theoretical Idea of the totality of reality, viewed by KANT as an infinite task for thought, has value-character; ‘totality of reality’ is a problem of epistemology; philosophy must be a theory of values directed to the ‘Voll-endung’ (fulfilment) toward the totality and includes the universe of values in its horizon; it must strive after a system of values; and also investigate the a-theoretical values, such as morality, beauty, holiness; it orients itself to the historical life of culture to track down the multiplicity of the values; philosophy must reunite the worlds of ‘natural reality’ and of ‘values’; this unity can be immediately experienced when we are not thinking, 131; there is a third realm serving as a connecting link between reality and values; viz. that of meaning; meaning is constituted in the valuating act of the subject, but is not itself value, but relates reality to values; it joins these two in a higher synthetic unity; value is meaning of a transcendent, timeless, and absolute character; meaning is ‘immanent meaning’; reality is the object of the transcendent epistemological subject; in the realm of values there is no subjectivity at all; culture is reality to –which values cling; philosophy must work with an ‘open’ system, 132; such a system is only a formal order of ‘the stages of value’; philosophy must not be ‘prophetism’; nor a view of life and the world; the latter must be included in theoretical inquiry; the object of philosophy is the totality of the cosmos inclusive of the subject (the whole man and his relation to the cosmos); philosophy necessarily becomes a theory of the total meaning of life, 133; the pitfall in RICKERT’s neutrality view
lies concealed in his a-priori identification of 'truth' with theoretical correctness, and in his a-priori supposition that such truth is an 'absolute' 'value', 'timelessly valid', 'resting in itself', 134; this view is antinomous on RICKERT's own standpoint, 135; the test of the transcendental basic idea applied to RICKERT's philosophy, 136, 137; RICKERT's view of Calvinism, 149; the judgment 'Truth is the highest value' is not theoretical but proceeds from a life and world view; theoretical judgments are oriented to a (theoretical) value; in the judgment 'this rose is beautiful' the aesthetic attitude is abandoned for the theoretical judgment about 'the aesthetic value', 151; he distinguishes theoretical from practical philosophy, 530.

RICKERT, HEINRICH, II,
Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, 207;
Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 207, 421;
Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, 207, 208;
RICKERT, HEINRICH, II, on culture, nature, value, 201; culture is 'natural reality to which values cling', 204; qualifies historical science as individualizing; cultural life filled with meaning, 207; reality bears meaning; all normativity is reduced to the cultural denominator, 208; his concept of transcendental logical historical forms of knowledge, 209; his distinction between systematical and individualizing sciences, is antinomic, 213, 217; at first he used the term 'natural history' but he gave it up
later on because he believed that the historical viewpoint cannot include an individualizing view of nature, 230; and Kuypers, 243; individual causality; causal equation or inequivalence; individuality as such is an apeiron, not a norm as Rickert thinks, 254; his error, 275; individuality originates from the matter of experience; the genuine individual science is related to values by cultural science, 421; individuality is empirical uniqueness related to values; natural science method is blind to values and works in a generalizing way; individuality forced into the form-matter scheme, 421; individuality is a sensory mè on in Neo-Kantianism; meaning-indiv. in the general notion of culture only, 422.

Rickert, Heinrich, III,
Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 49, 50; System der Philosophie, 51;
Kant als Philosoph der modernen Kultur, 428.
Rickert, Heinrich, III, his criticism of Riehl's 'Critical realism'; epistemology should not include a problem in its pre-suppositions; Rickert starts from the 'Satz der Immanenz'; his objection made against Riehl is also valid for Rickert's own transcendental idealistic epistemology; he qualifies naïve exper. as 'a complex of vague and rash opinions', 49; he identifies the abstract sensory aspect with the integral whole of empirical reality; he rejects the copy theory; speaks of a pre-theoretical Erleben of the unity of value and reality; his Sinn-Begriff; his 'naïve realism' is Kantian phenomenal nature, 50; his notion of Erleben is: concept-less, irrational, nameless, a unity of two theoretically construed worlds, corresponding to the dualism of nature and freedom, 51; his copy theory of naïve experience, 49-51; of a work of art as a sensory perceptual thing related to aesthetic value, 113; Sorokin tries to solve the totality problem of sociology from the standpoint of H. Rickert's philosophy, 162; and Darmstaedter's sociology, 409; Kant held the State to be 'power'; this statement of Rickert's must be restricted to international relations, 428.

Riehl, Alois, I,
Der philosophischen Kritizismus, 268, 281, 340.
Riehl, Alois, I, holds that there is no antinomy in Locke's system, 268 (note); R. holds that Hume had unwavering faith in mathematics as the foundation of all science; he misunderstands Hume's conception of mathematical certainty; Riehl says that Hume never meant to dispute the universal validity of 'pure geometry', and that Hume only attacked the possibility, presumed by geometry, of dividing space to infinity, some further arguments of Riehl's on this subject, 281; his interpretation confronted with Hume's statements about 'pure geometry', 285; in the third period of his development Kant was very close to Hume's scepticism, 340.

Riehl, Alois, II,
Der philosophische Kritizismus, 80, 373, 439, 519.
Riehl, Alois, II, his involuntary admission of the numerical analogy in logical unity, multiplicity, etc., 80; association based on the connection between the organs of sight and touch, 373; his paraphrase of Kant's observation on judgments, 439; thought and intuition are originally united in their common subject of consciousness (= the cogito); he denies any essential difference between cognitive (experiential) and logical concepts; but he does not realize Kant's aporia, 519.

Riehl, Alois, III,
Der Philosophische Kritizismus, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49.
RIEHL, ALOIS, III, points out that the ‘bond between the objective and the subjective world’ would be broken if MÜLLER’s theory of the specific energy of the sense organs were true, 42; he holds that it is impossible to found a law on one single unexplained exception, 43; there is a necessary relation between stimulus and sensation; RIEHL ignores the subject-object-relation, 44; he gives a Nominalistic interpretation of the relation between sensory percepts and things perceived; he distinguishes arbitrary from natural signs, like Occam, 45; his Kantianism, 47; his critical realism; his rehabilitation of the sensory aspect of human experience, 47; things and our consciousness form one totality of reality; this thesis is an improvement on Kantianism, but not wholly satisfactory, 48.

RIEKER, K., III, Grundsätze reformierter Kirchenverfassung, 520, 521, 544, 545, 546, 547. RIEKER, K., III, refutes the political interpretation of CALVIN’s system of Church government, as if the elders were representatives of the congregation in the modern sense of representation, 521; he says that the conception of ‘governmental power’ as service is of Reformed origin, 544; RIEKER says that Church government was conceived by LUTHER as dominion in a juridical sense; this is an error, 545; the elders are representatives of the congregation insofar as they are its ministering organs according to their office; they are no mandatories of a popular will above them, 546, 547; an individual Church-member has a right to examine if the orders and arrangements of the ecclesiastical office bearers are in accordance with the Word of God and has to obey insofar as such is the case, 547.

RIEMANN, II, the second founder of the theory of mathematical functions; and intuition, 484.
RIGHT, SUBJECTIVE, II, in THOMASIUS, HOBBES, PUTENDORFF, my own right is all that has not been forbidden me; in GROTIIUS it is all that other juridical subjects in relation to me are forced to respect on account of the legal order, 395; KANT excludes purpose from the concept of subjective right, 396; according to VON SAVIGNY and PUCHTA a subjective right is essentially the particular will-power of the individual, 397; confusion between subjective right and juridical competence on account of the elimination of the subject-object-relation, 398; in THONI's conception, 397, 400; in DUGUIT's view, 399; and competence; and object, 402; and reflex permission; VON JHERING sought the difference in the legal protection (the action in a material sense); this is wrong, 404; a juridical object is nothing but a modal function and is determined by the modal function of the juridical subject-object-relation, 405; the person of the King cannot have a private right to the king's office, 410.

RIGHT, SUBJECTIVE, III, THOMAS AQUINAS recognizes subjective natural rights of individual man; a subj. right is a social function according to DUGUIT, 460.

RIGHTS, I, of man; of the citizen, 321.
RIGHTS, II, might is not right, 241; innate human rights in LOCKE, 350, 357, 95; WOLFF, 413; personality- and property-rights, 392, 413; Roman ius in rē, 392; rights to rights, 394; HUGO GROTIIUS, 395.
RIGHTS, III, inalienable rights of man were opposed to the absolute sovereignty of the State without denying such sovereignty, 399; they are denied by LÉON DUGUIT, 460.

RIGHTS, INALIENABLE, I, and the public interest, in WOLFF, 321.

RIGHTS, INNATE NATURAL, I, in ROUSSEAU, 318.

RIGHT, PERSONAL, II, (jura in personam), was held to be the volitive control over a person in consequence of a particular personal legal relation, in the opinion of the will-theorists, 398.

