A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy

(1969)–H. Dooyeweerd– rechtenstatus

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H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy (vert. William S. Young en David H. Freeman). The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, z.p. 1969 (2de druk)

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Dit bestand biedt, behoudens een aantal hierna te noemen ingrepen, een diplomatische weergave van de tweede druk van A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy. van H. Dooyeweerd, in een vertaling van William S. Young en David H. Freeman uit 1969. De eerste druk van deze vertaling dateert uit 1953. Het oorspronkelijke werk verscheen in 1935-1936 onder de titel De wijsbegeerte der wetsidee.

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p. 278: voetnoot ‘1’ heeft in de lopende tekst geen nootverwijzing. In deze digitale editie is de noot onderaan de pagina geplaatst.

p. 401: voetnoot ‘1’ heeft in de lopende tekst geen nootverwijzing. In deze digitale editie is de noot onderaan de pagina geplaatst.

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[pagina I]

A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT

[pagina III]

A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT

HERMAN DOOYEWEERD Dr jur.

Professor of Philosophy of Law, Free University of Amsterdam Fellow of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences

TRANSLATED BY

DAVID H. FREEMAN

Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Wilson College

AND

WILLIAM S. YOUNG

Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Butler University

VOLUME I

THE NECESSARY PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED PUBLISHING COMPANY

1969

[pagina IV]

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUE CARD NUMBER A 54 - 7310

Original title:

DE WIJSBEGEERTE DER WETSIDEE

Printed in the United States of America

[pagina XV]

CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD (ABREVIATED) TO THE FIRST (DUTCH) EDITION	v
FOREWORD TO THE SECOND (ENGLISH) EDITION	x
TRANSLATORS' PREFACE	xii
CONTENTS	xv

PART I - PROLEGOMENA

INTRODUCTION - THE FIRST WAY OF A TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT		3
	Meaning as the mode of being of all that is created	4
	The direction of philosophical thought to the totality of meaning implies critical self-reflection	5
	The supposed reduction of the selfhood to an immanent, subjective pole of thought	6
	The transcendence of our selfhood above theoretical thought. The so-called transcendental subject of thought cannot be self-sufficient as a theoretical abstraction	7
	How does philosophical thought attain to the Idea of the totality of meaning?	7
	The Archimedean point of philosophy and the tendency of philosophical thought towards the Origin	8
	The opposition between so-called critical and genetic method is terminologically confusing, because it is not clearly defined in its sense	9
	The restlessness of meaning in the tendency of philosophic thought towards the origin	11
	The three requirements which the Archimedean point must satisfy	12
	The immanence-standpoint in philosophy	12
	The immanence-standpoint does not in itself exclude the so-called metaphysical way to that which transcends human thought	13

[pagina XVI]

		Page
	We employ the term immanence-philosophy in the widest possible sense	13
	The inner problematic situation of the immanence-standpoint	15
	Why totality of meaning cannot be found in the coherence of the modal aspects	15
	The Archimedean point as concentration-point for philosophic thought	16
	Does the so-called transcendental subject of thought satisfy the requirements for the Archimedean point?	16
	The theoretical synthesis supposes the modal diversity of meaning of the logical and the non-logical which is its opposite	18
	The pitfall in the conception of the so-called transcendental subject of thought as Archimedean point: cosmic diversity of meaning and diversity in the special logical meaning	19
	Misunderstanding of the intermodal synthesis of meaning as a transcendental-logical one	19
	The necessary religious transcending in the choice of the immanence-standpoint	20

CHAPTER I - THE TRANSCENDENTAL CRITICISM OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT AND THE CENTRAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA FOR PHILOSOPHY		22
§ 1 -	The problem of time	22
	Rickert's conception of the self-limitation of thought	23
	The immanence of all modal aspects of meaning in time	24
	The influence of the dialectical ground-motives upon the philosophical conception of time	25
	The integral character of cosmic time. The correlation of temporal order and duration, and the subject-object relation in the latter	28
	All structures of temporal reality are structures of cosmic time	29
	The transcendental Idea and the modal concepts of time. The logical aspect of temporal order and duration	30
	No static conception of the supra-temporal. Is the acceptance of a central trans-cosmic time desirable?	32
	The eschatological aspect of cosmic time in faith	33
	Naïve and theoretical experience of time	33

§ 2 -	The transcendental criticism of theoretical thought and the dogma concerning the autonomy of the latter. The second way to a transcendental criticism of philosophy	34
	The dogmatic positing of the autonomy of theoretical thought	35

[pagina XVII]

		Page
	The different views of the autonomy of theoretical thought and the origin of this difference	35
	The dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical thought as an impediment to philosophical discussion among the various schools	36
	The necessity of a transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought as such. The difference in principle between transcendent and transcendental criticism	37

§ 3 -	The first transcendental basic problem of theoretical thought. The ‘gegenstand-relation’ versus the subject-object-relation	38
	The antithetical structure of the theoretical attitude of thought in its purely intentional character and the origin of the theoretical problem	39
	A closer confrontation of the naïve attitude with the theoretical	41
	The subject-object-relation in naïve experience	42
	The consequences of ignoring the first transcendental basic problem in the traditional conception as to the relation of body and soul in human nature	44

§ 4 -	The second transcendental basic problem: the starting-point of theoretical synthesis	45
	The impasse of the immanence-standpoint and the source of the theoretical antinomies	45
	The various -isms in the theoretical vision of reality	46
	The problem of the basic denominator for the theoretical comparison and distinction of the modal aspects	47
	The rôle of the -isms in pure mathematics and in logic	47
	Provisional delimitation of the moral aspect	48
	The starting-point of theoretical synthesis in the Kantian critique of knowledge	49
	The problem of the starting-point and the way of critical self-reflection in theoretical thought	51

