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Het geboorte-niveau der Nederlandse rooms-katholieken (1954)

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Genre

non-fictie

Subgenre

non-fictie/sociologie


© zie Auteursrecht en gebruiksvoorwaarden.

Het geboorte-niveau der Nederlandse rooms-katholieken

(1954)–F. van Heek–rechtenstatus Auteursrecht onbekend

Een demografisch-sociologische studie van een geëmancipeerde minderheidsgroep


Vorige Volgende
[pagina 190]
[p. 190]

Summary

With regard to the high fertility of the Dutch Roman Catholics the following problems were especially studied in this work:

(1)How much does the Dutch birth level exceed that in other West European countries comparable with Holland?
(2)To what degree has the fertility of the Dutch Roman Catholics contributed to this difference?
(3)Does the available literature give any insight into the question if from an economic point of view it would be desirable to have a smaller increase in population than demographic experts expect for this country in the future? What sociological aspects would be involved in that case?
(4)What are the factors causing the birth level to be higher for the Dutch Roman Catholics than for non-R.C. groups in this country?
(5)Do the Dutch Roman Catholics take the moral rules laid down by their church, particularly those referring to birth control, differently from their co-religionists abroad?
(6)If so, would it be possible to apply sociological concepts and methods in order to gain more insight in this phenomenon?

 

Our study yielded the following conclusions:

 

The Dutch birth level is highest among all West European countries except Portugal; our death rate is the lowest in the world. Presumably it is the relative fertility of the Dutch Roman Catholics which is greatly responsible for the former phenomenon, if we compare Holland with Protestant countries whose social and economic structures differ but little from ours, but which are characterized by a considerably lower birth level. A clear example is Denmark; to a less, but still high degree also Norway. In a comparison of Holland with other Protestant countries greatly different from our country in social and economic respects, such as England, the fertility of the Dutch R. Catholics remains an important factor, but not a predominant one. In such a demographic comparison probably a combination of other forces is of greater importance, such as the smaller degree of urbanisation and industrialisation in Holland, as well as

[pagina 191]
[p. 191]

the greater integration of the family, while also the religious checks on birth control applied by some Dutch Protestant groups will affect the difference in birth level between Holland and England. These are some of the factors to be studied more closely for an analysis of the causes of the relatively high birth rate in Holland. This problem, however, falls outside the scope of the present work.

From an examination of the relevant literature it appears that there is little certainty as to the question whether the high birth rate and low death rate in Holland caused the Dutch population to increase more rapidly than is desirable for its future prosperity. We may state, however, that the Dutch nation would run fewer economic and sociological risks, especially with regard to full employment and the standard of living, if in the next three decades the population should increase less than is now expected by demographic experts on the ground of the present development. From the fact that the economic and social disadvantages of overseas emigration are generally accepted, it may be concluded that both our government and our nation would appreciate a retardation of the increase in the Dutch population.

We presume that in the present circumstances the economic and sociological standpoints with regard to the most desirable size of the growth of the population in this country do not differ considerably.

The difference in marital fertility between Dutch Roman Catholics and non-R. Catholics is considerable, but it is not caused by the factor of religion only. Other factors of importance are the relatively small degree of urbanisation of the Dutch R. Catholics, their predominance in agrarian occupations in the sandy parts of this country (where the small farm and agrarian expansion have special opportunities) and their under-representation in the marine clay districts. Another point of influence may be their spread over the occupational structure, i.e. their over-representation in occupations with a high birth rate and their under-representation in those with a low fertility. This does not alter the fact, however, that the religious factor plays an important part in accounting for the difference stated. This becomes clear, when we compare the marital fertility of the sandy areas in the Roman Catholic province of North Brabant with the Protestant province of Drenth, which - apart from the religious factor - have almost the same structure socially and economically. This fact is all the more important now that agricultural expansion in these provinces is gradually getting exhausted and the problem of over-population is making itself felt, especially in North Brabant. Taking this into consideration, it is to be expected that with the present continuation

[pagina 192]
[p. 192]

of the great difference in marital fertility between Roman Catholics and non-Roman Catholics the religious factor in these provinces will play an increasingly important part. The marital fertility levels of comparable R. Catholic and Protestant towns also show big differences. As may be inferred from the results of local investigation the effect of this difference on the increase in the total population figure is probably diminished by the fact that Roman Catholics marry at a later age and less frequently. Nevertheless, the figures of fertility and the gross birth rates in the two groups still show considerable differences.

A comparison of the birth levels of Roman Catholic districts of a more or less equal social and economic structure on either side of the Dutch-Belgian and Dutch-German frontiers repeatedly yield higher figures for the Dutch districts, while the Roman Catholic frontier districts across the Dutch frontier hardly ever exceed the Dutch in fertility. It is interesting to note that differences between comparable Protestant Dutch and German frontier districts are lacking or very small. It is also remarkable that the differences just mentioned were sometimes found with regard to Roman Catholic frontier districts abroad having the same percentage of church-going people as the comparable Dutch districts, while in other cases the differences found were so great, that in these Belgian and German districts the Roman Catholics who observe Easter probably do not reach the same degree of fertility as the Dutch Roman Catholics in the comparable Dutch frontier districts.