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SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, I, the philosophy of a special science examines the philosophical pre-suppositions of this science in the light of a total theoretical vision of temporal reality, which vision is ruled by the transcendental basic Idea and the basic motive; the supposed independence of special science with regard to philosophy; its historical arguments, 545; Modern Humanism recognizes this claim to independence on the part of special science; HANS DRIESCH opposes this view, 546; epistemology being orientated to the ‘Factum’ (or the ‘Fieri’, as the Neo-Kantians say) there is no possibility of independent philosophical critique of method and constructions in mathematical natural science; philosophy does not guide but it follows special science; the latter is taken to be neutral, 547; RICKERT and LITT; the need of an integral empirical method in philosophic investigations; no science is able to investigate a
specific modal aspect ‘with closed shutters’ toward all the other modalities, 548; philosophic and scientific thought in mathematics and its problems; ‘pure mathematics’, 549; mathematics is not a ‘fait accompli’, not a ‘factum’; a theoretical scientist will maintain, perhaps, that he only works with technical concepts and methods not implying philosophical or religious pre-suppositions, 550; but behind such concepts and methods are hidden very positive philosophical postulates; e.g. the principle of ‘logical economy’ and fictions not corresponding to the ‘states of affairs’, 551; behind the so-called ‘non-philosophical’ positivist standpoint is hidden a philosophical view of reality which cannot be neutral with respect to faith and religion; the mask of neutrality and the mischief done by the technical pragmatic conception of scientific thought; difference between the concept of an individuality structure and the modal concept of function; in a modal aspect we can distinguish the general functional coherence of individual functions of things, events, social relations, etc., 552; structural differences are only to be understood in terms of typical individuality structures; examples taken from the jural modus, and from the physical aspect, 553; a tree, an animal, an atom, a molecule, a cell, have physical-chemical functions but other functions as well: they are typical individuality structures, 554; under the influence of the positivistic view of the task of science and in keeping with the continuity postulate, the concept of function was used to eradicate the modal diversity, and the typical structures of individuality were erased; e.g. in ‘pure theory of law’, and ‘pure economics’ modal functional and typical structural views are confused; the Austrian School of economics; Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre, 555; the absolutization of the functionalist viewpoint is not neutral with respect to philosophy or to religion, but is the fruit of a Nominalist view of science; the positivist school of Ernst Mach; and of the Vienna School; Driesch’s ‘conception’ of ‘organic life’ as an ‘entelechy’; Woltereck’s conception of organic life as a material living substance (matrix) with an outer material constellation and an inner side of life experience; are examples of the illegitimate introduction of a specific structural concept of individuality as a functional one; in modern times psychology and the cultural sciences have reacted against the complete domination of the functionalistic science-ideal, mainly from the irrationalistic antipode; empirical science depends on the typical structures of individuality, 556; twentieth century physics abandoned its classic functionalistic concept of causality, matter, physical space and time; relativity and quantum theory reduced Newton’s physical conception to a mere marginal instance; Planck, Heisenberg; radio activity; Mach and Oswald oppose the acceptance of real atoms and light waves and try to resolve the physical concept of causality into a purely mathematical concept of function, because of their positivist-sensationalistic standpoint in philosophy, 557; the principle of logical economy in the positivist and empirico-critical sense of Mach and Avenarius is not the only criterion in physics; the discussion about causality (Planck, V. Laue, Lenard, and Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Jordan), 558; science pre-supposes a theoretical view of reality; B. Bavink holds natural science to be autonomous with respect to philosophy; he overlooks that physics has eliminated the naive view of reality, 559; in Bavink’s view the physical world is opposed to human thought as ‘a world in itself’; he considers ‘nature’ to be ‘rational’ in its deepest foundation; this is like ‘critical realism’, 560; but physical reality cannot be comprehended apart from a subjective insight into the mutual relation and coherence of the modalities within the cosmic temporal order; physical phenomena have an
objective analogon in the sensory ones, they must be subjectively interpreted in scientific thought and thereby logically opened; the experimental method is one of isolation and abstraction; it is pointed to the solution of theoretical questions which the scientist himself has raised and formulated, 561; modern physics rests on epistemological pre-suppositions that have been generally accepted since the days of GALILEO and NEWTON; but they imply a purely quantitative and functionalistic view of reality which became the content of the Humanistic rationalistic science-ideal; the appeal to ‘reality’ in scientific investigations is never free from a philosophical and religious prejudice; RANKE said that historical science has only to establish how the events have really happened; but the word ‘really’ is ambiguous: in historical science we do not grasp an event in its full reality, only in a particular aspect, 562; it pre-supposes a theoretical view of reality of a philosophical character; Historicism; the Historical School; the view of the State in which the latter is identified with its historical aspect of power, 563; biology offers many examples of a functionalistic view of reality; evolutionism; holism; mechanists and neo-vitalists; DRIESCH denied that organic life can be reduced to a physical-chemical constellation of matter, and proclaimed it to be a reality in itself, an immaterial entelechy; this was an ‘immaterial substance’ and the result of a new absolutization; holism wanted to conquer DRIESCH’s dualism by a conception of structural totality; but
holism fell back on a functionalism that construed the whole of a living organism by levelling its different aspects; any special science has to solve the problem concerning the limits of its field of research and the modal structure of this aspect; empirical phenomena have as many modal aspects as human experience has; only the theoretical Gegenstand relation gives rise to fundamental divisions of the non-logical fields and to the philosophical problems implied; in the empirical phenomena the inter-modal coherence is realized and the typical structures of individuality can only be studied in their empirical realization; philosophy can, therefore, not ignore the results of special scientific research, 565; philosophy cannot be restricted to the problems implied in the special sciences, since it has also to give an account of the data of naïve experience; Christian philosophy and science should mutually penetrate; the modern Humanistic division between science and philosophy cannot be maintained, 566.

SCOTUS, JOHN DUNS, I, De Rerum Principio, 186; Opus Oxionense, 186. SCOTUS, JOHN DUNS, I, a more consistent realist than THOMAS, held to the primacy of the will; his doctrine of the potestas Dei absoluta, 185; this potestas absoluta was distinguished from the postestas Dei ordinata and bound to the unity of God's holy being (essence); the lex aeterna originates in this Essence; absolute truth and goodness are grounded in the Divine Being; this potestas cannot have any Nominalistic purport, 186. SCOTUS, JOHN DUNS, II, Quaestiones sup. Metaph., I, IV, q. 1., - 21. SCOTUS, JOHN DUNS, II, on being, 21.

SCRIPTURES, THE, II, Reveal God's act of creation; appeal to our religious root of existence; tell us about man's place in the cosmos; the fall into sin, redemption, 52.

SCULPTURE, III, its structure, 111 ff.; it is an enkapsis, 111; its objective implicitly intended vital function, 117; ARISTOTLE's failure to account for its reality, 126; a sculptor has to open the natural structure of the material, 126.

SEA-HOG'S EGGS, III, DRIESCH's experiments, 735, 753.

SECONDARY QUALITIES, III, these qualities were adduced as an argument to refute naïve experience, 36, 37; in LOCKE; MÜLLER's specific energies of the sense organs, 39.

SECONDARY RADICAL TYPES, III, of art, 110.

SECRET MEN'S SOCIETIES, III, the so-called 'Mannerbunde'; are under the leading of a political structure; the skull-cult; initiation rites for boys, according to LOEB; ancestor worship; Vehmgerichte; cruelty at initiation, 363-366.

SECTARIAN CONVENTICLES, III, were favoured by LUTHER's theory of the Church, 513.
SECTION. II, ‘section’ in the system of rational numbers is the ‘irrational’ function of number, which can never be counted off in finite values in accordance with the Archimedean principle, 90.

SECTS, III, in TROELTSCH and WEBER sects are viewed as independent sociological types, 527, 528, 529, 530; they nearly always arise through the fault of the Church, according to KUYPER, 532; they as a rule approach the institutional church in the second and third generations, 534.

SECULAR GOVERNMENT AND THE CHURCH, III, secular authority in the Church, according to THOMASIUS, 517.

SECULARIZATION, I, of Nominalism by JOHN OF JANDUN, and MARSILIUS VAN PADUA, 188, 190.

SECULARIZATION OF POLITICAL CONVICTION, III, is furthered by ignoring the ultimate fundamental questions of belief; this fact justifies Christian party formation, 624.

SEGMENTARY AND ORGANIC TYPES, III, of social forms, in DURKHEIM, 175.

SEIGNORIAL RIGHTS, II, in the Netherlands, 236.

SEIN UND SOLLEN, III, in modern political theory, 385; this dualism of Neo-Kantianism is criticized by HERMANN HELLER, 388: and accepted by SIEGFRIED MARCK, 401.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, I, as absolutely free ego in FICHTE, 414.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, II, cosmological self-consciousness, 473; unity of self-consciousness, and KANT’s synthesis, 494, 495; cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, logicized in KANT, 498; KANT’s definition, 500; he excludes sensibility, 501; its unity; the cogito in KANT, 519; and the self, according to HEIDEGGER, 523; HEIDEGGER’s interpretation of KANT on the finite ego in the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, 528; KANT did not conceive the transcendental unity of self-consciousness to be sensible, 535; not a single aspect transcends self-consciousness, 539; cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, 540, 541; pre-theoretical and theoretical experience rooted in self-consciousness, 560; cosmic self-consciousness and the selfhood, 562; and the knowledge of God, 562; this self-knowledge and the knowledge of God restores the subjective perspective of human experience, 563; its transcendent freedom, 574; man's self-
consciousness becomes more and more individual; his individuality has a sociotial structure, 594.

**SELFHOOD, I, is supposed to be reducible to an immanent subjective pole of thought, 6;** as pure actuality in **SCHELER, 111.**

**SELFHOOD, II, in HEIDEGGER: finite; its essence is historical time, 524, 525; only in theoretical abstraction HEIDEGGER holds reality to be accessible to the selfhood, 527; his self is the origin and identical with time; our self and time, 531; his ‘existential’ time is not ‘cosmic time’, 531; the transcendence of the religious selfhood above time, 535; sensory phenomena and the selfhood, and cosmic time, 539; the transcendental phenomenological subject or ego, 543; the subjective a-priori of the intentional content of the acts, 544; intersubjectivity of egos as mental monads, 545, cf. 549; the absolute transcendental subject is an absolutization, 546; the religious root of human existence, 549; our selfhood is under the law, 552; intermodal synthesis and selfhood, 554; the transcendent horizon of the selfhood, 560; the individual ego has been integrated into the religious selfhood and self-consciousness, 562; man in his full selfhood transcends the temporal earthly cosmos in all its aspects and partakes of transcendent root of this cosmos, 593.**

**SELFHOOD, III, is the individual religious centre of human existence and experience; this existence is a ‘stare extra sê’, 6.**

**SELF-KNOWLEDGE, I, we do not possess real self-knowledge in the transcendental-logical concept of the thinking ego, according to KANT, 54; depends on knowledge of God, 55.**

**SELF-REFLECTION, I, philosophy cannot do without critical self-reflection; Κνῶθι σεαυτόν, know thyself; how is selfreflection possible, if it does not transcend the concept, and we cannot think in a theoretical sense without conceptual determination, 5; self-reflection pre-supposes that our ego directs its reflecting act of thought toward itself; in this act philosophical thought finally transcends its own limits, 7; the way of self-reflection is the only way leading to the discovery of the true starting-point of theoretical thought, 51; the concentric direction of this thought, necessary for critical self-reflection, must spring from the ego as the individual centre of human existence, 55; the selfhood gives this central direction to theoretical thought by concentrating on the true, or on a pretended absolute Origin of all meaning; self-knowledge is in the last analysis dependent on the knowledge of God; a real account of this fact is only given in the Biblical Revelation of man as the image of God, 55; critical self-reflection started by LOCKE concerning the root of the science-ideal, 271; it went no further than the idea of the sovereign personality, 500.**

**SELF-REFLECTION, II, intuitive self-reflection on the modalities and theoretical synthesis; the modal aspects are our own and do not transcend the self; they refer to the selfhood; in the foundational direction there is no free synthesis; analysis remains at rest in the synthesis of the given; enstatic Erleben of individuality structures; Hineinleben, 474; Erleben lacks theoretical insight into modalities; conscious Erleben, or intuition, 475; our experience of identity, 500; in phenomenology, 544; FICHTE and HUSSERL, 549; radical religious self-reflection, 550; and the access to the intermodal synthesis, 554; HUSSERL follows DESCARTES’ solipsist selfreflection, 584.**
SELF-FEELING, II, is a psychological phenomenon which manifests itself in a concentric direction to the ego; but the ego escapes every attempt to grasp it in a psychological view, 115.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY, I, of philosophical thought, 12, 14; is an absolutization of meaning, 20; of philosophic thought, within its own field, 20, 22, 23. SELF-SUFFICIENCY, II, this postulate cannot be epistemologically accounted for; it forces its religious a-priori on us in the disguise of a 'pure theory', 492.