§ 5 -	The third transcendental basic problem of the critique of theoretical thought and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception	52
	The alleged vicious circle in our transcendental criticism	56
	What is religion?	57
	The impossibility of a phenomenology of religion. The ex-sistent character of the ego as the religious centre of existence	57
	The supra-individual character of the starting-point	59
	The meaning of the central command of love	60

[pagina XVIII]

		Page
	The spirit of community and the religious basic motive	61
	The Greek form-matter-motive and the modern Humanistic motive of nature and freedom	61
	Sin as privatio and as dynamis. No dialectical relation between creation and fall	63
	The dialectical character of the apostate ground-motives. Religious and theoretic dialectic	64
	The uncritical character of the attempts to bridge the religious antithesis in a dialectical starting-point by a theoretical dialectic	64
	The religious dialectic in the scholastic motive of nature and grace	65
	The ascription of the primacy to one of the antithetic components of the dialectical ground-motive	66
	The meaning of each of the antithetic components of a dialectic ground-motive is dependent upon that of the other	68

§ 6 -	The transcendental ground-idea of philosophy	68
	The three transcendental Ideas of theoretical thought, through the medium of which the religious basic motive controls this thought	68
	The triunity of the transcendental ground-Idea	69
	The transcendental critique of theoretical thought and the dogmatic exclusivism of the philosophical schools	70
	The metaphysical-analogical concept of totality and the transcendental Idea of the totality of meaning. Transcendental critique of the metaphysical conception of the analogia entis	71
	The so-called logical formalizing of the concept of totality and the philosophical Idea of totality	73
	The principle of the Origin and the continuity-principle in Cohen's philosophy	74
	Being and Validity and the critical preliminary question as to the meaning of these concepts	76
	Levelling of the modal diversity of meaning in the generic concept rests upon an uncritical misjudgment of the special meaning in the logical aspect	77
	The masking of the transcendental ground-Idea by the so-called dialectical logic. Theodor Litt	77
	Modal diversity and radical identity of meaning. Logical identity has only model meaning. Parmenides	79

§ 7 -	The transcendental ground-idea as hypothesis of philosophy	82

[pagina XIX]

		Page
	The theoretical character of the transcendental ground-Idea and its relation to naïve experience	82
	The datum of naïve experience as a philosophical problem	83
	The naïve concept of the thing and the special scientific concept of function	83
	Philosophy, special science, and naïve experience	84
	‘Reflexive’ thought versus ‘objective’ thought in recent philosophy. The confusion of ‘object’ and ‘Gegenstand’ in this opposition	86
	The transcendental ground-Idea as hypothesis of philosophy	86
	The relation of transcendent and transcendental points of views and the original meaning of the transcendental motive	88
	Kant's opinion concerning the transcendental Ideas. Why did Kant fail to conceive of these Ideas as ὑπόϑεσις of his critiques	89
	It was Fichte who tried to remove the difficulties involved in the Kantian dualistic conception	90
	The decline of the transcendental motive in the Marburg methodological logicism, in Litt's conception of reflexive thought, and in Husserl's ‘egology’	91
	The basic Idea of philosophy remains a subjective ὑπόϑεσις The criterion of truth and relativism	91
	The transcendental limits of philosophy and the criterion of speculative metaphysics	92
	Calvin's verdict against this metaphysics	93

§ 8 -	The transcendental ground-idea of philosophy as cosmonomic idea (wetsidee)	93
	The Origin of this terminology	93
	Objections against the term ‘cosmonomic Idea’ and the grounds for maintaining it	94
	Misunderstanding of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea as meaning-idealism	96
	Cosmonomic Idea, modal concept of laws and modal concept of subject and object	97
	The dependence of the modal concepts of law, subject and object upon the cosmonomic Idea	98

§ 9 -	The symbol of the refraction of light. The cosmic order of time and the cosmological principle of sovereignty in its proper orbit. The modal aspects of reality as modal law-spheres	99
	The lex as boundary between the ‘Being’ of God and the ‘meaning’ of the creation	99

[pagina XX]

		Page
	The logical function of thought in apostasy	100
	The re-formation of the cosmonomic Idea by the central motive of the Christian religion	101
	The modal law-spheres and their sphere-sovereignty	102
	Christian religion does not allow of any absolutizing with respect to its fulness of meaning	104
	Sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects in their inter-modal coherence of meaning as a philosophical basic problem	104
	Potentiality and actuality in cosmic time	105
	Cosmic time and the refraction of meaning. Why can the totality of meaning disclose itself in time only in refraction and coherence of modalities?	105
	The logical function is not relative in a logical but in a cosmic sense	106
	The elimination of cosmic time-order in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason	107

§ 10 -	The importance of our cosmonomic idea in respect to the modal concepts of laws and their subjects	108
	Modal concepts of the lex and its subject. The subject as subject to laws	108
	The disturbance of the meaning of the concepts of the modal laws and their subjects in the Humanistic immanence-philosophy	108
	Rationalism as absolutizing of the general rule, irrationalism as absolutizing of individual subjectivity	110
	The concept of the subject in the irrationalistic phenomenology and philosophy of existence	111
	The concept of the lex and the subject in ancient Greek thought and its dependence on the Greek form-matter-motive	112