A comparison of the difference in birth level between Roman Catholics and non-Roman Catholics in Holland on the one hand and in foreign countries on the other hand, would often suggest a greater difference in Holland. It would be desirable, however, to collect more data and make further enquiries.

In Switzerland, where the proportional figures and mutual relations of the religious groups resemble those in the Netherlands, the differences in fertility between Roman Catholics and non-Roman Catholics are exceptionally high. The birth level for Switzerland however, is very low, suggesting that religious heterogenity in itself need not always increase the fertility of all religious groups, as some sociologists assume.

Socio-historical investigations have revealed the following development with regard to the mentality of the group examined. For some centuries past the Roman Catholics in this country have been in a large minority, which within the territory of the Dutch Republic in the 17th and 18th centuries was religiously and economically oppressed. Consequently in those days the Roman Catholics in the

[pagina 193]
[p. 193]

North Low Countries fought a secret battle against Calvinism for the souls of the religiously undecided part of the population of the Republic. In this struggle they developed a certain rigorism in their pastoral activities, which was also influenced by the strictness of the Jansenists. Moreover the Dutch Roman Catholics have more or less unconsciously adopted a manner of applying their specifically Roman Catholic religious standards, which was influenced by Calvinism. The rigorism of their illegal activities and their Calvinistic strictness thus combined and contributed to the special religious élan and fighting spirit which distinguishes the Dutch Roman Catholics from their co-religionists abroad.

Another important factor is their comparatively strong geographic concentration and the few social contacts these centres had with the big towns in Holland. The fighting spirit of the Dutch R. Catholics mentioned above, is even strengthened to-day by a sense of vulnerability bearing relation to the underdeveloped growth of the Roman Catholic élites, the religious secession (quantitatively exceeded, however, by the higher Roman Catholic birth rate), and the heterogeneous character of the group, which circumstances all necessitate permanent vigilance.

On the other hand it is typical of the Dutch Roman Catholics that they combine a high level of aspiration with a relatively favourable time perspective. As to the latter factor it is of importance that the Roman Catholics in Holland are the only religious group with a reasonable chance of once attaining the majority within our nation, whereas the percentage of the members of the Dutch Reformed Church has strongly declined during the last few decades. Many Protestants hold the irrational view that this Roman Catholic majority is bound to come. This idea naturally affects the Roman Catholic time perspective; the fear among the Dutch Protestants of a Roman Catholic predomination may be favourable to the development of the so-called ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’.

Considering the great religious secession also among the Dutch Roman Catholics and the slow but undeniable decline of their birth rate, it is by no means certain, though not impossible in about fifty years time, that this group will attain a religious majority. Their chance of a political majority is, of course, smaller.

The relatively high birth level of the Dutch Roman Catholics as compared with their co-religionists abroad is but one of many indications pointing to their strong fighting spirit and religious élan. This mentality is especially noticeable in the more rigid church organisation of the Dutch Roman Catholics and the absence of mixed denominational trade unions in this country. The relatively

[pagina 194]
[p. 194]

great rigorism of the group studied by us also appears from the stricter observance of the fast in the Netherlands as compared with e.g. Belgium; their strong religious élan is manifested in their overseas missionary activity, surpassing that of Roman Catholics in other countries with overseas territories.

There are indications that the Roman Catholic clergy in Holland are more active in their opposition against the use of anti-conceptional means than they are in other countries. It cannot be proved, however, that the Roman Catholic church in the Netherlands follows a general, purposeful and direct population policy in order to attain a majority, though indirectly it certainly exercises a social control contributing to a relatively high birth level of its followers. Nor is it to be denied that even about 1930 the Dutch Roman Catholic priests praised the formation of very large families as a God pleasing work and even now the idea of ‘justifiable parenthood’ is interpreted by the Roman Catholic clergy in this country in a wider sense than is usual with most non-Roman Catholics in Holland.

The increasing urbanisation and the accelerated industrialisation of this country will bring the formerly isolated Roman Catholic groups more and more into contact with other groups of the population and thus render them subject to influences of environment favourable to birth control in all its forms. This greater friction between various cultural patterns will probably enhance among devout Roman Catholics the feelings of frustration caused by the unchanged Roman Catholic standards with regard to the problem of the use of anti-conceptional means.

Another problem connected with birth control is that of the large Roman Catholic families without adequate domestic help. According to Roman Catholic research workers many of these families are seriously in danger of being disorganised, which may have the effect of creating criminal tendencies.

Roman Catholic research workers, too, expect for the next few decades a gradual levelling of the Roman Catholic and non-Roman Catholic birth levels in this country. Although we do not exclude the possibility of such a levelling, we must point to the fact, that the gradual decrease of the present housing shortage and any prospective improvement of the standard of living, may cause a retardation of the decline in the birth rate, especially among Roman Catholics.

The relatively high birth level of the Dutch Roman Catholics will continue to have important social and economic consequences during the next fifty years at least. This phenomenon will remain one of the most important internal factors affecting the future of the Netherlands.


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