SELF-SURRENDER, I, absolute self-surrender is religion, 58.

SEMEN RELIGIONIS, II, has been preserved in the human heart thanks to God's gratia communis; and in many apostate religions important remnants of the original Word-Revelation have been retained, 311.

SEMI-MANUFACTURES, III, e.g. planks, 131, 132.

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De Benef., 3, 20 ff, - 411.
SENÉCA, II, on slavery, 411, 412.
SENÉCA, III,
Epist. 102 (bib. XVII, 2), 227.
SENÉCA, III, developed the idea of an uncorrupted natural state as a society under the leadership of the best and not as an aggregate of a-social individuals, 229, 230 (note).

SENENSUS, PETRUCCIUS, III, on 'universitas', 233.

SENSATIONS, II, are distinguished from feelings in psychology, 116.

of movement, 112; feeling, 347; sensory SENSIBILITY, II, in the sensory experience
imagination, and objectivity, 425; pure ‘sensibility’ in KANT, 495.

SENSORIUM DEI, II, in NEWTON's thought, 96.

SENSORY IMAGES, II, of movement, 168.
SENSORY IMAGES, III, there is no logical identity in sensory impressions as such;
they do not furnish a logical foundation for the application of the fundamental
logical norms to a judgment, 450; are not preponderant in naïve experience,
but anticipate the symbolical aspect; their degrees of clarity, 38; qualitative and
modal differences between sensations, in HELMHOLZ, 43; MÜLLER's law, 44;
sensations are signs, according to RIEHL, 45; symbols, 46; RIEHL rehabilitates
the sensory aspect of experience, 47, 48.

SENSORY PICTURE, II, of the destruction of a cultural area by some natural
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SENSUALISM, I, Nominalistic sensualism in MARIUS NIZOLIUS, 244.

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SERVET, M., III, CALVIN's struggle against SERVET's pantheism, 72.

SERVITUTES, II, praediorum rusticorum compared with servitutes praediorum
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Ernst Troeltsch over de betekenis van het Calvinisme voor de
Cultuurgeschiedenis, 531.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, I,
Pyrrhonic Hypotyposes, 275;
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, I, 'being is appearance'; this Pyrrhonic scepticism had
the ultimate intention of denying every criterion of truth; it was adopted by HUME
and BERKELEY; in 1718 Sextus Empiricus' work was published in a Latin
translation, in 1725 in a French version, ascribed to Huart, 275; he states that
the first explicit division of philosophy into ethica, physica, and logica, was
made by a pupil of PLATO's, XENOCRATES, 536.

SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, III, was at first promiscuous, according to BACHOVEN,
331; sexual communism instead of individual marriage is nowhere to be found,
according to LOWIE, 332.

SEXUAL PROPAGATION, II, an original type of biotic modal individuality of meaning,
itssubstrata display anticipatory types of meaning individuality, 424.

SHAFTESBURY, I, sought the ethical faculty in the moral sentiment, 338; ethics
is psychologically and aesthetically grounded in the ‘feeling of beauty', 339; he...
converted the Humanistic personality-ideal irrationally into that of the aesthetic morality of genius and turned against every supra-individual norm and law; true morality consists in a harmonious, aesthetic self-realization of the total individuality; this was his transformation of the Greek ideal of kalokagathon; virtuosity is the highest disclosure of the sovereign personality in SHAFTESBURY’s thought; not a single power and instinctive tendency is allowed to languish; they are all brought into harmony by means of a perfect life, and thereby the welfare of the individual as well as of society is realized; the source of moral knowledge is in the subjective depths of individual feeling, 462; morality is brought under a subjective and aesthetic basic denominator; the morally good is the beautiful in the world of practical volition and action; the good, like the beautiful, is harmonious unity in the manifold; it is the object of an original approbation rooted in the deepest of man’s being: taste is the basic faculty for both ethics and aesthetics, 463.

SHAFTESBURY, II, his aestheticism, 276.

SHAPERS OF HISTORY, II, CAESAR, GALILEO, REMBRANDT, LUTHER, CALVIN, 243, 244; and historical economy, 286.

SHELL-LIME, III, as an enkaptic structural totality; it possesses a typical embracing form totality, 702.

SIB (OR CLAN), III, organized community but with an undifferentiated qualification; kinship in it is usually unilateral; maternal or paternal; it is not patriarchal or matriarchal; patrilineal sibs are called gentes among the Romans, 353; LOWIE’s error, 354 [cf. s.v. LOWIE] common descent is a fiction; the sib or clan is not found at the lowest level of primitive cultures, but the conjugal family and kinship community are found, 354; sibs are often very large; they cannot exist without comprising a considerable part of the natural kinship; members must be born in the sib; there is sometimes adoption; the sib is dominated by the family mind; once a sibmate always a sibmate; the rule of clan-exogamy: sibmates must not marry with each other; such a marriage is incest, 355; the sib is a peace relationship between sibmates; it executes the vendetta; this testifies to the presence of a political structure interwoven in the sib; the sib-chieftain leads ritual and is a magician; the sib encloses a business organization in agriculture or in hunting; totemistic clans are centres of mana belief, etc., 356; the leading structure in the sib is the family bond; what structures are combined in it depends on societal conditions; clans are extremely changeable units; common descent is a fiction,
357; sibs have a leading structural principle, not a leading function; its collective responsibility in case of a blood-guilt; the leading structural principle is the unilateral family bond, 358; this is a parallel to the relation between foster parents and their foster child; adoption of a child incorporates it into either the father's or the mother's clan; the fiction of common descent proves the supra-arbitrary nature of the clan's structural principle; its foundation is a power organization, 359; sibs are not economically founded; their foundation is a power organization uniting the power of the sword, that of faith, economic power, etc. in an undifferentiated total structure, 360.

SIDGWICK, N.V., III,
The Electronic Theory of Valence, 700.

SIEVERS, E., II, modern phonology, 224.

Siger of Brabant, I, an Averroist; disrupted Christian faith and Aristotelian metaphysics, 260.

Signifying, II, Husserl considers it as a psychical act which can only intend the linguistic meaning but belongs as such to psychology; but the intending and signifying function is not identical with an act; the change in the intentional meanings of symbols is adapted to the cultural development by virtue of the inner structural moment of lingual formation; the reference of the symbol to what is signified is made only via the meaning intention and subjective signifying, 226.

Signs, I, have universality in Berkeley, 273.
Signs, III, like Occam, Riehl distinguishes arbitrary and natural signs, 45.

Sigwart, II,
Logik, 442, 444.

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Silico Lattices, III, 773.

Similarity, III, in the culture of different peoples are not due to derivation, 332, 333.

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Simmel, Georg, I, philosophy is 'a temperament seen through the picture of the world', 127.
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Soziologie, 210;
Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, 211, 212;
Der Fragmentcharakter des Lebens, 212; Logos, Band V, 212.
Simmel, Georg, II, his form-matter scheme in sociology; geometrical form used to distinguish formal sociology from material social sciences, 210; social forms are a priori conditions in the historical psychical life of social individuals, as elements of society. Society is their synthesis; psychical interaction is the
fundamental social category; was Simmel's material historical?, 210; form and content scheme; his Neo-Kantian scheme for the epistemology of history; the individualizing view of reality as 'objective mind', 211; theoretical cognitive and non-theoretical cognitive forms; he cannot differentiate between sociology, history; cultural sciences, 212; on history, 252.


Simmel, Georg, III, his concept 'social form', 172; on the unity of societal communities, 241; he is the 'father' of the formalistic school of sociology; the true realities in society are the separate individuals; the concept of society vanishes; an organism is a unity because of the interaction between energies of its organs being more intense than that with any exterior being, 242.

Simon, Saint, I, tried to combine Restoration historical thought with the naturalistic scientific view of the Enlightenment, transforming into the rationalistic idea of progress the irrationalistic idea of development of Romanticism and the Historical School; his school started a positivistic sociology, 209.

Simon, Saint, II, his positivistic view of culture, 200; his view of worldhistory, 269.

Simon, Saint, III, Oeuvres de St. Simon et d'Enfantin, 455.

Simon, Saint, III, society is an organism, 163; the constitution of the state is of secondary importance, 452; economical factors in 'civil society' gave rise to authority and subordination; property is the origin of class-distinctions; authority belongs to the ruling classes; the natural scientific method in sociology, 453; politics will turn into economics; government into the administration of common interests; the State will vanish, 455.

Simplicity, II, Classicist aesthetics was guided by the science ideal and by analysis penetrated to the functional character of aesthetic meaning. It discovered modal analogies in the aesthetic sphere: unity in multiplicity, economy, simplicity and clarity, frugality, 347.


Sin, I, wiped out the image of God, 4; the possibility of sin; sin as privatio; the law of sin; a dynamis; there is no contradiction between creation and fall, 63; Descartes' explanation, 236; in Leibniz' sin is due to metaphysical imperfection, 237.

Sin, II, the curse of sin, 32; sin is not mere privatio; is sinful reality still meaning?, 33; sin is both privation, and, positive, i.e. apostasy, a power; but not independent of the meaning character of creation, 33; Common Grace, 33; world, flesh, and sin, 34; sin and legal order,
SIN AND MEANING, II, Sin is not merely privatio; it is also a positive guilty apostasy insofar as it reveals its power, derived from creation itself. Sinful reality remains apostate meaning under the law and under the curse of God's wrath, 33.