CHAPTER II - PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE- AND WORLD-VIEW		114
§ 1 -	The antithetic position of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea in respect to the immanence-philosophy and the postulate of the historical continuity in philosophical thought contained in the idea of the ‘philosophia perennis’	114
	The basis of cooperation between Christian thought and the different trends of immanence-philosophy	114
	A popular argument against the possibility of Christian science and philosophy	115
	Partial truths are not self-sufficient. Every partial truth is dependent upon truth in its totality of meaning	116

[pagina XXI]

		Page
	The undeniable states of affairs in the structure of temporal reality	116
	The idea of the perennial philosophy	117
	How is the idea of the ‘philosophia perennis’ to be understood? Philosophic thought and historical development	118
	What is permanent, and what is subjected to the historical development of thought. The scholastic standpoint of accommodation forever condemned	119
	The conception of the antithesis of standpoints in the immanence-philosophy as ‘Weltanschauungslehre’ (theory of life- and world-views)	120
	The consequence of our transcendental critique for the history of philosophy	122
	The only possible ultimate antithesis in philosophy	123

§ 2 -	The distinction between philosophy and life- and world-view and the criterion	124
	The boundaries between philosophy and a life- and world-view as seen from the immanence-standpoint. Disagreement as to the criterion	124
	Life- and world-view as an ‘individual impression of life’, Theodor Litt and Georg Simmel	126
	The relationship as seen from the Christian transcendence-standpoint	127

§ 3 -	The neutrality-postulate and the ‘theory of life and world-views’	128
	Rickert's defence of the neutrality-postulate	129
	Criticism of the fundamentals of the ‘Weltanschauungslehre’	134
	Immanent antinomy in Rickert's philosophy of values	135
	The test of the transcendental ground-Idea	136
	The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea does not judge about matters over which no judgment belongs to man, but leads to fundamental self-criticism of the thinker	137

§ 4 -	Sequel: The pretended self-guarantee of theoretical truth	138
	Litt's argument concerning the self-guarantee of theoretical truth	138
	Critique of Litt's conception	141
	The first pitfall in Litt's demonstration: the unconditional character of the ‘transcendental cogito’	142
	The second pitfall: the opposition of transcendental thought and full reality	143

[pagina XXII]

		Page
	The ‘self-refutation of scepticism’ reduced to its true proportion	144
	The test of the transcendental ground-Idea	147

§ 5 -	The transcendental ground-idea and the meaning of truth	148
	The impossibility of an authentic religiously neutral theory of the life- and world-views. The concept of truth is never purely theoretical with respect to its meaning	148
	Immanence-philosophy recognizes no norm of truth above its transcendental ground-Idea	150
	The distinction between theoretical and a-theoretical judgments. The inner contradiction of a restriction of the validity of truth to the former	151
	Theoretical and non-theoretical judgments. The latter are never a-logical, but merely non-‘gegenständlich’	153
	Litt's distinction between theoretical and ‘weltanschauliche’ truth and the self-refutation of this distinction in the sense in which Litt intends it	154
	The inner contradiction of this dualism. The meaninglessness of judgments, which are alleged not to be subjected to the norm of truth	154

§ 6 -	Closer determination of the relation between philosophy and a life- and world-view	156
	The life- and world-view is no system and cannot be made a system without affecting its essence	157
	What is the meaning of the concept ‘universal-validity’? The Kantian conception is determined by the critical Humanist immanence-standpoint	158
	The possibility of universally valid judgments depends on the universal supra-subjective validity of the structural laws of human experience	160
	The universal validity of a correct judgment of perception	161
	The criterion of universal validity of a judgment concerning supra-theoretical states of affairs and the unconditional validity of the religious law of concentration of human experience	162
	The so-called ‘transcendental consciousness’ as hypostatization of theoretical human thought in its general apostasy from the fulness of meaning of truth	163
	Impurity of the opposition ‘universal-validity’ and individuality as a contradictory one	164
	Neither life- and world-view, nor philosophy is to be understood individualistically	164

[pagina XXIII]

PART II - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASIC ANTINOMY IN THE COSMONOMIC IDEA OF HUMANISTIC IMMANENCE-PHILOSOPHY

		Page
CHAPTER I - THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE HUMANISTIC TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA AND THE INTRINSIC POLARITY BETWEEN THE CLASSICAL SCIENCE-IDEAL AND THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY		169

§ 1 -	Introduction. Humanistic philosophy and the humanistic view of life and the world	169
	The undermining of the personal sense of responsibility in the religious commitment	170
	The synthetic standpoint of Thomistic philosophy and the disruption of this synthesis by the nominalism of late scholasticism	172
	The Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy and medieval culture	173
	The integral and radical character of the religious ground-motive of creation, the fall and redemption in the Biblical sense	173
	Sin and the dialectical conception of guilt in Greek and Humanistic philosophy	175
	Once again the inner reformation of philosophic thought	176
	The speculative logos-theory	177
	Philosophy as ancilla theologiae in Augustinian scholasticism	177
	The scholastic character of Augustine's cosmonomic Idea	178
	The entrance of the dialectical ground-motive of nature and grace in Christian scholasticism	179
	Creation as a natural truth in Thomas' theologia naturalis	180
	The elimination of the integral and radical meaning of the Biblical motive of creation in Thomas' metaphysics	180
	The elimination of the radical meaning of fall and redemption. The neo-Platonic Augustinian trend in Thomas' natural theology	181
	The Aristotelian cosmonomic Idea	181
	The content of the Thomistic cosmonomic Idea	182
	The intrinsic dialectic of the scholastic basic motive of nature and grace and the nominalism of the fourteenth century	183
	The ‘primacy of the will’ in the nominalistic school of thought versus the ‘primacy of the intellect’ in the realistic metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. There is no essential connection between realism and the primacy of the intellect	185

