The conceptual foundations of decision-making in a democracy

[p. 245]

Volume II
Justifications, Addenda and Capita Selecta

J&A to Part One:
The Democratic Society and Its Norms

Philosophers on Norms and Morals.

In Part One, norms in general, I wrote: ‘There is general agreement in philosophy that we cannot ground “ought” in “is”, that we cannot find any totally objective basis for evaluating a norm and justifying its enforcement, that any such attempt must end in infinite regress.’ To my surprise, some philosophers objected to that statement.

As clearly stated, it is the evaluation and justification of a norm which is qualified as subjective, not its existence. The fact that philosophers so often fail to make this distinction is a justification for writing this book.

Obviously, our written laws and possibly unwritten but accepted morals, have an empirical existence. As Jonathan Harrison contends (Edwards and Pap, p 309), they may ‘be necessitated by other facts about the nature of man and the society he lives in’, a view which is compatible with the functional nature of abstract concepts presented in the parts about information and truth.

A.C. Ewing wrote (Edwards and Pap, p.320): ‘No argument is available which could prove the subjectivity or fallacy of all ethics without establishing a similar conclusion about all other branches of study except mathematics and formal logic...’. I do not talk about fallacy, for - as shown when dealing with justice, in the paragraph about subjectivity (p. 133) - it is unwarranted to associate subjectivity with fallacy (or with random, not well considered). But I agree with the rest of his statement and do not even exclude mathematics and formal logic from that ‘indictment’. It is the notion that norms and morals have an existence outside human individuals who understand and hold them which I reject. That notion may be suggested by the commonality of some basic norms. But such commonality can be totally explained as a result of their effectiveness in ensuring the coexistence and cooperation which is the basis of human existence. The difference lies in the justification for accepting a proposition in terms of true. An ‘is’ proposition can be evaluated in terms of truth at two levels of objectivity: factual or conventional. With an ‘ought’ proposition couched in terms of ‘good’, ‘desirable’, ‘necessary’ etc. truth and objectivity only apply in connection with the presumed consequences of accepting or rejecting the proposition.

[p. 246]

Depending on the personal predilection of its author, there are two opposite positions arguing against the subjectivity of the evaluation of norms. Both are erroneous. At one end of the spectrum are those who deny the possibility to discuss ethics and moral norms in other terms than taste or, like Ayer reject ethical concepts as being ‘pseudo-concepts and therefore unanalysable’. The arguments he puts forward to support that contention also lead him to state that ‘there cannot be such a thing as ethical science, if by ethical science one means the elaboration of a “true” system of morals.’ (Note that a ‘true system of morals’ would be scientific ethics, not ethical science.) As we have shown in the section about science, we can never design any system, scientific or otherwise, which we can be sure to be true. The distinctive feature of science is not the truth of its statements, but its objective to come as close as possible to truth, and the method used to achieve it. This objective itself, however, is neither more nor less amenable to analysis than ‘fundamental moral concepts’. As the scientific method requires norms, namely those from which it derives its procedures, these norms either must also be pseudo-concepts if we follow Ayer's line of reasoning, or - as I propose - be functional and grounded in the purpose we have in mind when designing procedures for establishing the ‘truth-value’ of scientific systems. Similarly, moral concepts can be analysed if evaluated in the light of a common objective, which for instance could be the pursuit of coexistence and cooperation amongst human beings. In the light of what we know today about life and information, it is the rejection of the functional character of concepts (moral and otherwise) which is subjective and a fallacy.

At the other end are those who want to impose their set of morals on others by appeal to an authority above the human individual: religious leaders and secular moralists. They appeal to ‘the law of nature’, to ‘evidence’, to ‘common sense’, to Bible or Koran, all designed to put their view of morals beyond the individual's appreciation and authority. If they feel obliged to justify their rejection of subjectivity, they argue that such subjectivity means that one moral must be as good as any other, which inevitably leads to moral positivism, relativism or nihilism. These arguments have been refuted in my book.

Their most ubiquitous argument is that rejecting an objective - in the sense of subject-independent - basis for morals leads to unacceptable consequences. For instance Brand Blanshard's refutation of subjectivism (Edwards and Pap, p 343) rests upon just one argument: that subjectivism per force leads to moral positivism, while nobody acts as if he really believes that. I mention his argument because of the illustration he uses. Blanshard notes that Russell's own social engagement is the best counter-example of his subjectivism (see below). I am constantly surprised by the inability of many reputed philosophers to see the implications of their arguments. If Russell believes that what he considers good (to desire the happiness of mankind) is his subjective choice, then why should the decision to pursue this choice at the expense of his own direct interests be in contradiction to this subjectivity? Why - as often argued by moralists - has that choice less merit than if it followed from obeying the dictates of some moral authority? The only explanation can be the desire of the author to put the authority of his choice above that of human beings or his lack of confidence in the morality of his fellow man. Whether justified or not, in a democracy this lack of confidence does not justify the imposition of one's own morals on others. (Why Russell's pursuit of the good is not in contradiction with the rational-choice theory I intend to explain in an article, to be published on my web-site).

[p. 247]

Russell (Edwards and Pap, p 300) holds that the only rationally defensible view is that any preference for a norm must be subjective; he concludes that such a preference then is a matter of taste. As stated, he did not like his own conclusion and ends with the remark: ‘Whatever our definition of the “Good”, and whether we believe it to be subjective or objective, those who do not desire the happiness of mankind will not endeavour to further it, while those who desire it will do what they can to bring it about...’ (Edwards and Pap, p. 302).

I concur with Russell's last remark, but not with his decision to forego the search for a minimum agreement on what is the ‘Good’. The view of man presented in this book may induce hope that those who desire to further the ‘Good’ might form a majority. But the lack of an adequate aggregation and coordination process, coupled with historical prejudices and mythologies, practically guarantees that those of good will work at cross-purposes and pull in different directions. As long as they fail to agree on a common objective and an adequate organisation of social decision-making, their desire can be perverted and abused by individuals and groups who will exploit it for their own purposes.

Philosophers seem caught in a paradox, they see no passage between the Charybdis of moral totalitarianism and the Scylla of positivism or nihilism. As usual, that paradox finds its origin in an imprecise use of language, in this case about functionality and subjectivity, leading to unwarranted connotations and generally accepted but equally unwarranted tenets of philosophy. In chapters 2a.7, p. 44 (functionality) and 4a.3, p. 133 (subjectivity) those errors have been redressed.

If we see man as a social being and accept the functional character of norms, then holding these norms to be subjective does not mean that they are irrational or random. There is an ultimate judge of norms: the success of societies applying them, a success in which its members have a stake. If people have the shared, if subjective, purpose of achieving coexistence and cooperation under the constraint of subjective equality, if morals have an indispensable function in attaining that objective, then there is no paradox. The passage between Charybdis and Scylla becomes clear if not easy.

The inescapable conclusion is that we cannot - by relegating it to God, nature or ‘reality’ or by retreating into moral nihilism, - shirk the task of establishing, justifying, propagating and applying those norms, The job must be done, and the conclusion of the first volume is that philosophers and social scientist have a role to play. One of those who contested my assertion of the subjectivity of the evaluation of norms works at the same university and faculty as prof. Maris, the author of the book I quoted to support that assertion. That illustrates the extent to which philosophers are ignorant of this responsibility, especially its ‘integration’ part.