SIN AND THE STATE, III, the sword power of the State is because of sin, 423.

SINZHEIMER, HUGO, III, De Taak der Rechtssociologie, 577.
SINZHEIMER, HUGO, III, wants to prove that empirical sociology can study societal human relationships apart from any normative legal viewpoint; he adduces the figure of a criminal organization, 577.

Si O₂ FORMATIONS, III, of radiolaria, 108.

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SLAVERY, II, a human being can never be a juridical object; LACTANTIUS and SENECa against slavery; the Christian Church opposed slavery indirectly, 411.

SMEND, RUDOLPH, III, Der Staat als Integration, 259, 387; Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht, 389, 400.
SMEND, RUDOLPH, III, applied LITT's theory to the state, considering the latter as a universal integrational system unified by subjective and objective factors; later he appealed to the state's functional territorial organization of power according to the historicist view, 259; he founded the Berlin School, and introduced the dialectical cultural scientific method in his Integrationslehre, 387; the State is in a perpetual process of renewal, 389; State and law are two independent and different aspects of communal life, 399; State and law cohere but are self-contained provinces of spiritual life, 400.

SNAIL HOUSES, III, as objective structures, 774.

SNOWDEN INCIDENT, PHILIP, III, and internal relations, 486.

SOCIAL ASPECT, II, in STAMMLER, 16, 67; control, command, power, a modus of sociality, 68; social individuality structures, 69; convential and ceremonial economy; lingual expression and social contact, 113; empathy, 113; social refers to human intercourse, 140, 141; sociality and history; forms of intercourse differ with time and place; social norms require positivizing formation, which is a historical retribution; forms of intercourse have meaning, a lingual retrocipation, 227; in its closed structure history need not be signified to continue its course; closed social intercourse is inevitably significant; social behaviour varies with time and place: there is a history a social intercourse; therefore intercourse is not history, 228.
Social Categories (Transcendental), III, are the conditions of systematic investigations; further distinctions should not be imposed on social structures in a subjective and a priori way, but as a result of structural investigation. Transcendental social categories do not pertain to the ultimate genera embracing different radical types, but refer to the transcendental societal categories in the plastic horizon: thing, event, enkaptic intertwining, internal structural causality, etc., these categories are the links between the modal and the plastic dimension of the temporal order; they are not related to the metaphysical idea of being, nor to the constitutive formative function of a transcendental subject of experience (Kantian or Husserlian); but to the modal and the plastic structures; the most fundamental category is the correlation between communal and inter-communal or inter-individual relationships, which are founded in the modal aspect of social intercourse; the contrast between differentiated and undifferentiated social relationships is founded in the historical aspect; the categories of natural and organized communities, institutional and non-institutional relationships impart a typical direction to primary categories towards individuality-structures; natural and institutional communities are sharply to be distinguished from free associations; differentiated and undifferentiated communities of an historical foundation are not essential to every society; there are non-institutional natural communities e.g., those founded in a neighbourhood in a vital spatial sense; in the genetical order historically founded communities are always preceded by natural ones; and institutional natural communities precede those of a non-institutional character; a differentiated society cannot exist without the stable foundation of institutional organized communities; the primary condition of a society is its relative stability; the categories of societal form and social interlacement are also transcendental, apart from their typical variable realization; the latter requires a genetic and an existential form; these forms are the nodal points of enkaptical interlacement between societal relationships of a different radical or a different geno-type; the category of voluntary associations is not a genus proximum; the term ‘voluntary association’ implies a close connection with human purposes; this category pertains to the genetic form of organized communities which only originate in the free individualized and differentiated inter-
personal relations, 570; the category of societal form assumes a typical transcendental relation to a well defined category of societal individuality structures; TÖNNIES' category of 'Gesellschaft' is the product of an individualizing and rationalizing process in the inter-individual and inter-communal relations of society; the purposes pursued in these organizations are to be freely chosen and extremely varied, according to the variation of human needs in the process of cultural disclosure, 571; the genetic forms constituting voluntary associations have an abstract character; purpose and means must be indicated to relate them typically to the organized community to be formed; juridically they imply a social compact, which functions in the sphere of common private law; institutional organized communities have priority over differentiated voluntary associations; voluntary organizations may be associatory or authoritarian in form; the latter require a labour contract or a contract of enrolment to grant membership; such contracts are genetic forms constituting a communal relation; here voluntary associations may assume an indirectly compulsory character in their existential forms; the contractual character of their genetic forms is a transcendental condition of differentiated voluntary associations, 572; a contract of association is a collective interindividual act of consensus constituting a unified will of a whole, bound to a common purpose; agreements not directed to the formation of voluntary organized communities do not constitute a unified will of a whole bound to a common purpose; TÖNNIES holds all associatory bonds in the 'Gesellschaft' to be based on the do ut des principle; BINDING and TRIEPEL called the genetic form of an association a Vereinbarung, i.e., a unifying act of the will; two parties have opposite interests and aims; such a contract they held to be based on the principle of do ut des; these opinions are wrong; BINDER and TRIEPEL extend their concept 'Vereinbarung' even to the parties in a law suit; but only voluntary associations are strictly bound to the genetic form of a 'Vereinbarung', 573; the Humanist natural law doctrine was too one-sided; it assumed that institutional communities, too, could only arise from individualized inter-individual relations; in modern society the genetic form of marriage is an agreement; this agreement is not sufficient in most countries to constitute a marriage; the natural law doctrine of the contractual genesis of a State has been generally relinquished; the leading function of a voluntary association is not identical with the purpose that its founders had in view; such a purpose gives form to the internal structural principle and means the free choice of the type of association; a modern mining industry has a supra arbitrary structure: an historical (subjective-objective) organization of power comprising capital, management, division and coordination of labour; its genetic and existential forms shape its internal relations as well as its external relations in an enkaptic interlacement, 574; its internal structure is realized in a necessary correlation of communal and inter-individual relationships; the example of a modern department-store; the limits within which the subjective purposive plan of the founders plays an individual formative rôle; the purpose of a voluntary association is not restricted to the internal life of the organized community to which it refers; it is necessarily directed to the correlation of internal communal and external inter-individual relationships, 575; the genetic form of a closed club is constituted chiefly by the aim and means of the founders and is a nodal point of inter-structural intertwinements; the internal leading function of a trade-union is the moral bond of solidarity between the labourers typically founded in their organized historical vocational power to elevate labour to an essential and equivalent partner in the process of production, 576; purposes
like the promotion of the intellectual and bodily development of the members, etc., do not qualify the internal community; only the chief aim has a typical relation to the leading function without coalescing with it; the typical relation between purpose and internal structure of a criminal organization; Sinzheimer's sociological and Hauriou's institutional view of a criminal association; it is not possible to establish the factual existence of a criminal organization without the aid of norms functioning in the social order; a positivist might consider norms as factual rules of behaviour in a society that has accepted them, 577; but this does not explain the 'code of honour' and the internal authoritative order in a criminal organization; this code has a supra arbitrary foundation in the structural principle of their internal communal sphere independent of criminal purposes and not different from that of a 'lawful' industrial organization; it is given an illegitimate positive form; Hauriou distinguishes between purposes and internal 'institutional idea'; this idea is neo-Platonic and becomes an 'idée d'oeuvre' in an organized community; but this metaphysics cannot explain a criminal organization, 578; Tönies' contractual view of 'Körperschaften'; the relative truth in this view. Voluntary associations formed for a subjective purpose pre-suppose a process of individualization in the inter-personal societal relations guaranteeing the individuals a sphere of private liberty outside of all institutional
communities; an historically closed society embraces almost the whole temporal existence of its members in communal relationships; in the individualizing process a real emancipation takes place, 580; primitive societal forms shut people off in a kind of exclusive symbiosis; the breaking up of the undifferentiated institutional communities is connected with the rise of associatory organizations; man's emancipation is in line with the opening process of history and with his vocation; this process is much more accelerated in a city than in a town; a patriarchal family of agriculturists, and a metropolitan family; a medieval town and a modern city, 581; the dissolution of the guilds; the complicated picture of modern city life and society; the political institutional bond is a really integrating bond in such a city; a rural village community; metropolitan relations are largely impersonal; the process of expansion and emancipation is not necessarily un-Christian; it breaks through narrow-minded nationalism, opposes the defication of temporal societal relationships, 582; temporal societal relations should express the religious supra-temporal unity of the human race; the Corpus Christi; JESUS' parable of the Good Samaritan; the opening process of society increases the individual man's needs, and his dependence on others; division of labour HEGEL's dialectical idea of the 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft'; the 'strategem of reason' (List der Vernunft); he tries to reconcile HOBBES' naturalistic individualistic construction with the Humanistic idea of law and morality in KANT's conception, 583; the 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft' drives the individual out of family life and raises him to a higher spiritual level pointing to the 'Vernunftstaat'; in this state the antithesis between the subject and the norm has been cancelled in the substantial (and no longer formal) moral freedom of everybody as a part of the whole; HEGEL's State conception as the organized administration of justice and 'Polizei', 584; the three main structures of civil society in HEGEL; society and the absolute State, division of labour; social classes; a logical triad, 585; Korporationen; society and family are parts of a whole; vocational class honour; a single unorganized person; individual and universal interests reconciled by civil law, 586; criticism of HEGEL's view; his masterly interpretation of the modern individualized inter-individual societal relations; his evaluation of the influence of the Christian idea of free interpersonal relations on the individualizing process; his universalistic defication of a national State, his logicist speculative scheme of three social classes; over-emphasis on economic motives is oriented to the idea of the homo economicus; he forces voluntary organizations into his three classes, 587; HEGEL discovered a structural law of modern society: viz. the generalizing and integrating tendency in the free societal purposes which forms the necessary counterpart of the increasing individualizing tendency; the normative law of correlative differentiation and integration; individuality structures in the differentiated inter-individual and inter-communal relationships (free market relations, publicity, fashions, sports, competition, the press, traffic, musical and theatrical performances, private philanthropy, diplomacy, etc.), 588; these individuality structures possess two radical functions; fashion and sports are qualified by a typical function of social intercourse; free market relations, publicity, etc., are qualified by the economic function; social philanthropy by the moral aspect; missionary activity is an activity of faith; all these structures are of a typical historical foundation; individual acts display different individuality structures: saluting a friend is qualified as a typical act of social intercourse; a purchase agreement, a lease contract, are economically qualified; a public performance of music is aesthetically qualified, an alms in public is morally
qualified, etc.; these structures are not based on organization; the acting individuals act in essential coordination in a cooperative or in an antagonistic sense; they follow the same direction (in fashion, e.g.); supplement each other (division of labour), or are at strife (competition), 589; primitive inter-individual relations are undifferentiated and interwoven with the undifferentiated order of the narrow tribal or folk community and share its isolating and limiting character; they vary from tribe to tribe; those of one community are experienced as alien or hostile by another; each tribal relationship has its vertically individualized, miniature ‘society’; modern Western society tends to expand their sphere of validity horizontally; they have an international tendency; leading groups set the pace and are generally followed, 590; the leading houses in Paris, London, Vienna, etc., lay down the norms of fashion; they cannot create norms in a perfectly arbitrary way, but are bound by dynamic principles of taste, social distinction, efficiency, etc., and by the various societal individuality structures; extravagances never have a normative function; they have a patent expansive, international character; there are no national fashions; but there are folk dresses, 591; fashion is an integrating factor in inter-individual social relations; v. JHERING treats fashion as a social excrecence in contrast to folk dress, and as originating from impure motives of class pride and vanity; but fashion is not a sign of decadence, nor a