[pagina XXIV]

		Page
	The primacy of the will in the cosmonomic Idea of Augustine	185
	The potestas Dei absoluta in Duns Scotus and William of Occam	186
	The nominalistic conception of the potestas Dei absoluta entirely contrary to its own intention places God's Creative Will under the boundary-line of the lex	187
	The nominalistic critique effectuated a radical disruption between the Christian and pagan motives in medieval scholasticism	187
	Secularization of nominalism in late scholasticism	188

§ 2 -	The rise of humanistic philosophical thought	188
	The collapse of the ecclesiastically unified culture	189
	A closer consideration of the religious ground-motive of Humanism: the motive of nature and freedom	190
	The ambiguity of the Humanistic motive of freedom	190
	The new ideal of personality of the Renaissance	191
	The motive of the domination of nature and the ambiguity of the nature-motive	192
	The πέϱας and the ἄπειϱον. The antithesis with the ancient ideal of life	194
	The Cartesian ‘Cogito’ in contra-distinction to the theoretical nous as the Archimedian point of Greek metaphysics	195
	There is no relationship between Descartes' and Augustine's Archimedean point. The misconception of the Jansenists of Port Royal on this issue	196
	The connection between Descartes' methodological scepticism and the discovery of analytical geometry. The creation-motive in the Cartesian ‘cogito’	197
	The polar tension between the ideal of personality and the ideal of science in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental Idea	198
	The tendency towards infinity in Giordiano Bruno's pantheism	199

§ 3 -	The postulate of continuity in the humanistic science-ideal and the basic antinomy in the humanistic cosmonomic idea	200
	The concept of substance in the new Humanistic metaphysics is quite different from the Aristotelian-Thomistic or Platonic one	201
	The lex continui in Leibniz and the Marburg school of Neo-Kantians	204
	The fundamental antinomy in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea	204

[pagina XXV]

		Page
	The supposed solution of this antinomy in transcendental thought	205
	The tendency of continuity in the freedom-motive of the ideal of personality	206

§ 4 -	A diorama of the dialectical development of humanistic philosophy after Kant. The process of religious uprooting and the actuality of our transcendental critique	207
	The origination of a new historical science-ideal out of an irrationalistic and universalistic turn in the freedom-motive	207
	The polar tension between the historistic ideal of science and the idealistic dialectic of Hegel's freedom-idealism	208
	The rise of positivistic sociology and the transformation of the historical method of thought into a natural scientific one	209
	The transformation of historicism into naturalistic evolutionism	210
	The first expression of the spiritual disintegrating process in Historicism. Nietzsche's religion of power	210
	The rôle of neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism in the crisis of historicism	212
	The classic ideal of science and the development of 20th century physics. The neo-positivism of the Vienna school	212
	Husserl's eidetic logic and phenomenology	213
	The attitude of decline in Spengler's philosophy of history and in Humanistic existentialism	214
	The actuality of our transcendental critique of theoretical thought	215

CHAPTER II - THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCE-IDEAL IN THE FIRST TYPES OF THEIR MUTUAL POLAR TENSION UNDER THE PRIMACY OF THE FORMER		216

§ 1 -	The naturalistic-monistic and the dualistic type of transcendental ground-idea under the primacy of the science-ideal. Its connection with the pessimistic and semi-pessimistic view of life	216
	The conflict between Descartes and Hobbes as the first expression of the basic antinomy in the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea	216
	Hobbes' pessimism and its connection with his ascription of primacy to the science-ideal. Virtue and necessity in Macchiavelli	217

[pagina XXVI]

		Page
	The dualism between thought and extension in Descartes	218
	The background of the ideal of personality in this dualism	218
	The metaphysical problem concerning the relation between soul and body acquires a new significance in the light of the transcendental Humanist ground-Idea	219
	The deeper ground of Descartes' partial indeterminism	220
	The antinomy in Hobbes' naturalistic conception of thought in the light of the deterministic ideal of science. The ideae innatae of Descartes	221

§ 2 -	The mathematical-idealistic type of humanist transcendental ground-idea	223
	The supposed Thomistic-Aristotelian traits in Leibniz' philosophy	223
	The secularization of the motive of nature and grace in Leibniz' philosophy	226
	The refinement of the postulate of continuity in the science-ideal by means of Leibniz' mathematical concept of function.
	The discovery of differential and integral calculus	227
	The two roots of Leibniz' philosophy. The misunderstanding in Schmalenbach concerning the Calvinistic origin of Leibniz' individualism	229
	Leibniz' concept of force and the motive of activity in the ideal of personality	230
	Primacy of the mathematical science-ideal in Leibniz' transcendental ground-Idea	232
	Leibniz' Humanistic theism	234
	Logicization of the dynamical tendency in the ideal of personality	234
	Leibniz' intellectual determinism and his doctrine of innate Ideas in the light of the lex continui	236

§ 3 -	The moderate nominalism in Leibniz' conception of ideas. The idea as symbol of relations and as the concept of law of the rationalistic ideal of science	240
	The apparent fight against nominalism in the third book of Leibniz' ‘Nouveaux Essais’	241
	Leibniz' nominalistic standpoint in his treatise concerning the philosophical style of Nizolius (1670)	244
	The notion of the logical alphabet and the symbolical conception of ideas	245

[pagina XXVII]

		Page
§ 4 -	The modal aspects of reality as modi of mathematical thought	247
	Phenomenon and noumenon in Leibniz' metaphysics; ‘verités de raison’ and ‘verités de fait’. Leibniz' mathematical idealism	249
	Spinoza and Leibniz. Wolff's eradication of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths	250