symptom of the ‘mass man’; fascist and national socialist salutes were a foolish set-back caused by the setting up of national barriers; fashion is only radically qualified as a structure of social intercourse; it is geno-typically and phenotypically differentiated in particular subject-object-relations and in its interweavings with other structural types of inter-individual relations, e.g., a fashion in sporting dress, evening dress, travelling-costumes, lounge suits, etc.; such differentiation bears an expansive cosmopolitan character; this is the result of the integrating process manifest in modern society; the differentiating factors in the integrating process are the individuality structures of the inter-individual relations (592) especially in those of social intercourse; national and local forms not founded in climatic or other natural factors are experienced as obsolescent peculiarities; in the typically economic relationships the correlation between integration and differentiation is very marked owing to modern technique, modern traffic, trade, industry; the integrating tendencies in these structures are founded in the economic power of the leading entrepreneurial groups; customary stipulations, standard contracts, general conditions in individual economically qualified agreements; little scope is left to the private autonomy of the contracting parties; contrats d’adhésion, 593; the organized industrial groups bring about a horizontal integration in the contents of the individual agreements; this integration is differentiated according to the horizontal branches of industry or trade; DUGUIT supposes that such integration is an intrinsical transformation of civil law into an economically qualified social law; but in this case there is only question of an enkaptic interlacement of industrial and commercial law with civil law; outside of the internal sphere of civil law there is no equality of the coordinated subjects in the inter-individual societal relations; science is a necessary integrating factor presenting itself as a concrete social phenomenon in the correlation of interindividual and organized communal relationships; science is theoretically-logically qualified and materially differentiated, and is the foundation of the individuality structure of modern technical progress; the opening and individualizing process is a rationalizing process, 594; it is destined to disclose and realize the potentialities and dispositions inherent in social relations according to the divine world-order; as far as the formation of law is concerned the Historical School pointed out the necessary part played by scientific jurists; their inference that theoretical jurisprudence is a formal source of positive law was erroneous; PUCHTA; VON JHERING; modern individualization and integration should be counterbalanced by the unfolding of organized institutional communities and voluntary associations; otherwise they will result in an individualistic process of disintegration; hence the extremely individualistic and merciless capitalistic form of the industrial sector of Western society, 595; the class struggle; labour became impersonal market ware; the labour community was affected by the individualistic contractual view; unlimited competition created the Hobbesian ‘homo homini lupus’; family, kinship, and the State were also affected by this social disease; the ‘sacred’ egoism of the separate States; all these abuses revealed the Civitas terrena; modern society is forming voluntary associations to counter-act this destructive individualism, 596; employers and labourers are organizing; trusts, world concerns, are international; cartels exercise restraint on competition, but may become a menace to healthy market relations; collective bargaining between employers and the employed; this was stimulated by the Christian idea of solidarity in opposition to Marxism; but there was some misconception of an entire branch
of industry being a ‘natural community’, and ‘organical part of the national whole’, which error was an after effect of the universalist-Romantic view of human society current in the Christian historical trend of thought during the times of the 19th century Restauration, 597; a public legal organization of industrial life is not a ‘natural community’; it has no public legal competence on its own account; the Romantic view cannot be interpreted in terms of the principle of sphere-sovereignty, a misconception on the part of the Protestant League of Trade Unions in the Netherlands; medieval political autonomy as a subjective right of the guilds only suited an undifferentiated society; public legal authority can never be derived from the inner nature of a private organization of industrial life; the Dutch Public Industrial Organization Act of 1950, 598; the organs of such an organization have delegated autonomy; the State combines a horizontal public legal integration with a compulsory vertical organization of national production processes; the State can only bind the industrial (and agricultural) relationships as far as they are enkapically interwoven with the State’s structure; the political integration displays international tendencies; since the second world war individual States are more interdependent than formerly, 599; international political relations are increasingly being integrated; the second article of the Charter of the United Nations; international security and the position of the leading powers; the integrating function of the U.N.O. in the non-
political spheres; the Uno is not an all-inclusive society, but a voluntary organization of individual States; it is qualified by an international public legal function and founded in an historical international organization of power; but it is not an institution; nor has it any monopolistic organization of armed force or a territory, 600; it is not endowed with real governmental authority over the separate States; it is not a civitas maxima; its inner nature is determined by the juridical principle of international public interest; its integrating function displays a promoting and supporting character, not a compulsory trait of State regulation; modern society shows continuous tension between differentiation and integration processes, between individual and organizational bonds; individualism and universalism; more than a third part of mankind is delivered to totalitarian power, 601; Western democracy tries to integrate its military forces; communism is a secularized eschatological faith; dialectical Western humanism has been swayed between universalism and individualism; its ideas of freedom and authority have been undermined by Historicist relativism, 602; the doctrine of unassailable human rights cannot check the absolutization of temporal communal relationships; the Biblical view excludes individualism as much as universalism; such a voluntary association as a club touches man's temporal existence only superficially; occupational organizations (trade unions, e.g.), are very important, and animated, at least partly, by a spirit of community and solidarity; the typical foundation of a restricted club is an historical form of organized social power, 603; its leading function is that of social intercourse within a closed communal circle; the club's authority is vested in the board and the general assembly; the exclusion of a member from any personal social intercourse deprives him of his internal societal rights; the requirements for membership and the grounds of expulsion have a typical internal juridical character; the ballot in connection with the social position of an applicant, for admission; this internal social law has its reverse side in civil legal inter-individual relations, 604; a political party shows an enkaptic interlacement with the State guaranteed by its primary aim of influencing the State's policy; also in the party's genetic and existential societal forms; undifferentiated unions are no political parties; SOROKIN's view criticized, 605; a party is not a faction; there are factions in a Church, in a school, in a trade union, etc. OSTROGORSKI's definition mentions as a party aim 'the attainment of a political goal', but 'political' remains an undefined general concept in its ignoring the typical trait in a party's structure; this structure is bound to that of the State as a res publica; the rise of parties manifests the interest and the sense of responsibility of the founders and members with respect to State affairs, 606; JAMES BRYCE argues the indispensibility of parties in a free country; parties awaken the public spirit in the people; their discipline is a remedy against political egoism and corruption; - the debate between parties promotes mutual correction and the finding of a common basis for practical cooperation; Kelsen attributes this situation to a universal axiological relativism inherent in democracy; he says that autocracy is founded in the belief in an absolute verity; why this view is wrong, 607; Kelsen's appeal to the principle of proportionality is unwarranted by his relativistic view of democracy; without belief in an absolute supra-theoretical Truth and supra-arbitrary norms the political struggle would be meaningless, 608; the factual grouping of the population into political parties may or may not coincide with the differentiation into 'religious groups'; opposite parties may have the same religious basis, and the same party may embrace Christians and atheists; but the radical antithesis between the Biblical and the apostate
religious motive is decisive; the dualistic motive of nature and grace may blur the line of division; it is not always necessary to form separate Christian parties; a political party has an historical foundation; its unity is dependent on the power of a political conviction concerning the policy of the State, 609; it does not rely on military power; a military organization is not a political party; the possibility of an anarchistic political party, 610; a farmer party, a labour party, a middle class party are only variability types which are enkaptic interweavings between a political party and occupationally differentiated interests; the meanings of the adjective ‘political’, 611; the party bond is never of a theoretical political character; because the party takes sides in practical politics; the Anti-Corn-Law-League of 1838 was not a political party but an organization ad hoc for the realization of certain transitory political aim; so was the Eastern Question Association of 1878; a genuine party requires some total view of the State and its policy to guarantee the party’s relative stability; inner divergences regarding practical politics, between conservative and progressive opinions, etc., cannot affect the inner unity so long a compromise remains possible, 612; opposing parties may make a mutual, inter-communal compromise ad hoc, so long as the latter does not concern fundamental principles; the leading function is not that of faith; i.e., political faith; political organization is not really pisteutically qualified; a common politi-
classical belief is not the leading function, 613; political divergence is possible between members of the same Church; the party's qualifying function is the moral aspect; the typical moral bond of a political conviction is indispensable, 614; SOROKIN overestimates legal rules; the moral bond of political conviction is a non-original, retrocipatory individuality type of the moral aspect; referring to the nuclear type of formative power in a typical politico-structural sense; the party community implies an historical vocation; the moral political bond produces a mind of politic-ethical solidarity; a totalitarian party discipline contradicts the moral guiding function, 615; organizational stratification should not muzzle independent thought and creative criticism; overstrained party discipline changes the individual member into a negligible quantity; and the leaders are mediocrities and hypocrites, says SOROKIN; this seems to be an unwarranted assertion, 616; very big parties are apt to affect the integrity of the moral bond by the formation of a dictatorial elite; the Russian Communist party has acquired a monopoly, grants its members certain privileges and advantages, but exercises an extremely rigorous party control over its members, 617; exclusively personal interests cannot explain the loyalty of American citizens to their parties; notwithstanding the 'spoil' system; pressure groups and deceitful slogans and promises endanger the party's moral bond; a party is a voluntary association and therefore not a part of the State, 618; the prohibition of a party has a dubious effect; there may come underground activity; in elections and the formation of a new cabinet political parties have a typical enkaptic function within the constitutional sphere of the State; the parliamentary system of government is insolubly bound to the parties; this side of party life does not belong to the inner sphere sovereignty of a party; for its public legal functions are derived from the State and depend on the public function of the electorate; historically the parties arose from local election committees; these were their genetic forms; a monopolistic party in a totalitarian State is an extremely close enkaptic interlacement similar to that of a Church-State, 619; the monopolistic party is the chief organ of the totalitarian State, and it rules the whole machinery of the body politic; but in its inner sphere it remains a closed community qualified by a moral bond of common political conviction, which conviction it cannot impose on all the citizens of the State; the term 'ecclesiastical parties' is confusing; since it has various meanings; the task of the Church with respect to politics, 620; why a political party cannot be bound to a Church confession; the Catholic national party is closely bound to the Roman Catholic Church, 621; the Anti-revolutionary Party is independent of ecclesiastical authority; a party's political belief is conditioned by the life- and world-view of its members which is rooted in a basic motive, 622; the appeal to a common belief deepens and strengthens the moral bond, checking an overstrained party disciplin; in Anglo-Saxon countries there is little interest in the deeper fundamentals of party principles; public opinion there is partly Christian and partly Humanistic, but generally anti-totalitarian; BRYCE observes that the party system of the U.S.A. has contributed to the unification and homogeneity of the population; but there is no real political education of the members; parties are oligarchically ruled and require blind obedience to their discipline; the French Revolution and Marxism have stimulated Europeans to reflect on the spiritual fundamentals of party formation; the antithesis between liberalism and conservatism in the English dual party system is too superficial now that Western society is faced with the threat of totalitarian ideologies, 623; the secularization of political
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SUBSTANCE, II, a metaphysical concept; founded in the absolutization of the Gegenstand relation; excluded from the naïve subj.-obj.-relation; ARISTOTLE’s ‘soul’ concept, 11; subst. is not the ‘genus proximum’ of its ‘accidents’, 14; STOKER’s substance concept, 32; substance and accidents, 58; matter in classical physics is the substance of occurrence; NATORP on this, 95 (note); the metaphysical concept of substance caused great confusion in the discussion of life phenomena, 109; DRIESCH conceives phenomena of life as a substance with entelechy, 110; epistemol. criticism inferred that the substance is cognizable or not, 430; Subst. and accidentia in ARISTOTLE; was adopted by KANT in a modified form, 445; the substance is independent of human experience in pre-Kantian metaphysics, 467; substance or ousia in ARISTOTLE; thought is related to substance; Ding an sich is a substance in KANT, 496, 506.