§ 5 -	The basic antinomy in the humanistic transcendental ground-idea in its mathematical-idealistic type and the relation of this type to the optimistic life- and world-view	252
	The Theodicy with its apparent reconciliation of the ideals of science and personality. The optimism of Leibniz	252
	The deceptive formulation of the polar tension between the ideal of science and that of personality in the terminology of the Christian doctrine of faith	253
	The basic antinomy in the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea acquires in Leibniz the mathematical form of the antinomy of the actual infinity	255
	‘Metaphysical evil’ as an eternal necessary truth in creative mathematical thought	256
	Metaphysical evil as the root of physical and moral evil (sin!)	258
	How Leibniz attempted to resolve metaphysical evil into the continuity of infinite mathematical analysis	259
	Leibniz and Bayle	260

CHAPTER III - THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY AND THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE IN THE CRITICAL TRANSITION TO THE PRIMACY OF THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY		262

§ 1 -	The psychological turn in the science-ideal and its transcendental idea of origin	262
	The psychological turn in the ideal of science in empiricism since Locke	262
	The inner antinomy in Locke's psychological dualism	264
	Locke maintains the mathematical science-ideal with its creation-motive, though in a limited sphere	267
	The tendency toward the origin in Locke's opposition to the innate Ideas, and the transcendental Idea of origin in Locke's epistemology	268
	The distinction between the knowledge of facts and the knowledge of the necessary relations between concepts	269

[pagina XXVIII]

		Page
§ 2 -	The monistic psychological type of the humanistic transcendental ground-idea under the primacy of the science-ideal	271
	The psychologized conception of the science-ideal in Hume. Once again the nominalistic trait in the ideal of science	272
	Hume and Pyrrhonic scepticism. Sextus Empiricus	275
	Sceptical doubt in Hume, as in Descartes, has only methodological significance	275
	The criterion of truth	276
	The natural and philosophical relations. The laws of association	277

§ 3 -	The transition of the creation-motive in the science-ideal to psychological thought. Hume's criticism of mathematics	280
	Contradictory interpretations of Hume's criticism of mathematics	280
	The method of solving this controversy	282
	Hume drew the full consequences of his ‘psychologistic’ nominalism with respect to mathematics	283
	Hume's psychologistic concept of space. Space as a complex of coloured points (minima sensibilia)	284
	Psychologizing of the mathematical concept of equality	285
	The position of arithmetic in Hume's sensationalism	287
	Hume's retrogression into the Lockian conception of mathematics remains completely inexplicable on the sensationalistic basis of his system	288

§ 4 -	The dissolution of the ideals of science and of personality by the psychologistic critique	289
	Hume's criticism of the concept of substance and his interpretation of naïve experience	289
	The creative function of imagination and the way in which the creation-motive of the Humanistic ideal of science is transmitted to psychological thought	292
	Hume destroys the metaphysical foundation of the rationalist ideal of personality	294
	The radical self-dissolution of the ideals of science and of personality in Hume's philosophy	296

§ 5 -	Continuation: The criticism of the principle of causality as a critique of experience	297
	The problem pertaining to the necessary connection of cause and effect is to Hume the problem of the origin of natural laws as such	298

[pagina XXIX]

		Page
	According to Hume, the law of causality is only to be maintained as a psychical law of association. Nevertheless, every legitimate foundation for the ideal of science in a mathematical physical sense is lacking	299
	The way in which Hume's Critique finally undermines the foundations of his own psychological science-ideal	299
	Hume disregards the synthesis of logical and psychical meaning in his psychological basic denominator	300

§ 6 -	The prelude to the shifting of the primacy to the ideal of personality	302
	The extension of the psychologized science-ideal over the modal boundaries of meaning of the aesthetic, juridical, moral and faith-aspects	302
	The cooperation between the associations of ideas and those of passions	304
	The way in which Hume's psychologized ideal of science destroys the conception of freedom of the will in the sense of the mathematical ideal of science	305
	The prelude to the shift of primacy to the ideal of personality	306
	Hume withdraws morality from the science-ideal. Primacy of the moral feeling	307
	Hume's attack upon the rationalistic theory of Humanist natural law and upon its construction of the social contract. Vico and Montesquieu	310

§ 7 -	The crisis in the conflict between the ideal of science and that of personality in Rousseau	313
	Rousseau's religion of sentiment and his estrangement from Hume	316
	Optimism and pessimism in their new relation in Rousseau	317
	Locke and Rousseau. The contrast between innate human rights and inalienable rights of the citizen	318
	The ideal of personality acquires the primacy in Rousseau's construction of the social contract	319
	The antinomy between the natural rights of man and the rights of citizen. Rousseau's attempt to solve it	321
	The origin of this antinomy is again to be found in the tension between the ideal of science and that of personality	323

[pagina XXX]

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CHAPTER IV - THE LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN THE IDEALS OF SCIENCE AND OF PERSONALITY IN KANT. THE (CRITICAL) DUALIST IDEALISTIC TYPE OF TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA UNDER THE PRIMACY OF THE HUMANIST IDEAL OF PERSONALITY		325

§ 1 -	Introduction. The misconception of Kant's transcendental idealism as the philosophic expression of the spirit of reformation	325
	Kroner's view of the relation of Kant's transcendental idealism to the Christian religion	325
	Is Kant the philosopher of the Reformation? Przywara	326
	The Idea of freedom as both the religious totality and origin of meaning: Höningswald	328