SUBSTANCE, III, the origin of the metaphysical concept; ousia; the search for true being, 4; in Neo-Scholasticism, substance is the human personality in its concrete unity and identity, 5; BOETHIUS’ definition; that of THOMAS AQUINAS; AUGUST BRUNNER, 6; the term ‘substance’ first appeared in Quintilianus Inst., 7; primary substance in ARISTOTLE; eidos; secondary substance, 9; this primary substance is foreign to naïve experience; ousia is the primary category of being; its accidentalia; thing in itself; its sensibility is purely epistemological; its accidents are independent of possible perception; qualitates occultae; difference between substance as ‘thing in itself’ and the naïve thing experience; substance is the first temporal Gegenstand of theoretical logical thought; ousia synthetos or composite substance, 10; THOMAS AQUINAS holds the substance to be unknowable; the whole and its components; substance in
ARISTOTLE, is antinomous, 12; forms is the cause of matter, is ousia, 13-15; MARLET's interpretation of substance, 16; matter is the principium individuationis, also in THOMAS; materia quantitate signata; the subst. concept is a fundamental depreciation of individuality, 17; thing and substance; function; RUSSELL, 18, 19; the concept ‘energy’ has replaced that of ‘matter’ in modern physics; RUSSELL’s view; he holds the distinction between physical and mental to be unreal, 20; his concept ‘event’; matter and mind are logical structures of relations between events; WHITEHEAD distinguishes events from objects, 21; a thing with aspects is as useless a concept to RUSSELL as a substance, 22; NEWTON’s ‘material units’; substance in modern biology, 23; the modern mathematical concept of function serves to obliterate the idea of the modal and the plastic horizons of experience; ARISTOTLE’s ousia was meant to account for individuality structures, 26; DESCARTES’ conception of substance; Humanistic soul substance before KANT; metaphysical concept criticized by HUME, who influenced RUSSELL; HUME’s relations of resemblance and contiguity between impressions; KANT’s category of substance, 27; RITTER on thing and substance, 28; substance in STOKER’s view, 68; ALBERS; MARLET, 72; BAVINK; KANT, 100; individuality structures are not substances, 108; FR. OPPENHEIMER calls human society a secondary ‘immortal substance’, 167; KJELLEN applies the substance concept to the State, 197; the State is founded in the substantial form of human nature, in ARISTOTLE, 201; the generic relation of ruler and subject joins a plurality to the unity of a community of men whose material bodies are ruled by a soul as substantial form; the relation between ruler and subject is called taxis, it is a kind of law, in ARISTOTLE, 208; the State is not a natural substance; the taxis is the constitution, 209; taxis has to explain the unity of a composite substance, 211; ARISTOTLE considers an organized community as an analogy of a natural substance, 212; in THOMAS the theory of the organic character of human society acquires its foundation in the ‘substantial form’ of human nature, 218; the authoritative structure of an organized community has its metaphysical foundation in ARISTOTLE’s substantial form, 223, 230, 239, 244; LITT rejects this metaphysical hypostatization of the human ego into a substance, 250; a substance can only possess one single substantial form, in THOMAS, 707; substance precludes insight into enkapsis, 710; substance in DRIESCH, 736-741.

SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, I, attacked by OCCAM, 184; in THOMISM, based on a lex aeterna, 202.

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SUBSTRATUM AND SUPERSTRATUM SPHERES, II, the earlier modal spheres are the foundation of all the later modal aspects in an irreversible coherence of meaning, 51.

SUFFRAGE, ORGANIC, III, and medieval Craft guilds, 466, 467.

SUPER-MAN, I, in NIETSCHE, 211, 466.
SUPER-MAN, III, in KALLIKLES, 398.

SUPER-NATURAL, I, faith in the super natural is given up in the Renaissance, 191.

SUPER-PERSONAL LIFE, III, is the only entelechy, according to DRIESCH, 740.
SUPPLY AND DEMAND, II, an economic law was positivized as a basic norm of the economic determination of prices, 361.

SUPPOSITIONAL LOGIC, I, of PETRUS HISPANUS, 184.

SUPRA-TEMPORAL, THE, I, in the religious sphere of our consciousness we transcend time; the 'pre-functional' can only be experienced in the religious concentration of the radix of our existence upon the absolute Origin; even the idolatrous absolutizations of the temporal cannot be explained from the temporal horizon; eternity is set in the human heart and that is why he directs himself to things eternal; the religious centre is not rigidly static; PARMENIDES' conception of the eternal divine form of being is immobile, like PLATO's world of the eidè and the immortal soul (cf. PHAEDO); this view is antinomic, as PLATO pointed out; PARMENIDES absolutized the modal spatial aspect, 31; the term: 'central trans-cosmic time' is not serviceable, 32, 33; supra-temporal unity of the aspects, 101.

SUPRA-TEMPORAL NORMS, II, according to WINDELBAND the logical, aesthetic and ethical norms have an absolute character, because elevated above time, and therefore not subject to change, 239.

SUPRA-THEORETICAL, I, judgments, 70.

SUSPENSION THEORY, III, and entelechy, 745.


SWANTON, R.J., III, refuted the constructive evolutionist theory of the rise of the human family, 331; the matriarchy and promiscuity theory is untenable as regards North-America, 332; he is a follower of BOAS, 333.

SWEDENBORG, I, was humorously criticized by KANT; he was a 'visionary', 334.

SWORDS, THE TWO, III, of the Corpus Christianum, in the Middle Ages; a Scho-

SYMBIOSIS, III, Parasitical symbiosis; an example of a natural and an unnatural kind of interlacement, 93; animal types of symbiosis are not normatively qualified societal relationships, 172; symbiosis is interwoven with correlative enkapsis between a living being and its environment, 648; ALTHUSIUS’ theory of human symbiosis, and sphere-sovereignty, 662, 663.

SYMBOLICAL ANTICIPATIONS, II, in history, 284.

SYMBOLIC ASPECT, III, of the structure of the State; ‘material integrating factors’, according to SMEND; verbal languages within its territory, 487; Belgian Revolution, 488.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC, II, why useful; restricted II, in logicism, 339.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC, II, why useful, restricted to the logical form of propositions, etc., 59, 452-455; [cf. s.v. WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL, HUSSERL:] is not purely analytical, 452; on the whole and its parts, 451 ff.

SYMBOLIC SUBSTRATUM, II, of the beauty of nature, 139.

SYMBOLISM, II, juridical relations are only possible when signified; the smashing of a window pane, the getting into a public means of conveyance, have a juridical signification as a delict, and as the indirect expression of the intention to make an agreement of conveyance respectively. These significations are founded in language, 137; cultural symbolism, 285.

SYMBOLS, I, in positivism formulas and concepts are mere symbols in natural science, 213; in LEIBNIZ, 240; are representative and make knowledge possible, 273.

SYMBOLS, II, incomplete symbol, MALAN, 84; objective sensory phenomena are symbols of physical states of affairs, 100; the numerical symbol -I-, 173, 174; sensory symbols in primitive law, 183; historical memorial symbols, 223; cultural and lingual symbols, 285; symbols in art, 348; conventional, unconventional, explicit, implicit, abstract symbols, 381; social symbols, 382; symbols of reality are the universalia post rem in THOMISM, 387.