§ 2 -	The development of the conflict between the ideal of personality and that of science in the first phase of Kant's thought up until his inaugural oration of 1770	330
	The motives of the preceding Humanistic philosophy. The manner in which Kant wrestles with their mutual tension. The influence of Pietism	330
	In his natural scientific conception, Kant remained a faithful adherent of the ideal of science; his reverence for the spirit of the ‘Enlightenment’	331
	The influence of Rousseau and Hume	332
	Kant's first period: Kant as an independent supporter of the metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolff. The primacy of the mathematical science-ideal in the first conception of his transcendental ground-Idea	335
	Kant's second period: the methodological line of demarcation between mathematics and metaphysics. The influence of Newton and English psychologism	336
	The rupture between the metaphysics of the science-ideal and moral philosophy in this period of Kant's thought	338
	Influence of Crusius	339
	Third period: the dominating influence of Hume and Rousseau. Complete emancipation of the ideal of personality from the metaphysics of the science-ideal	340
	The transitional phase in Kant's thought until 1770	341
	The problem of the mathematical antinomies. Leibniz' and Newton's conception of space and time	343

§ 3 -	The further development of this conflict and the origination of the real critical philosophy	344

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	The separation of understanding and sensibility in Kant's inaugural address of 1770	344
	The development of Kant's new conception of the ideal of personality. Earlier optimism is replaced by a radical pessimism with respect to the sensory nature of man	346
	The new conception of the ideal of personality as ὑπόϑεσις in the transition to the critical standpoint	351
	The ‘Dialectic of Pure Reason’ as the heart of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason	353

§ 4 -	The antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality in the critique of pure reason	354
	The deepest tendencies of Kant's Copernican revolution in epistemology are brought to light by the ascription of primacy to the ideal of personality resulting in a new form of the Humanistic ground-Idea	355
	The dualistic type of the Kantian transcendental ground-Idea	357
	In Kant's transcendental dualistic ground-Idea the basic antinomy between the ideals of science and of personality assumes a form which was to become the point of departure for all the subsequent attempts made by post-Kantian idealism to conquer this dualism	358
	The expression of this dualism in the antithesis of natural laws and norms	359
	The form-matter schema in Kant's epistemology as an expression of the inner antinomy of his dualistic transcendental ground-Idea	360
	The function of the transcendental Ideas of theoretical reason	362
	Kant's shifting of the Archimedean point of Humanist philosophy is clearly evident from his critique of metaphysical psychology, in which self-consciousness had identified itself with mathematical thought	365
	Kant's criticism of ‘rational cosmology’ (natural metaphysics) in the light of the transcendental trend of the cosmological Ideas	367
	The intervention of the ideal of personality in Kant's solution of the so-called dynamical antinomies and the insoluble antinomy in Kant's dualistic transcendental ground-Idea	369
	Within the cadre of Kant's transcendental ground-Idea the natural ‘Ding an sich’ can no longer be maintained. The depreciation of the theoretical Idea of God	372

§ 5 -	The development of the basic antinomy in the ‘critique of practical reason’	372
	Autos and nomos in Kant's Idea of autonomy	373

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	The dualistic division between the ideal of science and the ideal of personality delivers the latter into the hands of a logical formalism	374
	The precise definition of the principle of autonomy through the Idea of personality as ‘end in itself’	376
	In the application of Kant's categorical imperative to concrete actions, the dualism between ‘nature’ (ideal of science) and ‘freedom’ (ideal of personality) becomes an antinomy	378
	Kant's characterization of Leibniz' conception of free personality as ‘automaton spirituale’	380
	Kroner's conception of the origin of the antinomy in Kant's doctrine of ‘pure will’ as ‘causa noumenon’	381
	The antinomy between nature and freedom in Kant's concept of the highest good	381
	Kant formulates the antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality as it is implied in the concept of the highest good as the ‘antinomy of practical reason’	383
	In Kant's Idea of God the ideal of personality dominates the ideal of science	384

§ 6 -	The development of the basic antinomy in the critique of judgment	385
	The attempt to resolve the dualism between the ideal of science and that of personality in the Critique of Judgment. The problem of individuality	385
	Kant's rationalistic conception of individuality	387
	The idea of teleology in nature	388
	The law of specification as the regulative principle of the transcendental faculty of judgment for the contemplation of nature	389
	The reason why the ‘Critique of Judgment’ cannot resolve the basic discord in Kant's Archimedean point	390
	The same antinomy which intrinsically destroys the Idea of the ‘homo noumenon’ recurs in the principle of teleological judgment	393
	The fictitious character of the teleological view of nature follows directly from Kant's transcendental ground-Idea	395
	The origin of the antinomy of the faculty of teleological judgment in the light of Kant's cosmonomic Idea	396
	The basic antinomy between the ideals of science and personality in Kant is everywhere crystallized in the form-matter schema. A synopsis of the development of this antinomy in the three Critiques	400

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	Kant's dualistic transcendental ground-Idea lacks an unequivocal Archimedean point and an unequivocal Idea of the totality of meaning	402

CHAPTER V - THE TENSION BETWEEN THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE AND THAT OF PERSONALITY IN THE INDENTITY-PHILOSOPHY OF POST-KANTIAN FREEDOM-IDEALISM		403