SYMBOLS, III, objective sensory phenomena (e.g. colours) are symbols of the pre-sensory aspect of energy (i.e. physics), 37; symbolic anticipations in sensory impressions evoke a name, 38; OCCAM’s division of signs, 45, 46; from a natural-scientific viewpoint, objective sensory phenomena are only symbols referring to imperceptible physical relations, 46; naïve experience is not destitute of names for things but implied the symbolically signifying aspect as well, 51; a tree has a symbolical object-function because it can be named, 57; in the genetic process of human life the cultural function precedes the lingual modus, 78; books, scores, etc., are symbolically qualified, they signify the aesthetic structure of a work of art in an objective way and cannot actualize it, 110, 111; literary works of art show a typical cultural foundation and formation of lingual means of expression which is modally different from the formative moment inherent in symbolic signification as such, 123; the relation between intuitive and symbolic knowledge; the routine view of modern daily life must not be
confused with actual naïve experience; this fact implies a loss in intensity with respect to naïve experience; but it does not affect our experience of things essentially familiar to us, 144, 145; the relation between the internal structural principle and the modal foundational system in the subject-object relation of symbolically qualified things, e.g., a book, 150-153; as means of social mediation, 243, 250-253, 272; realize reciprocity of perspectives, 250; in a ‘closed sphere’ a symbol becomes objective, transpersonal, constant, enabling the sphere to expand, 252.

SYMPATHY, II, according to BERGSON intuition is an immediate subjective psychical ‘empathy’ penetrating with ‘intellectual sympathy’ into the ‘durée’, i.e. he creative qualitative vital stream of time, 481.

SYNODS, III, German Synods and congregational representation in the 19th century; ‘Synodal Konsistorial System’ in the modern Lutheran Church, 548.

SYNOLON, II, in ARISTOTLE: the substantial form of a natural being, as such, lacks individuality and must be combined with matter into a synolon (tòde ti), 419.

SYMPHONOPHORA, III, and animal colonies, 649.

SYNTHESIS, I, requires self-reflection, 51; attempts to accomplish a synthesis of antithetic motives, 65; between natural necessity and freedom accepted in Kantian epistemology - rejected in his ethics, 90; of pagan and Christian motives began to lose ground in the Renaissance, 189; KANT did not really solve the problem of the epistemological synthesis, 423; between Kantianism and Existentialism and Christian doctrine, in EMIL BRUNNER, 520.

SYNTHESIS, II, a-priori synthesis, in KANT, 13; analytical and inter-modal synthesis, 434; synthesis precedes analysis in KANT, 443; synthesis is the combination of a plurality and transcendental logical unity; the pre-requisite of analysis; logical synthesis and the imagination (in KANT), 497;
logical synth. and intermodal synth. are not distinguished by KANT, 498; synthesis speciosa and synthesis intellectualis, 514; the primary meaning-synthesis between ‘pure’ sensibility and ‘pure’ thought; they are modi of the transcendental imagination which is essentially time and selfhood, 528; intermodal synthesis and selfhood, 559.

SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHY, III, on the State, 402-406.

SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS, I, in KANT, and analytic judgments, 73. SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS, II, in KANT; MAIMON denies that they are a priori applicable to sensory experience, 449; they play a constitutive rôle with respect to objective experience, 568.

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TABOO, II, is the negative counterpart of mana, 317.

TAINE, HYPPOLITE, II, on the spirit of classicism, 345.

TALION, II, is a primitive principle implying juridical economy, 67.

TAO, II, is the identification of retributive justice (in the order of nature) and inescapable necessity, found, a.o., in the old Chinese idea of TAO, 133.

TARWAD, III, the tarwad house and tarwad property; and polyandry, 341.

TASK OF THE STATE, III, and the structure of the body politic, are confounded by JELLINEK, 432.

TASTE, I, is the basic faculty for ethics and aesthetics, in SHAFTESBURY, 463.

TAXIS, III, is an ordering principle concerning the distribution of authority and benefits, 208; ARISTOTLE's concept is a general metaphysical idea, applied in his discussion of body and soul, 209, 211; its sociological sense is an analogy, 212; accepted by THOMAS AQUINAS, 219.

TAXON, III, in biology, 80, 81.

TECHNÈ, II, is not purely objective; its norms; its communal character; progress and reaction; authorities, 258; is only a formative factor if discovery or invention is generally accepted in society, 259.

TECHNICAL ECONOMY, II, the intermodal coherence between economy and technique is only developed at a higher stage of culture, 67.
TECHNIQUE, II, technical economy, 67; technical authorities, industry; tools, norms, 258; inventions, 259; technicizing of economic life, 361; technique, its excessive power, 362.

TECHNIQUE, MODERN, III, and the correlation between differentiation and integration, 593.

TELEOLOGY, I, ‘the formal teleology of nature’; dictates the law of specification, in KANT, 389.
TELEOLOGY, II, is opposed to causality in STAMMLER, 16, 17.
TELEOLOGY, III, versus destination, 60; teleological world-plan in DIogenes of Apolonia; he applies ANAXAGORAS’ idea to the interpretation of particular natural phenomena, 633.

TENDERNESS, III, in the family tone, 285; family feeling is opened by the moral function into tenderness, 293.

TERMINISM, II, Occam ascribed an exclusively intentional existence to the universalia as symbolical signs (i.e. termini) by which only empirical things are signified; he is inclined to identify the intentional concept with the actus intelligendi, 388.

TERMITES, II, the remarkable works built by beavers and termites in social cooperation do not have a cultural character, 198.

TERRITORIAL SYSTEM, III, of Lutheran church government, ousted the Episcopal system, and was inspired by the wish to guarantee tolerance to the Pietists, 517.


TETENS, II, faculty psychology, 111.

THEISM, I, of DESCARTES and Leibniz, 122.

THEODICY, I, of Leibniz, 252, 259, 260, 261.

THEOLOGIA NATURALIS, I, in Occam, 67; in Thomas Aquinas, 180.

THEOLOGY, I, in ARISTOTLE, 72; and philosophy, in AUGUSTINUS, 178; the queen of sciences, 510.
THEOLOGY, II, is a theory based on the synthesis of the logical function of thought and the temporal function of faith, 562.
THEOLOGY, III, a philosophical difference cannot be reduced to a theological difference; Marlet and Robbers try to do so, 73.

THEORIA, I, in Greek thought claims autonomy with respect to popular faith; versus pistis, in Parmenides, 35; in Greek thought was dominated by the form-matter motive since ARISTOTLE, 36; enables man to attain the union of human thought with the Divine pure Form, 72.

THEORETICAL ACTIVITY, I, is hypostatized as an immortal ousia or substance, 44.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS, I, in theor. analysis reality appears to split up into various modal aspects, 3.

THEORETICAL ANTINOMIES, I, their source, 45, 46; in KANT; mathematical and dynamical antinomies, 368.

THEORETICAL ATTITUDE, I, of thought, 35.

THEORETICAL CONCEPT, I, what it defines, 30.

THEORETICAL INTUITION, II, plays no part in KANT’s functionalistic critique of knowledge, 501.

THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE, I, is only ‘image’ in FICHTE, 457.

THEORETICAL REASON, I, is not an unproblematic datum, 40; it was KANT’s basis of theoretical synthesis, 49.

THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS, I, its starting point in immanence phil., 45, 46.

THEORETICAL THOUGHT, I, reality appears to split up into various modal aspects in theor. thought, 3; this thought is impossible without conceptual determination, 5; concept formation rests upon a sharp distinction among the aspects and a synthesis of the logical with the non-logical aspects; the process of theor. thought is anti-thetical; the non-logical aspects are made into a Gegenstand, 18; in the philosophical-theoretical attitude we approximate time - and temporal reality - only in an analytical setting asunder of its modal aspects, which nevertheless continue to express their coherence in their intrinsic structure, 34; the first transcendental problem of theoretical thought, 38; the anti-thetical attitude of such thought: Gegenstand is that which resists our analytical function and is opposed to it; the theoretical antithesis can only present itself within the temporal total structure of the act of thinking; the anti-thetical structure is intentional, not ontical; in logical analysis the aspect which is opposed to the logical function is distinguished theoretically from the remaining aspects, 39; x opposite to y, and both to the logical function; the resistant, i.e. the Gegenstand, continues to express its coherence with the other non-logical aspects that have not been chosen as the field of enquiry, 40; the first transcendental problem as to the theoretical attitude is the ‘Gegenstand relation’, (cf. sub voce); what do we abstract from empirical reality and how is such abstraction possible; confrontation with the naive attitude; (cf. sub voce), 41; dogmatic theory of knowledge considered the theoretical attitude as an unproblematic datum, eradicated the difference between theoretical and naïve attitudes and identified the subject-object relation with the antithetic Gegenstand relation, 43; to this fact it is to be ascribed that philosophical and theological anthropology had a dichotomistic conception of human nature as a composition of a material body and an immortal rational soul; PLATO and ARISTOTLE (cf. sub voce) hypothesized the theoretical activity of thought in its logical aspect as an immortal ousia or substance; THOMAS AQUINAS held that the entire rational soul, characterized as it was by the theoretical activity of thought, must be an immortal and purely spiritual substance; this conclusion was directed by the dualistic form-matter motive, 44; the antithetical attitude offers resolute resistance against
every attempt to reduce one of the aspects to another; it avenges absolutizations by involving theoretical thought in internal antinomies; theoretical synthesis is a union, but not a deeper unity of the logical and non-logical; it pre-supposes a supra-theoretical starting-point; absolutization points to such a starting-point, 46; theoretical distinction of the non-logical aspects presupposes an insight into their mutual relationships and coherence, i.e., a basic denominator for comparing them; they cannot be distinguished unless they have something in common; this denominator is the cosmic time-order; on the immanence standpoint another denominator is sought, e.g., by absolutizing one of the aspects; in Greek metaphysics by accepting the metaphysical concept of being as a so-called ‘analogueous unity’; the theoretical vision of reality is the vision of the abstracted modal aspects in the totality of their coherence, 47; the theoretical vision in pure mathematics; different schools: logicism, symbolistic formalism, empiricism, intuitionism; ‘isms’ in logic; in ethics, aesthetics, and theology, 48; KANT started from theoretical reason as the basis of every theoretical synthesis, 49; the central problem of theoretical thought is concerned with the relation between the thinking ego and its theoretical-logical function; the antithetic structure of theoretical thought obliged KANT to oppose the logical function to the other aspects of thinking, but he identified the act with a purely psychical temporal event which could become a Gegenstand of the transcendental logical ‘cogito’; the real act can never be a ‘Gegenstand’ of its logical function, 50; as long as theoretical thought is directed to its ‘Gegenstand’ only, it remains dispersed in a theoretical diversity; it must acquire the concentric direction to an ultimate unity of consciousness lying at the root of all modal diversity, i.e., to the thinking ego; human I-ness is a central and radical unity, as such transcending all temporal aspects; the way of critical self-reflection only can lead to the discovery of the true starting-point of theoretical thought, 51; the concentric
direction of theoretical thought cannot have a theoretical origin; it springs from
the ego as the individual centre of human existence, 54; the selfhood can only
give this central direction to its theoretical thought by concentrating upon the
absolute Origin of all meaning; self-knowledge depends on the knowledge of
God; both exceed the limits of theoretical thought and are rooted in the ‘heart’,
i.e., the religious centre of our existence; this central supra-theoretical
knowledge penetrates the temporal sphere of our consciousness, 55; the
alleged vicious circle in our transcendental criticism; we have only proved that
the concentric direction of thought in self-reflection cannot originate from the
theoretical attitude of thought itself; it can only issue from the ego as a
supra-theoretic individual centre of human existence; only the contents of the
supra-theoretical pre-suppositions can be questionable, but not their necessity,
56; the thesis that the starting-point of theoretical thought is only to be found in
the central religious sphere of consciousness is no longer to be proved
theoretically, because this insight belongs to self-knowledge and transcends
the theoretical attitude; without such knowledge the true character of the chosen
starting-point remains hidden from us, 57; the concentric direction in theoretical
thought must be of religious origin, although it is always bound to the anti-theitical
Gegenstand-relation; critical selfreflection in the concentric direction of
theoretical thought to the ego necessarily appeals to self-knowledge; here lies
the point of contact between philosophic thought and religion; the
supra-individual character of the starting-point; the selfhood has an intrinsically
ex-sistent character; so the starting-point of philos. thinking is not in the
individual ego alone; the I-ness shares in the Archimedean point in which the
whole cosmos centres, 59; philosophy can be cultivated only in a community;
the starting-point is supra-individual; our I-ness is rooted in the spiritual
community of mankind, first in Adam, in whom the whole of the human race
has fallen, then in Jesus Christ, in Whom the new humanity is rooted as the
members of one body; our I-ness lives in the -We- directed to the divine -Thou-, 60; (cf. sub voce ‘Gegenstand’); the I-ness penetrates with scientific thought
deeper into its Gegenstand and reveals its own deficiency in comparison with
naive experience, 84; theoretical thought should not dominate a life and world
view, says LITT, 155; theoretical thought was believed to be impartial and
infallible, in the Enlightenment, 170.

THEORETICAL THOUGHT, II, is religiously determined, and not selfsufficient, 41;
is bound within the limits of the temporal coherence of meaning, 41; speculation
rejected by ST PAUL in Romans 9, 42; cannot be emancipated from the cosmic
temporal order, 47.

THEORETICAL TRUTH, I, identified with theoretical correctness in LITT, 139.


THEORY OF LAW, PURE, II, is antinomous in H. KELSEN, 17; is a logification of
the jural aspect, 46.

THIEME, HANS, III,
Naturliches Privatrecht und Spät. scholastik, 314.

THING, II, corporeal and incorporeal things in Roman Law, 394.
THINGHOOD, I, is only due to impressions separated in time but united by associational relations, in HUME, 293. THINGHOOD, III, is theoretically explained away as a category of relation; or as a metaphysical concept of substance; a fictitious union of associated impressions; a constant system of functional relations; thinghood is experienced in the naïve attitude in its integral individuality structure, 28; HUSSERL’s misinterpretation of the thing structure; naïve experience of a linden tree; focussing our theoretical attention on it, implies theoretical abstraction, for the tree is not experienced as a separate independent entity; the ‘simple’ only occurs in the full complexity of a universal interlacement of structures, 54; the different subject and object functions of the tree do not together constitute it as a thing; not even its modal individuality in the aspects; the functional coherence seemingly absorbs the tree’s individual functions, 55; a tree’s last subject function, 56; its object functions; its logical object function cannot be eliminated, 57, 58; the internal modal typical opening process and the modal anticipations, the structural coherence; our implicit inarticulate awareness of this structure, 59; a thing’s integral unity; the leading, qualifying function indicates the intrinsic destination of a thing in the temporal world-order; no teleology or entelechy; external teleological relations lie outside a thing’s internal integral actual unity although they play an essential part in our naïve experience; we do not confound the inner nature of a tree with the needs of other beings which it may satisfy because of the subject-object relations of naïve experience, ARISTOTLE’s entelechy of a living thing, 60; but the structure of individuality of a living thing is incompatible with ARISTOTLE’s conception of the ‘inner telos of a natural ousia’; metabolism in a living organism does not eradicate the boundaries between its modal functions; sphere-sovereignty, 61; there is not a hidden entelechy or vital force which can explain metabolism in its physical chemical
structure; there is no encroachment of vital energy on this physical chemical
structure; STOKER's concept of substance; individuality structures belong to
another dimension of our experience than the modal structures, 62; modal
irreducibility is founded in the same temporal order as the plastic horizon of
human experience; the seeming contradiction between modal sphere
sovereignty and the internal unity of a thing is only due to the
Gegenstand-relation; the theoretical époche of cosmic continuity; every modality
of an individual whole has a bottom-layer in the continuous inter-modal
coherecence of cosmic time; the internal thing-causality is not parallelism nor
modal interaction of functions, 63; the problem of body and soul arose from the
absolutization of the Gegenstand relation; STOKER's objections; time is not
an external cause in the structures of individuality; but the various functions
are intrinsically temporal; the continuity of cosmic time is intermodal but not
empty, 64; reality has its intermodal bottom-layer in the continuity of cosmic
time; the individual identity of a thing receives its determination from its internal
structural principle and is intuitively experienced in the naïve attitude; the
transcendental idea of the individual whole is the cosmological a priori of the
theoretical analysis of its modal functions; we are unable to isolate the cosmic
temporal bottom layer of a thing structure, nor can we theoretically isolate our
intuitive faculty, 65; the possibility of the internal unfolding process in a tree is
an unsolvable problem; to grasp a thing's temporal unity within the functional
diversity of our cosmos, we must appeal to the naïve experience of time;
philosophy cannot replace naïve experience, 66; the individuality structure of
a tree embraces all the modal aspects in subject-object relations of naïve
experience; it individualizes the modal functions and groups them together in
a typical way within the cadre of an individual whole, 76; this individuality horizon
is the ground of a thing's temporal unity in the diversity of its functions; modern
vitalistic holism rejected; the structural unity of a thing has a law- and a
subject-side; its modal functions can only become its internal structural functions
insofar as they express the structural unity as an individual whole, 77; see
further sub voce: Individuality-structure.

THOMAS AQUINAS, I,
De Instantibus, 26.
THOMAS AQUINAS, I, time as the numerical measure of motion can have real
existence only in the soul, although it has a fundamentum in re in the motion
of matter, 26; following his teacher ALBERTUS MAGNUS, THOMAS AQUINAS sought
to adapt to Christian doctrine the speculative Aristotelian philosophy in
interrelation with neo-Platonic, Augustinian and other motives forming the
common property of Christian thought in the patristic period: the lex aeterna
with the lex naturalis, Christian and pagan ideas were seemingly made to
converge, 173; compare sub voce Christian Philosophy, pp. 179-181; the lex
naturalis, immanent to natural substances, relates to a transcendent lex aeterna
(the plan of creation in the Divine Mind); this lex aeterna is Divine reason; the
obligating force of the lex naturalis is derived from the will of the Creator;
providence is the teleological natural order and hierarchy of substantial forms;
the Divine Origin of this order is the first cause and final goal of the whole
temporal movement in nature from matter to form, 182; in the sphere of
supra-natural grace the Divine Origin is conceived in the light of Revelation,
the lex naturalis has its complement in the lex charitatis et gratiae, 183; he
accepted ARISTOTLE's axiological view of theory and practice, 538.
THOMAS AQUINAS, II,
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 21, 566, 567;
Summa Theologiae, 21, 85, 386, 419;
Expositio in Metaphysica, 21;
In Sent. II, dis. III, q. 2., a. 2., 386, 419;
Quaestionones sup. Metaph., 389.
THOMAS AQUINAS, II, on 'being'; metaphysical unity, etc. as grounds of being,
21; on object and subject; esse intentionale et esse subjective, 367; principium
individuationis; formae separatae, 419; and the human soul, 419.
THOMAS AQUINAS, III,
Summa Theologiae, 6, 12, 321, 707, 714;
De ente et essentia, 12, 16;
Summa c. gent., 12, 221;
De Regimine principum, 219, 221;
Comm. Aristot. Politica, 219, 221;
cf. 323.
THOMAS AQUINAS, III, accepted BOETHIUS' definition of personality, 6; held
substance to be unknowable, 12; form is the cause of the being of matter;
matter is the principle of individuality, 16; but then 'substance' is not possibly:
individuality structure; THOMAS accepts ARISTOTLE's principium individuationis;
and also the creative Ideas in the Divine Logos of Augustinian Scholastics; the
result was insoluble antinomies in the view of the soul's immortality; dialectical
dualism in the explanation of the Aristotelian Thomistic categories, 17; he
accommodated ARISTOTLE's theory of organized communities to the Christian
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the members of an undifferentiated organized community consider one another as genuine blood relatives though there is no real kinship among them; there is a natural communal mind; yet their societal relationship has only an historical foundation and is morally qualified; such societies perform structural functions that at a higher stage of cultural development belong to more than one organized community of different structures; they are 'supra-functional', but not 'all-inclusive'; they are interlacements of social structures, and their difference from differentiated communities is not merely modal, but it is structural, and above all typical structural; a differentiated organized community may adopt typical structural functions of other societal relationships; e.g. a state owned public school, or industry, an established Church, etc. These are pheno-types; their foundational and leading functions are genotypically differentiated, and undifferentiated communities combine the most heterogeneous structures in one and the same organization; these structures are interlaced in an intracommunal sense, not in an intercommunal way; they are founded in some power-formation, closely bound to biotic conditions; the patriarchal 'joint family', the sib, etc. The predominance of a political structure in secret men's societies; problems concerning these communities, and also: Kulturkreislehre; the joint family displays a more complicated structure than the kinship; the patriarch's authority; the right of primogeniture; authority is connected with economic factors, 350; the aul among the Kirghiz has an indivisible common property belonging to from six to ten families jointly; yet the aul is not economically qualified, 351; it implies a political structure with armed power in the case of the Kirghiz 'aul'; but the whole of it is permeated by the family mind; FUSTEL DE COULANGE describes the ancestor worship of an Undiffer. Organ. Comm. among the
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