§ 1 -	The transitional period between critical idealism and monistic freedom-idealism. From Maimon to Fichte	403
	Maimon's attempt at a solution of the antinomy in Kant's form-matter scheme by means of Leibniz' principle of continuity	404
	Maimon's falling away from the veritable transcendental motive. How the transcendental Idea loses for him its direction toward Kant's ideal of personality	405
	Maimon's mathematical Criticism and the Marburg school among the Neo-Kantians	406
	The problem as to the relation between the universal and the particular in knowledge within the domain of Kant's apriori forms of consciousness. Maimon's cosmonomic Idea	408
	In the explanation of his ‘principle of determinability’ Maimon starts from three fundamentally different ways in which thought can combine a manifold of ‘objects of consciousness’ into a logical unity	409
	The break between form and sensory matter of knowledge. Maimon's later critical scepticism with respect to Kant's concept of experience	410
	Within the limits of the critical standpoint, the mathematical science-ideal appears unable to overcome Kant's dualism between sensibility and reason	412

§ 2 -	The continuity-postulate in the new conception of the ideal of personality and the genesis of the dialectical philosophy in Fichte's first ‘theoretische wissenschaftslehre’ (1794)	413
	The ground-motive of Fichte's first ‘Wissenschaftslehre’. The creative moment in the personality-ideal	413
	The Archimedean point in Fichte's transcendental ground-Idea	415
	Fichte's ‘absolute ego’ as origin and totality of all cosmic diversity of meaning is nothing but the hypostatization of the moral function	416
	Fichte's attempt at a transcendental deduction of the Kantian forms of thought from the self-consciousness	418

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	Dialectical thought, dominated by the ideal of personality, usurps the task of the cosmic order	420
	To Fichte the ‘absolute ego’ remains outside the dialectical system. The Idea of the absolute ego as ethical task	422
	Fichte attempts to give an account of the possibility of theoretical knowledge by referring the latter to the selfhood. Why this attempt cannot succeed on Fichte's immanence-standpoint	423
	Transcendental deduction of the Kantian categories of relation from self-consciousness. The science-ideal is here derived from the ideal of personality	424
	The domination of the continuity-postulate of the ideal of personality. The Humanist transcendental ground-Idea in its transcendental monist-moralistic type	426
	Productive imagination is to Fichte the creative origin of sensory matter	426
	Fichte conceives of the productive imagination as an unconscious function of reason	429
	In his concept of the productive imagination, Fichte does not penetrate to pre-theoretical cosmic self-consciousness but remains involved in Kant's functionalistic view of knowledge	431
	Fichte's doctrine of the productive imagination and Heidegger's interpretation of Kant	434

§ 3 -	The tension between the ideals of science and personality in Fichte's ‘praktische wissenschaftslehre’ (1794)	435
	Fichte refers the impulse toward sensory experience to the moral function of personality, in which the ideal of personality is concentrated	436
	The infinite and unlimited ego as moral striving. Elimination also of Kant's practical concept of substance. The ego as infinite creative activity is identified with Kant's categorical imperative	437
	The ‘fatalism’ so keenly opposed by Fichte is nothing but the science-ideal of the ‘Aufklärung’, dominating the ideal of personality	440
	The dialectical line of thought of the practical doctrine of science: feeling, intuition, longing, approbation, absolute impulse (categorical imperative)	442
	The categorical imperative as the absolute impulse that is grounded in itself	446
	Fichte's dithyramb on the ideal of personality: ‘Ueber die Würde des Menschen’ (On the dignity of man)	447

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	The passion for power in Fichte's ideal of personality. The science-ideal converts itself into a titanic ideal of culture	448
	The antinomy between the science-ideal and personality-ideal has actually converted itself in Fichte's first period into an antinomy between Idea and sense within the personality-ideal itself	450

CHAPTER VI - THE VICTORY OF THE IRRATIONALIST OVER THE RATIONALIST CONCEPTION OF THE HUMANISTIC TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA. THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY IN ITS IRRATIONALIST TURN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE		451

§ 1 -	The transition to irrationalism in Fichte's third period under the influence of the movement of the ‘sturm und drang’ (‘storm and stress’)	451
	Fichte's relation to ‘Sturm und Drang’	451
	The irrationalist view of the individuality of genius. The irrationalist turn in the ideal of personality	453
	Tension between the irrationalist conception of freedom and the science-ideal in its Leibnizian form in Herder. The antinomy is sought in ‘life’ itself. The Faust- and the Prometheus-motif	453
	The irrationalist Idea of humanity and the appreciation of individuality in history	454
	Fichte's third period and the influence of Jacobi. Transcendental philosophy in contrast with life-experience. The primacy of life and feeling	455
	Hegel as opposed to the philosophy of life and feeling	457
	Kant's sensory matter of experience is now the ‘true reality’ to Fichte	457
	Recognition of the individual value of the empirical as such. Fichte's estimation of individuality contrasted with that of Kant. Individualizing of the categorical imperative	460
	No radical irrationalism in Fichte's third period	461

§ 2 -	Aesthetic irrationalism in the humanistic ideal of personality. The ideal of the ‘beautiful soul’. Elaboration of the irrationalist freedom-motive in the modern philosophy of life and its polar tension with the science-ideal	462
	Schiller and Kant's ‘Critique of aesthetic Judgment’. Aesthetic idealism. The influence of Shaftesbury	462
	The ideal of ‘the beautiful soul’	463

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	The ‘morality of genius’ in early Romanticism	465
	The tension of the ideals of science and personality in Nietzsche's development. Biologizing of the science-ideal (Darwin)	465
	The relationship of αὐτός and νόμος in the irrationalist ideal of personality. Dialectical character of the philosophy of life. Modern dialectical phenomenology	466
	The types of the irrationalist cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic thought	467

§ 3 -	The genesis of a new concept of science from the humanistic ideal of personality in its irrationalist types. Fichte's fourth period	467
	Orientation of a new science-ideal to the science of history	468
	Fichte in his fourth period and the South-West-German school of Neo-Kantianism	469
	Hegel's supposed ‘rationalism’	470
	‘Intellectual intuition’ in Schelling	471
	Hegel's new dialectical logic and its historical orientation	472
	The problem of the ‘Realität der Geisterwelt’ (reality of the world of spirits)	473
	Trans-personalist turn in the ideal of personality. The new conception of the ‘ordo ordinans’ in Fichte's pantheistic metaphysics	474
	Fichte's basic denominator for the aspects of meaning becomes historical in character. Fichte's philosophy of history	476
	Natural individuality must be annihilated in the historical process by the individuality of the spirit	478
	Individuality and Society	478
	Abandonment of the Critical form-matter schema	479
	Fichte's logic of historical thought	481
	Fichte's new historical concept of time	485
	In the ‘Staatslehre’ of 1813, Fichte anticipates the ‘cultural-historical’ method of the South-West-German school of Neo-Kantianism. The synthesis of nature and freedom in the concept of the ‘free force’	486
	The ‘hidden conformity to law’ of historical development. The irrationalist concept of the law	488
	Irrationalizing of the divine world-plan	489
	The concept of the ‘highly gifted people’ (das geniale Volk)	491
	The inner antinomies in this irrationalist logic of history	492

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Law and individuality	493
The ‘historical nationality’ as ‘true reality’ contrasted with the state as conceptual abstraction	494

PART III - CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSITIVE CONTENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA

CHAPTER I - THE ANTITHETICAL AND SYNTHETICAL STANDPOINTS IN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT		499

§ 1 -	A systematic presentation of the antithesis between the basic structure of the christian and that of the various types of humanistic transcendental ground-idea	499
	Schema of the basic structure and the polar types of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, in confrontation with the Christian ground-Idea	501

§ 2 -	The attempts to synthesize christian faith with immanence-philosophy before and after the reformation	508
	The consequences of the synthetic standpoint for Christian doctrine and for the study of philosophy in patristic and scholastic thought	508
	The cleft between ‘faith’ and ‘thought’ is only a cleft between the Christian faith and immanence-philosophy	509
	The false conception concerning the relationship between Christian revelation and science. Accommodated immanence-philosophy as ancilla theologiae	510
	The consequence of the Reformation for scientific thought	511
	The after-effect of the nominalistic dualism in Luther's spiritualistic distinction between the Law and the Gospel	511
	The scholastic philosophy of Melanchton. Melanchton and Leibniz	513
	Melanchton did not break radically with immanence-philosophy	515
	Why a radical Christian philosophy can only develop in the line of Calvin's religious starting-point	515
	The cosmonomic Idea of Calvin versus the Aristotelian-Thomistic one	518
	Calvin's Idea of the Law versus Brunner's irrationalistic and dualistic standpoint	519
	There is no dualism between ‘gratia communis’ and ‘gratia particularis’	523

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	Abraham Kuyper and his often misunderstood idea of antithesis	523
	Why I reject the term ‘Calvinistic philosophy’	524
	The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea and Blondelism	525
	The significance of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea for a philosophic contact between the different schools	526

CHAPTER II - THE SYSTEMATIC PLAN OF OUR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS AND A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA TO THE SPECIAL SCIENCES		528

§ 1 -	The so-called divisions of systematic philosophy in the light of the transcendental ground-idea	528
	The fundamental significance of the transcendental ground-Idea for all attempts made in Humanistic immanence-philosophy to classify the problems of philosophy	528
	Windelband's opinion concerning the necessity of dividing philosophy into a theoretical and a practical section	531
	The distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy in Greek thought	532
	The sophistic distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy in the light of the Greek motive of form and matter	533
	The axiological turn of this distinction. The primacy of theoretical philosophy versus the primacy of practical philosophy	536
	The primacy of practical knowledge in the naturalistic-nominalistic trends of Greek immanence-philosophy	538
	In Greek immanence-philosophy, the necessity of ascribing primacy to the theoretical or to the practical reason is connected with the dialectical form-matter motive	539
	Why we cannot divide philosophy into a theoretical and a practical	540

§ 2 -	The systematic development of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea in accordance with indissolubly cohering themata	541
	The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea does not recognize any dualistic division of philosophy. The themata develop the same philosophical basic problem in moments which are united in the transcendental ground-Idea, in its relation to the different structures of cosmic time. These moments are inseparably linked together	542

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	The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea does not recognize any other theoretical foundation than the transcendental critique of philosophical thought	543

§ 3 -	A closer examination of the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences	545
	The separation of philosophy and the special sciences from the standpoint of modern Humanism	546
	The intrinsic untenability of a separation between science and philosophy	548
	The impossibility of drawing a line of demarcation between philosophical and scientific thought in mathematics, in order to make this special science autonomous with respect to philosophy	549
	The positivistic-nominalistic conception of the merely technical character of constructive scientific concepts and methods	550
	The positivistic view of reality versus the jural facts	551
	The modal-functional and the typical structures of reality	552
	The absolutization of the concept of function and the illegitimate introduction of a specific structural concept of individuality as a functional one	555
	The dependence of empirical sciences upon the typical structures of individuality. The revolution of physics in the 20th century	556
	The defence of the autonomy of the special sciences from the so-called critical-realist standpoint	559
	Experiments do not disclose a static reality, given independently of logical thought; rather they point to the solution of questions concerning an aspect of reality which, under the direction of theoretical thought, is involved in a process of enrichment and opening of its meaning	561
	The appeal to reality in scientific investigation is never philosophically and religiously neutral. Historicism in science	562
	The conflict between the functionalistic-mechanistic, the neo-vitalistic and holistic trends in modern biology	564

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